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THE TAIFA OF DENIA AND THE MEDIEVAL MEDITERRANEAN
Travis Bruce, Ph.D.
Western Michigan University, 2010
This dissertation treats the Muslim kingdom of Denia on the Spanish
Mediterranean coast. Through a singular political program, the eleventh-century
rulers of Denia created a maritime kingdom based on the resources and networks of
the Mediterranean. Denia played a unique role as a Mediterranean polity, developing
economic links with Christian Barcelona, Sardinia, Pisa and Genoa that would
connect Muslim and Christian populations over several centuries. The dissertation
demonstrates the importance of economics in the Muslim-Christian relations of the
western Mediterranean using Latin archival documents, Latin and Arabic narrative
sources, and archeological and numismatic evidence. It explores the extent to which
local populations were dependent upon and reacted to the new economic and political
structures of the eleventh century. The role of trade as a cross-cultural phenomenon
and the nature of religious and political legitimacy revealed by this dissertation are as
relevant today as they were in the eleventh century. For both the issues it explores
and its innovative use of sources, the dissertation makes a substantial contribution to
Spanish, Islamic and Mediterranean History.
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INTRODUCTION

Denia, on the eastern coast of the Iberian Peninsula, was one of the principal polities,
or taifas, to emerge after the disintegration of the Cordovan caliphate at the beginning
of the fifth/eleventh century. The taifa rulers, or muliik al-fawii 'if, sought for the
most part to duplicate on a regional scale the model of AndalusT statehood established
under the Umayyads, some seeking even to reestablish the erstwhile caliphate under
their own power.

This model included not only Umayyad courtly culture and

administrative practices, but also a decidedly peninsular or continental orientation.
Denia's rulers, however, consciously pursued a policy of active participation in the
Mediterranean, and their taifa became a bridge between that world and the Iberian
Peninsula. Mujahid al-'AmirT (r. 400/1010-436/1044) and his son, 'An (r. 436/1044468/1076), expanded, built, and exploited maritime networks that placed their taifa in
contact with ports and states across the Mediterranean.
Denia's history sits at the crossroads of two phenomena:

the fall of the

Cordovan caliphate and the renewal of maritime exchange that transformed the
Mediterranean over the course of the fifth/eleventh century.

Both of these

phenomena had their roots in the preceding century; political, social, and economic
factors had weakened the centralized Islamic state in Cordova, while gradual growth
along the Christian and Islamic Mediterranean coasts created opportunities for

2
increased trade and piracy. Denia's rulers certainly did not orchestrate these changes,
but the taifa's specificity lay in Mujahid and 'Alf's ability to recognize and exploit the
opportunities that arose from them.
The taifa of Denia traces its origins to the regime of Ibn AbI 'Amir, better
known as al-Man$ur (r. 369/978-392/1002). The 'Amirid government, though in
many ways the apex of the AndalusI caliphate, ultimately undermined it and led to its
fall by insinuating itself between the legitimate caliphal ruler and the power that he
exercised. 1 As biijib, or chamberlain, al-Man$Gr became the de facto ruler of al
Andalus, usurping the political power of the Umayyad caliph, Hisham II, in the final
years of the fourth/tenth century.

Al-Man$Gr's reforms supplanted traditional

AndalusI tribal power structures, replacing them with elements loyal to his regime.
Militarily, al-Man$ur relied increasingly on Berber tribesmen imported from North
Africa, paid for through direct and indirect land taxes, while caliphal administration
came under the control of 'Amirid servile clients, known as $aqiiliba (s. $iqliibf). 2
The delicate balance between these pro-'Amirid elements and the AndalusI elite was
upset when al-Man$Gr's son, 'Abd al-Rabman, disregarded Islamic political tradition
and his father's prudent precedent and had himself declared heir to the childless
Hisham II in 399/1008.

The civil war that followed, known in AndalusI

historiography as the fitna, saw the fall and disintegration of the Cordovan caliphate,
1

Evariste Levi-Provens;al, HEM, 2: l 96ff; Philippe Senac, Al-Mansur. Le jleau de !'an mil (Paris,
2006). Peter Scales, The Fall of the Caliphate a/Cordoba: Berbers and Andalusis in Conflict (Leiden,
1994), remains the best analysis of the final caliphal years and the beginning of the fitna. See also
David Wasserstein, The Rise and Fall of the Party Kings: Politics and Society in Islamic Spain 10021086 (Oxford, 1985).
2
See below, chapter 8 for a discussion of al-Man�iir's fiscal refom1s and their effects. Chapter 2,
infra, analyzes 'Ami rid administration, the Saqiiliba, and Mujahid's place within that group.
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and the fragmentation of al-Andalus into over thirty regional polities, the taifas. 'Abd
Allah b. Buluqqin of Granada, one of the last taifa rulers, described how the once
unified AndalusI caliphate fell to pieces:
When the 'Amirid dynasty came to an end and the people were left without an
imam, every military commander rose up in his own town and entrenched
himself behind the walls of his own fortress, having first secured his own
position, created his own army, and amassed his own resources. 3
Mujahid al-' AmirI was one of the principal Saqaliba officers on the eve of the
fitna, most likely serving as governor in the Sharq al-Anda/us, or eastern maritime
provinces of al-Andalus. 4 While a series of candidates and factions vied for control
of the crumbling caliphate, Mujahid transforn1ed the territorial authority he had held
under the former regime into a regional polity centered on the Mediterranean port of
Denia, sometime shortly after 400/1010. Mujahid's early intentions are not clear,
and, like many of his peers, he likely considered the situation temporary and was
simply looking to protect his position in the transition between two regimes.
Nevertheless, in 405/1014, Mujahid broke with the Cordovan caliphal model and
declared Denia a caliphate in the name of an Umayyad candidate, 'Abd Allah al
Mu 'aytI. 5 Mujahid's declaration was singular in that it did not attempt to succeed the
Cordovan Umayyad regime, but was intended as the religious and political basis for
the conquest of the principal islands and routes of the Western Mediterranean.
3

'Abd Allah b. BuluqqTn, Kitab a/-tibyan li-l-amfr 'Abd Allah b. BuluqqTn akhir umara' banT zTrT bi
Gharnafa, ed. A.T. TfbT (Rabat, 1995), 58 (English trans. A.T. TfbT, The Tibyan. The Memoirs of 'Abd
Allah b. BuluqqTn, Last Zfrid Ami"r of Granada [Leiden, 1986], 45).
4
See below, chapter 2, for Mujahid's role prior to the fitna. For the Sharq al-Anda/us, see Pierre
Guichard, "Shar� al-Andalus," EI2, 9:35 I a, and the corresponding bibliography.
5
lbn 'ldharT, Bayan al-mughrib, vol. 3, 1-Jistoire de /'Espagne musulmane au Xf"'' siecle. Texte
arabe publie pour la premiere fois d'apres un manuscript de Fes, ed. Evariste Levi-Provenr;:al (Paris,
1930) (hereafter Bayan), 116.

4
Mujahid was establishing a caliphate based on a new territorial paradigm, one of
expansion through maritime conquest.

Within months, Mujahid and his caliph

conquered the Balearic Islands and began preparations to invade the island of
Sardinia the following year. Mujahid's Mediterranean caliphate failed in the face of
Pisan and Genoese resistance, his forces were pushed from Sardinia, and he deposed
al-Mu'aytT shortly thereafter, but he adapted this Mediterranean policy to build a
regional kingdom that extended through the routes and networks he had intended to
conquer outright.6
Denia's principal activity in the early taifa years was piracy, an aggressive
guerre de course carried out against the Christian ships and ports of the Western

Mediterranean. Characterized by the medieval Muslim historian lbn Khaldiin as
maritime jihad, state-sponsored piracy filled the regime's coffers while offering
Denia's rulers the legitimacy of military action against unbelievers.7 Nevertheless,
nonviolent commercial exchange, with Muslim and Christian ports alike, from
Barcelona and Pisa to al-Mahdiyya and Alexandria, also passed through Denia.
Maritime commerce and regional distribution, moreover, seem to have become the
taifa's principal activities in the final years of Mujahid's reign, and especially under
his son, 'AIT, whose rule began with Mujahid's death in 436/1044, and ended in
468/1076 when the taifa was annexed by the taifa of Zaragoza.
Denia's history remains linked to al-Andalus and the Iberian Peninsula, but its
specific historical interest comes from this determined Mediterranean policy over two
6 See below, chapter 4, for the invasion of Sardinia and relations with Pisa.
7 lbn Khaldun, Kitab al- 'ibar wa-diwan al-mubtada' wa-1-khabar Ji ayyam al- 'arab wa-1- 'ajam
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generations. Denia was, in fact, active in multiple regions and areas of influence,
defying easy categorization. Historians often consider the Iberian Peninsula and the
Mediterranean as different spaces, but Denia's history surpasses those constructions,
and, in a certain manner, highlights their limits. Denia existed concomitantly in both
spaces, as a littoral periphery of the Iberian Peninsula, and as a Mediterranean
thalassocracy, at the junction of various identities and forces.
Denia's participation in multiple spheres illustrates the dynamics of the
fifth/eleventh century Mediterranean, while taking into account the specificities of a
fragmentary and declining al-Andalus. The taifa's success was the result of a process
of progressive investment by the Umayyad regime in its maritime zones followed by
the collapse of that state, releasing those zones from Cordova's centralizing forces.
Denia also developed in conjunction with other Christian and Muslim ports,
contributing to and benefitting from the Mediterranean economic renewal that Robert
Lopez defined as the "commercial revolution" of the Middle Ages.

The two

phenomena were not exclusive, and it was precisely Denia's participation in both that
determined its course throughout the fifth/eleventh century.
Previous studies of .fitna-era al-Andalus, and Denia m particular, have
examined the taifa from a uniquely Andalus, or Islamic point of view, isolating it
from the Mediterranean. 8 In the last twenty years, however, studies have offered new
Clelia Samelli Cerqua, Mujiihid al- 'Amir, "wa ibnuhu" lqbiil al-Dawla Ji Diiniya was Sardiiniya
wa jazr al-Balayiir fi-l-qarn al-khiimis al-hijra - al-1:wdii 'ashrii al-1111/iicff (Cairo, 1961); Clelia
Samelli Cerqua, "La vita intelletuale alla corte di Mugahid al-• Amiri," Annali dell 'lstituto
universitario orientate de Napoli, 14 (1964), 1-26; Maria Jesus Rubiera Mata, La taifa de Denia
(Alicante, 1985); Rafael Azuar Ruiz, Denia is!amica (Alicante, 1989); David Wasserstein, The
Caliphate in the West. An Islamic Political Institution in the Iberian Peninsula (Oxford, 1993).
8

6
approaches to AndalusI and Mediterranean history that make it possible to reexamine
the taifa in a way that encompasses its variegated identities.

Olivia Remie

Constable's Trade and Traders in Muslim Spain only briefly mentions Denia, but
demonstrates the usefulness of examining al-Andalus in its relation with the
Mediterranean.9

Constable likewise incorporates a variety of Latin, Arabic, and

material sources that together point to new possibilities for historical inquiry. More
recently, Peregrin Horden and Nicolas Purcell proposed a vision of the medieval
Mediterranean based on "micro-regions" and communications through small,
interlaced, and superimposed accidental networks.10 The present study will analyze
the taifa of Denia through this culture of communications, examining how it built its
networks across the various zones of al-Andalus and the Western Mediterranean.
In this dissertation I analyze the taifa of Denia according to the dynamics of
its internal and external networks, with its ambition of integrating vaster
Mediterranean spaces.

Thus, I hope to demonstrate how exchange and

communications networks were the result of forces of "duration," characterizing
Mediterranean spaces throughout time; how Denia developed within these networks,
in particular

those of the Iberian

Peninsula, Sharq

Mediterranean, and the Muslim and Christian worlds.11

al-Anda/us, Western
These communications

resulted not only from long-term historical forces, but also from Mujahid and 'AlI's

Olivia Remie Constable, Trade and Traders in Muslim Spain. The Commercial Realignment of the
Iberian Peninsula, 900-1500 (Cambridge, 1994).
10
Peregrin Horden, Nicolas Purcell, The Cornipting Sea. A Study of Mediterranean History (Oxford,
9

2000).
11
For the concept of "duration" or "duree" in the Mediterranean, see Fernand Braudel, La
Mediterranee et le monde mediterraneen al 'epoque de Philippe!!, 2 nd ed. (Paris, 1966).
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decisions and policies, according to their v1s1on of Denia and its place in the
Mediterranean and al-Andalus.

In this regard, it 1s important to understand the

relation between the taifa of Denia, an artificial political construct, and the "organic"
Mediterranean communications networks. I will thus explore to what extent Denia's
success came from "natural" forces and/or decisions knowingly made by its
sovereigns, and how the Mediterranean networks influenced and were influenced by
these policies.
I will first examine the political aspects of this network, with the relevant
antecedents. This will include the historical space that Denia occupied in the Sharq
al-Anda/us between the Mediterranean and the Iberian Peninsula, according to its
relationship with the Cordovan Umayyad regime.

The Western Mediterranean

underwent structural changes between the disintegration of the ancient world and the
establishment of the Muslim system, deteriorating the nature of communications.
These changes came partly from a relaxation of the central political powers on the
Mediterranean littorals, and I will show how this relaxation made it possible for the
communities of the Sharq al-Anda/us to orient their communications networks
according to their own interests. Later, the rehabilitation of central power in these
zones assimilated, according to its ambitions and needs, the structures created by
these peripheral communities. The fragmentation of the caliphate of Cordova at the
beginning of the fifth/eleventh century released the cities of the Sharq al-Anda/us
from an imposed policy and the constraints of a meta-network of centripetal
communications, and made it possible for the rulers of this area to establish their own

8
relations on regional and Mediterranean levels.

I will thus examme how the

sovereigns of Denia worked to create a physical and communicative space around
their power, as well as the inscription of this space in the peninsula and the sea
according to AndalusT and Mediterranean dynamics. This power was founded and
consolidated through violence and conquest, but beyond their military presence the
sovereigns of Denia had to lay down their power in terms understandable not only for
their AndalusT subjects and counterparts, but also for the other political regimes of the
Mediterranean.
The second section will define the communications networks built around the
taifa of Denia. I will first examine Denia's position vis-a-vis the Mediterranean and
Iberian networks, as described by geographers, as well as tendencies of circulation as
revealed by biographical dictionaries.

This will shed light on the terrestrial and

maritime transportation routes that bound Denia to its networks. In addition, analyses
of documentary sources and material culture, including ceramics and numismatics, as
an indicator of commercial exchange, as well as the political bonds that contributed to
the establishment and the exploitation of these routes will supplement these findings.
Thus, I will demonstrate how Denia was bound to Christian ports, such as Pisa and
Barcelona, by means of violence, trade, and political interest. Principal exchange
nevertheless occurred with al-Andalus and the Muslim Mediterranean, and I will
analyze the networks by which Denia's rulers bound their polity to those worlds.
Lastly, I examine the structures resulting from the Mediterranean and
continental policies of Denia's rulers. This will illuminate the basis for Mujahid and

9
'ALI's political power and the definition of Denia's political territory in terms of
security, taxation, and communications, particularly with the establishment of
governmental fortifications in the kingdom's interior. I will then examine how the
taifa's maritime policies led to demographic changes and the increasing importance
of coastal settlements. In addition to these physically palpable aspects, the sovereigns
of Denia created structures of Islamic culture in their court with the establishment and
the patronage of Islamic studies. Because of these structures, and the city's resulting
reputation, Denia became an essential hub in the network of Iberian and
Mediterranean scholars. These physical and cultural structures were not only the
effect of political decisions, but also the expression of the lasting place that Denia
occupied in the Iberian and Mediterranean networks, and its role as binder and portal
between those two spaces.
This dissertation will show that Denia's rulers based their state on its liminal
position between the Iberian Peninsula and the Mediterranean, substituting networks
and routes for territory and land. It will further demonstrate that traditional divisions
applied to Iberian or Mediterranean history, including those based on religion, often
oversimplify matters, imposing a priori interpretations. Denia's complexity comes to
light through its multiple connections built across various geographic, political, and
cultural frontiers. In relation to Christian polities like Pisa and Barcelona, Denia's
rulers blended religious antagonism and intercultural exchange with the same political
and economic ambition that influenced their policies towards other taifas and Muslim
ports. Finally, I will demonstrate that the taifa of Denia illustrates the complex layers
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of communications and exchange that defined m large part the medieval
Mediterranean.

TRANSLITERATION

I have followed the Studia islamica simplified system of transliteration for
transcribing Arabic into Latin letters. Nevertheless, I have also kept spelling for
common and proper nouns regularly used in English to facilitate reading.
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t=w
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CHAPTER I

GEOGRAPHY, SOCIETY, AND POLICY BEFORE THE FITNA
Denia's history did not begin with the fall of the Cordovan caliphate and the rise of
Mujahid. Political, social, and geographical antecedents played an essential role in
determining how the taifa's history would play out over the course of the century.
The taifa of Denia developed in direct relation with the region's maritime resources
and in fact represents a continuation of many of the policies followed by the
Umayyad and 'Amirid regimes.
The Western Mediterranean underwent profound structural changes during the
disintegration of the Roman Empire and the rise of Islam, provoking the isolation of
coastal regions. The decline of centralized political powers allowed independent
communities in the Sharq al-Anda/us to reorient communications networks according
to their own interests, based on piracy and maritime commerce with the North
African coast. After the Islamic conquest, Cordova sought over time to extend its
control over maritime access and resources, especially after conflict began with the
Fatimids, relying on existing social and political structures as a relay for the Umayyad
regime. Military conquests played a role, but Cordova also extended its influence by
simply recogmzmg authorities already in place and integrating them into
administrative and governmental systems.

Relations with North Africa and the

Maghreb continued during this time among the communities of maritime merchants
11
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and pirates whose interests remained tied to the sea and neighboring Mediterranean
coasts.
Thus, at the beginning of the fifth/eleventh century, when the fragmentation of
the Umayyad caliphate liberated the cities of the Sharq al-Anda/us from constraining
centralized systems, regional elites found themselves, not on the periphery of the
Umayyad-lberian world, but at the meeting point between al-Andalus and the
Mediterranean.

REGIONAL GEOGRAPHY

Denia's geographical setting profoundly influenced its maritime direction and the
means by which it interacted with the outside world. 1 Its port and exceptional access
to Mediterranean lanes, along with a hinterland that offered limited possibilities for
expansion and development logically led to its maritime history.

Denia's

development thus depended on its ability to impose itself as a redistribution point
between the Mediterranean and AndalusT markets.
The Betic Cordillera, which culminates m the Montg6 and the Balearic
Islands, dominates Denia's geography.

Arcs of steep mountain ranges enclose

narrow valleys form the Jibal Balansiya.

Waterways are rare and are usually

In addition to personal observations, we consulted the following works for information concerning
regional geography; E. Bermudez y Bermudez, M.P. Reus Lopez, L. Soliveres Cholbi, Geografia de la
Provincia de Alicante (Alicante, 1990); V. Castaneda y Alcover, Relaciones geograficas, topograficas
y historicas de! Reyno de Valencia, hechas en el siglo XVII a ruegos de D. Tomas Lopez, 2 vols.
(Alicante-Castellon de la Plana, 1919) (Valencia, 1998); A.T. Grove, 0. Rackham, The Nature of
Mediterranean Europe. An Ecological Histo,y (New Haven, 2001); J.J. Quereda Sala, Comarca de la
Marina Alicante (£studio de geografia regional) (Alicante, 1978).
1
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seasonal torrents, while the few rivers - Serpis, Jal6n and Gorgos - are not navigable.
The climate is typically Mediterranean, cooler and rainier in the north, with favorable
precipitation around Alcoy, and dryer and hotter in the south. The uneven terrain
inhibits communication, and road networks depend heavily on the possibilities
offered by valleys and mountain passes, isolating the region from the more
Islamicized and urbanized zones of the interior. The regional population was thus
concentrated in the coastal plains and the valleys that linked the coast with the
interior.

The south of the taifa, corresponding to northern TudmTr, though

mountainous, is less uneven than the Jibe,! Balansiya. The Vinalop6 and Segura
valleys are irrigable, notably the Segura huerta, and act as major communications
routes between the regions of Valencia and Murcia, as well as with the Peninsula's
interior plains.
The taifa of Denia thus had few peninsular resources. Powerful neighbors
surrounded Denia to the north and south, so its rulers turned to the sea as their only
real option for expansion. The coastline between Denia and Alicante is as uneven as
the mountainous interior, with numerous ports and anchorages that could serve as
relays in Denia's maritime development. Denia's port is sheltered by the massive
Montg6, and readily accessible to the coastal plains.

The small ports of Javea,

Moraira, Altea, Benidorrn and Villajoyosa allow for shipping along the coast towards
the south, while Alicante's port acts as an extension of the routes following the
Vinalop6 and Segura. Extending out into the sea, at the end of the Betic Cordillera
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and on the eastern tip of the Peninsula, Denia was only a day's sail from the Balearic
Islands, whose ports served as the first stops for ships traveling to points farther east.
The sea is an essential part of this region, demonstrated by the fact that it
flourished only during times of intense maritime circulation. The decline of the
Mediterranean towards the end of the Roman Empire and during the Early Middle
Ages caused a corresponding decline in settlement and population density.

The

reversal of this decline, beginning during the later Umayyad emirate and early
caliphate, allowed the rulers of Denia to build their state based on the renascent
maritime resources of the Sharq al-Anda/us.

MARITIME POLICIES UNDER THE UMAYYAD EMIRATE

Denia's liminal position on the threshold between the Iberian Peninsula and the
Mediterranean sea lanes profoundly shaped the policies of it rulers. The Sharq a/
Anda/us was isolated from Cordovan political, cultural and economic networks before
the fourth/tenth century.

The early Umayyad emirate was content with the

recognition offered by tributary payments from regional elites who favored their
contacts with the other shores of the Western Mediterranean. Cordovan policies
began to change in the late third/ninth and early fourth/tenth centuries, promoting
Umayyad interests along the coast and appropriating the Peninsula's maritime space.
These policies improved links between with the sea, and laid the framework for the
taifa of Denia, since Mujahid and 'Alf established and operated their state at the
intersection of those two spheres. Mujahid's ambition and will were essential in
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Denia's rise at the beginning of the fifth/eleventh century.

It is also important,

however, to underline the foundations laid by the Umayyad regime's occupation of
maritime space and the installation of maritime structures and ports in relation to
caliphal ambitions and Mediterranean networks.
Mujahid modeled his policies during the transitional period of the early fitna
on those of the erstwhile caliphate.

Eventual changes in taifal politics were

conditioned by the regime's own power, in correspondence with its unique place in
the Iberian and Mediterranean contexts.

The fall of the caliphate dismantled

centralized continental networks at the same time that the economic weight of the
Mediterranean was steadily increasing, allowing Denia's rulers to consciously exploit
their position between the Iberian Peninsula and the Mediterranean Sea.
The extension of Umayyad interests in the Western Mediterranean was a
gradual process.

Cordova initially abandoned the Sharq al-Anda/us to relative

provincial isolation, and expressed little interest in maritime affairs. The decline of
Mediterranean relations towards the end of the classical era influenced the
internalized development of roads and markets after the Islamic conquest.
Mediterranean networks stimulated by economic exchange within the Roman Empire
fell into obsolescence. In addition, the paralyzing weakness of the Umayyad regime
between the second/eighth and third/ninth centuries limited any eventual interest in
outlying coastal regions. Cordova only began to extend its reach into Denia's region
as part of an overall process of strengthening economic and political dynamics,
coinciding with the renewal of Mediterranean networks. Communications began to
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mcrease between older centers of exchange, superseded at times by more recent
establishments.

Maritime and population decline {third to eighth centuries)
Henri Pirenne ascribed the breakdown in Mediterranean unity to the Islamic invasions
of the seventh and eighth centuries.2

While Mediterranean communications did

indeed decrease, the process had begun much earlier, starting in the third century and
continuing until the eighth. The creation of a new religious, political and economic
space through the Islamic conquests in fact reoriented and renewed communications
networks, leading to new economic developments beginning in the ninth century. 3
This decline, though felt throughout the Mediterranean, was sharper in the
West, far from the more prosperous Eastern markets, and especially along the Iberian
coast. Maritime circulation did not end, but it did fall off substantially.4 At the same
time, and in the same region, the number of occupied rural sites fell by sixty-three
percent.5 This downward trend reflected similar trends in maritime exchange, and

2 H. Pirenne, Mahomet et Charlemagne (Paris, 1937), 120 and passim.
3 The decline and renewal of the early medieval European and Mediterranean economies is the
subject ofM. McCormick's Origins of the European Economy. Communications and Commerce, A.D.
300-900 (Cambridge, 200 I).
4 The number ofshipwrecks off the coast of Tarragona fell from 86 in the third century to 32 in the
sixth, a sixty-three percent decrease; A.J. Parker, Ancient Shipwrecks of the Mediterranean and the
Roman Provinces, BAR International Series, 580 (Oxford, 1992), 13-15; M. McCormick, Origins, 67,
n. 7. Paul Reynolds notes that the importation of ceramics from Carthage to Alicante lasted until the
sixth century when Byzantium withdrew its presence and artificial commercial stimulus; Reynolds,
Trade in the Western Mediterranean, AD 400-700: The ceramic evidence, BAR International Series,
604 (Oxford, 1995),139.
5 J.M. Carrete et al., A Roman Provincial Capital and its Hinterland. The Survey of the Territory of
Tarragona, Spain, 1985-1990 (Ann Arbor, 1995), 56,280; M. McCom1ick, Origins, 67,n. 7.
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rural settlement patterns were symptomatic of a larger crisis throughout the Western
Mediterranean.
Pierre Guichard has noted urban degeneration accompanied by a "heavily
affected demography" in the Sharq al-Anda/us, including the region of Denia.6 This
desertion of urban sites forms the basis for Guichard's theory on the early
"Berberization" of the Valencian region, where the social and geographic patterns had
become so loose that new Arab-Berber elements were easily able to penetrate.7 Sonia
Gutierrez Lloret has likewise highlighted a similar dismantling of urban networks in
the kura of TudmTr.8 The breakdown in urban-rural relations in Late Antiquity and
6 P. Guichard, Structures sociales "orientates" et "occidentals" dans l'Espagne musulmane (Paris,
1977), 191-3; P. Guichard, "Le peuplement de la region de Valence aux deux premiers siecles de la
domination musulmane," M. C. V., 5 (1969): I I 9; P. Guichard, "Animation maritime et developpement
urbain des cotes de l'Espagne orientale et du Languedoc au Xe siecle," in Occident et Orient au X'
siecle. Actes du IX' congres de la societe des historiens medievistes de l'enseignement superieur public
(Dijon, 2-4 juin 1978) (Paris, 1979), 188; P. Guichard, "Les debuts de la piraterie andalouse en
Mediterranee occidentale (798-813)," R.O.M.M., 35 (1983-1): 57; P. Guichard, "Les zones littorales de
la region orientale d'al-Andalus aux VIW-Xle siecles," in Castrum 7, 273-290.
7 P. Guichard, Structures, I 93.
8 Cf S. Gutierrez Lloret, La Cora de Tudm,r. De la antigiiedad tardia al mundo islamico.
Poblamiento y cultura material (Madrid-Alicante, 1996), 237, 269 and passim. Gutierrez recently
published an article summarizing recent archeological works, though she underlines their limited
results. She highlights works that link archeological sites abandoned before the fourth/tenth century
with cities cited by the Treaty of TudmTr: Talmo de Minateda/Hellin, Cerro de la Almagra/Mula,
Begastri/Cehegin, Ilici/La Alculdia de Eiche: S. Gutierrez Lloret, "La islamizacion de Tudmir :
balance y perspectivas," in Vil/es et campagnes de Tarraconaise et d'al-Andalus (Vf'-Xf' siecles): la
transition, ed. Ph. Senac (Toulouse, 2007), 284-90. The population of Colonia Julia lllici Augusta!
(site of la Alcudia in Eiche), the '\}J)/Ilsh" in al-'UdhrT's version of the Treaty of TudmTr, migrated to
the present site of Eiche, a city that shows no signs of occupation prior to the fourth/tenth century.
Similarly, Alicante, also cited in the Treaty of TudmTr, changed sites during this crisis. Despite the
mention of Laqant's port by the fourth/tenth century geographer al-lshtakhrT, al-RazT wrote that the
"locality" was in the Sierra de Benicadell, and so inland: al-'UdhrT, Nusus 'an al-Anda/us. Fragmentos
geografico-historicos de al-Masiisalik ilii gam,' al-mamiilik, ed. 'A. al-A. al-AhwanT (Madrid, 1965),
5; S. Gutierrez Lloret, La Cora de Tudm,r, 236; E. Lopez Segui, I. Gomez Martinez, A. Pastor Mira,
F.E. Tendero Fernandez, P. Torregrosa Gimenez, "Eiche medieval : la evolucion de su sistema
defensivo," in De la medina a la vi/a: Actas 11 Jorandas de Arqueologia Medieval, ed. F.J. Jover
Maestre and C. Navarro Poveda (Alicante-Petrer, 2004), 34-5; P. Rosser Liminana, "La ciudad de
Alicante y la arqueologia del poblamiento en epoca medieval islamica," in Urbanismo medieval de!
pais va!enciano, ed. R. Azuar, S. Gutierrez, and F. Valdes (Madrid, 1993), 32, 47; Al-l�takhrT, Kitiib
masii!ik a!-mamii!ik (Viae regnorum descriptio ditionis moslemicae), B.G.A. vol. 3, ed. M.J. de Goeje
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the Early Middle Ages is visible in the appearance of agricultural production inside
urban centers. 9 The crisis became more aggravated during the first centuries of
Muslim domination, especially during the Umayyad emirate, when the majority of
Roman cities disappeared. 10
This process was more acute in the east than in the rest of al-Andalus, which
Pierre Guichard relates to the region's isolation vis-a-vis the interior and the
economic, political and cultural heart of the Umayyad regime in Cordova.11 The
abandonment of the coastal Via Augusta for the interior route linking Cordova to
Zaragoza exacerbated the crisis even more. The Cordovan Umayyad regime in fact
was established at the height of the Mediterranean crisis, and so favored interior
peninsular roads. The coastal cities were excluded from the Umayyad networks and
deprived of their economic role, only furthering their demise.
This isolation was moreover not only economic. The lower Segura region of
Tudmfr in the fifth/eleventh century was known as the land of the muwalladfin, or
neo-Muslims, indicating a late adoption of Islam. 12 Regional construction materials
and ceramics under the emirate demonstrate a remarkable lag in the process of
Islamicization in comparison with other regions of al-Andalus.13 Christophe Picard
noted an enduring cultural Christianity among maritime communities further south,

(Leiden, 1967), 41/234; al-Raif, "La Description de l'Espagne d'Ahmad al-RazT," French trans. E.
Levi-Proven9al, Al-Anda/us, 18-1 (1953): 70-1.
9 S. Gutierrez Lloret, La Cora de Tudm1r, 267.
10
S. Gutierrez Lloret, La Cora de Tudm,r, 269.
11
P. Guichard, Stn,ctures, 192.
12 Al-'UdhrT, I.
13 S. Gutierrez Lloret, La Cora de Tudm,r, 188-195, 281.
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while more than three hundred Christians were captured during an attack on Orihuela
in 297 /909-10. 14
Biographical dictionaries, moreover, confirm the remoteness of the kiiras of
TudmTr and Valencia. The origins and itineraries of 'ulama' recorded at the end of
the caliphal period by Ibn al-FaradT reflect the concentration of the Arab elite in
interior cities such as Cordova, Toledo, and Zaragoza.15 Pierre Guichard noted nine
scholars from the region of Valencia and about thirty from TudmTr - Denia is never
mentioned - but these figures are far below those for urban centers further inland.
TudmTr's higher numbers are the result of 'Abd al-Ral)man II's establishment of
Murcia as a governmental urban pole in the third/ninth century.16 Murcia was in fact
an essential center for the diffusion of Islamic material culture beginning in the
fourth/tenth century. The Islamicization of TudmTr progressed at the same rhythm as
the development of new urban networks, themselves symptomatic of the
determination of the Umayyad state to finally extend its reach into the region.

14

Ch. Picard, la mer et !es musulmans d'Occident au Mayen Age (Paris, 1997), 14; lbn 'ldhar'f,
Histoire de l 'Afrique du Nord et de l 'Espagne musulmane intitulee Kitab al-bayan al-mughrib
(hereafter Bayiin), t. II, Histoire de l'Espagne musulmane de la conquete au Xi" siecle, ed. G.S. Colin
and E. Levi-Provenr;:al (Leiden, 1951), 146; Cronica de 'Arfb sabre al-Anda/us, Spanish trans. J.
Castilla Brazales (Granada, 1992), I 05.
15
P. Guichard, "Peuplement de Valence," 109.
16
Al-'UdhrT, 6/62-3.

Political neglect of the Sharq al-Anda/us
The entire AndalusT eastern seaboard had been more or less autonomous since the
Muslim conquest. Depending on the different treaties signed with the conquering
Muslims, the region's inhabitants kept their independence in exchange for tributary
payments and recognition of Islamic authority. Instead of being integrated into the
structures of the central regime, TudmTr, 1 7 Tortosa, 1 8 and the Balearics 19 were not
only excluded from the major trunk roads, but were also without the political,
economic, and cultural Muslim elite that would have been a driving force of
Islamicization.20 The central Umayyad regime's early satisfaction with tribute and
promises of non-aggression thus accentuated the region's isolation.

17 The Visigothic dux Theodemir signed a treaty with 'Abd al-'Aziz b. Musa b. Nusayr in 94/713,
giving seven cities over to the invaders: E. Levi-Provenyal, HEM, I :32. The three principal extant
versions of the treaty are given by: al-'Udhri, 4-5/58-60 ; al-l)abbi, Kitab bughyat al-mu/tam is Ji tarTkh
rijal al-andalus (Desiderium quaerentis historam virorum populi andalusiae [dictionarium
biographicum}), (B.A.J-1. 3), ed. F. Codera and J. Ribera (Madrid: 1885), 259, no. 675 ; al-l:limyari, La
Peninsule iberique au Mayen Age d'apres le Kitab ar-Rawd al-mi'tar fi habar al-aktar d'Jbn 'Abd a/
Mun 'im al-Himyari, ed. and French trans. E. Levi-Provenyal (Leiden, 1938), 63/78-9. The seven
cities are not the same in each version of the treaty, the differences being attributable to when they
were written. The cities common to each version are: Orihuela, Mula, Lorca, Alicante and Valencia,
although Villena has been proposed in place of Valencia. For the last two cities,al-'Udhri gives Eiche
and Iyi(h), al-l)abbi gives Begastri and Iyi(h) and al-1:Iimyari gives Ello and Villena. R. Pocklington
cites a version of the Cronica def Moro Rasis that gives Denia instead of lyi(h). These variations
illustrate changes in the urban landscape between the second/eighth century and the fifth/eleventh,
sixth/twelfth and ninth/fifteenth centuries: R. Pocklington, "El emplazamiento de Iyi(h)," Sharq a/
Anda/us, 4 (1987): 180.
18 In his description of Pechina, al-1:limyari writes that the port was settled by sailors who had fled
the coast near Tortosa after having broken the pact that they had signed with the Umayyad emir: al
l:limyari (1975), 80; J. Lirola Delgado, El poder naval de al-Anda/us en la epoca de! Califato Omeya
(Granad� 1993),388.
19 In 234/849, the emir 'Abd al-Ral)man II sent 300 boats to the Balearics in retaliation for attacks
against Muslims perpetrated in violation of the treaty signed between the inhabitants of the Islands and
the Umayyad regime. After the punitive expedition, the emir once again granted peace to the Balearics
and renewed the treaties in exchange for tributary payments and promises of loyalty: lbn 'Idhari,
Bayan, 2:91.
2° Ch. Picard,La mer, 15.
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Cordova did occasionally show interest in the Mediterranean, but did not have
the resources necessary to maintain any kind of real presence there until the reign of
'Abd al-Ral)man III. Umayyad access to naval resources was in fact sporadic at best
until the fourth/tenth century. AndalusT maritime activity remained largely private
until the later third/ninth century, when a series of crises persuaded the Umayyads of
the need for a more active naval policy.

UMAYYAD MARITIME POLICY AND MEDITERRANEAN DEVELOPMENT

The Umayyad emirate did not have a permanent fleet, relying largely on requisitioned
boats and private individuals for its naval needs. The first Umayyad caliph, 'Abd al
Ral)man III, was also the first to develop an official fleet with the accompanying
maritime infrastructures. In response to a series of crises - Viking raids in 229/844
and 244/858, the rebellion of Ibn I:Iafsun under Mul)ammad I and 'Abd al-Ral)man
III, and the Fatimid threat from North Africa - the Cordovan regime took notice of its
coasts and the need to actively occupy and invest in them. After the Viking attacks,
Seville became the site of the first diir al-�inii 'a (i.e. arsenal), armed forces were
charged with watching the coast near Tortosa, and watchtowers (mahiiris) were built
near Almeria.21 'Abd al-Ral)man III established a second diir al-�inii 'a in Algeciras
during Ibn I:Iaf�un's insurrection in order to better control the coast and maritime
circulation in the Straits of Gibraltar. 22

2

1
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lbn 'ldhar"i, Bayiin, 2:97; Al-1:1imyar"i, 183/221; J. Lirola Delgado, El poder naval, 114.
E. Levi-Provenyal, HEM, 2:90.
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lbn I:Iafsiin's rebellion was symptomatic of the weaknesses of the Umayyad
regime under Mubammad I and his sons, but 'Abd al-Rabman III was able to face the
Fatimids at the height of his power, strengthened by a reconquered al-Andalus. At
the beginning of his reign, though, the Umayyad caliphate lacked the maritime
infrastructures and political control of coastal regions necessary to secure the
peninsula against the Fatimid threat. 23

'Abd al-Ral)man III established a fleet at

Algeciras in 301/914 to prevent Fatimid aid from reaching lbn I:Iafsiin. Pechina later
became part of the caliphal maritime system, and served as the point of departure for
the fleet beginning in 319/931. 24 In 321/933, the caliph made sure that the governor
of the hira of Ilb,ra had everything necessary to establish the caliphal fleet and
shipyards in Almeria, Pechina's port.25 This transfer reflected in fact a change in the
Umayyads' naval ambitions and needs. The Fatimids had replaced the Vikings as the
major maritime threat, and this new conflict implicated not only the Straits of
Gibraltar, but also the Western Mediterranean, where Almeria offered a better
vantage than Algeciras.

The port also offered the advantage of an experienced

maritime community in the Babriyyiin settled there since 271/884. 26
'Abd al-Rabman III had to respond to many aspects of the Fatimid threat,
while also overseeing the development of his own caliphal state.

The Fatimid

23 The Fatimid threat centered mainly on the Maghreb, where their expansion endangered the
peninsula's supply of gold coming from Africa. 'Abd al-RaJ:iman Ill's policies, and especially his use
of monetary emissions as a tangible sign of his caliphal legitimacy, necessitated a secure and
continuous access to the sub-Saharan gold that made its way through Sijilmasa and Fez before
reaching the MaghrebT ports: J. Devisse, "La question d'Audagust," in Tegdaoust I. Recherches sur
Aoudaghost, ed. D. Robert, S. Robert and J. Devisse (Paris, 1970), 128.
24 lbn l:layyan, al-Muqtabis V, ed. P. Chalmeta, F. Corriente and M. SubJ:i (Madrid, 1979), 312/236.
25 Ibn l:layyan, Muqtabis V, 323/243.
26 Ch. Picard, La mer, 25.
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problem committed Cordova to a more ambitious maritime policy, not only from a
defensive point of view, but also offensively, in order to secure its access to the routes
and roads of the Western Mediterranean. Umayyad maritime policy subsequently
was no longer a response to a crisis, but was built around the territorial unity of
Umayyad al-Andalus, an ensemble that now included and went beyond the heretofore
neglected coastal zones. The Umayyad caliphal accession thus symbolized the power
of a regime that was now ready to assimilate politically and economically the
Mediterranean into its own space.

Mediterranean policy and the assimilation of independent ports
The Andalus1 maritime provinces rebounded after the crises of Late Antiquity and the
Early Middle Ages. Beginning in the third/ninth century, maritime traffic began to
revive in part through the establishment of modified networks by independent and
stateless communities between the Andalus1, African, Italian, and even Provenc;:al
coasts.

Piracy seems to have been one of the principal activities for Western

Mediterranean sailors, having left far more traces in the sources than commercial
exchange, though commerce certainly must have played a role in relations.
Mediterranean economic development, as well as the Umayyads' progressive
assimilation of their coasts, made piracy into a state affair, integrated in the
caliphate's maritime policies, while maritime structures were adapted to the needs of
the state. The assimilation of pirate-merchant networks into the Umayyad apparatus
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thus contributed to the reintegration of the Iberian Peninsula in the dynamics of the
Mediterranean.
Cordovan political disinterest in the Sharq al-Anda/us was due in large part to
the Mediterranean economic situation, the internalized orientation of AndalusT
society, and the simple inability of the first Umayyads to cohesively dominate al
Andalus. This disinterest had allowed the fomentation of numerous regional revolts
that Cordova could only clumsily handle as long as it lacked the necessary will and
resources. The interference caused by these crises often accentuated the region's
isolation, but also promoted independent maritime development.
Pierre Guichard's study of AndalusT piracy has shown how this activity grew
through the cracks in the early Umayyad state.27 The near autonomy of the Valencian
kiira permitted the development of corsair activities that contributed to the renewal of
this maritime zone. The term "corsair" is consciously used here since, although
third/ninth-century piracy stemmed from stateless dynamics, the Umayyad regime in
many ways approved of these attacks against unbelievers and did not neglect to
collect its share of the corsair booty. Indeed, Umayyad maritime policy at this time
resembles a tacitly approved and vaguely directed guerre de course. AndalusTs may
not have led the Saracen raids against Marseilles in 838, Ostia in 841, Aries in 842
and Rome in 846, but Ibn Rustih does write in the third/ninth century that the
inhabitants of the Roman coast were plagued by Berber raids from al-Andalus and

27 The rebellion of' Abd Allah al-BalansT against his nephew al-l:lakam I, and his subsequent move to

Valencia in 796 promoted the expansion of maritime activities in this region since it led to the arrival
of North-African sailors and ships come to support the rebel; P. Guichard, "Les debuts," passim.

North Africa.28 In addition, southern-Italian sources claim Capua and Benevento
often solicited AndalusT raiders during their conflict between 841 and 847.29 In
234/849, when Cordova orchestrated punitive actions against the Balearics, raids
were also carried out against the Tuscan and Provenyal coasts, and an official
Umayyad representative was expedited to Valencia to ensure proper payment of the
khums. 30 These combined instances indicate an at least tacit participation by the

Umayyad regime in the pirate activities associated with its coasts.
Commerce with the Latin West did exist and was an integral part of
Mediterranean traffic, but AndalusT ships came away from Christian coasts more
often laden with slaves and booty than peacefully attained merchandise.31 This piracy
in fact increased over the following years, with the establishment of corsair colonies
on the eastern coast of the Iberian Peninsula, as well as along the African, Italian, and
Provenyal coasts.
28

The nature of these colonies is at times ambiguous, acting

P. Guichard, "Les debuts," 73, n. 72; Anna/es Bertiniani (Anna/es de Saint-Bertin), ed. F. Grat, J.
Yielliard and S. Clemencet (Paris, 1964), 24, 43, 52; Liber pontijicalis. Texte, introduction et
commentaire, ed. L. Duchesne (Paris: 1892), 81, 99-10 I; lbn Rustih, Kitiib al-a 'liiq al-nafisa, in
Description du Maghreb et de /'Europe au IIf'=JX' siecle, ed. and French trans. M. Hadj-Sadok
(Algiers, I 949), 70/7 I.
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Historia Langobardorium Beneventanorum, M.G.H. SSrL, ed. G. Waitz, (Hannover: 1878), 241;
Chronica Monasterii Casinensis. Die Chronik von Montecassino, MG.H. SS, t. 34, ed. H. Hoffman
(Hannover, 1980), 74; Chronica Sancti Benedicti Casinensis, MG.H. SSrL, ed. G. Waitz (Hannover:
1878), 473.
30 Anna/es Bertiniani, 57; lbn 'ldharT, Bayiin, 2:91.
31 Piracy did not in fact stop maritime activity along the Carolingian coasts, and Saracen ships were
not uniquely pirates. Notker Balbulus relates a story that indicates peaceful commercial exchange with
the Christian West in the second half of the ninth century. During a trip to Narbonne, Charlemagne
supposedly saw a ship arrive claiming to carry Jewish, African and Breton merchants; the emperor's
"wisdom" allowed him to see that they were really Nonnan pirates. Although the monk's panegyric
enthusiasm causes him to make chronological errors, and Charlemagne was in fact never confronted
with Nom1an pirates, Vikings did attack the Carolingian coasts during Notker's lifetime. Notker thus
relates an admittedly doubtful historical anecdote, but one that must have seemed plausible to him
during his own time. The presence of africanos, or Saracen, merchants in Narbonne's port must not
have been so rare as to seem implausible: Notker Balbulus, De gestis Caroli Magni libri duo, MG.H.
SS, t. 2, ed. G.H. Pertz (Hannover, 1824), 757.
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simultaneously as "nests of bandits," trading posts, and relay points m the
Mediterranean networks. 32

The AndalusI colonies were at first private, even

renegade, but the Umayyad state slowly absorbed them in its gradual march to the
sea.

Pechina
Members of the Yemenite Banu Siraj established Pechina, augmented by
Muslims in ribat guarding the coast against Viking attacks. 33 In 271/884, however,
members of the Babriyyiin who had fled Tortosa settled in Pechina. Inadequate
control of the coast during the last years of Multammad I's reign had resulted in the
proliferation of semi-autonomous maritime communities along the coast of the Sharq
al-Anda/us. According to al-I:IimyarI and al-BakrI, the "people of the sea" from
Tortosa, Tudmir, and Ilbira lived under a treaty signed with Cordova, indicating their
status as muwalladiin and native dhimmz. 34 The renegade Babriyyiin had broken the
terms of their treaty by attacking Marchena, and fled to the North-African coast
where the inhabitants of Tenes invited them to develop a market. Tenes thus joined
the list of MaghribI ports either occupied or founded as AndalusI colonies, along with
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Ch. Picard, "Bal:,riyyiin, emirs et califes : I' origine des equipages des flottes musulmanes en
Mediterranee occidentale (VIII•-x• siecle)," Medieval Encounters, 13 (2007): 437-43; Ch. Picard,
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M.L. Ceccarelli Lemut (Pisa, 2007), 591 and passim.
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Al-l:fimyar1, 37/47, 183/221. On Pechina, see E. Levi-Provern;:al, HEM, 1 :348-356.
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J. Lirola Delgado, El poder naval, 388; Al-Bakr1, al-Masalik wa-1-mamalik (Description de
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35

These Bal;riyyiin and their AndalusT compatriots m fact carried out the
circulation of commercial goods between al-Andalus and the Maghreb as much as
they did piracy against Christian coasts. The scattering of AndalusT communities
among the North African ports clearly indicates their role in maritime commerce and
transport. It should be pointed out that even those who primarily practiced piracy
were also merchants, since maritime theft is more or less coercive commercialization,
and is lucrative only as long booty can be sold.
The community settled in Pechina, continuing its activities and maintaining its
relations beyond the territorial and cultural confines of the Umayyad state. 36 The
BaJ;r;yyfin of Pechina took advantage of 'Abd Allah's accession in 276/889-90 to
stabilize their precarious position, paying tribute and asking the new emir to approve
. ch01ce
.
the1r
of governor. 37

'Abd Allah, weakened by numerous rebellions,

acquiesced to their request, authorizing the fortification of Pechina and continued
overseas commerce. The guarantees offered by Cordova did little more than sanction
the reality of the situation, but did imply governmental power.
Pechina grew independently of state structures, and Cordovan approval of the
Babriyyiin's governors passed through simple requests and ritual payments.

The
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E. Levi-Provenc;:al, HEM, I: 350; al-BakrT, 55/117, 65/135, 69/141, 82/166.
36 Members of the Tenes AndalusT community left after a series of epidemics, settling in Pechina near

the watchtowers established by Mul)ammad I in 244/858. The BaJ:,riyyiin convinced the local Banu
Siraj to allow them to establish a market and built a more permanent city. Although under Muslim
leadership, a number of the sailors were Christian, as shown by a statue of the Virgin placed over one
of the city gates; AI-BakrT, 62/129, 81/163; E. Levi-Provenc;:al, HEM, 1:352; Ch. Picard, La mer, 14;
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instability of the Umayyad regime at the end of the third/ninth century contributed to
the social and economic renewal of seafaring communities, of which Pechina was the
most important, along the AndalusI coast. Nevertheless, as Cordova reestablished its
power over outlying regions, these naval structures increasingly came to serve the
needs of the state. 'Abd Allah's army used Pechina as a base of operations against
Ibn I:Iaf$lin in 297/909, indicating that Cordova was strengthening its ties with the
city. 38 When 'Abd al-Ral)man III established the caliphal shipyards in Algeciras in
301/914, he further extended Umayyad control over the coast, enrolling local
elements to watch over maritime traffic.
Pechina did not however move immediately into the Cordovan sphere of
influence.

Monetary emissions of fuhis (s. fats) in 303/915-6, 305/917-8 and

306/918-9, fictitiously minted under the authority of the defunct Aghlabid regime,
indicate that even after an unsuccessful rebellion in 303/915-6, Pechina's relationship
with Cordova remained ambiguous. 39 Moreover, the minting of fulus modeled on
Aghlabid Ifriqiyan coins indicates the strong commercial links between Pechina and
the North Africa coast. The Cordovan assimilation of the Ba(zriyyun elite was in fact
a gradual process, first acknowledging their position within the community and then
including them in state affairs.
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The port of Pechina officially entered the Umayyad state in 310/922, when the
population submitted to the fiscal system of 'Abd al-Ral;man, who also named a loyal
supporter as governor of the province. 4° From then on, Cordova increasingly relied
on Pechina for its naval needs. The port's piracy became a state-sponsored activity
that Cordova learned to use as a political tool in its relations with both Christians and
Muslims.
Indeed, 'Abd al-Ral;man III used Pechina as the base port for a naval
expedition against the opposite shores of the Strait in 319/929. 41 The Umayyad's
choice reflects a growing awareness of the need to occupy the waters of both the
Strait and the Mediterranean. It also allowed Cordova to take advantage of the skills
of Pechina's naval community. In fact, during the 319/929 expedition, nine local
dignitaries and their mercenary crews accompanied the fleet, accounting for oneseventh of the expedition's total of 7,000 men. Piracy was one of the port's primary
activities, and the state's involvement only increased the possibilities for booty.
Almeria became the seat of the caliphal shipyards two years later. In 321/933, 'Abd
al-Ral;man III ordered that the governor of IlbTra receive all the means necessary to
ensure that the fleet and dar al-sina 'a would be capable of fulfilling their mission. 42
Once prepared, part of the fleet was sent to police the waters around the Balearics
before attacking the Christian coasts, while another squadron joined the Umayyad
forces in Ceuta.
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These missions illustrate the new role of the Umayyad fleet as an essential
tool of territorial control. Cordova had become a maritime power, though not without
lingering resistance. In the beginning, Cordova profited from the permeable line
between privateering and piracy. The assimilation of these Babriyyun incorporated
by extension their activities and networks into the state's apparatus and policies. It is
then difficult, and a bit irrelevant, to differentiate between the privateering activities
of the caliphal fleet - augmented, it should be pointed out, by private individuals who
would later become admirals - and the piracy practiced by those same elements
outside the official Umayyad framework. Their attacks and raids were then linked to
Umayyad ambitions, and especially the appropriation of the Mediterranean maritime
space.
The Umayyad investing of Algeciras, then Pechina, coincided with advances
in outlying regions that had heretofore profited from the anarchy of Mu}:iammad I's
reign. 'Abd al-Ral;man Ill's maritime policy then evolved according to the different
crises - Ibn I;Iafi�un, the Fatimids - but also according to the growing power that he
held over his own maritime space. Almeria, as well as secondary ports such as
Tortosa and perhaps Denia, became an outpost on the maritime frontier. Cordova
effectively used the private initiatives at the origin of Pechina 's naval structures to
extend its influence over the sea.

The Balearics and Fraxinetum were similarly

assimilated, becoming maritime extensions of the Umayyad state and key points in its
Mediterranean networks.

31
Fraxinetum
The Saracen colony at Fraxinetum began when a storm shipwrecked twenty
sailors from al-Andalus on the peninsula near Saint-Tropez. 43 The sailors set up
camp, sending word back home of choice lands and locals who were weak and easy
prey. The arrival of reinforcements solidified their settlement, and the colony quickly
became involved in regional power struggles, selling its services to the different
factions. It threatened the mountain passes that linked Italy and France, while also
raiding up the Rhone valley. More importantly, and as shown by four shipwrecks in
the waters between Marseilles and Cannes, Fraxinetum served as a relatively
important harbor for Muslim ships in the fourth/tenth century, meriting references to
the colony by Arabic geographers of the tirne. 44
The shipwrecked sailors and those who later joined them were most likely
members of the Babriyyiin community that had fled the AndalusT coast under
Mul)ammad I and later settled in Pechina. Al-I:IimyarT in fact wrote that after their
attack on Marchena, the Babriyyiin moved from place to place, attacking the Frankish
and other coasts. 45 The chronology is plausible, and one of the ships found off the
coast was carrying ceramic jars similar to those unearthed during an archeological
campaign in Pechina. 46 The Babriyyiin from the Sharq al-Anda/us had thus dispersed
throughout the Western Mediterranean, establishing colonies on the Iberian,
43
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Proven9al, and North African coasts, maintaining commercial contact, and creating a
pirate network that operated largely outside state structures.
Fraxinetum maintained its illicit, or at least ambiguous status until sometime
before 328/940, when its qa 'id, or military governor, appears in a document.47 This
was probably similar to the early assimilation of Pechina, with the approval of a
locally chosen agent, and not a qa 'id sent from the capital. 'Abd al-Ral).man III had
granted safe passage to ships travelling to al-Andalus from the kingdom of Hugh of
Provence, and sent the terms of the treaty to the appropriate agents - most likely those
who practiced piracy against Hugh's subjects. Ibn ijayyan provides a list of those
concerned, among whom was Na�r b. A}:imad, qa 'id of Fraxinetum (Farakhshin'ft).
The colony's bellicose nature is indicated by the fact that the ranking Umayyad agent
there was a qa 'id, while elsewhere the treaty was sent to administrative governors,
'ummal.
Ibn ijawqal describes agricultural production and fertile land in Fraxinetum,
but the colony was neither urban nor stable, similar to the Saracen colony that
occupied the mouth of the Garigliano until 915. Philippe Senac has pointed out that
no biographical dictionaries list intellectual figures in association with the colony.48
The four ships discovered along the coast belonged to the same milieu as the pirate
merchants of Pechina, and while they certainly practiced commerce, at least one was
the victim of violence.49 The ships carried millstones as ballast, most likely replacing
47
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(human) booty sold in AndalusI markets. Ibn I:Iawqal wrote that the colony was held
by mujahidin who threatened the Franks with impunity. 50 A Greek fleet patrolling
Mediterranean waters chased pirates back to Fraxinetum in 931.51 Fraxinetum was
little more than a pirate haven and relay point between al-Andalus and the Italian and
Provence coasts. As Cordova extended its reach into the Mediterranean, and adopted
the guerre de course as a political tool, Fraxinetum was brought into the system,
probably by way of its contacts with Pechina.
Umayyad interest in Fraxinetum's privateering 1s perhaps evident in an
expedition in 323/933, when a fleet was launched from Pechina, only to tum back at
the Balearics because of harsh weather.52 The expedition may have been a response
to the Byzantine attack on the colony two years earlier, and, as we shall see, the
Balearics served as the staging point for naval raids in the Gulf of Lyon and
Tyrrhenian Sea. A more successful expedition attacked Ampurias and the Catalan
coasts in 325/935. 53 The retributive destruction of these expeditions, as well as the
material and human booty that they generated, underline how the integration of the
corsair colonies into the Umayyad state also led to an assimilation of their operations.
Umayyad maritime policy had clearly undergone a substantial change since
the first Viking attacks in the third/ninth century. 'Abd al-Ral)man II and Mul)ammad
I had worked to protect better the AndalusI coasts, but 'Abd al-Ral;man III had gone
50
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on the offensive. This policy was not simply a response to Fatimid threats or a move
to conduct jihad against Christian coasts, but was an integral part of the appropriation
of the coastal regions. The Cordovan court not only came into contact with the
Bal:,riyyun and their sometimes illicit activities, but it also adopted the guerre de
course that resembled in many ways the yearly suwa \f raids against the Christian
north.

Pechina and Fraxinetum became part of the Umayyad naval apparatus,

including those who had led in the pursuit of piracy. As he expanded his interests
into the Mediterranean, 'Abd al-Ral)man III came to rely on the structures that he
found along the way, namely the social, economic and political elite of the coastal
communities. Mul)ammad b. Ruma):iis, who, as a private individual, had contributed
his own resources to the first Umayyad naval expeditions out of Pechina, became
admiral of the fleet and then governor of the kura of IlbTra in 328/940. He led a
caliphal expedition in 331/943 that raided the Frankish coast as far as Marseilles,
while another expedition a few years later targeted Byzantine interests in the central
Mediterranean. 54
This last expedition may have been in support of the colony at Fraxinetum. In
942, King Hugh of Provence attacked Fraxinetum in concert with a Byzantine fleet,
initially seeking to eradicate the troublesome pirates and raiders. 55

Hugh was

victorious, but decided to send the Greeks away and sign a pact with the Saracens to
use them against his rival, Beranger. The same year, Hugh avoided an invasion of
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Magyars by providing them with a guide to Spain, where Ibn I:Iayyan noted their
destruction. 56 Ibn Rumal:iis' 331/943 expedition seems then to have been retribution
for Hugh's actions, in support of Fraxinetum, while the Umayyad admiral took
advantage of an expedition against Fatimid al-Mahdiya in 334/945 to also attack
Byzantine targets.57

As late as 334/945 then, the Umayyad fleet was actively

pursuing corsair activities in concert with the Bal:,riyyun communities.
Fraxinetum and Pechina were not the only points in Cordova's newly acquired
network of Mediterranean regions and relays. The Umayyad regime had profitably
applied the same policy of conciliating with cooperative private interests to the
Balearics, definitively bringing the islands under its control through the process of
recognition, assimilation, and appropriation.

The Balearic Islands
The Balearics had escaped direct Cordovan authority during the fitna at the
end of the third/ninth century. After the 234/849 expedition, and the 235/850 treaty,
integration into the Umayyad state was interrupted - if it had ever really begun - and
the Balearics passed back into the dar al-l:,arb. 58 Thus in 290/902, the emir 'Abd

56 Liutprand, Antapodosis, 134; Muqtabis V, 481/361.
57 Al-'UdhrT, 82. The Se/er ha-qabbalah mentions an expedition by Jbn RumaJ:iis against Byzantine
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ha-Qabbalah, 63.
58 P. Guichard, "L'integration des Baleares au pouvoir omeyyade de Cordoue," in Les Jiles orientals
d'al-Andalus i /es seves re/aciones amb Sharq al-Anda/us, Magrib i Europa cristiana (ss. VIII-XIII),
ed. G. Rossell6-Bordoy, (Palma de Mallorca, 1987), 61.
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Allah authorized a privately-led jihad that brought the islands back under Cordova's
influence. 59
'I�am al-KhiwalanI had solicited the emir for permission and aid in taking the
islands, after having stopped there on his pilgrimage to Mecca. 'Abd Allah agreed,
and the expedition resembled the one launched from Pechina around the same time,
since Umayyad naval resources were augmented by the "rich people" accompanying
al-KhiwalanI. Al-KhiwalanI in fact owned the boat he had taken on his hajj, and was
most likely an analogous character to Mubammad b. Rumabis. He belonged to the
Mediterranean maritime culture, perhaps as a member of the Babriyyun community.
Like Ibn Rumabis, al-KhiwalanI adapted to the new political situation, transitioning
from private piracy to state-approved guerre de course, and received the governorship
(wilaya) of the islands. The Umayyad state in return expanded its role in the licit
pirate activities of the coast, while also extending its control over the maritime
provmces.
Pierre Guichard wrote that Cordova's reaction was the simple approval of a
conquest that it would not have been able to carry out itself. 60 Ibn KhiwalanI's
private initiative was certainly rewarded with a government appointment, and
Cordova probably did lack the ability or confidence to undertake such an effort, but
'Abd Allah did recognize and act on the opportunity when it was offered to him,

lbn Khaldun, Kitab al- 'ibar wa-dTwan al-mubtada' wa-al-khabar Ji ayyam al- 'arab wa-al- 'ajam
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investing his own resources to assure its success.61 'Abd Allah's contribution was
most likely essential, since Ibn Khaldun describes a long campaign during which al
KhiwalanT had to conquer the island }:zi�n by }:zi�n. 62 Al-KhiwalanT disposed of
considerable personal resources, but the conquest described was most likely beyond
the means of isolated pirates and sailors. Jihad necessitated caliphal approval, but al
KhiwalanT also needed 'Abd Allah's help to assure a successful invasion.

The

Balearics, like Pechina and Fraxinetum, thus passed back under Cordova's nominal
authority.
AI-KhiwalanT's work did not end with the conquest, and his efforts served his
and Cordova's interests. Ibn Khaldun relates the island's Islamicization through the
construction of mosques and baths, while the establishment of merchant inns (funduq
/ pl. faniidiq) encouraged commerce.

The Balearics were thus different from

Fraxinetum, devoid as it was of urban structures, and the faniidiq indicate a policy of
integrating the islands into the Mediterranean commercial networks and not of relying
solely on piracy.
The Umayyad regime also seems to have been more interested in the
Balearics, perhaps in part because of their proximity. While Fraxinetum remained
part of a military framework under its qa 'id, al-KhiwalanT was named wati of the
islands, to be succeeded by his son who would exercise the wiliiya until leaving for

61 This exploitation of private initiatives by the state is comparable to the early modem use of
mercantile companies. As Joseph Strayer wrote, "The founding of colonies was a conspicuous
example of well-to-do men performing a function that seemed desirable to, but beyond the resources
of, early modern states"; On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State (Princeton, I 970), I 06.
62 lbn K.haldun, Kitab al- 'ibar, 4:353.
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the Orient in 350/961-2.

63

Moreover, 'Abd al-Ral)man III underlined his interest by

naming an 'amil to the islands in 318/930-1. 64 Indeed, although the term waif can be
ambiguous in terms of official responsibilities and subjugation to state authority, the
'amil was a Cordovan fiscal agent, an official representative of Umayyad

administration. Umayyad interest in the islands was not isolated, but was rather part
of 'Abd al-Ral)man Ill's program to expand his influence in the Western
Mediterranean and to consolidate his hold over the Sharq al-Anda/us.
The Balearics served as a supply and meeting point for the caliphal fleet from
then on, while also continuing its role as a major center for privateering. Majorca
became the Umayyad Mediterranean outpost, linking Almeria, the Sharq al-Anda/us
and Fraxinetum. In this role, the Balearics seem to have served along with Tortosa
for Mediterranean campaigns against Christian coasts, and not in conjunction with
attacks against Fatimid North Africa.

Both the 321/933 and 323/935 campaigns

against Frankish targets stopped over in Majorca. 65 During the 323/935 campaign,
the fleet completed preparations in Majorca, continued on to attack Ampurias and
Barcelona, then passed through Tortosa on its return.

The governor ( 'amil) of

Majorca was ordered to allow ships from Italy to pass in 328/940, and was probably
among the "governors of the coasts" ( 'ummal al-sawabil) and "commanders of the
fleet" (quwwad al- 'ustiil) notified of peace with Barcelona the same year. 66 Umayyad
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Mediterranean policy thus relied on the Balearics, and their incorporation into the
state apparatus was essential for its success.
Cordovan control over the islands was not however without problems. When
the new 'amil was named in 321/933, a caliphal fleet was sent along as a preventive
measure.67 The fleet was expedited again in 333/945 to ·accompany the new qcu;ff, and
Cordova sent an expedition in 366/947-8 to suppress an insurrection. 68 'Abd al
Ral)man III named one of his own clients to replace al-KhiwalanT's son as governor
(wall) when he left for the Orient in 350/961.69 Through his nomination of the qar;lf,
'amil and walz, the caliph thus reinforced his fiscal, administrative, military and
juridical control over the islands.

The wati al-Muwaffaq invested considerable

resources in the development of naval structures, and Ibn Khaldun links the
augmentation of the Balearic fleet with attacks on the Frankish coasts.70

The

following lines in the Kitab al- 'ibar describe a series of Umayyad clients and their
Cordovan-supported jihad against the Christian Western Mediterranean. Although on
the periphery of Cordova's centralizing power, a situation that would facilitate their
scission during the fitna, the Umayyad regime knew how to use the Balearics'
position on the maritime frontier to advance its presence in the Mediterranean.
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Control over the Sharq al-Anda/us
The Umayyad regime was able to impose its mamlaka on the coastal regions through
a series of military actions and conquests. A series of caliphal fortifications at first
allowed the state to keep the area under watch, facilitating then its integration into the
Umayyad fiscal and tributary system. The installation of Umayyad power along the
coast passed through the ports and shipyards. On a human level, Cordova was largely
able to assimilate local elites into governmental structures, as seen in Pechina,
Fraxinetum and the Balearics.

This policy allowed Cordova to use the coastal

communities to link continental and Mediterranean networks, to appropriate the
possibilities they offered. Piracy became guerre de course, a source of profit and
power, while awakening Christian ports offered new economic possibilities. Over
time, the Umayyad then 'Amirid regimes intervened more and more in maritime
affairs. Cordova relied on local elites, but also developed a real maritime policy
practiced by its own agents.

Campaigns of conquest and consolidation
Umayyad power extended towards the coasts and Mediterranean networks
along with the reconquest of neighboring dissident zones. Ibn I:Iafsun 's revolt is the
most well known, but at its nadir, Cordovan authority was limited to the city's
surrounding area.

'Abd Allah then 'Abd al-Ra}:iman III had to face not only the

famous muwallad rebel, but also revolts in the Algarve, the Middle and Upper
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Marches, and the Sharq al-Andalus.

71

The regional independence provoked by these

rebellions allowed the development of private and non-state commercial and pirate
networks among littoral and Mediterranean communities. Cordova adapted at first to
these networks and the way they functioned. Recognizing de facto local powers gave
the Umayyads a semblance of authority, while assimilating private initiatives allowed
the regime to extend its influence into areas where its means were limited. Cordova
practiced these methods together with real military and diplomatic campaigns,
integrating the Sharq al-Anda/us into the AndalusT system while also extending its
reach into the Mediterranean.
Less than a century before the fall of the caliphate, the Sharq al-Anda/us was
still vacillating between Cordova and its own interests. The region was the first to
loosen its political ties with Cordova, despite the capital's efforts, conquests, urban
and fortification networks. The Sharq al-Anda/us' entry into the AndalusT system
under 'Abd al-Ra]:iman III's caliphate offered the region better communications with
the rest of the peninsula, without necessarily cutting its ties with the Mediterranean.
Thus, when the caliphate disintegrated at the beginning of the fifth/eleventh century,
Denia and its neighboring taifas could separate from the Umayyad political structure,
while still acting as intermediaries between the peninsula and the sea.
'Abd al-Ra]:iman III brought local elites into the Umayyad system, implanting
the system itself through a fiscal and political administration supported by

71 E. Levi-Proveni;:al, HEM, I :380-388, 2:23-32.

42
fortifications and urban structures. 72

Umayyad efforts to reclaim the Sharq al

Andalus advanced through three major campaigns: in 304/916-7, during the 312/924-

5 expedition against Pamplona, and in 317/929-30.73 Cordova's conquests secured its
control over the AndalusT Mediterranean coastline along with its maritime access and
networks.

Organizational reforms and decrees in Tortosa's districts in 312/924

complemented Pechina's entry into the Umayyad state in 310/921-2. The defeat of
the Banu al-Shaykh in the kf,ra of TudmTr in 316-7/928-9, along with the
repossession of Chinchilla and the }:ii�n of Shan! Bftar secured Cordovan access to the
eastern ports. The following year's expulsion of the Banu Jawshan from Sagunto,
north of Valencia, and Jativa finalized the new caliph's hold over the Sharq al
Andalus.74

The caliphal assimilation of this region, either through conquest or
approbation of fails accomplis, as in the case of Pechina or the Balearics, was
furthered by the nomination of governors ('umma[) in 317/929-30 and 318/930-1.
Ibn I:-Iayyan provides a list of provincial governors for the year 317/929 including the
hira/s of Tortosa, Valencia and Jativa, TudmTr and IlbTra, and mentions the
nomination of a new 'amil for the Balearics in 318/930-1. 75 'Abd al-Rabman III was
thus pursuing a double policy, using non-state structures already in place, adapting
72
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them to his caliphal maritime ambitions, while also imposing Umayyad agents
through which he could govern the provinces. Political and fiscal administration
passed through agents supported by urban and rural structures, sometimes fortified,
while the construction of ports, shipyards and maritime fortifications extended rule to
the shores of the Mediterranean.

The ribat of Guardamar and the assimilation of networks
Al)mad b. Bahlul b. Zarb ordered the construction of a mosque on the site of a
ribaf near Guardamar in 333/944.76 The mosque's construction coincided in fact with
a radical modification of the site.

The ribaf, heretofore only seasonal and

intermittently occupied, was partially destroyed and replaced by a permanent, more
monumental and religious structure. Ceramic indicators demonstrate moreover a
close commercial relationship between the ribaf and regional zones of urban
production during this second phase.77 The ribaf of Guardamar reflects the spread of
Cordovan influence through local elites as well as the concomitant urbanization and
Islamicization of the kura of TudmTr.
The recently published definitive study of the caliphal ribaf of Guardamar
reevaluates the role of these structures in the religious, commercial and political life
of the Mediterranean coasts.78

Long seen as a means of improving coastal

C. Barcel6, La Escritura arabe en el pafs valenciano. Jnscripciones monumentales, vol. 2
(Valencia, 1998), 128-9; C. Barcel6, "Los escritos arabes de la Rabita de Guardamar," El ribat califal,
134.
77 R. Azuar Ruiz, "De ribaf a rabita," El riba\ califal, 229-30.
78
El ribat califal.
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surveillance through the establishment of pious warrior communities, these sites were
in fact initially built through private commercial and religious initiatives.79

An

analysis of the different known ribiit/s in the Western Mediterranean points to their
commercial functions, indicated by their position at the junction of land and maritime
communications.

The maritime communities handily exploited the mercantile

possibilities of sites like Guardamar and San Carles de la Rapita near Tortosa, both of
which were at the mouth of rivers: the Segura for Guardamar and the Ebro for San
Carles.so During a period of limited urbanization, these ribiit!s served as centers of
exchange for rural communities without access to the commercial structures typical
of the urban world. Gutierrez Lloret in fact linked the extinction of Guardamar with
the abandonment of qurii in the Lower Segura following the restructuration of the
region around the city of Orihuela, a pole ofUmayyad caliphal urban society.s 1
Ribiitls also played an active role in the Islamicization of littoral zones. While
the cultural Islamicization of the Lower Segura preceded the ribiit of Guardamar,
Gutierrez Lloret ties its "important religious significance" to its role in regional
proselytism.s2 In fact, from the beginning Guardamar was characterized by decidedly
devotional grouped settlements whose religious nature only increased over time.s3 As

M.J. Rubiera Mata, La Taifa de Denia, 39; C. Martinez Salvador, "Sobre la entidad de la rabita
andalusi omeya. Una cuesti6n de terminologia: ribaf, rabita y zawiya," El ribat ca/ifal, 175; P.
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R. Azuar Ruiz succinctly explains, the ribiif was simultaneously mercantile and
religious, dedicated to commerce and the expansion oflslam.
State dynamics did not establish the ribiif, rather it was part of the
"development of routes and commercial relays that characterized the coasts of al
Andalus at the end of the third/ninth and beginning of the fourth/tenth centuries."84
This pious and mercantile settlement was thus part of the same dynamic that saw the
establishment of communities in Tenes, Pechina and Fraxinetum. Moreover, as with
Pechina and Fraxinetum, the Umayyad state assimilated these private independent
structures by including members ofthe Bal:zriyyi'in elite in the Cordovan system.
Cordova seems to have followed a specific policy in its relations with the
maritime communities of Pechina and Guardamar. This policy becomes clear in light
of hypotheses presented by Patrice Cressier concerning the Banii Bahliil. 85 Cressier is
able to reconstruct the clan, linking the founder of the third/ninth-century mosque at
the MaghribT ribiit in Massa, Bahliil, with two Cordovan market inspectors between
302/914-5 and 313/925-6, A}:imad b. I:IabTb b. Bahliil and A}:imad b. Bahliil, the Ibn
Bahliil who minted imitation Aghlabidfuhis in Pechina in 303/915-6, 305/917-8 and
306/918-9, and finally the A}:imad b. Bahliil b. Zarb who ordered the restoration of the
Guardamar mosque in 333/944. 86 Cressier points out the difficulty of clearly linking
on the one hand the possibly Shiite Bahliil from Massa and A}:imad b. Bahliil b.
Zarb's "unorthodox" ribiit with the Cordovan !iiil:zib/s al-suq dependent on the
84
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Umayyad regime on the other. Nevertheless, he explains that this hypothesis does
coincide with the "progressive expansion of the Cordovan state's control over a group
of initiatives and processes created outside its own environment."87
Indeed, Cordova's engagement with local elements under 'Abd Allah and
'Abd al-Ral)man III was a blend of both public and private, and its control over
outlying regions remained imprecise. The Banu Bahlul provide in fact an example of
how the Umayyad state managed its relations with these networks and gradually
incorporated them into its own dynamics.
The link between the ribiif of Massa, a pious and commercial settlement, and
the port of Pechina, itself founded on the site of a ribiif by merchant sailors, makes
sense given relations between Western Mediterranean maritime communities. Like
Tenes, Guardamar was established as a seasonal colony on a site chosen for its
commercial potential.

TudmTr maintained closer economic and even religious

relations with North Africa than with Cordova: under 'Abd Allah and 'Abd alRal)man III, the 'ulamii' of the region studied not in Cordova, but in Qayrawan, Mi�r,
and Medina. 88 There was thus a communications network that included the ribiifls
and ports of Massa, Pechina and Guardamar, along with Fraxinetum, Mayurqa and
the different AndalusT colonies along the African coast.

It remains to be seen,

however, how the state was able to recuperate this network created beyond its reach
by independent maritime communities.
P. Cressier, "De un ribii! a otro," 217.
M. Fierro and M. Marin, "La islamizaci6n de las ciudades andalusies a traves de sus ulemas (s.
II/VIII - comienzos s. IV/X)," in Genese de la ville islamique en al-Anda/us et au Maghreb occidental,
ed. P. Cressier and M. Garcia-Arena] (Madrid, 1998), 73-4.
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'Abd Allah's approval of the Babriyyun choice for governor in 276/889-90
shows perhaps Cordova 's inability to install its own agent in Pechina. Nevertheless,
it also marks a renewal of Umayyad involvement in littoral matters. Cordova was
able to gradually appropriate regional power by accepting the governors nominated
by the Babriyyun and intervening in local affairs when requested. In this way, the
networks built by coastal communities remained intact, while local elites, such as
Mu!Jammad b. Ruma!Jis, kept their power while also integrating AndalusT political
society.
This process explains the dispersion of, and roles played by, members of the
Barn} Bahliil from Massa to Pechina, Cordova, and Guardamar. Bahliil, possibly
descended from an Islamicized family from the Upper March, was important enough
to found the mosque in Massa. 8 9 Circulation between Massa and Pechina would have
been logical, especially given the mercantile nature of both sites.

In fact, this

circulation, involving the MaghribT, IfrTqiyan, and AndalusT coasts, explains the
imitation Aghlabid ju/us minted at Pechina by Ibn Bahliil between 303/915-6 and
306/918-9. Pechina was not necessarily rejecting Umayyad rule with these pieces no rebellions are mentioned for Pechina after 303/915-690

-

but was simply

responding to local fiduciary needs. Despite its growing political ties with Cordova,
Pechina was still part of an economic zone dominated by Mediterranean markets, in
which IfrTqiyan coins were the common currency.
89 Cressier tentatively relates Bahliil to Bahlul b. Marzuk, who had rebelled against al-tlakam I in the
Upper March around 184/800; P. Cressier, "De un ribiit a otro," 216, n. 76; E. Levi-Provern;:al, HEM,
1: 154-6.
90 Muqtabis V, 111-2.
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The relationship between the Ibn Bahlul whose name appears on the Pechina
Ju/us and the two Cordovan market inspectors mentioned in 302/914-5 and 313/925-6
is not evident. However, one of the chief responsibilities of the �abib al-suq was
monetary vigilance, involving an awareness of mercantile needs and monetary
supply.91 Market inspectors could also head the official mint (al-sikka), as in the case
of Yabya b. 'Abd Allah b. Yunis al-Muradi under 'Abd al-Ra}:iman III.92 It is
possible then, as suggested by Patrice Cressier and S. Fontenla Ballesta, that the lbn
Bahlul on the Pechinafitlus is in fact the A}:imad b. Bahlul named as market inspector
in Cordova in 313/925-6.93
This member of the Banu Bahlul acted then as an intermediary between the
Umayyad and Mediterranean worlds.

His authority was probably similar to the

governor's, chosen by the local elite and approved by Cordova. A}:imad b. Bahul
illustrates then the independence of coastal communities, but also the way in which
Cordova could lean on and assimilate the leaders of those communities, thereby
absorbing their human and material resources.
Abmad b. Bahlul continued to combine the interests of Cordova and his own
milieu after quitting his functions as market inspector. We can most likely identify
him with the person of the same name who ordered the reconstruction of the mosque
at Guardamar in 333/944. Coinciding radical modifications transformed the ribaf
from a simple seasonal trading and religious post to a pole for the spread of Islamic
P. Chalmeta, El "seiior de! zoco" (Madrid, 1973), 373.
P. Chalmeta, El "senor de! zoco ", 375.
93
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material and urban culture.

The homogenous ceramic material from this second

phase of occupation points to close commercial ties with workshops in Murcia and
Elche. 94

Sonia Gutierrez Lloret notes in fact a technological and decorative

standardization throughout TudmTr at this time, and associates it with the integration
of rural communities in urban networks as part of the overall process of caliphal
expansion. 95 Thus through Abmad b. Bahul's intennediary status between the state
and maritime communities, Guardamar was brought into the Umayyad commercial
and cultural network, serving even as a point of diffusion for the extension of
Cordovan interests in the region.
Guardamar's reconstruction was probably also part of Umayyad maritime
policy, linked to the need to watch over the AndalusT coasts. Even if the site was
originally established for non-strategic commercial and religious reasons, the second
phase of occupation coincides with important changes in Cordova's relationship with
the sea. The ribiit itself was not fortified, but it did occupy an ideal site for coastal
surveillance at a time when the caliphate was moving to counter Fatimid power in the
Mediterranean. Without denying its civilian mercantile functions, the ribiit could
serve a strategic purpose.

Christophe Picard underlines the general association

between these structures and the need to defend ports and estuaries in correlation with

94 J.L. Menendez Fueyo, "La ceramica de la rabita califal," El ribat califal, 127-30.
95 S. Gutierrez Lloret, La cora de Tudmfr, 188, 310; "Ciudades y conquista. El fin de las ciudades
visigodas y la genesis de las mudun islamicas del sureste de al-Andalus," in Genese de la ville
islamique en al-Anda/us et au Maghreb occidental, ed. P. Cressier and M. Garcia-Arena( (Madrid,
1998), 156-7.
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the Viking threat, the Fatimids, and expansionist Umayyad policies for North
Africa. 96
Guardamar seems in fact to have been part of a larger program of Umayyad
maritime policy aimed at recuperating independent coastal sites for use in its
Mediterranean campaigns. The same year that Al)mad b. Bahlul began construction
on the mosque, most likely acting under Umayyad authority, the shipyards in Tortosa
were expanded and brought under caliphal authority.97 These actions themselves
coincide with a period of intense maritime conflict with the Fatimids in which navies
from both sides captured ships and raided principal ports.98

Guardamar's

reconstruction was then a defensive component in a larger offensive maritime policy
against the Fatimids.
The Banu Bahlul and the Banu Rumal)is underline Cordova's flexible use of
local notable families in a policy that largely blurred the line between public and
private affairs. Thus, Mul)ammad b. Rumal)is had led private Babriyyun elements in
Umayyad expeditions before leading those same elements as admiral and governor of
the kura of IlbTra. In the same way, the reconstruction of the riba! of Guardamar was
sponsored by another member of this maritime elite who had also served in an
important post in the caliphal administration. Al)mad b. Bahlul's action no doubt

96 C. Picard, La mer, 149-151; R. Azuar Ruiz, "Atalayas, almenaras y rabitas," in Al-Anda/us y el
Meditemineo (Malaga, 1995), 74.
97 E. Levi-Provern;:al, Inscriptions arabes d'Espagne (Leiden-Paris, 1931), I :83-4.
98 Al-'Udhr1, 82; lbn KhaIdun, Kitiib al- 'ibar, I :454, 4:46; al-Nu'man, Kitiib iftitii/:1 al-da 'wa, ed. F.
Dachroui (Tunis, 1975), 336; al-Nu'man, Kitiib al-majii/is w'al-musiiyariit, ed. M. Yalaoui (Beirut,
1996), 179
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served personal needs, but he was also aware of Cordova's strategic interests in the
site.
The Umayyad caliphate under 'Abd al-Ra}:iman III developed then an
ambitious policy that brought the coastal provinces under its authority, maintaining
them as an active frontier against Christendom and the Fatimid threat and exploiting
their commercial potential.
Commercial Policy and Treaties with the Christian West
The coastal fortifications and shipyards, in conjunction with the different expeditions
against the Christian coasts give a first impression of a policy of violence based on
religious and sectarian conflict. Yet, towards the middle of the century, Cordovan
aims began to shift. Now stable in the Sharq al-Anda/us, the Umayyad regime moved
to exploit the economic resources of the coastal zones. This meant in part continuing
the naval raids against Christendom, a source of booty and especially slaves, but it
also meant a move towards commercial exchange with those same regions. The
expansion of Umayyad power in the Western Mediterranean through coastal
installations, the Balearics and Fraxinetum gave Cordova the power to dictate treaties
to Christian powers seeking access to Mediterranean sea lanes and Iberian markets.
The caliphate thus doubly profited from its newly developed maritime infrastructures,
imposing Islamic hegemony over the sea while also encouraging the integration of
AndalusI ports in Mediterranean economic networks.
This new economic policy set in gradually, and did not in fact halt jihad and
maritime raids against Christian coasts. Nevertheless, there is a clear pattern of

accommodation with the West, and a desire to protect burgeoning relations between
AndalusI and Christian markets. Thus, even while continuing to expand its maritime
presence through military and naval actions, Cordova was also defining its frontiers
and political space through treaties.

Peace treaties
'Abd al-Ral:iman III seems to have developed this double policy from fairly
early on in his caliphate. Once Umayyad naval power was established, he did not
solely seek to use it as an offensive tool, but consciously applied it to impose
beneficial diplomatic relations. The caliph ordered the fleet to anchor off the coast of
Barcelona in 328/940 to help encourage the count Sufi.er to negotiate peace with
Cordova.99 The same year, Abd al-Ral:iman III received a delegation from Hugh of
Provence in seeking safe-conduct for his merchants to conduct business in al
Andalus. ' 00

The possible reading of "Arles" for the delegation's provenance

underlines the considerable effects of Fraxinetum's pirate activities along the coast of
Provence, explaining the specific mention of the colony's qa 'id among those
concerned by the negotiations. 101 The caliph ordered his coastal governors, those
responsible for pursuing the guerre de course against the Christian coasts, to allow
Hugh's merchants and ships peaceful access to al-Andalus. He also commanded his
99 Muqtabis V, 454.
It is not clear whether Hugh's agents were already in Barcelona and profited from the situation to
negotiate their own treaty, or whether this involved separate diplomatic efforts.
101
Muqtabis V, 454, n. 3. Hugh's attack two years later on Fraxinetum indicates that the qii 'id Nasr
b. AJ:imad was in fact not honoring the terms of the treaty.
100
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naval forces to avoid Sufier's lands and honor the peace signed with his subjects.

102

While negotiations with Barcelona equally concerned Iberian politics and the need to
manage recalcitrant Pamplona, Ibn I:Iayyan highlights the commercial implications of
the treaty with Hugh: "Their boats began to come to al-Andalus from that time, and
they profited greatly." 103
'Abd al-Ral)man Ill's desire to balance naval aggression and maritime
commerce 1s again evident in the arrival at the caliphal court of merchants from
Amalfi in 330/942. 104

Ibn I:Iayyan writes that such a thing would have been

impossible before the caliph's reign, and that all involved, both the merchants and the
caliph, benefited from the relations codified by the treaty. Amalfitan merchants
became so common in al-Andalus in fact that Ibn I:Iayyan designates them by name,
MaljiyyTn or MaljafiinTn, and not simply Riim.

Thus, only two years before

establishing the caliphal shipyards in Tortosa and the ribii! in Guardamar, 'Abd al
Ral)man III was defining the acceptable limits for AndalusI pirates.
The Amalfitans were not the only merchants to benefit from Cordova's new
policy.

An ambassador from Sardinia accompanied another Amalfitan group in

August of 330/942 to ask for peace and friendship from the Umayyad court. 105
Sardinia was one of the principal points of passage for ships in the Western
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Mediterranean, connecting al-Andalus and Sicily and linking the Tyrrhenian and
Provenc;;al ports. The island was thus a common target for both North-African and
AndalusT pirates who regularly disrupted Christian navigation along its sea-lanes.
The Fatimid fleet, for example, attacked the island on its way back from an
expedition against Genoa in 323/934-5, harassing Ri'im ships coming from Spain. 106
A few years earlier, a Byzantine fleet chased pirates from Fraxinetum back to their
homeport, having probably encountered them in Sard waters. 107 With their safe
conduct pass, the Amalfitans would have passed through Sardinia on their way to al
Andalus, easily convincing the Sards of the advantages of signing a treaty with
Cordova.
Cordova continued to define diplomatically its dominant position m the
Western Mediterranean, signing treaties with Guy of Tuscany and the Pope (.yafzib
Riima). 108

The Tuscan embassy illustrates not only the geographic extent of the

AndalusT pirates, but also the renewal of maritime activities in ports such as Pisa that
would later play an essential role in Denia's commercial networks. The Pisans in fact
began their reintegration of Mediterranean shipping as early as the beginning of the
tenth century, since one of the first events mentioned in the city's annals is the
expulsion of the Saracen colony at Garigliano in 915. 109 Following the coast to the
lucrative Sicilian and Calabrian markets, the Pisans necessarily had to face the
Garigliano pirates, and their elimination certainly facilitated Pisan maritime
lbn al-AthTr, al-Kiimil ft-l-tiir1kh, 4:568/52; ldrTs, Tiir1kh al-khulafo ', 262; Liudprand,
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107
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commerce.

Guy's delegate to Cordova may have been seeking protection from

Fraxinetum's pirates, but Pisan commercial ambitions for AndalusT markets may have
also played a role.110
Philippe Senac has highlighted the convergence of treaties and diplomatic
envoys in the Cordovan court in the last years of 'Abd al-Ra}:iman Ill's reign.111 In
addition to those mentioned, embassies were also exchanged with Constantinople and
the court of Otto I. Senac argues for an evolution in Cordova's maritime policy, and
a choice to favor commercial relations over piracy.112 While this may be true, and
traces of AndalusT pirate activities in the second half of the fourth/tenth century are
scant, the expansion of Cordova's naval capacity, and its use of the fleet in
conjunction with diplomatic negotiations indicates that more than commerce was
involved. The agreement signed in 328/940 with Sufi.er for example was coerced, and
the presence of the caliphal fleet in Barcelona's harbor convinced the Catalan count
that it was in his best interests to cooperate. The treaty signed was not simply
commercial, allowing Catalan merchants to circulate, but imposed a regular tribute
payment and the cancellation of a marital alliance with Pamplona. The treaty signed
with Hugh of Provence is not as explicitly described, but 'Abd al-Ra}:iman III most
likely demanded tributary payments in exchange for allowing Hugh's ships to

110 The papal delegation seems to have been in Cordova to secure relics. Al-'Udhr1 (p. 7) mentions a
papal envoy in 350/960-1 asking for access to an olive tree that flowered every Christmas.
111 Ph. Senac, "Contribution a I' etude des relations diplomatiques entre I'Espagne musulmane et
!'Europe au X e siecle: le regne de 'Abd Ar-Rahman lil (912-961)," Studia islamica, 61 (1985): 45-55;
Ph. Senac, "Note sur !es relations diplomatiques entre !es comtes de Barcelone et le califat de Cordoue
au X e siecle," in Histoire et archeologie des terres catalanes au Mayen Age, ed. Ph. Senac (Perpignan,
1995), 87-102.
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circulate unmolested, as was likely the case with Guy of Tuscany as well. The
Umayyad regime was allowing Christian merchants access to its markets, but it was
also asserting its dominant position and the dominant position of Islam, relegating the
Christian powers of the Western Mediterranean to tributary status.
The treaties do not signify, moreover, that the guerre de course against
Christian shipping stopped. Negotiations involved the subjects and ships of specific
polities, and did not in any way involve blanket protection for merchants or other
sailors. 'Abd al-Ral)man III ordered his governors and fleet commanders to respect
Sufier's people and territory, while Ibn I:Iayyan's description of the treaty signed with
Hugh implies only safe-conduct for merchants peacefully entering al-Andalus. These
terms in fact recall a third/ninth-century fatwa published by Mohamed Taibi:
As for Christian ships that come [towards us], whether they be near or far
from port, it is not permitted to capture them if they are known to have
commercial relations with Muslims, unless they are in their own waters or are
heading towards a land that is not Islamic. If the ship is not publicly known to
specialize in commerce with Muslims, its capture is licit.113
Abd al-Ral)man Ill's diplomacy then did not end piracy, but incorporated it as a tool
in his greater Mediterranean policy of Umayyad hegemony, both political and
economic.
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Piracy, guerre de course, and commerce
Fraxinetum continued to operate as a corsair colony until 974, despite
Cordova's assurances and directives. One of the colony's most famous actions in fact
was the capture of the Abbot Maieul of Cluny in 972. 114

'Abd al-Ral).man III

considered in fact a request by Otto I around 950 for friendship and an end to
Fraxinetum's activities as an insult to his court and to Islam, though he may have later
accepted the German emperor's offer. 115 It is also possible that the embassies sent by
Constantinople and Otto II to al-I:Iakam II's court in 361/972 and 363/974 were in
relation to the colony's continued perturbation of roads and sea-lanes. 116 At the least,
they must have sought the renewal of the maritime agreements implicating
Fraxinetum signed under 'Abd al-Ral).man III.
Latin sources do not mention Saracen raids in the second half of the
fourth/tenth century, but this does not mean that Cordova abandoned piracy as a state
tool. Ibn Khaldun lists a series of governors for the Balearics beginning in 350/961
until thefitna, with each actively pursuing maritimejihad. 117 The central regime may
have sought to promote mercantile exchange with the Christians, but the provincial
governors seem to have exercised an at least limited margin of choice. In addition, an
eighth/fourteenth century text cites the qa 'id al-ba/:zr, or admiral of the fleet, as one of
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the three most important men in the caliphate, sharing royal power along with the
qa(iz of Cordova and the governor of the Upper March.118 Such power would not
come from a purely defensive role, no more than the governor of the Upper March
only sought to defend his borders against the Christian North. Despite the treaties
signed, the caliphal fleet most likely still carried out maritime raids analogous to the
yearly suwa 'if led against the Spanish Christian territories to assure their continued
cooperation and tributary status. The absence of data on this period, and especially
on any major excursions like those in 324/935 and 328/940 would, however, indicate
that Cordova selectively applied its naval force, aiming principally at ships on the
highs seas or non-tributary targets.
Moreover, even after signing the treaty with Barcelona and Hugh of Provence,
'Abd al-Ra]:iman III ordered the expansion of the naval facilities in Tortosa in
333/944-5, illustrating the balanced use of maritime coercion. An inscription built
into the Tortosa cathedral walls commemorates the establishment there of a caliphal
dar al-�ina 'a. 119 Tortosa was only a secondary port, and its qa 'id was subject to the
authority of Almeria, but it did play an important role in maritime relations with the
Christian coasts. The port had already served for the expeditions in 321/932-3 and
323/934-5, and continued in this role for the expedition that supported negotiations
with Barcelona in 328/939-40. Mu]:iammad b. Ruma]:iis left Almeria with only two
ships, but was joined in Tortosa by ten war ships, two galleons and two other boats.120
E. Levi-Proveni;:al, L 'Espagne musulmane au X' siecle (Paris, 1932), 85; Ibn Samak, al-Zahriit al
manthfira Ji al-nukat al-akhbiir al-mii 'thflrah, ed. M. MakkT (Cairo, 2003), 129.
119
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118
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The following year, the people of Tortosa petitioned the caliph to reduce their fiscal
contributions because of their active role on the frontier with the Christians. 121
Tortosa was in fact ideally located for this role. The plentiful supply of wood in
Tortosa's hinterland helps explain the caliphal shipyards, while al-RazT confirms that
the port was on the main sea route between al-Andalus and the Franks.122 Cordova
thus continued to develop its naval power over the course of the century, but
channeled its use to support political ambitions that did not necessarily always
involve conflict with its Christian counterparts. Caliphal shipyards and fleets could
enforce as well as participate in the new political and commercial order.
The Umayyad regime supported the development of local coastal facilities
between Almeria and Tortosa, continuing to extend state control over maritime
elements in less important ports.

The treaties signed in 328/940 implicated the

commanders of the fleet and governors of the coastal ports, but do not specifically
mention Denia. Al-RazT did write however in the fourth/tenth century that Denia's
port was "very good and very old", indicating that it may have been among the ports
included in the 'Abd al-Ral)man Ill's missive. 123 Nevertheless, there is no sign of any
real development of Denia's port or any other improvement in its infrastructures
before the fifth/eleventh century. Ships passing through Denia probably anchored in
what was left of the Roman port, the same port that acted as a maritime outlet for
Ondara and its hinterland. The taifa of Denia was thus built on an ensemble of
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regional elements developed by the caliphate, but necessitated nevertheless the
convergence of those elements under Mujahid's political ambitions.
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CHAPTER II

THE RISE OF THE 'AMIRIDS AND BIRTH OF THE MULUKAL-TAWA'IF
The 'Amirids, al-Man�ur b. AbT 'AmTr and his sons, did not radically change the
policies developed under 'Abd al-Ral)man III and al-I:Iakam II. The ba}ib al-Man�ur
was careful to maintain a continuity that would legitimize his position and effective
usurpation of power, preserving the balance between commerce and guerre de course
but also relegating maritime affairs to secondary status. Nevertheless, over the course
of the 'Amirid regime, certain developments directly affected the future taifa of
Denia.

First of all, al-Man�ur extended his regime's control over the Sharq a/

Anda/us and strategic maritime structures, making way for the 'Amirids' own
Saqaliba clients, placing them in key positions, notably in the Sharq al-Anda/us.
Mujahid was one of the most important of the 'Amirid clients under al-Man�ur and
'Abd al-Malik, and his actions at the beginning of the fitna were a continuation of his
responsibilities under the erstwhile regime. Mujahid was able to construct a new
polity out of the fallen caliphate, but he also had to contend with his former 'Amirid
companions and the internal dynamics of the Siqlabf group partly determined the
long-term development and survival of his taifa. Lastly, the fragmentation of caliphal
power and territory during the fitna led to profound issues of legitimacy for the taifa
kingdoms that inherited that power, influencing traditional views of the state and
political territory.
61

'AMIRID MEDITERRANEAN POLICY

Coastal resources and territorial control
The 'Amirid regime, like the Umayyad administration whose power it usurped, was
primarily land-based, and the sea remained a peripheral, though non-negligible,
concern. The death of al-I:Iakam II, and the minority of his son Hisham II, opened the
way for al-Man�ur's carefully orchestrated seizure of effective power. As part of this
plan, the /:ziijib used a combination of client administrators and loyal local notables for
regional maritime activities, taking particular caution in regards to the position of the
qii 'id al-ba/:zr.
Al-Man�ur's po1sonmg of the admiral 'Abd al-Ral)man b. al-Rumal)is in
369/980 was m fact one in a senes of similar actions that followed Hisham II's
ascension in 365/976. 1 The Banu Rumal)is were part of the AndalusT Arab elite, and
had consciously used their position as ship owners and outfitters to tie their destiny to
the Umayyad regime and its maritime policies.2

'Abd al-Ral)man b. Rumal)is's

position at the summit of state power must have threatened al-Man�ur's plans on
more than one level. The Kitiib al-Zahra! al-manthfira describes the qii 'id al-bal:zr as
one of the three most influential members of the caliphal administration, ascribing to

1 E. Levi-Provenc;al, /-/EM, 2:262; Fragments historiques sur !es Berberes au Mayen-Age. Extrait
inedits d'un recueil anonyme compile en 712-13 I2 et intitule Kitab mafakhir al-Barbar, ed. E. Levi
Provenc;al (Rabat, 1934), 18-9.
2 M. Meouak traces the Banii Rumal:iis' genealogy to the Kinana tribe and links members of the
family to the Umayyad regime as early as the Damascene caliphate: "Les Banii Rumal:iis et !es Banii
Tumlus, fonctio1maires au service de l'Etat hispano-umayyade," in £studios onomastico-biograficos de
al-Anda/us (familias andalusies), V, ed. M. Marin and J. Zan6n (Madrid: 1992), 274-80; Pouvoir
souverain, administration central et elites politiques dans l'Espagne umayyade (11"-lV"/Vlll"-X"
siecles) (Helsinki, 1999), 152-5.
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him almost exclusive authority over maritime activities.

3
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In addition, the Banu

Rumabis were fervent supporters of the Umayyads and members of the Arab military
aristocracy that al-Man$iir wished to oust from power to preserve his own. Thus, and
like the generals Ja'far b. al-Musbafi and Ghalib b. 'Abd al-Rab.man whom al-Man$iir
eliminated, Ibn Rumabis was a potential obstacle. 4 The admiral's assassination thus
removed a potential rival and opened the post to a trusted 'Amirid sympathizer.
Al-Man$iir entrusted Abmad b. Mubammad b. 'Arns with lbn Rumabis'
responsibilities.5 Ibn 'Arns had been qa<fi of Ecija, then sa/:zib al-shurta, when he
saved the young Hisham II's life during an attack organized by al-Man$iir's enemies
in 368/979.6 Named as qa 'id al-ba/:zr the following year, lbn 'Arns also received the
Banu Rumabis' fortune, effectively ending the clan's access to power.7 lbn 'Ab1
'Amir thus ensured the loyal cooperation of one of the most important caliphal
vizierates, thereby gaining essential control over the caliphal fleet.
Al-Man$iir notably used the fleet on two occasions in his raids against the
Christian North. The fleet had been necessary to transport troops and supplies from
Alcacer do Sal to Porto during the famous expedition against Santiago de Compostela
in 387/997, although the fleet did not serve in the attack itself. 8 Ten years earlier, al-

3 lbn Samak, al-Zahriit al-manthi7ra fi al-nukat al-akhbiir al-mii 'thi7rah, 129; E. Levi-Provens;al,
Espagne musulmane au X' siecle, 85
4 On the elimination of these two generals, see E. Levi-Provens;al, HEM, 2:212-220, 222-233.
5
Fragments historiques sur les Berberes, 19
6 lbn J:lazm, Naqf al- 'arits, Textos Medievales, 39, ed. C.F. Seybold (Valencia, 1974), 173; lbn al
Abbar, Kitiib al-l:n1lla al-siyarii ', ed. H. Mones (Cairo, 1964), I :279-80.
7 Fragments historiques sur !es Berberes, 19.
8 lbn 'ldharT, Bayiin, 2:295/492; E. Levi-Provenr;:al, HEM, 2:246-50.
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Man�ur used the fleet in an equally spectacular raid against Barcelona, whose port
provided access for the ships and the troops they transported.9
The Barcelona expedition did not follow the most direct route from Cordova
through Medinaceli and the Upper March, but instead passed through the Sharq a/
Anda/us. There are no indications ofregional dissent at this time, but just as 'Abd al
Ral)man Ill's passage had in 312/924 on the way to Pamplona, al-Man�ur's path
allowed him to solidify regional support for his rule. While in Tudmir, the l:zajib, his
entourage and army were sumptuously received by a local dignitary, Ibn Khattab, for
two or three weeks.10 The Banu Khattab were perhaps descendants of Theodomir
himself, and their Visigothic ancestry demonstrates the persistent existence ofa local
elite that had preserved its power by playing on Cordova's distance vis-a-vis the
region.11 Ibn Khattab was a Marwanid client, but his generosity towards al-Man�ur
shows an ability to adapt to changing times. His exceptional generosity attracted the
l:zajib's favor and convinced him ofhis loyalty. Al-Man�ur compensated Ibn Khattab
by placing the 'ummal ofthe kfira ofTudmir under his authority, and naming his son,
Abu al-A�bagh Musa b. Khattab, qaefi of Valencia, Ondara, Tortosa, and the
Balearics.12
9

Musa reaffirmed his family's loyalty a few years later when he

lbn al-Abbar, Kitab al-bu/la al-siyara ·, 2:311-2; lbn al-KhaFb, al-1/:,atah fi akhbar Gharnafah, ed.
M. 'A. '!nan (Cairo, 1973), 2:105-6; M. Sanchez Martinez, "La expedici6n de Al-Man�ur contra
Barcelona en el 985 segun las fuentes arabes," in Catalunya i Fran9a meridional a /'entorn de I'any
mil = la Cata!ogne et la France meridionale autour de !'an mil. Contribucions de/ co!.!oqui
internaciona! Hugues Capet 987-1987. la France de /'an mil, Barcelona 2-5, Julio! 1987, eds. X.
Barra( i Altet et al (Barcelona, 1991), 294.
10
Ibn al-Abbar, Kitab al-bulla a!-siyara ·, 2:311-3; Ibn al-Khatib, al-Iha/ah Ji akhbar Gharnafah,
2:106; Al-'Udhri, 15-6.
11
lbn Khattab's ancestor, 'Abd al-Jabbar b. Khattab b. Nadir, an Umayyad client, had arranged the
marriage between his son and the daughter of Theodomir; al-'Udhri, 15.
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welcomed with equal generosity Taraka, 'Abd al-Malik al-Muz;affar's client. Al
Man�ur's passage through the Sharq al-Anda/us was thus the occasion to solicit the
recognition of the local aristocracy for his power and dynasty before enrolling them
in his administration.

Saqaliba: agents of'Amirid policy
Al-Man�ur did not however rely uniquely on the cooperation of local elites for his
governmental needs. Over the course of his reign, and through those of his sons, Slav
slaves and clients or Saqaliba, performed many of the essential roles in the 'Amirid
regime.

The Umayyads, then al-Man�ur, despite his initial apprehensions,

increasingly relied on loyal client servants in key positions of power. Palace Saqaliba
had opposed Ibn 'A.hi 'Amir's move to usurp the young caliph, Hisham II's political
power and the bajib subsequently relied principally on his Berber allies. After a time
however, al-Man�ur began to build his own group of loyal Slav servants, first at
Madinat al-Zahira, then in strategic and sensitive positions throughout al-Andalus.13
These clients were particularly important in the Sharq al-Anda/us, where al-Man�ur
and especially his sons used Slav agents to execute their rule in these outlying regions
with a history of equivocal ties to Cordova.
Al-Man�ur assigned the wilaya over the Balearics to one of his own mawati,
Muqatil, knowing that the Islands' distance from the capital and recent Islamicization

13

E. Levi-Provern;:al, HEM, 2:279.
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necessitated a strong state presence.

14

'Abd al-Ral)man III had replaced 'Abd Allah,

the son of 'I�am al-KhiwalanI, with his own maw/a, al-Muwaffaq, in 350/961-2, and
al-I:Iakam II named his client, Kawthar, to the post in 358/958-9. Kawthar's death in
389/998-9 opened the way for the 'Amirid client Muqatil, who governed the Islands
until the early part of the fitna.
Muqatil's governorship coincided with an upsurge in maritime aggression,
and indicates the 'Amirids' use of their mawalT administrators to implement military
and political policy. The Balearic Islands, especially after the fall of Fraxinetum,
represented an AndalusI outpost on the maritime frontier. As in the continental
frontier provinces, the Balearic governors were probably charged with leading jihad
under their own initiative within limits set by Cordova.15 These governors thus
practiced a policy of maritime jihad, though perhaps hampered by the treaties signed
with Christian envoys.

Ibn Khaldiin notes, moreover, that Muqatil enjoyed the

support of al-Man�iir and his son in hisjihiid. 16 A few years later, in 396/1006, 'Abd
al-Malik al-Muzaffar received a Byzantine embassy that presented him with AndalusI
sailors taken prisoner off the coasts of Sardinia and Corsica carrying out the guerre de
course ordered by al-Muzaffar and commanded by Muqatil.17 The sailors' capture
may, in fact, be linked with a Saracen attack on Pisa in 1004 mentioned in the town
annals, indicating how far afield AndalusI pirates ventured.18

14

lbn Khaldun, Kitab al- 'ibar, 4:353.
Note that al-Mawardi cites this as one of the responsibilities of frontier emirs; Les Statuts
gouvernementaux, French trans. E. Fagnan (Algiers, 1915), 65.
16 Ibn Khaldun, Kitab al- 'ibar, 4:353.
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Basil !I's Rfim embassy to 'Abd al-Malik sheds light in fact on the multiple
facets of 'Amirid maritime policy, guided by economic, diplomatic, and military
interests. Ibn I:Iayyan states that the envoy requested a peaceful alliance, a request
that greatly pleased 'Abd al-Malik, and so we can assume that the peace treaty was
granted. The treaty signed with the Sardinian representative in 330/942 is mentioned
above, and embassies were exchanged between Constantinople and Cordova between
336/947-8 and 343/954-5, and again in 360/972.19 Treaties signed with Byzantium
may have been allowed to lapse, and the 396/1006 envoy seems to have been
intended to renew them. It would seem then that the 'Amirids continued Cordova's
policy of balancing the profits from protecting trade through treaties, with the
political and military benefits of naval aggression.
The 'Amirids trusted their Saqaliba agents to carry out this policy and impose
their regime as provincial governors and administrators. Muqatil was not the only
'Amirid client entrusted with these responsibilities: at his death, al-Man�ur counted
on seven principal officers, while his son, 'Abd al-Malik, raised that number to
twenty-six.20 Among these, many of the more important were at one time or another
dispatched to the Sharq al-Anda/us. Notably, Wa<;lib governed in Jativa, Mujahid in
Tortosa and Valencia, and Khayran in Alrneria.21 In Valencia, the 'Amirid mawati

19 Ph. Senac, "Contribution a l'etude des relations diplomatiques entre l'Espagne musulmane et
!'Europe au X 0 siecle: le regne de 'Abd Ar-Rahman III (912-961)," Studia islamica, 61 (1985): 47-8;
Muqtabis JV, 71.
20 lbn al-KhaFb, Kitiib a 'miil al-a 'lam, 121.
21 Wa<;lil:i served as governor in Jativa, while both Mujahid and Khayran are described as being active
in the region before the fitna; Al-Wansharisi, al-Mi 'yiir al-mu 'rib, ed. M. J:lajjT, (Rabat: 198 I), 6: 1601; lbn 'ldharT, Bayiin, 3: 155; lbn Kha Idun, Kitiib al- 'ibar, 4:355; al-QalqashandT, 256; Akhbiir duwwal
muhtk al-/awii 'if, 301-2; Dhikr bi/ad al-Anda/us, 217/229.
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Mu?affar and Mubarak oversaw the irrigation system under the regional vizier, while
another Siqlabz, Aflal), served in Almeria in conjunction with a Marwanid govemor. 22
Thus, Saqaliba clients occupied palatine, administrative, and military posts
throughout the AndalusT territories, and especially in the East, working with local
officials and reinforcing the regime's presence in outlying provinces.

Mujahid al-'AmirT on the eve of the fitna
Mujahid's role under the 'Amirids seems to have been akin to sal:zib al-shurta al-ulya
and qa 'id in the kiiras of Tortosa and Valencia. Hisham b. Mul)ammad b. 'Uthman
occupied that post under al-I:Iakam II, and the two provinces along with TudmTr were
responsible for supplying military requisitions to 'Abd al-Ral)man b. Mul).ammad b.
Rumal)is, whose authority over the regions stemmed perhaps from their maritime
nature. 23 Thus, the later Umayyad regime at times treated the Sharq al-Anda/us as a
single administrative unit.
Al-Man�ur had named lbn 'Arus to replace Ibn Rumal)is as qa 'id al-bal:zr, but
the loyal 'Amirid supporter may have been the victim of a subsequent purge, since
lbn I:Iazm writes that he fell into disgrace. 24 Extant sources do not indicate who
replaced Ibn 'Arus, nor who served as sal:zib al-shurfa al-ulya for Tortosa and
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Ibn Bassam, Dhakhlra, 3:15; al-'UdhrT, 82.
Muqtabis IV, 21, 46, 47, 216. 'Abd al-Rabman b. Mubammad b. Rumabis was charged with
collecting horses for the summer raids from Tortosa, Valencia and TudmTr. The role of lbn Rumabis,
who was both -$iibib al-shur/a a/-ulya and qa 'id al-baflr, would moreover seem to indicate that the two
kitras fell somehow under naval administration.
24 Ibn IJazm, Naq/ al- 'ants, 173/133.
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Valencia after the destitution of Hisham b. Mul)ammad b. 'Uthman.
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Nevertheless,

the double phenomena of purges and the increasing reliance on Slav clients indicate
that these responsibilities would have been given over to Saqaliba hands, as was the
case on some levels in Jativa, Valencia, and Almeria.
Ibn 'IdharI writes that Mujahid took control in Denia at the beginning of the
fitna because of his position at the head of the 'Amirid fityan, while Ibn Khaldun, al
QalqashandI, and the anonymous authors of the Dhikr bi/ad al-Anda/us and the
Akhbar duwwal muli,k al-fawa 'if ascribe duties to him in Tortosa and Valencia.26
This conforms not only with what we know of 'Amirid administration, but also with
Mujahid's childhood training and education. Mujahid grew alongside al-Man�ur's
own sons, benefitting from the same intellectual and martial education. 27 He was thus
destined for an advanced position within the 'A.mirid regime, as a principal officer,
with both civil and military responsibilities. Mujahid's role seems then to have been
similar to Wa9il)'s in the Upper March, though in the kiiras of Tortosa and Valencia.
He thus implemented 'Amirid policy in the eastern maritime provinces, and was in a
position at the beginning of the fitna to adapt it to the realities of a fractured al
Andalus, profiting from the structures built up by the Umayyad and 'A.mirid regimes.
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'A$ABIYYA AND FACTIONS DURING THE FITNA

The AndalusT fitna is commonly approached through a model of ethnic factions
seeking to appropriate the remnants of caliphal power. Cohesive group awareness is
a fundamental factor in this idea, designated as 'a$abiyya, the driving historical force
identified by lbn Khaldiin. The members of each faction would have considered
themselves as such, and their internal solidarity split AndalusT society.
This interpretation results in part from the analyses of authors contemporary to
the taifas, such as lbn I:Iayyan, who developed the term al-fitna al-barbariyya,
imputing the conflict to the Berbers.28 Fifth/eleventh-century Arab historians were
bitter and cynical, faced with their own fallen status and a fractured al-Andalus, and
so idealized the fallen Umayyad caliphate while scorning the muHik al-fawii 'if. 29
Most of these authors were descendants of erstwhile Umayyad clients.

They

identified themselves as being of Arab stock, and blamed the fitna on the recent
arrival of Berbers under al-Man$iir's military reforn1s. The MaghribT historian lbn
'IdharT is a notable exception, and while he does use the terrnfitna al-barbariyya, he
designates the Umayyad pretender Muryammad b. 'Abd al-Jabbar as the "door of the
fltna. ,,30

Accounts of this period thus characteristically present opposing ethnic

groups, well-defined in the case of the recently arrived Berbers, and more amorphous

28
See for example Ibn Bassam, Dhakhfra, I :443; P. Scales, The Fall, 2-3. See also B. Soravia's
excellent study of Ibn l:layyan; "lbn Hayyan, historien du siecle des Taifas. Une relecture de Dahira,
1/2, 573-602," AI-Qantara, 20-1 (1999): 99-118; "Une histoire de lafitna. Autorite et legitimite dans le
Muqtabis d'lbn l:layyan," Cuadernos de Madinat al-Zahra', 5 (2004): 81-90.
29
P. Scales, The Fall, 3-4; F. Clement, Pouvoir et legitimite, 84.
30
Ibn 'ldharT, Bayan, 3:50.

for the Andalusis and Saqaliba.
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Historical authors thus present the fitna as a three

way conflict among the Berber and Slav 'Amirids looking to preserve and expand
their political power, and the Marwanids, who sought to reinvigorate caliphal power
after years of 'Amirid usurpation. Modern authors likewise reproduce this model,
applying it to the entire taifa century. David Wasserstein, who rejects the idea of a
coherent 'Amirid party and highlights the social conflicts underlying the fitna,
nevertheless writes that the sources give the impression of a mainly ethnic conflict.32
Not only are the events of the fitna explained in terms of ethnic conflict, but the taifas
themselves are also organized according to the supposed ethnic origins of their
leaders. The numismatist Antonio Prieto y Vives structured his study of the taifa
kings according to this idea, and was implicitly followed in this by George C. Miles. 33
Even Peter Scales, who argued for a more nuanced version of this model, divided his
study on the fall of Cordova - subtitled Berbers and Andalusis in Conflict - into
chapters on the Marwiiniyya, Saqaliba, and Barbariyya. 34 There are, however, a few
exceptions to this trend: Frarn;:ois Clement notes that the importance of ethnic-cultural
origins is "overestimated" and sheds light on the cultural identity common to the
majority of the muh"ik al-fawa 'if. 35

Similarly, Mohammed Benaboud has

31
For the Berbers, should be noted the differentiation between new arrivals, the source of the
problem, and those who had settled after the conquest and more or less integrated Andalus1 society.
32 D. Wasserstein, Rise and Fall, 56, I 02.
33
A. Prieto y Vives, Los reyes de taifas. £studio historico-numismatico de los musulmanes espafioles
en el siglo V de la Hegira (XI de J. C.) (Madrid: 1926); G. Miles, Coins of the Spanish Mulitk a/
Tawa 'if (New York, 1954).
34
P. Scales, The Fall.
35
F. Clement, Pouvoir et /egitimite, 211-2; F. Clement, "Origines ethno-culturelles et pouvoir dans
l'Espagne musulmane des Taifas (V,/XI ° siecles)," MC.V., 29.1 (1993): 197-206.

72
demonstrated that social currents, and notably divisions between the elite, khassa, and
the lower classes, 'amma, were as influential as any ethnic divisions. 36

The fragile cohesion of the Saqaliba
It is important to examine this debate from the point of view of the Saqaliba for this
study, and specifically the 'Amirids of Denia. The Slavs had become a dominant
force within the 'Arnirid regime. 37 Like the English "slave," the term Saqaliba (s.
Siqlabl) comes from the lumping together of the Slavic peoples of Eastern Europe,
and the human trafficking of those same groups. In al-Andalus, it refers in general to
servile persons of European origin. 38 The emir al-I:Jakam I was guarded by "mute"
Slavs, so-called because they did not speak Arabic, but large-scale administrative and
military use of Saqa/iba did not begin until the caliphate. In its campaign to limit the
potential threat of the elite Arab and AndalusT families, the caliphate employed men
without tribal attachments and who were directly tied to the caliph through patronage
or wala '. Over the course of the century, Saqaliba who were captured or bought at a
young age then educated for state service came to form the body of the caliphal
administration.
36

In general, those destined for domestic or palatine service were

M. Benaboud, "'Asabiyya and Social Relations in al-Andalus During the Period of the Taifa States
(II th century AD.15th century A.H.)," Hesperis-Tamuda, I9 (1980-1 ): 5-45; M. Benaboud, A. Tahiri,
"Berberising al-Andalus," Al-Qantara, 11.2 ( 1990): 475-488.
37 See Mohammed Meouak's studies on the Saqiiliba in al-Andalus; Pouvoir souverain,
administration central et elites politiques dans l'Espagne umayyade (11'-JVIVI!l'-X' siecles) (Helsinki:
1999); Saqiiliba, eunuques et esclaves a la conquete du pouvoir. Geographie et histoire des elites
politiques « marginales » dans l'Espagne umayyade (Helsinki, 2004). Patricia Crone's study on the
military slaves who became masters of the 'Abbasid caliphate is also helpful; Slaves on Horses. The
Evolution of the Islamic Polity (Cambridge, 1980). E. Levi-Provens;al also addresses the subject:
HEM, 2:122-30.
38 E. Levi-Provens;al, HEM, 2: 123.
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eunuchs, as opposed to military officers. According to Evariste Levi-Proven9al, their
number in Cordova rose from 3,750 under 'Abd al-Ra}:iman III to 13,750 at the end of
the caliphate. 39

They were powerful enough under al-I:Iakam II to consider

manipulating the dynastic succession to protect their situation against Mu}:iammad b.
'AbT 'Amir's own vying for power. As a result, al-Man�ur initially preferred to rely
on Berber elements brought over from North Africa, but the need to counterbalance
the Berbers and the AndalusT aristocracy imposed the creation of a servile body of
supporters. These agents were not limited to domestic service, and occupied key
administrative and military positions. Al-Man�ur sought to create an army and state
structure loyal to him and independent of AndalusT aristocratic interests, and so
replaced the system of territorial concessions with monthly payments. 40 The 'Amirid

$aqaliba clients were thus made loyal to the regime, but they were also able to profit
from the system, with the main fityan creating even their own groups of Slav

mawalz. 41 The power provided by these positions allowed the $aqaliba to assert their
independence at the fall of the 'Amirid regime and to establish the Sharq al-Anda/us
taifas.
The fitna is often read as an opposition between the 'Amirids, the Berbers and
the AndalusTs, with each aspiring for the position of l:,ajib in the shadow of a puppet
cal.1ph 42

However, even if there were a certain initial cohesiveness among the

$aqaliba, the 'Amirid group rapidly split into several parts, with its members building
E. Levi-Proven9al, HEM, 2: 126.
P. Scales, The Fall, 135; al-TurtushT, Siraj al-muh,k, ed. J. al-Bayafi, (London, 1990), 370; 'Abd
Allah b. BuluqqTn, Tibyan, 58/40.
41 P. Scales, The Fall, 135; M.J. Rubiera Mata, La taifa de Denia, 47.
42 Cf. D. Wasserstein, Rise and Fall, 55.
39

40

alliances according to their own individual interests. This limits the idea of any
internal esprit de corps. Peter Scales countered David Wasserstein's idea that the
survival of the 'Amirid regime itself did not interest its officers, affirming the
existence of an 'A.mirid party.43

He argued that each of these fityan sought to

reproduce the 'A.mirid state model, with a puppet caliph manipulated by a bajib who
held the real power. Nevertheless, there was no consistent cooperation between the
'Amirid family and its clients towards a common goal beyond occasional
convergences of personal interests. The Saqaliba did not seek to place a member of
the 'Amirid family in the role of ba)ib and followed the Man�urid model only so long
as it allowed them to codify and protect their own individual power. In addition, the
group itself showed little cohesion and its supposed members were not systematically
hostile to the Berbers.
The Saqaliba themselves had no common tribal or ethnic ties. The term
designates clients of European origin, but these could have been Slaves, Franks,
Basques, Galicians, Italians, or, as perhaps in the case of Mujahid, Sards. Their
number and origin varied according to vagaries of raids and markets. Moreover, they
were often taken young and educated in al-Andalus, and so retained little of their
original cultures.

In addition, although some distinction is made to differentiate

between European and African slaves, the latter referred to as simply 'abid or slaves,
there was little real division between them, and the terms seem at times

43

P. Scales, The Fall, 9; D. Wasserstein, Rise and Fall, I 01.
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interchangeable.

44

75
They thus could have had no tribal or ethnic solidarity. It is true

that the ephemeral shu 'ubzyya movement, illustrated by Abu 'Amir Al)mad b. Garcia,
indicates claims of a non-exclusively Arab culture, and it is probably not an accident
this polemicist was employed in Denia's court; but the debate surrounding his risala
was so short-lived it has been seen as simple literary provocation.45 Any group
solidarity among the Saqaliba could only have been a social construct, with their
position and social function generating a temporary common interest.
The 'Amirid group itself began to splinter even before the fitna, contributing
to the collapse of the regime. Ibn al-Khatib notably lists the names of 'Abd al-Malik
al-Muz;affar's twenty-six chief fityan, and not those of his brother and successor,
'Abd al-Ral)man Sanchuelo.46 The Saqaliba must have sworn the bay'a towards
'Abd al-Ral)man, or they would not have been able to keep their positions during the
period immediately preceding the fitna. Nevertheless, many of the 'Amirid officers
did not support their master's supposed assassin.

Historians use the terms

"Marwanid" or "AndalusI" to describe the coalition that brought down 'Abd al
Ral)man Sanchuelo, substituting as it did Hisham II with Mul)ammad b. 'Abd al
Jabbar to oust the 'Amirids and restore Umayyad power, but the movement itself was
E. Levi-Provern;:al, HEM, 2: 125. The 'Amirid elite in Jativa and Valencia are referred to as 'abid,
while Mubarak and Mu�affar, considered members of the Slav group, are also called 'abid. Jbn 'Idhari
includes the $iqliibT Khayran in a group of 'abid; Ibn Bassam, DhakhTra, 3:15; Akhbiir duwwal muliik
af-!awii'if, 301; lbn 'ldhari, Bayiin, 3:96.
45
J. T. Monroe, The Shu 'iibiyya in al-Anda/us. The Risiila of fbn Garcia and Five Refi1tations
(Berkeley: 1970); D. Wasserstein, Rise and Fall, 169-73; P. Guichard, B. Soravia, Les royaumes des
taifas, 271. lbn Garcia wrote his risiila in reaction to the refusal by a poet employed in the Almeria
court to write for the $iqlabr Mujahid; he preferred to work for the Arab Banu $umadil). Yet, al
Mu'ta�im b. $umadil:i himself did not hesitate to build a diplomatic alliance with Denia by marrying
'Ali b. Mujahid's daughter: lbn Bassam, Dhakhrra, 1:523, 3:98, 239-40; lbn al-Abbar, Kitiib al-bu/la
al-siyarii ', 2:82.
46 Ibn al-Khatib, Kitiib a 'miil al-a '/iim, 121.
44

financed by al-I;>alfii', 'Abd al-Malik's widow.

47

Many of the 'Amirid mawati in fact

supported the movement from the beginning. Ibn 'Idhar"i wrote that Wa<;lib, governor
of the Upper March and al-Man�iir's principal maw/a, was the first to betray
Sanchuelo, and that the 'Amirid Saqaliba abandoned him before he arrived in
Cordova to try to regain his power. 48

Moreover, according to Ibn Bassam,

Mul)ammad al-Mahdi confinned Mujahid's position in Denia and the Balearics in
exchange for his betrayal of his patron, 'Abd al-Ral)man.49
Once the fitna had begun, dividing lines between the different factions were in
fact ill defined and unclear. In the following months, the Cordovan populace attacked
the 'Amirid Berbers and al-Mahdi expelled a number of Saqaliba from the capital.
Nevertheless, the 'Amirid maw/a Wa<;lib became chamberlain, and was able to
negotiate for peace with the Berbers and their Cordovan caliph, Sulayman b. al
I:Iakam, and Wa<;lib himself had a bodyguard of 400 Berber horsemen. 50 Al-Mahdi's
rejection of former the 'Amirid clients explains why an ephemeral rebellion around
the caliphal candidate Hisham b. Sulayman included both Berbers and a group of
'Ami rid Slavs. 51 It is true that a Berber party crystallized around Sulayman b. al
I:Iakam, and was opposed by the principal Slav leaders, but, once again, there was no
uniformity.

Even though Wa<;lib was the chief 'Amirid maw/a, he retained his

position as governor of the Upper March after Sulayman b. al-l:Iakam (imam of the
47 E. Levi-Provern;:al, HEM, 2:297-8; D. Wasserstein, Rise and Fall, 60-1; P. Scales, The Fall,
passim; lbn 'ldhar'f, Bayon, 3:52.
48
Jbn 'ldharT, Bayon, 3:69, 71.
49
lbn Bassam, Dhakhfra, 3: 171.
50
Ibn 'ldharT, B on, 3:85.
51 lbn 'ldharT, Bayon, 3:79.
ay
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Berbers) overthrew Mu}:iammad al-MahdT.52 Later, during al-Mahdi's second reign,
Sulayman and his partisans escaped to Jativa, where the'Amirid.fityan had fled after
their earlier expulsion and which would become a focal point for the Saqaliba taifas
in the Sharq al-Andalus. 53 Finally, Ibn'IdharT describes the coup d'etat that replaced
al-Mahdi with Hisham II as the work of a party of'Amirid clients, ta 'ifa min al- 'abzd
al- 'amiriyin, though Ibn Khaldun writes that it provoked Mujahid's dissension and
flight for the Sharq al-Andalus. 54
Historians also present Hisham II's second caliphate as a period of factional
tension, specifically between the Berbers, on the one hand, and the Slavs and
AndalusTs on the other. Indeed, the siege of Cordova by Sulayman al-Musta'in,
"imam of the Berbers" did divide AndalusT society, especially since a number of the
principal fityan supported Hisham II's regime.

Nevertheless, the actual ethnic

dimensions of the conflict have been exaggerated: the 'Amirid Siqlabz party still
lacked coherence, and the Berbers were not as monolithic as may seem. It is true that
a number of the so-called "Slav" taifas appeared during Hisham II's second caliphate,
perhaps in part to safeguard those territories against Berber expansion. In addition to
Mujahid, Mubarak and Mu?affar established their rule in Valencia around 401/10101, and Afla}:i took control of Almeria the following year. We should note that in both
cases, the'Amirid officers appropriated for themselves power that they were meant to

52

53
54

Ibn 'IdhiirI, Bayiin, 3:83, 93.
lbn 'IdhiirI, Bayiin, 3:83, 95.
lbn 'ldhiirI, Bayiin, 3:96, 100; lbn Khaldiin, Kitiib al- 'ibar, 4:354.
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share with a non-Slav agent named by Hisham II.

Since Wa�lil). held the office of

f:iajib under Hisham II, and was supported by the fityan Khayran and 'Anbar, it is
possible that the Saqaliba intended to oust the remaining Andalusis from the state
apparatus, thereby establishing a kind of mamluk regime. Nevertheless, while Slav
ambitions certainly played a role, these maneuverings were more the result of the
Cordovan regime's growing weakness and inability to rule beyond its own walls.
There are some signs of conflict with the Berbers in the Sharq al-Anda/us
during this period.

The older Berber populations settled in the region since the

earliest days of the conquest did not have any effect on the arrival of 'Amirid
factions, especially given that the "older" Berbers did not act in concert with the
"neo-Berbers," nor did they show signs of ethnic solidarity with them. 56 A series of
Berber raids did however target the region during Hisham II's second reign, but their
actions do not seem to have been politically or ethnically motivated. An attack on
Ondara, near Denia, destroyed the city, while the Valencian region was decimated in
401/1010-1.57 Two different sources provide the details for these attacks, one for
Ondara and the other for Valencia, describing perhaps the same attack in both cases.
Ondara's destruction, in any case, led to a flight towards Denia's more easily
defended hilltop, isolated between the sea and coastal swamps.

The attack on

Aflal:i was in place in Almeria alongside the governor 'Abd al-Ral)man b. Rawi sh by 400/1009-10,
before taking power in 402/1011-2: Al-'Udhr1, 82. Mu?affar and Mubarak were in charge of the
Valencian irrigation system by 40 I/ IO10-1, after having served in Mad1nat al-Zahra. Two years later,
in 403/1012-3, a few months before the Berbers entered Cordova the two jityan shared power over
Valencia, and were powerful enough to refuse entry to the fom1er vizier; lbn Bassam, Dhakh'ira, 3: 15,
18; lbn 'ldhar1, Bayan, 3:159.
56
D. Wasserstein, Rise and Fall, 57.
57
AI-tlimyar1, 31/39; lbn 'ldhar1, Bayan, 3:105.
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Valencia originated in Jaen, and brought back horses belonging to the "sultan," three
hundred soldiers, kuttiib and 'ulama ', most likely Cordovan refugees.

While

Saqiiliba officers did represent the Hishamid regime in the region, the Berber raids do
not seem to have been part of a larger strategic plan, and there was no concerted
ethnic opposition. In fact, during the conflict between Aflab and 'Abd al-Rabman b.
Rawish over the control of Almeria, the Hishamid governor turned to Berber
mercenaries for support. 58 There is thus a distinction between, on the one hand, the
political clash between Sulayman al-Musta'in, supported by Berber clans, and the
Saqiiliba-dominated regime of Hisham II, and, on the other, the actions taken by
Berbers forced to replace their erstwhile monthly payments with booty.
The fall of Cordova to Sulayman in 403/ l 013 caused a second 'Amirid exodus
towards the Sharq al-Anda/us. Khayran, among others, chased the Berbers from
TudmTr to establish his own power in the region. 59 Khayran's importance among the
former 'Amirid officers had grown since the death of Wac;lib, and he became the de
facto leader of the amorphous group.

Despite this, he chose to support 'AIT b.

I:Iammud in his move to expel Sulayman from Cordova, even though the I:Iammudids
were among the Berbers who had originally contributed to the fall of Hisham II and
Wac;lib. 60 K.hayran, moreover, was not the only Siqlabz to follow 'AIT b. I:Iammud,
since Mubarak and Mu?:affar minted dirhams in his name in 407/1016-7.61 He only
abandoned the Banu I:Iammud when he understood how little influence he would
58

Al-'UdhrT, 82.
lbn 'ldharT, Bayan, 3:115; Al-'UdhrT, 16. Note that during his flight from Cordova, Khayran was
aided by a Berber after being injured: lbn al-AthTr, al-Kami!fi -l-tarTkh, 9:269/420-1.
60 Ibn 'IdharT, Bayan, 3:116; lbn al-KhatTb, Kitab a 'ma! al-a 'lam, 141.
61 A. Prieto 138, 139; A. Vives 805, 806.
59

exercise m their caliphate. We should also note that when the "'Amirid party,"
including Khayran, Mubarak and Muiaffar, propped up al-Murtac;la to oppose the
Bam1 I:Iammud, they attempted to win the Berber Sinhaja of Granada to their cause. 62
While Ibn I:Iayyan writes that this episode marked the definitive end of AndalusT
unity, and that afterwards no one joined with the Berbers, Ibn al-AthTr reports a
reconciliation between Qasim b. I:Iammiid and the 'Amirids, including Khayran. 63 In
addition, Qasim confirmed al-Man�iir's grandson, 'Abd al-'AzTz, as ruler of Valencia,
as well as Zuhayr as Khayran's successor in Almeria (Zuhayr moreover counted the
Sinhaja of Granada among his allies for most of his reign).64
SiqlabT and 'Amirid coalitions did exist, opposing even "Berber" caliphal
regimes, but the cohesion and motivations of these groups were not the result of any
kind of ethnic identity. The 'Amirids drew together because of personal interests, and
did not hesitate to ally themselves with Berber elements or even to oppose other
'Amirids. Despite this, 'Abd al-Malik al-Muiaffar's erstwhile officers do at times
seem to have followed a communitarian logic based on relations built during their
'Amirid service, and even Mujahid, the most independent of the group, participated in
the network of former fityan.

62 lbn 'ldharT, Bayon, 3:125-7; lbn Bassam, Dhakhlra, I :351.
63 lbn Bassam, DhakhTra, I :352; lbn 'ldharT, Bayon, 3: 127; lbn al-AthTr, al-Kcimil fi-l-tcirTkh,
9:273/425
64 lbn 'ldharT, Bayon, 3:165-5, I 90-1; lbn al-Kha(Th, Kitcib a 'mcil al-a 'lcim, 163, 225.
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Mujahid and the 'Amirid fityan
Mujahid's role vis-a-vis the other 'Amirid officers during the fitna is not clear, and he
seems to have distanced himself from them from the beginning. lbn Bassam writes
that he left the group of 'Amirid clients and that he did not ask their help in anything
that he subsequently undertook.65 Mujahid had been one of the chief fityan, and as
such must have amassed considerable wealth and power that allowed him to build his
own network of clients. 66 Felix Retamero has remarked that fifth/eleventh-century
political power was comprised of itinerant groups, and Mujahid arrived in Denia
accompanied by "many men."67 Mujahid was explicitly among those who betrayed
his patron, the f:zajib 'Abd al-Ral)man Sanchuelo, and was ambivalent towards
Hisham II's second caliphate and Wac;lil)'s f:zijaba. He minted dirhams in Hisham II's
name, but the fact that he fled Cordova after Mul)ammad al-Mahdi's death indicates
dissent with the new regime.68 Indeed, for Mujahid, the 'Amirid regime, in the form
of a f:zajib from the Banu 'Amir manipulating a puppet caliph and supported by a
military and administrative organization comprised of Saqaliba and Berbers, was
dead. Peter Scales's interpretation then that the Saqaliba belonged to an 'Amirid
faction because they wanted to perpetuate that model is not correct, since that would

lbn Bassan1, Dhakhira, 3: 171
P. Scales, The Fall, 135; M.J. Rubi era Mata, La taifa de Denia, 47.
67 F. Retamero, "La Formalizacion del poder en la monedas de los muliik de Denia (siglo V H./Xl
D.C.)," al-Qan/ara, 27.2 (2006): 435; lbn 'ldharT uses the phrase "khalq kathTr" to describe Mujahid's
entourage, perhaps better translated as "many partisans"; Bayiin, 3: 116.
68 lbn Khaldiin, Kitiib al- 'ibar, 4:354; A. Vives, 7 I I, 712; A. Prieto, 134; G. Miles, Umayyads, 347,
350.
65

66

implicate a member of the Banii 'Amir as the de facto head of state.69 Mujahid's
regime, like Wa<;lil)'s, and probably Khayran's under al-Murta<;la, was a mamluk
regime. 70 The state was in fact a governmental structure maintained by political
personnel composed of mawati who contributed directly to its functioning and
participated in the succession of power (although dynastic succession did occur in
Denia). Significantly, the last remaining vestiges of the taifa of Denia after its fall to
the Banii Hiid were inMajorca and Segura, both of which were under the authority of
mawal'i ofMujahid's house.71 In addition, at least two ofMujahid's mawatiremained
in important positions under his son, 'AlI, since they both served as witnesses for a
treaty signed with Barcelona in 450/1058.72 Mujahid thus sought a position
analogous to the principal frontier families, such as the TujTbids in Zaragoza, which
would have given him de facto independence from Cordova in exchange for formal
though superficial recognition.
lbn Bassam's description seems somewhat exaggerated, motivated in part by
his judgment of Mujahid's support of Mubammad al-MahdT, but Mujahid was often
in conflict with his AndalusT and 'Amirid counterparts, more often than he was with
any of the Berber taifas. Fraternal 'Amirid sentiments do not seem to have often
69 P. Scales, The Fall, 9, n. 37.
70 A 404/1013 dirham from Almeria features the names ofKhayran, Hisham II and a certain 'Abd al
' AzTz, possibly al-Man�iir's grandson, and so may indicate a persistent loyalty towards the 'Amirid
house. However, even if Khayran was trying to bolster his shaky power by referring to both the
'Amirid and Marwanid dynasties, he made no move to submit to 'Abd al-'AzTz after his ascension in
411/1021-2. A. Canto Garcia, T. b. 1:1. IbrahTm, "Suplemento a las monedas de los Reinos de
Taifas," appendix to the re-edition of A. Prieto y Vives, Los Reyes de Taifas (Madrid: 2003), 132, no.
26.
71 Both were captured during Mujahid's invasion of Sardinia: lbn Khaldun, Kitiib al- 'ibar, 4:355; lbn
al-Abbar, Kitiib al-hulla al-siyarii ·, 2: 149-50.
72 Their names were 'Alam and Salama; J. Baucells i Reig, Diplomatari, vol. 3, doc. 977, pp. I 5541558.
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determined Mujahid's politics. While he did use the relations that he had built during
his time as an 'Amirid fata, it was only according to his own needs. Mujahid's
alliances and conflicts resulted more from his own objectives, especially his vision of
maritime dominance and the need to control the redistribution of Mediterranean and
AndalusT resources through his port. The 'Amirid question was even less important
under 'An, since by the second generation there were fewer representatives with
fewer mutual ties. 'An thus developed his policies and diplomatic relations according
to geopolitical choices, directed by Denia's ports, roads, and maritime networks.
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CHAPTER III

POLITY, TERRITORY, AND MATTERS OF STATE
Generational continuity through governmental structures implies the existence of a
state, and stable dynastic succession occurred in Denia, as well as other taifas.1 Yet
power during the taifa period eludes in many ways standard definitions of a state.
Can we say that Denia was a state? Was it sovereign? In fact, modern Western
political concepts do not readily apply to medieval Islam, while Mujahid and 'AlT' s
political positions do not really fit within the framework of contemporary Arab
Muslim political and juridical theory. These rulers' constant concerns about their
own legitimacy highlights the ambiguity of their position, not only for Denia, but also
for the taifa kingdoms as a whole, and this despite the real power that they held
through governmental and even state-like structures.

The transition from the

Cordovan caliphate to the regimes of the muluk al-tawii 'if seriously tested the
political and juridical ideas of the time, forcing rulers to adapt while observing the
letter of the law.
Taifa power is one of the principal themes of Pierre Guichard's recent work
on the period.2 Guichard is very cautious in his use of such tenns as "kingdom,"

1 By stable succession, we are not forgetting the conflicts that could and did arise over who would
succeed, but merely emphasizing the continuity ensured by supporting administrative and
governmental structures, regardless who reigned in the end.
2 P. Guichard, B. Soravia, Les royaumes des taifas, especially chapters 3 and 4.
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"state," and "sovereign," smce, even though historical lexical usage imposes their
use, his analyses question their pertinence or accuracy for the taifas. Indeed, he
defines them as regional powers, not states, political entities "without recognized
borders or specific institutions" whose rulers do not necessarily claim sovereignty.3
Guichard's analyses in fact echo those of Henri Terrasse who insisted on the
aggregative nature of the taifas, and the absence of fixed borders: the taifas were
capitals and not clearly delimited territories, and yet, according to Max Weber, one of
the principal notions of the state is its territoriality.4
Political territory is, however, an ambiguous concept, one that is ill applied to
pre-modem states. In fact, Weberian or Westphalian concepts of the state, with
notions of cohesive territory and frontiers that are stable in time and space and within
which the exercise of power is unitary are simply not relevant to medieval and
especially medieval Islamic polities.5 This is especially true for Denia, where the
typically fragmented taifal territory was spread over both land and sea networks.6
3 P. Guichard, B. Soravia, Les royaumes des taifas, 54, 79, 85, 87-9, 104. In an article with A.
Bazzana and Ph. Senac, Guichard described the taifas as "centers ofpower"; A. Bazzana, P. Guichard,
Ph. Senac, "La frontiere dans l'Espagne medieval," in Castrum 4, 38-9. Nevertheless, in his
Musulmans de Valence (275-9), Guichard points out the existence of"state" institutions in al-Andalus,
including the taifas, and notably the stability of those institutions from one regime to the next.
4 1-1. Terrasse, "Caracteres generaux des emirats espagnols au XI0 siecle," R.O.MM, 2 (1966): 192,
195-7; M. Weber, Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, English trans. of
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, eds. G. Roth and C. Wittich (Berkeley, 1978), 54-7.
5
J. E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence
in Early Modern Europe (Princeton, 1994), 7-20; M. Biggs, "Putting the State on the Map:
Cartography, Territory, and European State Fom1ation," Comparative Studies in Society and History
41.2 (1999): 375; M. Smith, "Networks, Territories, and the Cartography of Ancient States," Annals of
the Association ofAmerican Geographers, 95 (2005): 834.
6 L. Benton's analysis of early modem imperial territories, and especially maritime empires, is
particularly relevant to this study, given the intangible aspects of both. As Benton states, territorial
control in this context "was exercised mainly over narrow bands, or corridors, of territory and over
enclaves of various sizes and situations:" L. Benton, "Legal Spaces of Empire : Piracy and the Origins
of Ocean Regionalism," Comparative Studies ofSociety and Histoy, 47.4 (2005): 700, 706 and passim.
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Understanding Denia as a political entity thus entails a broad approach, examining
notions of state and territory alongside political mechanisms and apparatuses, from
tax systems and monetary production to the administration and its agents.

THE STATE DURING THE TAIFA PERIOD

Political legitimacy according to Islamic jurists
Denia's specifically maritime nature eludes in many ways traditional ideas of land
based territoriality with fixed borders, but a detailed analysis of the taifa in its
political, social, and religious contexts justifies in fact characterizing it as a state.
Before beginning this discussion, however, we should point out the semantic
inaccuracies of the terms used, knowing that these inaccuracies derive in part from
anachronistically applying modem Western concepts to medieval Islamic realities.
There is no state in Islam, not in the political and territorial sense commonly
understood in Westphalian terms. The state is a community, and that community is a
single unit.

Unique states ruling over distinct groups cannot exist anymore than

political boundaries between those groups. The state is one, a power ruling over an
indivisible community, and the taifas could only be emanations of that power.
Patricia Crone recently explicated the idea that from the beginning, the umma,
or community of believers, was simultaneously a congregation and a political
organization whose members were both believers and citizens ruled by the Prophet.7
7

P. Crone, God's Rule: Government and Islam (New York, 2004), 13.
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Bertrand Badie juxtaposed the evolution of political models in the medieval and
modem West and in the Muslim World. He noted the emergence in the West of an
"autonomous space of power [ ... ] beyond the limits of the religious order," while in
the Islamic world "the two categories of political space and frontier made no sense."8
Works on the religious nature oflslamic power abound, and generally reiterate
the absence of a delimited political space within the early Islamic world: politics, in
the Muslim juridical system, existed only to serve the community of believers or as a
tool of religious implementation.9

According to Crone, the legacy left to the

Prophet's caliphal successors was the responsibility of giving legal existence to the
umma and for providing leadership on the path to salvation.10 This does not mean
that the caliph did not hold temporal power, nor that secular power did not exist, only
that the basis for that power was couched in religious terms.11
The numerous civil wars and sectarian divisions of the first centuries of the
Hegira shook the Islamic theory of political-religious legitimacy, stretched further by
the increasing separation between the spiritual and profane aspects of Islamic
government. Scholars have noted the polarization between politics and religion from
8
B. Badie, Les deux £tats. Pouvoir et societe en Occident et en terre d'Islam, 2nd ed.(Paris, 1997),
19, 21.
9 A. Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam. An Introduction to the Study of Islamic
Political Theory: the Jurists (Oxford, I 98 I), xiv; F. Clement, Pouvoir et legitimite, 22; H.A.R. Gibb,
"Some Consideration on the Sunni Theory of the Caliphate," in Studies on the Civilisation of Islam, ed.
S.J.Shaw andW.R.Polk(Princeton, 1962), 141.
10
P. Crone, God's Rule, 13, 21.
11
M. Abbes's recent work on political philosophy in classical Islam argues against what Abbes calls
the Weberian schema of political Islam and the view that political power in Islam derived from
religious foundations. Unfortunately, Abbes oversimplifies recent historical works that demonstrate
the religious foundations of political power in Islam, glossing over chronological analyses that allow
for a secularization of power within a religious framework over time. Abbes's work then proceeds to
more or less ignore religion to emphasize secular aspects of power, avoiding the initial problems
posed. See M. Abbes, Islam et politique a I'age classique(Paris, 2009).

the early 'Abbasid caliphate, the divorce between legal and political authority.

12

Nevertheless, the principal of the caliphate and the universal law that it represented
was never questioned. 13

The Prophet's successor, alternatively or concomitantly

called imam, caliph, or am'fr al-mu 'min'fn, "commander of the believers," was thus the
sole legitimate sovereign, and any ruler's right to exercise power derived from the
imam's recognition or mandate.
This was at least the theory at the base of the Islamic political system. Over
time, however, and because of political and religious schisms within the Islamic
world, the concepts of an indivisible community and legitimate sovereignty evolved.
Jurists integrated fragmented power into their analyses on the imamate and political
society. Certain jurists, though not the majority, even questioned the idea of a unique
imam, arguing that a barrier between two regions, such as a sea, could justify the
existence of two imams. 14 Ibn Khaldun even notes that in the Muslim West, jurists
belonging to the otherwise conservative MalikI school of law opted for this opinion,
citing those who swore oaths to 'Abd al-Ral)man III. 15
The increasing importance of the 'ulamii ', along with the loss of juridical and
religious competence of the 'Abbasid caliphs, and the rising power of regional emirs,
led some jurists to distinguish between the religious and political domains. The

12 Z. Ghazzal, "The 'ulama': Status and function," in A Companion to the Histo,y of the Middle East,
ed. Y.M. Choueiri (Malden, 2005), 72; W.B. Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law
(Cambridge, 2005), 181
13 A. Lambton, State and Government, xvi; F. Clement, Pouvoir et legitimite, 22.
14 P. Crone, God's Rule, 273-4.
15 lbn Khaldiin, Prolegomenes, I:39 I. Ibn I:Iazm, on the other hand, rejected this idea because it
could lead the community into anarchy; in M. Asin Palacios, Abenhazam de Cordoba y su historia
critica de las ideas religiosas (Madrid, 1932), 5 :9-10.
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fifth/eleventh-century Persian historian Abu al-Fa9l BayhaqT wrote that God "has
given one power to the prophets and another power to kings; and He has made it
incumbent upon the people of the earth that they should submit themselves to the two
powers and should acknowledge the true way laid down by God."16 As many
historians note, this is very close to the medieval European dualist view of power, to
Pope Gelasius' auctoritas and potestas. 17 Similarly, in an anecdote transmitted by
'AlT b. AbT I:Iafs al-I�fahanT, the famous fifth/eleventh-century jurist al-JuwaynT
defended the idea that "it was incumbent on the 'ulama' to obey the sultan in
whatever fell under the latter's authority, but that in whatever fell under the authority
of the 'ulama' it was incumbent on the sultans to obey them."18
The fragmentation of political society in the East gravely weakened the
caliph's temporal authority. Indeed, since 334/945, the 'Abbasid caliphs had been
under the domination of the Biiyids whose own power was divided among several
emirs. The arrival of the Ghaznavids towards the end of the century only made the
situation worse. The shar,'a was no longer implemented by the imam but by those
who had usurped his power. Jurists thus had to reintegrate political power into a
legitimizing juridical structure in order to ensure the continued cohesion of the
community. Abu al-I:Iasan 'AIT al-MawardT (d. 450/1058) is the most famous of the
jurists who addressed the issue, and his Kitab al-af:ikam al-�ulfaniyya dominates
16 Quoted in C.E. Bosworth, The Ghaznavids: Their Empire in Afghanistan and Eastern Iran
(Edinburgh, 1963), 63.
17 P. Crone, God's Rule, 248; A. Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought. From the Prophet
to the Present (New York, 200 I), 94; 8. Lewis, The Political language of Islam (Chicago, 1988), 134.
18 Quoted in L. Marlow, "Kings, Prophets and the 'Ulama' in Mediaeval Islamic Advice Literature,"
Studia Islamica, 81 (1995): 118-9. Marlow's study shows that by the thirteenth century, the division
between law and politics, sharT'a and siyiisa, was a common subject in court literature.

historical analysis on the subject.

19

Al-MawardI reaffirmed the necessity of a sole

and unique caliph. He conservatively goes over electoral procedures and the caliph's
responsibilities, insisting on his religious, juridical and administrative obligations. 20
Al-MawardI's innovation lies in his treatment of authority for emirs, and especially
the legalization of power acquired through conquest or usurpation. He considered
that the regularization of usurped political authority was all the more important since
it was necessary to legalize the decisions of governors and qat;lzs, as well as the
imposition of canonical taxes and punishments. 21 Al-MawardI thus defined regional
rulers as the caliph's governors drawing their legitimacy from his recognition and
acting as his agents.
Al-MawardI extended this legitimacy, including not only those emirs named
directly by the caliph, but also those who had usurped their power, imarat al-isflla ',
in order to regularize "unlawful" situations.22 Thus, if a usurper recognizes the
imam's authority and acts in accordance with the law, "his investiture is mandatory
and he has the power to handle both religious and worldly affairs."23 A generation
later, al-GhazalI (d. 505/1111) wrote that this authorization was implicit, and that any
ruler who recognized the caliph in the khufba and on his money "is the sultan whose
decision and judgment must be carried out in the provinces."24

19 AI-MawardI, Les Statuts gouvernementaux, French trans. E. Fagnan (Algiers, 1915). See also
H.A.R. Gibb, "AI-Mawardi's Theory of the Caliphate," in Studies on the Civilisation of Islam, 151-65.
20
H.A.R. Gibb theorized that al-MawardI wrote his treatise for one of the 'Abbasid caliphs, either alQadir or his son, al-Qa'im, to help them against the Buyid emirs: "AI-Mawardi's Theory," 152.
21
P. Crone, God's Rule, 233.
22
Al-MawardI, Les Statuts gouvernementaux, 66-7.
23
AI-MawardI, Les Statuts gouvernementaux, 68.
24
P. Crone, God's Rule, 244, citing al-GhazalI, !f:iyo' 'uli"im al-din (Cairo, 1282), 2:116 and 1:6.
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Legitimizing taifal power
The fall of the Cordovan caliphate resulted in a similarly fragmented political
situation, leading to a transfer of power to the regional level and the creation of
several polities, the taifas, who inherited political authority without however enjoying
caliphal legitimacy. In addition, while the caliph's political authority was divided
among regional rulers, the imamate itself was disputed by multiple factions and
candidates before eventually disappearing.

Legitimacy thus became an essential

question for all involved, with caliphal candidates and the muliik al-fawa 'if offering
mutual recognition to consolidate each other's claims to power. The evolution of this
system may have benefited from the contemporary debate in the East, and over time,
rulers and jurists seem to arrive at a similar consensus.25 Thus, the fact that lbn
I:Iazm, one of the muHik al-fawa 'ifs more famous detractors, treats as villainous or
impious those jurists who support them implies that at least some of the fuqaha (s.
faq"ih) cooperated in legalizing the taifas.26

The muhik thus recognized, when

possible, one of the caliphal candidates through the bay 'a, khufba, and their coinage,

25 Given the contemporaneity of the AndalusT fitna and the writing of al-MawardT's texts, it is
improbable that his Kitab al-al:,korn al-sulfoniyya had any kind of profound effect on the debate in al
Andalus at this time. Nevertheless, Jose Maria Fomeas has retraced the diffusion of Ash'arT works in
al-Andalus during the fifth/eleventh century, notably those of al-BaqillanT (d. 403/1013) and al
JuwaynT (d. 478/1085), who borrowed many elements from al-MawardT; J.M. Fomeas, "De la
transmision de algunas obras de tendencia as'an en al-Andalus," Awraq, 1 (1978): 4-11; J.M. Fomeas,
"AI-Tarnhrd de al-BaqillanT y su transmision en al-Andalus," Miscelanea de estudios arabes y
hebraicos, 27-28 (1977-9): 433-40.
26 Ibn l:{azm, "Un codice inexplorado del cordobes Ibn Hazm," Arabic text and Spanish trans. M.
Asin Palacios, Al-Anda/us, 2 (1934): 35/38; P. Guichard, B. Saravia, Les royaurnes de taifas, 221. W.
B. Hallaq (The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, 182-5), underlines the important mutual
dependence of political (caliphs) and religious ('ularna ') authorities.

and received in exchange approbation to exercise their de facto power.
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Mujahid

himself chose to break with the Cordovan candidates, proclaiming in Denia the
caliphate of 'Abd Allah al-Mu'ayt"I in 405/1013, performing the bay'a, declaring his
name in the khufba, and issuing coinage carrying his name.28 Al-Mu'aytI was largely
recognized throughout the Sharq al-Anda/us, despite the division between Mujahid
and his 'Amirid peers, though members of the group soon turned to al-Murtac;la as
their candidate. 29 While none of these caliphates lasted long, and most were ended by
their instigators, they nevertheless provided transitory legitimacy to the regional
rulers in exchange for few real obligations.
The unstable political situation and tensions between I_Iammudid and
Marwanid factions nevertheless limited the normalizing effects of these caliphates,
and most of the muluk al-fawa 'if preferred not to test the limits, avoiding, for
example, producing coinage.30

When the last Cordovan caliph was deposed in

422/1031, and the I_Iammudid caliphs had lost their shine for all but a few, it became

Thus, for example, 'Abd al-' Aziz al-Man�ur of Valencia, Zuhayr of Murcia, Khayran of Almeria
and Mundhir b. Ya(:iya of Zaragoza recognized the caliphate of Qasim b. I:Iammud, who subsequently
confirmed them; lbn 'ldharT, Bayan, 3: 164-5, 190-1; lbn al-Kha(Tb, Kitab a 'ma/ al-a 'lam, 163, 225.
28
lbn 'ldharT, Bayan, 3:116; Ibn al-Kha(Tb, Kitab a'mal al-a'/am, 252-3; A. Prieto y Vives, Reyes,
no. 135; A. Vives y Escudero, Monedas, no. 819.
29
Khayran minted coins in his name, while the khufba was pronounced for him from the tops of"the
minbars of the East"; A. Prieto y Vives, Reyes, no. 140; G.C. Miles, Coins of the Spanish Muh1k al
Tawa 'if, no. 160; A. Ariza Armada, "Las cecas de taifas bajo dominio eslavo," Actas de! VJ encuentro
de estudios numismaticos: La produccion y circulacion de moneda en Sharq al-Andalus durante las
primeras taifas (404-478//0/3-/085), Gaceta numismatica, 1051106 (1992): 149-50; lbn Bashkuwal
(1989), 412, no. 598; lbn 'ldharT, Bayan, 3:125-7
3
° Coinage and monetary production as a whole, including mercantile, legitimizing and fiscal aspects,
are treated infra, this chapter. Coinage could be used to recognize a caliph, but it was above all else a
fiscal tool. Only the imam, or his representative, had the right to issue coinage and collect canonical
taxes. While the muhtk al-fawa 'if are known for their fiscal greed, they avoided doubly affirming their
legitimacy by collecting taxes with coins carrying their names as caliphal representatives. This no
doubt explains the high number of anonymous coins minted during this period; P. Guichard, B.
Soravia, Les royaumes de taifas, 48-50.
27
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difficult for the taifa rulers to legally couch their power. The solution was to invent a
caliph to whom they could swear oaths and from whom they could derive legitimacy.
Ibn 'Abbad thus declared in 427/1035 that he had found Hisham II, supposedly dead
for the last twenty-two years, and proclaimed him caliph in Seville.31 A large number
of the muHik al-tawa 'if took advantage of this improbable announcement to recognize
the old/new caliph and normalize their own situations, normalization often
symbolized by a reprisal of monetary production.32 The transition between this false
Hisham II, incarnated by a real person, and a completely fictitious imam was an easy
one, first for Seville's adversaries - namely Toledo and Badajoz - then after Hisham
II's death was announced around 451/1059-60 or 455/1063 when his name was
replaced on coins with the intentionally vague al-imam 'Abd Allah. 33 The taifa rulers
thus anticipated and even went beyond al-GhazalT's ideas, offering themselves the
right to issue coinage in the name of an imam who existed solely for that reason,
implicitly communicating their own legitimacy.34 This practice spread to almost all
of the taifas producing coinage, presumably for fiscal reasons, indicating that a

31
Akhbar duwwa/ muh"ik al-fawa 'if, 315; lbn 'ldharT, Bayan, 3: 190.
32 This false Hisham 11 was first recognized by the mlers of Valencia, Tortosa, Denia, and Cordova.
Over time, the taifas of Zaragoza, Almeria, Badajoz, Toledo, Carmona and a number of minor
kingdoms joined the list; lbn 'ldharT, Bayan, 3: I 90, 219. Zaragoza minted in Hisham ll's name
beginning in 423, and he was also on named coins from Alpuente, Calatayud, Denia, Lerida, Seville,
Toledo, Tortosa, Tudela and Valencia; A. Prieto y Vives, Reyes, 198, no. 225, and passim. See also
D.Wassserstein's discussion in his Rise and Fall, 155-60.
33
This imam 'Abd Allah appears on coins in Denia, Seville, Badajoz, Almeria, Valencia, Toledo,
Zaragoza, and Majorca; A. Vives y Escudero, Monedas, 448.
34 F. Clement has noted that the titles used on these coins, notably f:iajib, tied the mler to the imam,
confirming the right to mle in the caliph's absence; Pouvoir et legitimite, 250.

consensus existed between the rulers and the fuqaha' working to normalize the
evolving nature of public authority. 35
Franc,:ois Clement has demonstrated, with more detail, the "de facto power of
the AndalusT princes. "36

The taifas modeled themselves on the Umayyad state,

copying within the limits of their resources the Cordovan caliphate.37 The muliik al
tawa'if considered themselves to be legitimate rulers, and covered themselves with

the appropriate accompanying symbols and devices. Among these, the bay 'a was
essential, signifying "a reciprocal engagement between the new sovereign and his
subjects," without which the ruler could not claim legitimate power.38

Even if

legitimate power derived from the imam, receiving the bay'a translated a claim to
autonomous authority that was recognized by leading figures.39 Both Mujahid and
'AIT used the bay 'a ceremony as a political tool to normalize their power. The
Akhbar duwwal muluk al-tawa 'if is missing the sections concerning Denia, but its

anonymous author showed particular attention to the importance of this ceremony,
and noted that the Saqaliba in Jativa and Valencia pronounced the khuJba in
Mujahid's name, indicating a previous bay'a. 40 Mujahid's men swore oaths to 'AIT,
who later called on his governors to renew their oaths after he repressed his brother's

35

We should also note that the ji,qaha and especially qac/[s derived part of their own legitimacy from
being themselves recognized by the secular rulers. Despite their independence vis-a-vis political
power, judicial nominations were a state affair. It was thus in interests of all involved to come to a
regularizing consensus; P. Guichard, 8. Soravia, Les royaumes de taifas, 220-1.
36
F. Clement, Pouvoir et legitimite, 203 for the quote and ch. 4, 203-281, for his analysis.
37
H. Terrasse, "Caracteres generaux des emirats espagnols au Xl 0 siecle," 191.
38
F. Clement, Pouvoir et legitimite, 2 I 9; P. Guichard, 8. Soravia, Les royaumes des taifas, 53.
39
R. Mottahedeh, Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic Society, 2nd ed. (Princeton, 200 I), 501.
40
Akhbar duwwal muhik al-tawa 'if, 302; P. Guichard, 8. Saravia, Les royaumes des taifas, 53
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attempted coup d'etat.41 There was thus administrative and governmental continuity
between Mujahid and 'AlI, since the men who recognized his power through their
oaths supported and served him as the representative of his dynasty to which they had
sworn loyalty.
Mam/aka, dawla and the Taifa State

The vocabulary and terms that the taifa rulers used to define their power can shed
light on how they understood it themselves. The majority of contemporary sources
are hostile to the muluk al-tawii 'if, but the memoires of 'Abd Allah b. BuluqqTn, last
ruler of the taifa of Granada, offer a different view of the period.42 'Abd Allah may
have simply been seeking to vindicate himself before his Almoravid jailers, but his
Tibyan does provide a unique first-person political and governmental view. Granada

did function somewhat differently from Denia, influenced as it was by Berber
traditions, but the fundamental concepts of power and territory presented by this text
apply also to the other taifas.
'Abd Allah b. BuluqqTn principally employed two political terms when
referring to his taifa: dawla and mamlaka. Neither term clearly indicates the state,
and both have different meanings in different contexts. The first term's root, d-w-l,
signifies turning or alternating, but over time dawla came to mean a period of time or

""...i\bL � � ulS Lr" �:i, �4 .J," lbn Bassam, Dhakhfra, 3:130; "•.ii) •.l!� � t:ii:i .J," lbn 'ldharT,
Bayiin, 3:158.
42
'Abd Allah b. BuluqqTn, Kitiib al-tibiyiin li-/-iimfr 'Abd Allah b. Buluqqfn iikhir umarii' banT zfrf
bi-Gharniitii, ed. A. T. TfbT (Rabat, 1995).
41
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power, then "dynasty."

In the Tibyan, dawla indicates governmental administration

or political organization: 'Abd Allah mentions ministers (wazira' al-dawla) and refers
to wazzra' wa mudabbirz al-dawla, "the ministers and administrators of the dawla. "44
The notion of territoriality seems tied to the term when al-Muiaffar chooses 'Abd
Allah as his successor and, in order to teach him about affairs of state - amiir al
dawla - advises him to make note of everything that happens in his dawla during

times of crisis - ma yanqa<;ffft dawlatz ayam al-.fitan.45 The link between polity and
territory is clearer when 'Abd Allah writes that his grandfather's recovery of lands
previously lost to Ibn Sumadil) of Almeria "consolidated his dawla. "46 Together,
these different uses of the term dawla draw out not only the abstract notion of the
ZTrTd dynasty, but also the polity and territory over which it reigned.
Mam/aka similarly communicates the concept of a state, but with a stronger

affirmation of power and territory.

The root m-l-k signifies possession, giving

derivatives such as mulk, power, and malik (pl. muhik), a possessor and so also
ruler.47 This governmental sense contrasts with imama, since the malik exercises only
secular power.48 Malik often designated non-Muslim rulers during the first centuries
of the Hegira, but it eventually found its way into the Islamic political lexicon without
losing its secular connotations. Palatine ceramics in the Cordovan caliphal court, for

"Dawla" £/2 2· I 77b
.
'Abd Ailah b'. Buluq�Tn, Tibyan, 74, 86, 92.
45 'Abd Allah b. BuluqqTn, Tibyan, 54.
46 'Abd Allah b. BuluqqTn, Tibycm, 88
.
47 "Malik," EJ2, 6:26la.
43

44

48

P. Crone, God's Rule, 7, 46.

example, bore the term al-mulk, referring to both the regime and its power.49 This is
in fact similar to the term sultan, which evokes power and authority along with the
person that exercises them.so In the Tibyan, 'Abd Allah associates mamlaka with
both the exercise of power and area in which power is applied. 'Abd Allah uses it to
refer to the royal family, both Umayyad, when he writes that al-Man�ur was not from
the royal house, lam yakunu min ah! bayt al-mamlaka, and his own family.s1 He says
that his grandfather was murashshahan li-l-mamlaka, "raised to reign" or "destined
for the succession of the kingdom."s2 'Abd Allah was infuriated when he learned of a
tax revolt, since "the exercise of royalty" - perhaps even "the administration of a
kingdom" - was impossible under such circumstances, la tatammu bi-hi
mamlakatun.s 3 He also accuses Ibn Dhu-1-Nun of Toledo of acting against him as
Alfonso I of Castile's agent, since he "was waiting for my kingdom [mamlakatna] to
fall so that he could take it for himself."s4

49

M. Barcel6, "AI-Mulk, el verde y el blanco. La vajilla califal omeya de Mad'inat al-Zahra'," in El
sol que sali6 por Occidente. £studios sabre el estado Omeya en al-Anda/us (Jaen, 1997), 187-194.
50 «Sultan», £12, 9:849a; P. Guichard, Musulmans de Valence, 2:285-91.
51 'Abd Allah uses the terms ah/ bayt a/-mamlaka and ah! al-mamlaka; Tibyan, 54, 55, 56, 65.
52

A.T. TibT translates this phrase as "nominated as the successor to the throne of the kingdom"; The
Tibyan: Memoirs of 'Abd Allah b. Buluggfn, Last Zfrid Amfr of Granada (Leiden, 1986), 41.
53
'Abd Allah b. BuluqqTn, Tibyan, 127.
54
'Abd Allah b. BuluqqTn, Tibyan, 98.
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FISCAL AND FRAGMENTED TERRITORIALITIES

Tax systems and territorial models
Historians have questioned the sovereignty of these taifas because of their lack of
marked or fixed boundaries, but that does not mean that their territoriality was not
defined. Fixed linear political borders could not exist inside the dar al-Islam, and
geographic divisions between political entities corresponded more with transitions
between sovereignty zones. The Muslim vision of political territory translated more
as an emanation from a center rather than a regular presence within borders. For
Ralph Brauer, these divisions reflected fiscal dominance, and the borders between
states existed in the zones where the flow of taxes gradually changed directions. 55
Similarly, Pierre Guichard, in adapting Samir Amin's model of the tributary state to
al-Andalus, argued that tribute was the principal link between state structures and
local communities. 56
Political fragmentation could then translate into territorial divisions, without
necessarily imposing clear linear limits. Following Brauer's example, taxes do seem
a useful indicator of territorial dominion. Collecting canonical and non-canonical
taxes does in fact translate a claim to political legitimacy, especially when the
surplus, after paying the army and other local administrative costs, is not forwarded
on to a higher power.
55

The geographer Ibn Ij.awqal uses this same approach,

R. W. Brauer, Boundaries and Frontiers in Medieval Muslim Geography, Transactions of the
American Philosophical Society, vol. 85, no. 6 (Philadelphia, 1995), 5.
56
P. Guichard, Musulmans de Valence, 1 :20.
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associating fiscal and territorial authority when he writes that the Idrisids control
Tangiers because they receive the taxes. 57
This same relation between fiscal and political and territorial dominion is
evident in al-Andalus under the early Umayyad caliphate. When 'Abd al-Ral).man III
brought the Ba/:zriyyiin of Pechina under his direct control in 310/922, he imposed a
tributary payment while naming a governor to administer their lands. 58 Later, under
the taifa regimes, political powers still expressed their hold over territories through
fiscal coercion.

Murcia's independence or submission during the taifa period is

seldom clear, falling at imprecise times under Almeria, Valencia, and Denia. Ibn al
Abbar, however, makes clear the city's submission to Valencia, at least for a time,
when he writes that the Bam1 Tahir, who ran the city, sent their tax surplus to the
Valencian emirs. 59
Brauer's analysis presents a model of territorial division through fiscal
dominance, and while this model coincides with taifal territoriality, an accompanying
illustration showing homogenous cores with surrounding territories fading into each
other still perpetuates the idea of contiguous territory. Another model, advanced by
the anthropologist Monica Smith, uses the circulation of resources within a certain
57
"�l_;i. u� .J-G;4 �) J.-.,,.:i (..)":!..J"� � �) yi, f; Ibn l:lawqal, Kitab $iirat al-ard, 81177.
58 Ibn l:layyan, Muqtabis V, 181.
59 lbn al-Abbar, Kitab al-f:,ulla al-siyara ', 2: 116. The fact that ports, among the few places where
entry into a political territory was clear, were principal points for tax collection also demonstrates this
link between fiscal and political territory; R. Brauer, Boundaries, 14, 33-4. Goitein notes moreover
that ports were considered border crossings, and that al-thaghr was readily applied to ports such as
Alexandria and al-Mahdiya; Mediterranean Society, 1 :376; Geniza TS 8 J 6 13; Geniza TS 20.127.
lbn Jubayr complains that he and his companions had to pay the zakat upon arriving in Alexandria,
while lbn l:lawqal notes on numerous occasions that ports were places for collecting canonical taxes, as
well as customs duties on imports and exports; lbn Jubayr, Rif:,la (Beirut, 1988), 38-9; lbn l:lawqal,
Kitab $iirat al-ard, 70, 73, 74-5, 96-7, I 07-8; Ch. Picard, La mer, 160-3.
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area to define a reticular political territory.

100
This approach seems better suited to

pre-modern polities based more on corridors and connecting points than homogenous
expanses of land. Smith's model, however, maintains the idea of a delimiting border,
or at least the idea of a state that acts within its own specific delimited space and
boundaries.
In the case of the Andalus'f taifas, and especially Denia, fragmentation
excludes a cohesive or contiguous territory. The taifas were more or less coherent
aggregates defined by their tax systems, but not linear borders. Specific locations
under taifal authority were naturally denser around the capital, but became more
sporadic farther out, mingling with other taifas' possessions.

Components and

networks thus become the key terms for understanding taifal political space.

Political territory under the taifas
Historical works on al-Andalus in the fifth/eleventh century often contrast the
imagined unity of the erstwhile Umayyad caliphate with the fragmentation of taifal
society. Henri Terrasse insisted on the taifa kings' regionalism and lack of cohesion,
labeling their polities "agglomerates of military fiefs."61 Pierre Guichard wrote that
the taifas were more "centers of power" than states.62 Nevertheless, even though the
taifas may have lacked the homogeneity often attributed to the Cordovan caliphate,
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M. Smith, "Networks, Territories, and the Cartography of Ancient States," Annals of the
Association of American Geographers 95 (2005): 832-49; M. Smith, "Territories, Corridors, and
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1-1. Terrasse, "Caracteres generaux," 192.
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their territories were no less defined.

Moreover, even the caliphate had been

composed of territories and reg10ns tied to the state through treaties and oaths,
sometimes under Cordova's direct administration, but sometimes also semiindependent in exchange for tributary payment, while its internal and external borders
constantly evolved.
The fitna, however, did exacerbate this instability, which became a prime
characteristic of the taifas. The structures that had transmitted and enforced political
power were reduced to a regional scale, while civil wars and limited resources meant
that the imposition of power coming out of the new centers was intermittent at best.
Taifal territory thus became a zone or sphere of influence, with a core authority
around the capital and supporting points scattering out and overlapping neighboring
networks.

Division and definition
Henri Terrasse cited the frequent loss, retaking and sometimes exchange of
fortifications as a sign of taifal territorial instability, as a demonstration of their lack
of borders. 63 A lack of linear borders, however, does not automatically translate into
a lack of territorial definition, as shown by 'Abd Allah b. BuluqqTn's account of a
conflict between Granada and Almeria in which border quwwad were battling over
certain l:,u�iin in the district of Fifiana.64 Although there was not a linear border or a
clear division between the two taifas, 'Abd Allah maintained control of this territory
63
64

H. Terrasse, "Caracteres generaux," 195.
'Abd Allah b. BuluqqTn, Tibyan, 112.
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by building or restoring bu$-fin which he garrisoned. 'Abd Allah's description shows
that the muluk al-tawa 'if exercised their power over territories that were mutually
distinct, and that they could use force to protect that power.
The events that led to Denia's fall to Zaragoza indicate a similar territorial
structure. According to Ibn Bassam, al-Muqtadir wished to annex to the taifa of
Tortosa fortresses (qi/a') that were under Denia's authority. 65 After some hesitation,
'AlT b. Mujahid ordered his governors ( 'umma[) to fortify and defend the sites against
Ibn Hiid. These fortifications were far from the core of Denia's authority, separated
from the capital by fortifications belonging to other taifas - between Denia and
Tortosa there were four centers of taifa power - and yet they remained tied to the
regime through a political and administrative system. As in the conflict between
Granada and Almeria, even though these sites were impermanent and militarily
occupied only when threatened, al-Muqtadir's request and 'AlT's response show that
despite their dispersal they constituted part of each taifas' defined political territory.

Political territory as an aggregate of districts and regions
These conflicts shed light on the administrative structure of al-Andalus. The taifas
had inherited the caliphal system under which the peninsula had been divided into
circumscriptions (kura), and further divided into districts (iqlfm and/or juz '). 66 Other
terms could apply to these districts, depending on their administrative function and
65

Jbn Bassam, DhakhTra, 4: 184.
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their place within the hierarchy of territorial division: 'amal, f:iawz, na?,ar, jiha and
naf:iiya. Depending on the sources and time period, these terms could be more or less

precise. The qaryalf:iiJn binomial was the basic element in this system, forming either
a juz' or iqtim, which then formed an 'amal. 67 AndalusT territory was thus a mosaic
of circumscriptions and districts. The kiiras were both administrative and military,
but subdivisions, when they had a governmental and not just geographic signification,
mostly indicate fiscal organization.68 Iqtim clearly designated a fiscal division, and
al- 'UdhrT, al-BakrT, and the anonymous author of the Dhikr bi/ad al-Anda/us each
provide tax figures for specific iqtims. 69 On a larger scale, the 'amil, or governor of
an 'amal, could have military responsibilities, but was more often associated with
collecting taxes. 70
The fall of the Umayyad caliphate exaggerated these territorial divisions, not
only by further dividing territory between the different taifa kingdoms, but through
the disintegration of political control within these polities. The territorial base of the
muliik al-fawa 'if was in fact punctual, relying on fortresses and districts and

depending on the individual adherence of each. Rulers could aspire to a territorially
cohesive whole, but their vision of their kingdoms was fragmented and composite.
An analysis of 'Abd Allah b. BuluqqTn's Tibyan brings this vision to light. lbn
BuluqqTn sometimes writes of his mamlaka as a whole, using balda or na?,ar, but
when addressing specifically territorial questions, the emir more often speaks in terms
67
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of pieces. He conquers and invests bi/ad, never using a term that denotes discrete
unity. He handles the affairs of his subjects and his lands, writing bi/ad and thinking
probably down to the individual provincial components of his kingdom. 71 In the
section about his confrontation with Almeria, the conflict erupts in a region (naiar),
but implicates individual districts (jihat). Ibn BuluqqTn usesjihat in his description of
measures taken to consolidate his hold on the area, writing that his fortifications
"formed a protective line for our districts (jihat), limiting access to them, and
threatening thejihat of Almeria."72 This term can be translated with a linear concept,
as a boundary, but its use in the text also indicates a composite aspect.73
It would seem even that Ibn BuluqqTn uses jiha in the place of juz '. The
Tibyan does not employ the political-administrative vocabulary typical of other
contemporary sources, and terms such as iqtim, ki1ra, and juz' are absent from the
text. The absence of this last term is surprising since al- 'UdhrT only uses it for the
kura/s of Balansiya, al-JazTra, and 1/bTra, lbn BuluqqTn's own region, and he
specifically uses it for Fifiana.74 Reinhardt Dozy, moreover, highlighted uses ofjiha
in liaison with taxes and resources.75 Ibn BuluqqTn thus thought of his territory in
terms of administrative and fiscal components at a local level, and while they may
have formed a composite whole, each piece remained distinct.
71 'Abd Allah b. Buluqq'in, Tibyiin, 112.
"4.,_>..\I w\+;,. u1c 1.'.;fa _,��\iii_, Lil .;JI w� l)y,. 4,k wJ.....,, _,"; 'Abd Allah b. Buluqq1n, Tibyiin,
113.
73
Note that both E. Levi-Proven9al and A. Tfb1 adopt this linear approach in their translations; E.
Levi-Proven9al, "Les 'Memoires' de 'Abd Allah," al-Anda/us, 4 (1936): 55; A. TfbT, The Tibyiin:
Memoirs of 'Abd Allah b. Bulugg'in, Last Ztrid Amir of Granada (Leiden, 1986), I 03. lbn BuluqqTn
only uses the singular to refer to specific districts or fortifications; cf. 'Abd Allah b. BuluqqTn, Tibyiin,
114,149.
74 Al-'Udhr1, 20, 90-3, 120.
75 R. Dozy, Supplement aux dictionnaires arabes (Paris, 1967), 2:787.
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The taifa of Granada's administrative structure was typical of fifth/eleventh
century al-Andalus, and Denia shows the same territorial logic. There is no source
comparable to the Tibyiin for Denia, but some texts do indicate a similar relationship
between the taifa and its territory. For example, the account of Denia's fall to the
Banu Hud of Zaragoza mentions this same system of fragmented territorial
administration. 76 Al-Muqtadir b. Hud thus sought to annex certain fortifications, not
a territory, and 'AlI ordered his governors to abandon those areas (bi/ad). Ibn Bassam
uses 'ummal (s. 'ami[) for the governors acting under 'Ali Whereas a qa 'id acted as
a military governor, the 'amil served primarily in administrative functions related to
tax collection. The fortifications coveted by lbn Hud were thus the physical markers
for the taifa's fiscal districts, or a 'ma!.
This same concept comes through 111 the I 058 treaty signed by Denia and
Barcelona. 77 The treaty is treated in detail below in a chapter on relations between
Denia and the Christian Mediterranean, but it is pertinent also to this discussion. The
Arabic text of the treaty states that the Christians in all of 'Alf's territories, a'miil,
should recognize his sovereignty in their churches.

The text thus reflects an

administrative organization, and probably the fact that 'Alf would order each of his
governors to implement in their districts the measures described in the treaty.
The taifa of Denia thus communicated through a network of administrative
agents who governed and collected taxes in their respective districts. Denia exercised
76 Ibn Bassam, Dhakhfra, 4: 183.
77 J. Baucells i Reig, A. Fabrega i Grau, M. Riu i Riu, H. Hernando i Delgado, C. Batlle i Gallart,
Diplomatari de I 'Arxiu Capitular de la Catedral de Barcelona. Segle XI (Barcelona, 2006), vol. 3, doc.
977,pp. 1554-1558.
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its authority over not only its hinterland, but also over scattered points far from the
territorial core. In addition to towns such as Orihuela, Elche, and Murcia, sources
also place under Denia's authority at imprecise times towns and fortifications as far
and dispersed as Lorca, Baza, Baeza, Jodar, and Segura.78 This last town was under
the direct control of 'AIT's son, Mul)ammad Siraj al-Dawla, until the dynasty's fall,
while Granada had to invest heavily in its campaign to take Baeza.79 Thus, despite
their distance and isolation from the capital, these sites were still integral parts of
Denia's political territory. In fact, in the conflict that led to Denia's demise, lbn Hud
wanted to annex the fortifications to the taifa of Tortosa.80 Between the two capitals,
however, there were at least two, even three or four centers of taifal power. The
fortifications were thus scattered beyond the territorial core of either taifa, possibly
separated from the two by fortifications belonging to other taifas. Nevertheless, the
taifa's political network tied them to the capital.

RETICULAR TERRITORIES AND THE TAIFA OF DENIA

Denia's scattered territorial strncture responded to the very logic that underlay the
taifa itself. Denia's principal asset was its liminal place between the Mediterranean
Sea and the Iberian Peninsula, the traffic between which circulated through its port
and represented its prime resource.

Denia's port became a major transfer point

78 Dhikr biliid al-Anda/us, I :217; Al-'Udhr1, I 6; 'Abd Allah b. Buluqq1n, Tibyiin, 92, I 06; lbn al
Abbar, Kitiib al-f:,ulla a/-siyarii ', 2: 149-50.
79 Mubammad Siraj al-Dawla even minted dirhams from Segura after Denia's fall: A. Canto Garcia,
T. b. 1:1. Ibrahim, "Supplemento," 157, no. 91
80 lbn Bassam, DhakhTra, 4: I 83.
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between inland and sea networks, and Mujahid worked to ensure its place in the
economic redistribution between al-Andalus and the Mediterranean. The sea lanes
leading out from the capital became extensions of the taifa itself, while access to the
routes that fed its port and drained economic resources as far as Toledo and Seville
required active attention. Denia's rulers were conscious of the importance of these
networks, allowing them to structure their polity and dictate policy.

Road networks
Denia's establishment under the Greeks resulted from the possibilities offered by its
port and relations with its immediate hinterland.

The site itself, however, was

isolated, cut off from the main road networks by the last sections of the Betic
Cordillera whose peaks to the south and west of Denia were impracticable for
wheeled vehicles.81

Thus, the Roman road that linked the Latin capital with its

Iberian possessions bypassed the Jibal Balansiya to the north of Denia, passing from
Valencia to Alcira and Jativa, branching off towards either Cartagena or the
peninsular interior and Cadiz.82 As Denia grew, however, it became better integrated
into the communications networks, bending routes towards its port.

Early modern texts relate similar difficulties even in the seventeenth century: V. Castaneda y
Alcover, Relaciones geograficas, topograficas y historicas de! Reyno de Valencia, hechas en el siglo
XVII a ruegos de D. Tomas Lopez, 2 vols. (Alicante, 1919 [re-ed. Valencia, 1998]), I :33.
82 M.J
. Rubiera Mata, La taifa de Denia, 16-9; R. Azuar Ruiz, Denia islamica, 353; P. Sillieres, "Le
'Camino de Anibal', itineraire des gobelets de Vicarello, de Castulo a Saetabis," MC. V. 13 (1977): 3184; P. Sillieres, Les voies de communication de I 'Hispanie meridionale (Paris, 1990), 260-382; P.
Herrmann, ltineraires des voies romaines de l 'Antiquite au Mayen Age (Paris, 2007), 87-92.
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Denia began to transform in the first century CE from a redistribution center
for imported products to a port exporting its hinterland's agricultural surplus.83 A
secondary branch of the Via Augusta deviated from Alcira, passing through Cullera,
to serve Denia's port: al-'UdhrI and IdrisI describe this road as the town's principal
land access during the Islamic period. 84

A second route linked Denia with the

peninsular interior and Jativa through Orba and Bairen. 85 R. Azuar Ruiz has likewise
shown that a network of secondary routes not mentioned by the sources linked
Islamic Denia with the towns and villages of this mountainous region, and by
extension with the principal lines of communications.86
Part of this road network served Denia's port and its hinterland before the
caliphate's fall. Denia itself fell into desuetude at the end of Antiquity, its population
moving inland to Ondara without abandoning use of the town's port. Archeological
discoveries from the later emirate and early caliphate show settlements along the
roads linking with the coast and Jativa. 87 The fortified site of Almiserat (fourth/tenth
century), perched above the entrance to the Gallinera valley, bears witness to the need
to watch over active roads. This valley permitted communications with interior
settlements, notably those concentrated around Cocentaina and Alcoy, as well as
J.A. Gisbert Santonja, "El territorium de Dianium - Denia - en el Alto Imperio. La Marina Alta: la
producci6n agricola y poblamiento," las Ciudades y los campos de Alicante en epoca romana, special
edition ofCanelobre, 48 (2003): 121.
84 R. Azuar Ruiz, Denia is/amica, 353; Al-'UdhrT, 20; IdrTsT, Opus geographicum, 4:556; IdrTsT, Los
Caminos de al-Anda/us en el sig/o XII (Uns a/-muhaj wa-rawd a/-furaj), ed. and Spanish trans. J. Abid
Mizal (Madrid, I 989), 66.
85
Al-'UdhrT, 20; IdrTsT, Caminos, 66.
86 R. Azuar Ruiz, Denia is/amica, 354-7.
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The limited nature of these

roads reflects the sparse population density of this region; nevertheless, they
integrated Denia into the peninsular networks.
Both M.J. Rubiera Mata and R. Azuar Ruiz have remarked that Denia's rulers
sought to control road networks through conquest and the acquisition of strategic
points. 89 The taifa's geographic evolution over the course of the century incorporated
the roads that fed its port. Denia's conquests and diplomacy were often the result of a
need to control and ensure access to the paths that linked the taifa with AndalusT
markets. The taifa's expansion followed two directions that allowed its rulers to
master at least part of the principal networks and liaisons in the Sharq al-Anda/us.
Towards the south, the conquest of TudmTr brought the Via Augusta from Lorca and
Murcia to Jativa under Mujahid's power. Control over Baeza and Segura in the
modem province of Jaen gave Denia the "caliphal" road, sometimes referred to as the
Camino de Anibal, which linked Valencia and Cordova, probably including Jinjala,
Chinchilla, the junction for roads leading to Toledo. 90
Denia's expansion along the AndalusT roads dates from Mujahid's reign. The
taifa was most likely limited to its hinterland and the Jibal Balansiya until Zuhayr's
death in 429/1038. Mujahid pursued a double campaign of conquest and negotiation
against Zuhayr's heir, 'Abd al-'AzTz al-Man�ur, ruler of Valencia and then also
TudmTr and Almeria. He invaded 'Abd al-'AzTz's lands in 433/1042, provoking a
R. Azuar Ruiz, Denia islamica, 80-1, 411-3; A. Bazzana, Maisons, I :400.
M.J. Rubiera Mata, La taifa de Denia, 15; R. Azuar Ruiz, Denia islamica, 353-4.
90
Al-'Udhr1, Nu$fl$ 'an al-Anda/us (I 0), briefly mentions this road from Valencia to Cordoba. For
Jinjala; Idr1s1, Caminos, 65-6.
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rebellion by Ibn Sumadil) in Almeria, as well as the governors of several /:,,u$iin,
including Lorca, Jativa, and Jodar.91 'Abd al-'AzTz was able to recover Jativa, but
ceded Almeria to Ibn Sumadil) and the rest of TudmTr to Denia.92 Rubiera Mata notes
that this was probably the moment when 'Abd al-'AzTz lost control over his most
western territories, since Baeza and Segura are later mentioned under Denia's
power. 93 Rather than by outright military conquest, these territories most likely fell to
Denia through a change of allegiance by the fortifications' respective governors. We
should note that Ibn 'IdharT still places the governor of Segura, Sa'Td b. Rufayl (or
Sa'Td b. A]:imad b. Zanfil al-JumanT according to Ibn al-KhatTb) under 'Abd al-'AzTz's
authority two years later, and Ibn al-KhatTb describes him at one point as being in
rebellion.94

This insurrection may have been an intermediary step between

recognizing Valencia and submitting to Denia. In any case, Mujahid transformed his
taifa through these military and political interventions. On his death in 436/1044,
'AIT inherited ensured access to AndalusT road networks, and control over many of
those roads through strategic points, from Lorca almost to the gates of Cordova.
In fact, a comparison of the sites specifically mentioned as being under
Denia's authority and the principal regional roads clearly shows that these networks
fundamentally structured the taifa's territory. Denia controlled the Via Augusta from
Jativa to Lorca, and the Camino de Anibal that linked Jativa with Cordova and that
91 Akhbiir duwwal muhik al-fawii 'if, 302. The anonymous author of this chronicle may have chosen
these towns to illustrate the breadth of the rebellion, the three sites corresponding with the geographic
limits of Zuhayr's territories.
9
2 Al-'Udhr1, 16; Akhbiir duwwal muHik al-fawii 'if, 302.
93
M.J. Rubiera Mata, La taifa de Denio, 88; 'Abd Allah b. Buluqq1n, Tibyiin, 92, 106; lbn al-Abbar,
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allowed the Betic taifas an access to the Mediterranean that circumvented hostile
Zirid Granada.95 Denia was also in communications with the taifas of Alpuente and
Toledo through Chinchilla, and its ports became maritime outlets for the principal
AndalusT markets. Ceramics from Toledo discovered in the region of Denia indicate
regular commercial relations, while al- 'UdhrT notes that Jativa exported its products
as far as Ghana and the Bi/ad al-Sudan, most likely beginning the journey along the
road to Denia.96 The peninsular roads likewise led AndalusT 'ulama' to Denia's port,
which became the second port of embarkation for pilgrims and voyagers heading
east.97
The taifa's ports, notably Denia and Alicante, served as hubs between the
Mediterranean maritime and the AndalusT road networks. Maintaining roads and
ensuring unhindered circulation were among an Islamic ruler's responsibilities, and
Denia's rulers would have been doubly motivated by the taxes generated by both
goods transiting through their ports and markets and tolls exacted from travelers.98
Roads also acted as fiscal conduits, allowing state revenues from outlying and rural
areas to make their way to the ruler's court. The road network itself thus became a
resource, without which the taifa's port could not function and its coffers would
remain empty.
95
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Denia's peninsular interests were in fact so tied to these roads that on the eve
of the taifa's collapse, 'AIT was readily willing to cede territories that were not
directly related to them.

Ibn Bassam and 'Abd Allah b. BuluqqTn both ascribe

Denia's fall to 'AIT's greed, his love of money and luxuries, as well as his negligence
of military affairs.99 Ibn Bassam specifies even that he was especially interested in
commerce and taxes. When Ibn Hud sought to annex some of Denia's fortresses to
the taifa of Tortosa, 'AIT's first reaction was to order his governors to abandon those
lands, since, according to Ibn Bassam, he only cared about roads. Ibn Bassam writes
that two types of roads kept 'AIT's attention, those through the valleys and those
through the mountains. ' 00 Both types of roads were essential for the circulation of
commercial goods and their transportation to Denia's port, and control of them would
also offer revenue from tolls. A loss of territory that did not disrupt the taifa's fiscal
and commercial interests was not worth the expenditure of resources of an anned
conflict.

Linear boundaries did not delimit taifal territories; rather, networks of

loyalties and fortifications did; for 'All his polity was in essence an econo1nic
machine structured by the means of communication.

Maritime routes
The peninsular road network structured Denia's Iberian territory, drawing part of the
taifa's interests inland. However, those roads gained importance precisely because of
their role in the economic redistribution between al-Andalus and the Mediterranean.
99 Ibn Bassam, DhakhTra, 4:183; 'Abd Allah b. Buluqq1n, Tibyiin, 103.
100 Ibn Bassam specifically refers to .i�I lS.?.--, "horse paths," and .il.....:.,,ll .?,A, "paths of those who
climb."
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They were essential as the peninsular response to the maritime routes that linked
Denia's ports to the Mediterranean world. Mujahid concentrated throughout his reign
on controlling the means of circulation necessary to ensure Denia's place as a major
port. As a mirror to the inland routes, maritime lanes became tools for implementing
Mujahid's policies, to the point of becoming dynamic extensions of the taifa itself.
Mujahid chose Denia as his capital because of its strategic place in the traffic
between the Iberian Peninsula and the Mediterranean.

The taifa ruler's early

campaigns were closely tied to the western Mediterranean lanes, and while his
peninsular holdings clung to the roads, Mujahid's maritime conquests were
determined by the "route of the islands" that ran from Denia to the Italian and
Ifriqiyan coasts.
Christian Courtois first described an island route that ships in the Early
Middle Ages followed between Africa and Gaul, skirting Sicily, Sardinia and
Corsica. 101 Courtois's term came to encompass an ensemble of routes across the
Western Mediterranean, and especially the transversal axis that included the Balearics
and Sardinia. 102 This was not the only possible route for maritime vessels, and
sources indicate traffic along the North African shores, but an ensemble of factors topography, winds and currents - made the island route the fastest and safest. 103 The
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control of this route became an increasingly high stake over the course of the
fifth/eleventh century, as both Muslim and Christian shipping increased within the
Western Mediterranean and beyond.
The Balearic Islands offered the first key to controlling naval traffic between
al-Andalus and the Christian coasts. The Umayyads had understood this strategic
position, and used Majorca as a staging point for their raids against Frankish targets
in 321/933 and 323/935. 104 The fourth/tenth-century geographer al-Raif wrote that
ships travelling from Europe (al-art;i al-kabzra) to al-Andalus had to pass between the
Balearics and the continent. 105 This remained true in the sixth/twelfth century, when
a Genoese ship sailing from Almeria followed this same route home. 106 Denia was
only one sailing day from the Islands, and Arabic geographers almost invariably link
them. 107 Control over Denia and the Balearics thus offered Mujahid control over an
essential maritime passage.
Renewed Mediterranean relations in the fourth/tenth century attest to
Sardinia's key role in this route. Sardinia was an essential intersection for the ships
coming from al-Andalus and those travelling along the North-South axis from IfrTqiya
to Provence.

A Sard ambassador accompanied Amalfitan traders to Cordova in

104 Jbn ):layyan, Muqtabis V, 323-4, 366-8.
105 Al-Razi, 60; al-Bakri (2003), 382-3.
106 O.R. Constable, Trade and Traders, 17, citing Petrus Guillelmus, Miracii/a beati Aegidii, MGH
Scriptores, ed. P. Jaffe (Hannover: 1856), 12:32 I. Constable cites various other sources mentioning
this route, including Benjamin of Tudela and Roger of Hoveden.
107 "Facing [Ibiza] on the coast of al-Andalus is Denia, and between them is one majrii," Idrisi, Opus
geographicum, 582; "Facing [Denia] in the sea are the islands of Yabisa, Miniirqa and Mayurqa, "
Dhikr bi/ad al-Anda/us, 75; "The city of Denia [Y.dara in the text] faces the islands of Mayurqa and
Minurqa," "The islands of Mayurqa and Minurqa face Denia [B.dhara in the text]." al-Zayyat, Dhikr
al-iiqiitim wa ikhtiliifi,hii, ed. F. Castello (Barcelona, 1989), 24a, 30a.

115
330/942, seeking aman from 'Abd al-Ral)man III.

108

The Fatimid fleet that attacked

Genoa in 323/934 harassed Rum ships along the Sardinian coast returning from al
Andalus.109 Sardinia would remain an important navigational point throughout the
Middle Ages. A scholar travelling from lfriqiya to al-Andalus in 436/1044-5 died en
route in Sardinia, while a century later another 'atim returning to al-Andalus from the
Orient wintered on the island. 110 Ibn Jubayr's sixth/twelfth-century pilgrimage to the
East aboard a Genoese ship travelled from Denia's coast to the Balearics to Sardinia,
and he followed a similar route on his return voyage.111 The ruler who mastered these
points exercised cohesive control over the maritime routes of the Western
Mediterranean, able to protect his own ships and limit access for others. 112
Mujahid chose Denia as the capital and starting point of this thalassocracy in
large part due to its place vis-a-vis this maritime route. ldrisT's description of the path
leading from al-Andalus to Italy follows the axis from Denia to Majorca, passing by
Ibiza and Minorca, continuing then for four days to Sardinia.113 Ships travelling from
there could then carry on to the lfrfqiyan coast after two days, or to Italy, which was
even closer. 1 14

Ibn Ijayyan, Muqtabis V, 485.
lbn al-Ath1r, al-Kami/ fi-1-tcirTkh, 4:568; Idr1s, TarTkh al-khulafo' al-fotimiyin bi'/-maghreb: al
qism al-khciss min kitcib 'uyi7n al-akhbar, ed. M. Yalaoui (Beirut, 1985), 236; Liudprand, Antapodosis,
4-5:98.
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AI-Humayd1 (1989), 487, no. 697; al-l)abb1 (1989), I 14, no. 149, 586, no. I 184.
111
lbn Jubayr, Ri/:,la (The Travels of lbn Jubay1), ed. W. Wright and M.J. De Goeje (Leiden, 1907),
35,364.
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Al-Bakr1, 55/118; lbn Sa'1d, Kitcib bas/ al-ar<) Ji al-fi7I wa-1- 'ar<), ed. J. Vernet Gines (Tetouan,
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Mujahid's first military action after declaring the caliphate of al-Mu'aytf in
405/1014 was thus the conquest of Mayurqa and the Balearic Islands. 115

This

conquest led shortly thereafter to the invasion of Sardinia. Mujahid's hold over
Sardinia lasted only a short while, and the violent reaction by Genoa and Pisa
illustrates the underlying motivations for these conquests. Mujahid's goal was not the
simple conquest of islands, but the dominance of the Western Mediterranean's
maritime networks, for which the Balearics and Sardinia were key factors.
Mujahid's defeat at the bands of the Genoese and Pisan fleets deprived him of
outright control over the ensemble of Western Mediterranean networks. He could
nevertheless exercise substantial sway over the transversal routes through the
Balearics. In addition, while Denia's rulers did use the islands to attack Christian
vessels, Majorca likewise served as a stopover for the commercial traffic circulating
between al-Andalus and the other- Muslim and Christian- Mediterranean ports.
Direct connections also linked Denia and its other ports with the North
African coasts.

In fact, the MaghribI and Alicante coasts were so close that

geographers such as lbn Hawqal and al-BakrI considered them the two banks of the
same river.116 Arabic geographers directly linked Denia's continental ports with the
central Maghreb, from Tenes to Algiers, while Madinat Mayurqa faced Bidhaya
(B

· ) 117
oug,e
.

Maritime itineraries do not mention Denia's port before the

fifth/eleventh century, but at the time of the taifa it was described as being six days
115

lbn 'ldharT, Bayi.in, 3:116.
M. de Epalza, "Costas alicantinas y costas magrebies: el espacio marimo musulm{m segt'.m los
textos arabes," Sharq al-Anda/us, 3 (1986): 27; al-BakrT, p. 82/165; lbn I:Iawqal, Configuration, 1:71.
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116

117
from Marsa Janabiya - nears Algiers - and three days from Tenes.

These

descriptions should not be taken too literally, however, and we should not think that
ships leaving Denia's port necessarily sailed directly for Marsa Janabiya. They seem
more indications of trends, coupled with sequential cartographic descriptions of ports
along the two coasts.118
The maritime routes described by Arabic geographers were neither the sole,
nor the most important in the networks that linked Denia with the Muslim
Mediterranean. In addition to the Central Maghreb, sources indicate direct exchange
with Ifr,qiya and even Alexandria.

S.D. Goitein wrote that the route linking al

Andalus, Ifr,qiya, and Egypt was the "golden rule" of Mediterranean traffic.' 19
Muslim ships as early as the third/ninth century were sailing directly from Ifnqiya to
al-Andalus. The scholar Yal)ya b. 'Umar wrote that boats travelled directly by sea
between Tunis and al-Andalus, 'ala al-babr, and the geographer lbn Khurradadhbih
indicates that six days separated Tunis and al-Andalus. 120 Pechina/Almeria was the
principal port during this period, and would continue to dominate networks during the
fifth/eleventh century, but Denia would also make a place for itself in relations with
al-Mahdiya.

Chapter six will further develop this theme, but archeological and

118 See infra, ch. 6 for further discussion of relations between Denia and the North African coasts.
119 S.D. Goitein, letters of Medieval Jewish Traders (Princeton, 1973), 83. See also his "La Tunisie

du Xi e siecle a la lumiere des documents de la Geniza du Caire," in Etudes d'orienta!isme dediees a la
memoire de Levi-Provem;:a! (Paris, 1962), 2:559-580.
120 0.R. Constable, Trade and Traders, 32; Ch. Picard, La mer, 174; lbn Khurradadhbih, Kitab al
masa!ik wa a!-mama!ik, ed. M.J. de Goeje, B. G.A., v. 6 (Leiden, I 967), 87.
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textual sources bear witness to regular economic, intellectual and diplomatic relations
with lfriqiya made possible by the direct maritime links between the two coasts. 121
The character of Mediterranean maritime traffic evolved over the course of the
century. The central Maghreb and lfrTqiya went through periods of decline, and the
Mediterranean's economic center shifted more towards the East.122 In a letter during
the second quarter of the century, a man congratulates his friend for moving to Egypt,
for "the whole [Muslim] West is not worth a thing these days." 123 Markets that were
more lucrative drew ships in the latter fifth/eleventh century directly to the Eastern
Mediterranean. The sixth/twelfth-century geographer IdrTsT wrote that there were
thirty-six days of maritime travel between al-Andalus and Antioch, while also
including far fewer routes for the Maghreb than his predecessor al-BakrT. 124 IdrTsT
also writes that ships left Denia for the "farthest" Orient, following perhaps the routes
between al-Andalus and Tripoli indicated by Na�Tr-i Khusraw. 125 Geniza documents
show that ships from Denia, specifically those owned by 'AlT b. Mujahid, were

121
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among those travelling these routes, sometimes without stopping at all between their
port and Alexandria. 126
Denia's ships could thus follow the islands to carry maritime violence against
the Italian and Provenc;:al coasts, while its ports and markets could attract merchants
from those same coasts.

John Pryor has moreover underlined the essential

importance of these networks in the evolution of Christian Mediterranean shipping. 127
In controlling passage between the continent and the Balearics, Mujahid and 'Ali held
a major advantage, not only over the Christian ports, but over their taifa neighbors as
well.

Ships from Tortosa and Barcelona necessarily traversed Denia's waters,

explaining no doubt in part the mutual benevolence that characterized their relations
with Denia throughout the century.
Mujahid understood the importance of these maritime networks before even
creating the taifa of Denia and, just as with the continental networks, he structured his
policies in order to integrate and exploit them better. These routes were themselves
tools for Mujahid and 'AlI's Mediterranean ambitions. In fact, even though their
specific policies differed on certain points, they both worked to increase the taifa's
influence through the communications networks that became quasi-extensions of the
taifa itself.

126
127
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Piracy, state finances and maritime territoriality
The sea was not solely a source of non-violent exchange. Ships may have left Denia
to commerce with the Eastern ports, but IdrTsT also writes that the fleet that menaced
Christian shipping and coasts harbored in the taifa's port. 128

Mujahid and 'AlT

invested heavily in naval infrastructures, as we shall see below, notably to launch and
maintain this fleet. The taifa began with the invasion of Sardinia and raids against
Pisa and the Tuscan coast, and piracy remained one of its principal activities
throughout the century. 129 Barcelona was forced to engage Norman mercenaries to
limit Mujahid's tribute-exacting incursions, while monks kidnapped as human booty
from the monastery of Lerins were quickly found in Denia's slave markets. Majorca
was likewise a hub for pirates, to the point that lbn Khaldun describes its governors'
activities as a "maritime jihad." 130
Emily Sohmer Tai has advanced the idea that the privateering that emerged
over the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth century was a form of territorial
occupation. Specifically, she writes that Genoa, Pisa, and Barcelona, in trying to
monopolize the means of maritime violence to protect their economic interests, were
in fact territorializing those waters.131
128

Letters of marque did not exist for the

IdrTsT, Opus geographicum, 5:557
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fifth/eleventh century, but the maritime policy of Denia's rulers came through in the
guerre de course conveyed through their port. Piracy was a state affair, filling its
coffers and financing its existence. Denia did not have a monopoly on maritime
violence, nor did it seek to during most of its history, but there was a real link
between its maritime territory and policies. Denia's ships, in fact, are comparable to
fortifications built inland.

Ibn $umadi}:i wrote to 'Abd Allah b. BuluqqTn that

territories can only be held by building fortresses and occupying them. 132 A few
centuries later, the jurist Hugo Grotius (d. 1645), who was particularly interested in
maritime law and warfare, wrote that sovereignty over a particular part of the sea
came with the simple presence of a fleet. 133

This translates into an admittedly

ephemeral notion of territoriality, but one that agrees with the reticular structure of
Denia's own territory. Mujahid held not only the principal strategic points in the
Western Mediterranean, but he also extended his territory through ships launched
from his arsenals and ports.
Henri Terrasse was correct, and Denia had no borders, but this was not
specific to Denia. The absence of real political borders within the medieval Islamic
world requires an nuanced view of sovereign territory. As we have seen, political
territory was in many ways a fiscal matter, expressed through districts and governors.
In the absence of clear political borders, the taifa states can be seen as zones of fiscal
132
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authority enforced by military coercion. Other criteria can help clarify these limits;
the ability to name judges, for example, was an exclusive privilege of legitimate and
sovereign power.134 Nevertheless, a state exercises its authority over a territory from
which it can raise taxes in one form or another, and it is sovereign in those areas from
which it can extract revenue without having to forward the surplus on to a higher
power. Thus, while fixed lines do not necessarily separate states, fiscal circulation is
fundamental. A state's territory can evolve. It does not have to be contiguous and
can even be intermixed with that of another state, one that is not necessarily even
neighboring. Sites under a taifa's authority are denser around the capital and become
more dispersed farther out. This territory is reticular but remains the territorial base
for a political power. As in Granada, in Denia there was a dynasty, dawla, that
functioned as a legitimate polity attached to a territory over which it imposed its
coercive power, mamlaka, through agents and the use of force.
All of the taifas fit to some degree within this description, and the absence of
real political borders was a common characteristic.

Nevertheless, Denia seems

especially ill fitted with the idea of a territorially homogenous state because of its
policies of territorial occupation and its specifically maritime nature. The territories
over which Denia's rulers exercised their authority or from which they extracted
revenue were particularly fragmented and constantly evolving. Denia's territorial
nature was all the more unique since the majority of its resources came from the sea,
134 Dominique Valerian has argued that tribal loyalties as evidenced by bay'a oaths and the
attribution of 'iqta · contributed to the delineation of political space in later medieval North Africa;
"Frontieres et territoire dans le Maghreb de la fin du Mayen Age : les marches occidentals du sultanat
hafside," Correspondances, 73 (2002-3): 3-8.
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perhaps the most fragmented and slackest of territories. The taifa was based on
expansion across Mediterranean lanes.

The conquest of the Balearics and then

Sardinia involved the sea and maritime lanes as much as the islands themselves.
Those lanes should be viewed as a dynamic extension of its fiscal territory, especially
given Denia's dominance of them in the first years of its existence. Denia's ships
were of course not collecting taxes, but how much do they differ from tax-collecting
military expeditions sent by rulers to uncooperative zones that they clearly considered
under their authority? 135

Maritime booty furnished the majority of the taifa' s

financial means during its first years, later augmented by commercial shipping and
international exchange. Denia, the Balearic Islands and, for a time, Sardinia were the
focal points for Denia's Western Mediterranean network, while its ships can be seen
as J:,u�iin through which it exercised its fiscal policy. 136
The taifa of Denia does not correspond to traditional notions of a state, seated
on a precise and fixed territory. Nevertheless, Mujahid and 'Alf exercised sovereign
power over their fragmented lands. Governmental, fiscal, administrative and military
organizations continued from one reign to the next, imposing their authority and
enacting their policies.

Their peers, religious authorities and foreign embassies

recognized their dawla and the sovereignty of their state. This recognition and their

135
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capacity to exercise ultimate authority within a delimited, though fragmented, space
contribute to a larger view of government and the Islamic state in the taifa period.

STATECRAFT AND MONETARY PRODUCTION

Monetary production supported almost all facets of the taifa's existence. Money was
a financial, fiscal and political tool for Mujahid and 'AlT, although their production
was intermittent and dictated by punctual and fluctuating circumstances. Most taifas
did not issue money, relying on already circulating coins and non-monetary financial
tools; many rulers, in fact, were reticent before such an open affirmation of power. 137
The decision by Denia's rulers to mint coins thus illustrates an ambitious conception
of their state.

Monetary emission demonstrates not only an understanding of the

financial needs associated with maritime commerce, but also an idea of distinct and
legitimate sovereignty with a fiscal policy to match.

Money: a commercial tool
Legal tender was a common concept in the medieval Mediterranean, and local money
was the normal means of payment. 138

In his J:i;sba treatise written in early

sixth/twelfth-century Seville, Ibn 'Abdun specifies that only local money (sikkat al-

137 F. Clement, "L'apport de la numismatique pour l'etude des taifas andalouses du ye/Xi e siecle,"
Archeologie islamique, 4 ( 1994): 69; F. Clement, Pouvoir et /egitimite, 263-72.
138 S.D. Goitein, Mediterranean Society, I :234.
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balad) should be used in the marketplace.

139

Goitein notes that changing money was

so common that merchants adapted the verb jawwaza, "to render licit," to mean
"convert to legal tender." 140 They use the term jawaz al-balad to refer to local
money.

Most port cities, in fact, operated mints to satisfy, and exploit, foreign

merchants' need for local coins, just as the taifa ports of Tortosa, Valencia, Madinat
Mayurqa, Denia and Almeria all minted coins at least sporadically.141 The large
percentage of demonetized Fatimid pieces in regional coin hoards indicates that
Sharq al-Anda/us taifas issued coins in part for monetary exchange. 142 Merchants
generally paid a 10% customs fee on the value of their merchandise, and requiring
payment in local tender would have brought the state a double profit, from the tax
itself and the exchange fees. 143 Carolina Domenech Belda has noted that the Fatimid
pieces from the area show signs of perforation, cutting and fragmentation like local
coins.144 This treatment may in fact indicate that the coins were exchanged for local
tender for customs duties, since Alberto Canto has shown that coin perforation was
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probably tied to demonetization, making the coins useless for the payment of public
debts. 145
We should note, however, that perforated coins could still serve for daily or
mercantile transactions. 146

Fatimid coins in regional coin hoards were not only

pierced, but also often cut or fragmented, a sign of financial use based on weight and
not the monetary value of a coin. 147 Thus, even though the Fatimid coins were not
legal tender, they could still serve as a private, non-monetary means of payment.
The link between these Fatimid coins and local taifal emissions goes beyond
simple exchange, and helps explain some of the larger mechanisms behind AndalusT
monetary production. In fact, dates for imported Fatimid coins do not coincide with
the main periods of taifa production. The last Sicilian and IfrTqiyan dirhams imported
to al-Andalus were produced under the caliph al-Z:ahir (411-427/1021-36), and dinars
ceased arriving after Fatimid production stopped in the Maghreb around the middle of
the century. 148

Production in Denia did not begin in earnest until 4432/1040-1,

towards the same period as most other taifa mints. 149 The circulating monetary mass
at the beginning of the century - a combination of caliphal, I:Iammadid and Fatimid
coins - had sufficed for commercial needs. 150 However, when Fatimid importations
145
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diminished during the second quarter of the century, taifa rulers faced a lack of specie
for mercantile exchange that they tried to correct with their own emissions. Denia's
was not the most prolific taifa mint, but the quantity of dirhams and dinars produced
there does indicate commercial use.

Indeed, the fragmentation or cutting of a

majority of Denia's remaining coms indicates their role in local commercial
exchange. 151

Money: a legitimizing tool
Commerce, however, does not seem to have been the principal reason for monetary
production in Denia. Recent historiography has shown the instrumental role played
by coins in legitimizing and defining power. 152 Coin production was a state privilege,
and any decision to mint money "was fundamentally a political act." 153 Frarn;:ois
Clement and Pierre Guichard have both pointed out the close ties between minting
and regal titles, a prime tool for communicating political legitimacy. Mujahid and
'AIT both used semi-caliphal honorific titles, respectively al-Muwaffaq and Iqbal al151
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Dawla, and the inclusion of those titles, or laqab, on monetary inscriptions underlined
their role as political propaganda. 154 We should also note that Mujahid's mintings
coincided with transitional moments in his reign, when he needed to define and
support his power. Thus, when Berbers besieged Hisham II in Cordova in 402/10112 and 403/1012-3, Mujahid produced coins in the Umayyad caliph's name bearing the
mint name :i...b__,ll, Aliita. 155

Mujahid had established his independence vis-a-vis

Cordova partly in reaction to the Berber threat, but he still considered himself an
officer and servant of the Umayyad regime that had granted him the power he
possessed. The Aliita emissions thus reiterated his support for Hisham II, while also
associating his power with the Cordovan caliphate.
Mujahid used this same form of monetary propaganda when he declared the
caliphate of 'Abd Allah al-Mu'aytT in 405/1013. A dirham from that year, also from
Aliita, associates Mujahid with the imam 'Abd Allah, am1r al-mu 'min1n, "commander
of the believers." 156 lbn al-KhatTb associates this minting with the oath that Mujahid
ordered the people of Denia and Mallorca to swear to the new caliph, as well as his
use of the laqab al-Mustan�ir bi-Llah in his official communications. 157 There was
thus an ensemble of actions calculated to establish the new regime's legitimate
power, and for which numismatics was an "effective means of advertising." 158

154

'An used his !aqab on all his coins,while al-Muwaffaq appears only once. See appendix.
A. Vives y Escudero, Monedas de las dinastias arabigo-espanolas, (Madrid,1893) ns. 711, 712;
A. Prieto y Vives, Los reyes de taifas, ns. 134a, 134b; G.C. Miles The Coinage of the Umayyads of
Spain (New York, 1950), ns. 347,350.
156
A. Vives y Escudero,Monedas, no. 819; A. Prieto y Vives,Los reyes de taifas, no. 135.
157
lbn al-KhatTo,Kitab a 'mat al-a 'lam, 253.
158 D
. Wasserstein, Rise and fall, 155; F. Clement,Pouvoir et legitimite, 231; P. Guichard, "Quelques
reflexions sur le monnayage des premieres taifas andalouses," 157.
155
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Likewise, Ibn al-KhatTh and Ibn Khaldun write that 'Abd Allah al-Mu'aytT rebelled
against Mujahid while he was in Sardinia, and dirhams from that time carry only the
name of'Abd Allah. 159
Felix Retamero recently argued that these monetary em1ss1ons from Denia
were also a means to establish dynastic succession. 160 Thus, the 405/1013-4 dirham
carries the names of'Abd Allah and Mujahid on the reverse, while the obverse carries
the name 'Abd al-Rabman. 161 Ibn Bashkuwal writes, in fact, that 'Abd Allah al
Mu'aytI's son was named 'Abd al-Rabman. 162

Retamero explains that 'Amirid

numismatic protocol placed the names ofthe caliph and the highest court dignitary on
the reverse, while Sulayman al-Musta'In bi-Llah and the Banu ijammad inscribed the
caliphal successor on the obverse. The Aluta dirham combines the different protocols
to communicate an ensemble of messages: al-Mu'aytI's caliphate, Mujahid's f:,ijaba,
and the stability of a regime with an established succession. 163 Mujahid employed
this same technique towards the end of his reign to establish a stable dynastic parity
between his two sons, 'AIT and ijasan. Ibn 'IdharT affim1s that Mujahid had originally
159 lbn al-Kha\Th, Kitab a 'ma/ al-a 'lam, 253; lbn Khaldun, Kitab al- 'ibar, 4:354; A. Vives y
Escudero, Monedas, ns. 820, 821; A. Prieto y Vives, Los reyes de taifas, ns. 136, 137; A. Canto
Garcia, T. b. 1:L lbrahTm, "Suplemento a las monedas de los Reinos de Taifas," Los Reyes de Taifas
(Madrid, 2003), n0. 80; G.C. Miles, Coins of the Spanish Muliik al-Tawa 'if, no. 159.
16
° F. Retamero, "La formalizaci6n <lei poder," passim.
161
See appendix. A. Vives y Escudero, Monedas, no. 819; A. Prieto y Vives, Los reyes de taifas, no.
135.
162
Ibn Bashkuwal (1989), 412, no. 598.
163
F. Retamero, "La fom1alizaci6n <lei poder," 419-21. We should note, however, that the dirhams
carrying only al-Mu'ay\T's name also omit 'Abd al-Ral:tman's. In addition, while lbn Bashkuwal does
indeed give Abu 'Abd al-Ral:tman as al-Mu'a)iT's kunya, Retamero also cites a passage by lbn al
Kha\Th that we were unable to verify. Retamero writes that "segun recogi6 lbn al-Ja\Th, Mujahid hizo
constar el nombre del hijo de al-Mu'a)iT, que se llamaba 'Abd al-Ral:tman, en las monedas y en los
estandartes," (p. 420), but lbn al-Kha\Th makes no mention of al-Mu'ay\T's son. In fact, lbn al-Kha\Tb
(p. 252-3, cited supra) clearly writes that Mujahid took these actions in the name of al-Mu'ay\T
himself. The related footnote refers only to an article by F. Codera that cites a variant to the published
text and which in fact contradicts Retamero's analysis.
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chosen I:Iasan to succeed him, a fact confinned by dirhams minted in Denia and
MadTnat Mayiirqa between 430/1038-9 and 432/1040-1. 164 These coins carry I:Iasan's
name and, on one occasion, Mujahid's /aqab, al-Muwaffaq. The brothers' shared
succession was later expressed through dinars and dirhams minted in 435/1043-4 and
436/1044-5 and that bore their names on the obverse and their father's on the
reverse. 165 On his ascension, 'AIT produced coins with his own name, and his son's,
Mubammad, thus underlining not only unshared sovereignty, but also I:Iasan's
exclusion from the succession. 166 'AIT thus associated his son with his power until the
end of his reign, and rendered his role as heir-apparent even more explicit in the last
years, inscribing the title a/-fatii along with Mubammad's /aqab, Mu'izz al-Dawla. 167
Finally, when al-Muqtadir b. Hiid took Denia in 468/1076, 'AIT's son, Mujahid Siraj

164 lbn 'ldharT, Bayan, 3: I57; F. Retamero, "La formalizaci6n <lei poder," 437-8; A. Vives y
Escudero, Monedas, ns. 1323-5; A. Prieto y Vives, Los reyes de taifas, ns. I 98-205b; J. Rada y
Delgado, Cata/ago de monedas arabigas espanolas que se conservan en el Museo Arqueol6gico
Nacional (Madrid, 1892), no. 468; A. Canto Garcia, T. b. l;I. lbrahTm, "Suplemento," ns. 81-4; A.
Canto Garcia, T. b. l:{. lbrahTm, F. Martin Escudero, Monedas andalusies (Real Academia de la
Historia. Cata/ago de! Gabinete de Antigiiedades) (Madrid, 2000), no. 2241.
165
F. Retamero, "La formalizaci6n <lei poder," 438; A. Vives y Escudero, Monedas, ns. 1296-1301;
A. Prieto y Vives, Los reyes de taifas, ns. 206-8; G.C. Miles, Coins of the Spanish Muh,k al-Tawa'if, n.
266; M. Barcelo, "Assaig d'un corpus numismatic de la taifa 'amirida de Daniya-Mayfirqa (436-468),"
Actas de/ JV coloquio hispano-tunecino (Palma de Mal/area, 1979) (Madrid: 1983), ns. 1-3; T. b. l:{.
lbrahTm, "Adiciones a la numismatica de los taifas del Sarq al-Anda/us (404-478/1013-1085)," Gaceta
Numismatica, I 03 (199 I): no. 5.
166
A. Vives y Escudero, Monedas, no. 1306; A. Prieto y Vives, Los reyes de taifas, no. 209c; M.
Barcel6, "Assaig d'un corpus," no. 4; H. Lavoix, Catalogue des monnaies musulmanes de la
Bibliotheque nationale, t. 2, Espagne et Afrique (Paris: 1891), no. 456. l:{asan's assassination attempt
on 'AIT explains this exclusion. He finished his days in obscurity under the protection of'Abd al-'AzTz
of Valencia; lbn 'ldharT, Bayan, 3: 157-8; lbn Bassam, DhakhTra, 3: 130-1.
167
A. Vives y Escudero, Monedas, ns. 1320-2; A. Prieto y Vives, Los reyes de taifas, no. 216; G.C.
Miles, Coins of the Spanish Muh,k al-Tawa'if, ns. 283-91; M. Barcelo, "Assaig d'un corpus," no. 20.
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al-Dawla, entrenched himself in Segura, where he affirmed his own sovereignty with
dirhams bearing his name and the town's.168
Monetary production thus served to bolster the legitimacy of Denia's dawla,
or dynasty. The coins, together with other symbols of a legitimate Islamic regime,
such as pronouncing the khufba in the ruler's name, communicated stability and
inspired the loyalty of regional governors and respect from other taifa rulers. The
simple circulation of Denia's coins beyond its borders, as far as Catalonia and
Cordova, reinforced the regime's place in peninsular networks. In addition, payment
of public debts with the taifa's dirhams and dinars implicated recognition of the state,
if only because of its ability to impose its fiscal policy by means of force. We should
also note that these coins financed and supported state policies and projects. The
Aluta emissions, for example, not only served as propaganda, but also helped cover
the costs for Mujahid's Mediterranean campaigns against the Balearics and especially
Sardinia. Mujahid paid five "dinars of dirhams" for each foal requisitioned from
Mallorca, and he logically would have paid with the Aluta coins bearing the name of
the caliph in whose name he exercised that same authority.169 Those dirhams thus
symbolized the political power that held the Islands, while also serving to equip the
thousand-strong army that was preparing to invade Sardinia.

168

lbn 'ldhar1, Bayiln, 3:228; lbn al-KhatTo, Kitilb a 'mill al-a 'lilm, 255; lbn Khaldun, Kitilb al- 'ibar,
4:355; lbn al-Abbar, Kitilb al-1:,ulla al-siyaril, 2: 150; A. Canto Garcia, T. b. H. lbrah1m, "Suplemento,"
110. 91.
169
lbn al-Khatib, Kitilb a 'mill al-a 'lilm, 251.
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Money: a fiscal tool
This last point leads to the principal reason for monetary emissions under the taifa
regimes.

Money contributed to commercial circulation, stimulating mercantile

transactions.

It was also an effective form of political propaganda.

Above all,

however, money was a fiscal tool, intended to generate income for the state. Miquel
Barcelo raised this point in his analysis of a fatwa by lbn }:Iazm, who condemned
monetizing by the muliik al-fawii 'if. 170 lbn I:Iazm considered taifa coins tools for
rulers to extort their subjects through illegitimate taxes, financing their armies and
reinforcing their ill-gotten authority.

He complained of an al-Andalus ruled by

highwaymen who unleashed their armies on the people to impose illicit contributions
and tributes (mukiis, jiziya, and c;larzba). 171

Ibn Khaldiin specifically cites the

AndalusT taifas in his chapter on entry fees and market tolls, explaining that dying
regimes had to rely on illicit taxes to finance their armies and luxurious habits. 172
Alfred-Louis de Premare and Pierre Guichard together pointed out the effects
of an aggressive tax program developed by Mu?affar and Mubarak, the Slav rulers of
Valencia. 1 73 lbn }:Iayyan writes that the two fityiin imposed increasingly onerous
taxes on their subjects, in part with help from the Saqiiliba mercenaries that had
170

M. Barcelo, "'Ruedas que giran en el fuego <lei infiemo' o i:,para que servia la moneda de los
taifas?," in El sol que sali6 par Occidente. £studios sabre el estado Omeya en al-Anda/us (Jaen, 1997),
195-204. The fatwa in question is in "Un codice inexplorado <lei cordobes lbn Hazm," Arabic text and
Spanish trans. M. Asin Palacios, Al-Anda/us, 2 (1934): 35-44; P. Guichard, "Quelques reflexions sur le
monnayage des premieres taifas andalouses," p. 157.
171
lbn l:lazm, "Un codice," 35/38. We have followed M. Asin Palacios, who translates mubiirib,
warrior or bellicose, by salteador de caminos.
172 lbn Khaldun, Kitab al- 'ibar, I :346.
173
A.-L. Premare, P. Guichard, "Croissance urbaine et societe rnrale a Valence au debut de l'epoque
des royaumes de taifas (XI' siecle de J.-C.). Traduction et commentaire d'un texte d'lbn Hayyiin,"
R.0.M.M., 3.1 (1981): 15-30.
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settled in Valencia at the beginning of the fitna.

174

Local populations abandoned their

lands to avoid taxes, while those same lands were redistributed among members of
the court-favored elite. Fiscal policy may not have been as aggressive in other taifas,
but we can note that Valencia, Denia and Almeria all struck dirhams during this same
period. 175 These dirhams helped define and bolster the fragile new taifa regimes, but
they also would have facilitated taxation at a time when monetary supply from
Cordova was unstable at best. 176
Rulers could require payment for public debts in official local specie, and
subjects would be required to change their money, bullion or goods for the regime's
coins. This process could result in substantial additional income for the state, due to
monetization fees of around 1. 75% for gold and 3% for silver.177 Intermittent minting
was thus probably linked to punctual needs for income, just as the Aluta dirhams
coincided with Mujahid's Balearic and Sardinia campaigns.

This fiscal aspect

likewise explains in part the timing for Mujahid's two waves of monetary production,
as well as his son's subsequent issues. The coins were intended for use as payment
for public debts, but only the imam, or his representative, had the right to collect

174
A.L. de Premare, P. Guichard, "Croissance urbaine et societe mrale," 19, 24; lbn Bassam,
DhakhTra, 3:18-19.
175
A. Prieto y Vives, Los reyes de taifas, ns. 134-7 (Mujahid in Aliita), 138-9 (Mubarak and Muzafar
in Valencia); A. Canto Garcia, T. b. H. IbrahTm, "Suplemento," no. 26 (Khayran in Valencia); A. Ariza
Armada, "Las cecas de taifas bajo dominio eslavo," Actas del VI encuentro de estudios numismaticos:
La producci6n y circulaci6n de moneda en Sharq al-Andalus durante las primeras taifas (404478/1013-1085), Gaceta numismatica, 105/106 (1992): 149 (Khayran in Almeria).
176
F. Clement, "L'apport de la numismatique," 64.
177
E. Levi-Proven9al notes these figures for fourteenth-century Fez, and considers that early
medieval fees would have been similar: HEM, 3:42. Monetization was among the chief complaints
advanced by lbn �Iazm, who considered that Muslims should eschew the cormpt taifa mlers' coins for
bullion.
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canonical taxes.

178

A regime that could not show caliphal recognition on its coins

would have had little legal basis for imposing taxes via those same coins. Thus,
Denia struck coins only when its rulers also recognized a caliphal candidate, thereby
implicitly receiving recognition of their own power. 179 Mujahid thus initially minted
under Hisham II, then al-Mu'aytT. The consensus among Mujahid's peers concerning
the false Hisham II in Seville in the 430s/1040s allowed Denia to collect taxes with
coins struck in his name. In the second half of the century, the muliik al-fawa 'if were
faced with increasing financial demands and an absent caliph, leading them to
recognize a fictitious imam, 'Abd Allah, in order to produce coins and collect taxes in
his name. 'AlT followed this example until the end of this reign.
Finally, the fiscal importance of monetary production was a direct response to
the financial needs of the state, especially under 'AlT. In fact, the more or less
continuous production under 'AlT points not only to a fiscal program, but to a change
in the taifa's maritime politics.

The run of extent coins from 'AlT's reign 1s

intermittent, with pieces m1ssmg for 444-5/1052-4, 451-4/1059-63, 456/1063-4 et
458-66/1065-74, but Denia remains one of the most prolific taifa mints. 18° Felix
Retamero counted 144 overall pieces for the taifa, with 120 for 'AlT. 181 He also noted

178
Al-Maward1, Les Status gouvernementaux, 55, 59; M. Asin Palacios, Abenhazam de Cordoba y su
historia critica de las ideas re/igiosas, v. 5 (Madrid, 1932) 47; P. Crone, God's Rule: Government and
Islam. Six Centuries of Medieval Islamic Political Thought, (New York, 2004), 304.
179
Cf. al-Maward1, Les Statuts gouvernementaux, 66-70; F. Clement, Pouvoir et /egitimite, 52; P.
Crone, God's Rule, 233, 243-5.
180
See annex. Note that we include the mint at Mad1nat Mayiirqa, also under 'Ali, in this analysis.
181
F. Retamero, "Aproximaci6 a les encunyacions de la taifa amirita de Diin1ya-MayfJrqa (402?468/1011?-I 076)," Actas de/ VJ encuentro de estudios numismaticos: La producci6n y circulaci6n de
moneda en Sharq al-Anda/us durante las primeras taifas (404-478/1013-1085), Gaceta numismatica,
105/106 (1992): 87, 104.

that almost 25% of Denia's coins had been pierced.

182
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Alberto Canto's study of the

Spanish National Archeological Museum's numismatic collection demonstrated that
only 'Abbadid coins show similar perforation rates, while other taifas remain between
0% and 9%. 183 As noted above, perforation was a form of demonetization, forcing
subjects and travelers to change their coins for fiscally authorized specie.

Felix

Retamero thus notes that beginning in 435/1043-4, "the 'Amirid financial structure
depended in large part on a conscious policy of monetary emission." 184

Piracy

provided for a large part of Mujahid's financial needs, but changing Mediterranean
dynamics may have forced 'AlI to revert to monetization and taxation to support his
court.

The reinforced presence of the Christian port cities in the Western

Mediterranean seems however to have increasingly limited booty as a source of state
revenue.

Pisan action against Muslim beachheads interfering with maritime

commerce began as early as 1006 in the straits of Calabria, and their ability to oust
Mujahid from Sardinia points to their growing strength. 185 In 1035, the Pisans raided
the North-African port of Annaba (Hippo), also famous as a pirate haven, and two
decades later attacked Palem10, bringing home enough loot to begin construction on
their new cathedral. 186 The Mediterranean maritime lanes were no longer the domain
of Muslim navies, and navigation became increasingly difficult.

Biographies of

F. Retamero, "Aproximaci6," I 03. A high perforation rate indicates an equally high rate of
demonetization. Denia's production may thus have been much higher than the figures lead to believe.
Alberto Canto notes perforation rates of 30% for 'Abd al-Rat:iman Ill's earliest emissions, while coins
from those years are also the rarest from the Umayyad caliphate, indicating "a selective program of
demonetizing and reminting of coins:" A. Canto Garcia, "Perforations," 357.
183
A. Canto Garcia, "Perforations," 355.
184
F. Retamero, "Aproximaci6," I 03.
185
Anna/es pisani, 238; Breviarium Pisanae Historiae, 167.
186
Anna/es pisani, 238; Breviarium Pisanae Historiae, 167; al-BakrT, 55.
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Muslim scholars show numerous attacks on the high seas, and over the course of the
century jurists began counseling against travelling by boat for the pilgrimage to
Mecca. 187 In the second half of the century, the poet Abu al-'Arab Mufab al-SiqillT
refused an invitation to come to Seville from Sicily on the grounds that "the sea
belongs to the Rum, and the ships sailing on it run a great risk." 188 This does not
mean that Islamic piracy ceased, but it would have been increasingly difficult for
privateering to reliably provide for the needs of Denia's court in this context. As a
result, 'Ali turned to taxation and monetary emissions to supplement declining
revenues.

Ibn I:Iayyan notes significantly that 'Ali" s primary concern was state

revenue. 189
A large-scale fortification and construction program seems to have
accompanied this new fiscal policy. Rafael Azuar Ruiz insists on the concomitance
of regularized coin production and the arrival of a "series of large fortifications under
direct taifal power." 190

He advances that norn1alized minting allowed for the

construction of "emblematic fortifications," and in Denia's case, the urban qa$aba
and the border bi$n of Bairen. Azuar Ruiz and Josep Torr6 i Abad likewise see fiscal
aspects behind local fortifications, presenting them as the seats for semi-independent
governors on whom the taifa rulers depended for tax collecting. 191

Renewed

Al-1:lumaydT, 274, no. 332; lbn Bashkuwal, p. 351, no. 520, p. 548, no. 809, p. 719, no. 1028; V.
Lagardere, Histoire et societe en Occident musulman au Mayen Age. Analyse du Mi'yar d'al
Wan.forfsf (Madrid, 1995), 29, 63.
188
H. Peres, La poesie andalouse en arabe classique au XI" siecle (Paris, 1953), 216.
189
Ibn Bassam, Dhakhfra, 4: 183.
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R. Azuar Ruiz, "Fortificaciones," 126-8.
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R. Azuar Ruiz, "Fortificaciones," 126, 135; J. Torr6, "Fortificaciones en Yibiil Balansiya. Una
propuesta de secuencia," Casti/los y territorio en al-Anda/us (Granada, 1998), 404-5. See infra, ch. 7.
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monetary production thus allowed Denia's rulers to establish an ambitious fiscal
program, one that financed the construction of fortifications and representative power
structures, themselves tied to collecting taxes and tribute. This brings us back to Ibn
I:Iazm's claims that monetization only served to extort from the people the financial
means to better exploit and tax them.

MEN OF THE COURT: KUTTAB AND 'ULAMA'

Denia's rulers needed individuals who could carry out their policies and maintain
their administration. They needed to communicate, define and defend their power
using tools adapted to the literary culture of the taifas. The court had to rest in
contact with provincial governors, the 'ummal and quwwad, for tax collection,
territorial defense and enforcing court orders. Mujahid and 'AlI maintained relations
with their peers, AndalusT and elsewhere, and these relations followed strict protocols
and literary conventions requiring a long and onerous education. 192 They also had to
worry about the legitimacy of their power, politics and actions, and this legitimacy
often depended on the opinion of religious and legal scholars, the fuqaha '.
This section will not analyze in detail the literary culture of the taifa of Denia.
Numerous studies already exist concerning this culture, for Denia and al-Andalus,

192 Epistolary writing, already ornate under the Umayyad caliphate, became a tortuous art under the
taifas, "voluntarily bombastic, in rhythmical and rhyming prose, and making abundant reference to
literary and Koranic traditions": C. Samelli Cerqua, "La vita intelletuale a Denia," 8; E. Levi
Provern;:al, HEM, 3:25-6; P. Guichard, 8. Soravia, Les royaumes des taifas, 237.

138
and their authors are much more qualified in the subject matter.

193

Those studies, and

especially the work of Bruna Soravia, serve here as a basis for examining how the
rulers of Denia relied on scholars and men of letters. They needed the approval and
participation of an ensemble of these men, kuttab and fuqaha ', to operate their court
and execute their policies. 194

Kuttab
Kuttab (s. katib), or secretaries, were essential for the operation of the state. Mujahid
and 'Ali, like any ruler, needed a chancellery service capable of communicating their
orders to those who were to apply them. These communications needed to carry the
dignity and authority of the court, while remaining comprehensible for the addressees

193

First among these works is M.J. Rubiera Mata's study, La taifa de Denia (Alicante, 1985), which
is dominated by a literary approach. Rubiera Mata spends numerous pages enumerating the different
figures associated at one time or another with the taifa, and deftly links this literary culture with the
court's political legitimacy. Clelia Samelli Cerqua's work on the taifa's court is often cited. While her
article is more readily accessible, the publication of her thesis from the University of Cairo treats the
court's different literary figures individually and in detail: "La vita intelletuale a Denia," 1-26;
Mujiihid al- 'AmirT "wa ibnuhu" Iqbal al-dawla fl Diiniya wa Sardiiniya wa jazr al-Balayiir ji-l-qarn
al-khiimis al-hijra - al-J:,ada 'ashra al-mTladT (Cairo, 1961). Any study on the taifas should include
Henri Peres's La Poesie andalouse en arabe classique au ff siecle (Paris, 1953). Cynthia Robinson's
In Praise of Song. The Making of Courtly Culture in al-Anda/us and Provence, 1005-1134 A.D.
(Leiden, 2002) examines majiilis literature and its relationship with political power. We were unable
to consult Bruna Soravia's unpublished dissertation, but her collaboration with Pierre Guichard
presents part of her research; "Les fonctionnaires epistoliers (kuttab al-insha) en Espagne musulmane a
l'epoque des roitelets (Ve siecle h./XI ° s.)," (Doctoral diss., Universite de Paris 3, I998); "Entre
bureaucratie et litterature : la kitdba et les kuttdb dans !'administration de l'Espagne musulmane," al
Masdq, 7 (1994): 165-200; P. Guichard and B. Soravia, Les royaumes des taifas, 235-279. Finally, A.
Ben Abdesselem's study presents a competent though pedestrian description of the century's major
literary figures; La Vie litteraire dans I 'Espagne musulmane sous /es muliik al-/awa 'if (V'IX!' siecle)
(Damascus, 200 I).
194
The fifth/eleventh century is especially known for its poets, and Denia's court was one of the most
important patrons of AndalusI poetry. This subject does not, however, seem especially pertinent here,
and was not necessarily practiced by the kuttiib. Poetry was of course one of the more important tools
for establishing and expressing a regime's legitimacy, but it did not directly contribute to developing
and executing Denia's Mediterranean strategies. The bibliography in the preceding note also provides
the principal works on AndalusI poetry for this period, from both a literary and political point of view.

expected to apply them.
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Saravia cites a letter sent by Mu'tamid b. 'Abbad of

Seville to his quwwad al-bi/ad, as well as another by 'AH b. Ijammud, to order a tax
collection. 196 Even if these collections were exceptional, Denia's tax policies must
also have passed through official missives. When al-Muqtadir b. Hud sought to
appropriate some of Denia's fortresses, 'AH b. Mujahid sent letters to the concerned
'ummal, first to order their retreat, then, having changed his mind, to order them to
prepare their defense. 197 Likewise, sixty years earlier, when Mujahid declared al
Mu'aytT caliph, he ordered his kuttab to include the Umayyad's name in directives to
require loyalty oaths (bay 'a) from the people. 198
The kuttab's participation in the state's operation, and especially the definition
of its power, was more significant than simply writing letters.

Power is often

legitimized through ostentatious display of tradition, especially when that power is
precarious. The literary culture, or adab, of the secretaries thus had served to confirm
the conservatism of the caliphate, and especially al-Man�ur's f:iijaba, under which the
kuttab, along with the Berbers and Saqaliba, were part of the 'Amirid power
structure. 199 They thus offered their intellectual and literary abilities, their "moral and
literary orthodoxy," to the 'Amirids, contributing to the usurping regime's

195

P. Guichard and 8. Soravia, Les royaumes des taifas, 240, 248.
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P. Guichard and 8. Soravia, Les royaumes des taifas, 240. The term adab refers to the idea of
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Gabrieli, "Adab," E/2, I: 175b.
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legitimacy.

200

The caliphate's implosion dispersed these functionaries, who offered

their services to its heirs, often the same 'Amirid clients with whom they had shared
the administration of the fallen regime. 201 These kuttab played an essential role in
stabilizing the taifas at the beginning of the fitna, and Denia was no exception.
Mujahid thus attracted to his court, even if only briefly, a number of major figures
from the 'Amirid chancellery. 202
Secretaries occupied the majority of higher administrative offices, including
governorships and vizierates. 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Man�iir 'AlI entrusted his government
to the four secretaries sent to him by the caliph al-Qasim b. I:Iammiid, raising them to
the vizierate and bestowing on them countless gifts and riches, while they in tum
ensured governmental stability throughout his reign and during the transition to 'Abd
al-'Aziz's son, 'Abd al-Malik. 203
'AlI b. Mujahid likewise relied heavily on the kuttab in his court, involving
them in the taifa's most delicate matters. Abu al-A�bagh b. Arqam served Denia's
court for many years, and carried the title dhu al-wizaratayn, setting him apart among
the taifa functionaries. 204

200

Ibn Arqam was an essential contributor to Denia's

P. Guichard and B. Soravia, Les royaumes des taifas, 237.
Soravia and Samelli Cerqua cite a letter by the katib Ibn Shuhayd to Mujahid al-'AmirT that
expresses the relationship between the two men under their former patron: "We were, before distance
separated us [ ... ),before destiny shook us with violence [ ...),two companions tied by friendship,two
allies unconcerned with our lineages, because adab bound us together." Translation adapted from: P.
Guichard and B. Soravia, Les royaumes des taifas, 240-1; C. Samelli Cerqua, Mujahid al- 'Amirf, 225;
C. Samelli Cerqua, "La vita intelletuale a Denia," 606.
202
Among the most important of these were Abu b. Burd al-A�ghar, Abu 'AmTr Al:imad b. AbT
Marwiin b. Shuhayd, and Abu al-'Alii Sa'id al-BaghdiidT. See the article by C. Samelli Cerqua cited
supra for a more complete discussion ofDenia's kuttab.
203
Ibn 'IdhiirI,Bayan, 3:164-5.
204
lbn Bassiim, DhakhTra ( I 978), 1.2:740. See also "lbn Arqam, Abu 1-A�bag," Enciclopedia de a/
Anda/us. Diccionario de autores y obras andalusies, I :478.
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international relations, and AlI charged him with correspondence to the ruler of
lfriqiya, al-Mu'iz b. Ba.dis, as well as the Fatimid caliph al-Mustan$ir. 205 Ibn Arqam
served as one of the witnesses for the 1058 treaty with Barcelona, as did Mul;lammad
b. Muslim, another of 'AlI's important functionaries. 206 Faced with al-Muqtadir b.
Hud's imminent attack in 468/1076-7, 'AlI sent Ibn Muslim on a whirlwind
diplomatic tour of the remaining taifas pleading for support, a task the katib describes
in a letter to Ibn 'Aghlab, governor ofMayurqa and also a former student of adab. 207

'Ulama'
Denia's rulers also needed the religious and legal support of the fuqaha' and
'ulama '. 208 These men, and especially the qac;ff of Denia, were also political figures
because of their religious and legal roles, as well as a literary erudition comparable to
the kuttab. Mujahid thus sent Al;lmad b. al-I:Iasan b. 'Uthman al-GhasanI b. AbI
Ri'al, qac;ff of Denia, to accompany his son 'Ali on a diplomatic mission to
Qayrawan. 209 During the visit, Ibn AbI Ri'al discussed theological matters with local
scholars and showed himself a competent and sensible diplomat in his relations with
the Shiite court of al-Mu'izz b. Badis. The 'alfm Abu al-Fatuh Thabit b. Mul;lammad
al-JurjanI arrived in al-Andalus to accompany Mujahid on his expedition to Sardinia,
205 Ibn Bassam,DhakhTra, 3:184,271,295.
206 J. Baucells i Reig, Diplomatari, v. 3, doc. 977, p. 1557; M.J. Rubiera Mata, La taifa de Denia,
103-4.
207 Ibn Bassam,DhakhTra, 3:320ff.
208 The term 'ulamii' (s. 'iilim) refers in general to religious scholars, while fi1qahii' (s. faqTh), more
specifically denotes scholars of Koranic law, orjiqh.
209 Ibn al-Abbar, Takmrla (Fez) (1989), 67, no. I 21; H.R. Idris, "Deux maitres de l'ecole juridique
kairouanaise sous les Zirides (Xie siecle): Abu Bakr b. 'Abd al-Rahman et Abu 'Imran al-Fasi,"
Anna/es de l'lnstitut d'Etudes Orienta/es de la Faculte des Lettres d'Alger, (1955): 58-9.
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and was at this side when their ship sank.2

10

Mujahid showed such respect for

another scholar and jurist, Abu al-' Abbas A}:imad b. RashTq, that he placed him at the
head of his state and named him governor of Mayurqa.211 Ibn RashTq used his
Balearic court in tum to patronize religious and legal scholarship, and numerous
AndalusT 'ulamii' spent at least some time there during his mandate.212 'Ulamii' were
thus an essential component in the taifa state, and contributed to Denia's operations
within al-Andalus and across the Mediterranean.
'Ulamii' likewise legitimized the state and the power that supported it.
Fuqahii' often filled the office of qii(ff in their area, named by rulers because of their
knowledge of Islamic law.

The support of a secular power offered scholars

recognition and compensation for a life of studies, while rulers could not carry out
policies without their approval. In fact, the more a ruler's policies were illicit, the
more he would need the legal support of the fuqahii '. This was especially true for tax
collections, the illicit character of which is discussed above, and so necessitated in
particular legal pronunciations solicited for specific collections. 213 Ibn ijazm, in fact,
specifically criticized scholars who gave their approval to taifa rulers and their tax

Al-l:fumayd1 (1989), 7284, no. 345; al-Oabb1 ( 1989), 310, no. 604; lbn Bassam, DhakhTra, 4:91.
C. Samelli Cerqua, "La vita intelletuale a Denia," 602; al-l:fumayd1 ( 1989), 195, n. 208; al-Oabb1
( 1989), 224, n. 40 I; lbn al-Abbar, Kitab al-bulla al-siyarii ', 2: 128.
212
lbn Bashkuwal (1989), ns. 69, 262, 311, 598, 711, 777, 879, 1163; lbn al-Abbar, Takmila
(B.A.H.), 698, no. 1956; al-Oabb1 (1989), ns. 405, I069; al-l:fumayd1 (1989), 450, no. 630. Abmad b.
Rash1q hosted the famous debate between lbn l:fazm and Abu al-Wal1d al-Baj1: lbn al-Abbar, Kitiib a/
bu/la al-siyarii ', 2:128.
213 P. Guichard and B. Soravia, Les royaumes des taifas, 221; B. Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution
of Islamic Law, I 82-5. A recent article presented this relationship in terms of cost analysis,
summarizing that the 'u/amii' "could increase the mler's ability to extract a surplus from the citizenry
by conferring legitimacy, thereby lowering the cost of collecting taxes. It could also limit power
through legal constraints on taxation;" M. Co�gel, Th. Miceli and R. Ahmed, "Law, state power, and
taxation in Islamic history," Journal ofEconomic Behavior and Organization, 71 (2009): 704-17.
210
211
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collectors, treating them as evil men who hid their wicked hearts under lambskins

214

.

Ibn Buluqq'fn notes rebellious 'ulamii' inciting his subjects to refuse to pay taxes,
while in another conversation he is advised to name as qiir;ff a potentially complicit
scholar since : "For should you wish to take but one dirham from anyone without
regard for the law, the people would consider it an outrage. But if you were to take
1,000 dirhams by rightful means, in so doing you would have the full weight of the
law on your side, and no one would take offence."21 5
The tacit support of the 'ulamii ', through their simple presence, could also
help to bulwark a precarious regime, and religious studies played an especially
important role in medieval Islamic politics, notably so in Denia.

Mujahid's

biographers systematically describe him as 'alfm, a literary savant, a master of the
Arabic language, and an important expert on lexicography and Koranic recitation
(qirii'a). 216 He made his capital into the most important center for the study of
Koranic reading in al-Andalus. Mujahid himself wrote treatises on the subject, but
his school was especially known for the presence and teachings of Abu 'Amr al
DanT. 2 17 Al-Dani was such a renowned figure, that after his death in 444/1053, 'An b.
Mujahid marched at the head of this funeral procession. 21 8 However, though 'An
may indeed have been a pious man, this act, as well Mujahid's patronage of religious

lbn I:Iazm, "Un codice," 35/38.
'Abd Allah b. BuluqqTn, Tibyiin, 133.
216
Ibn Bassam, DhakhTra, 3:2 I; Jbn 'ldharT, Bayiin, 3: I55-6; lbn al-KhatTb, Kitiib a 'miil al-a 'liim,
250: al-l)abbT (I 989), 632, n. 1384; al-l:lumaydT ( 1989), 564, n. 829; Yaqut, Kitiib al-Trshiid al-iir'ib ilii
ma 'rifat al-adTb, 6:243-244.
217
lbn Khaldun, Prolegomenes, 2:455-6; P. Guichard and B. Soravia, Les royaumes des taifas, 222;
C. Samelli Cerqua, "La vita intelletuale a Denia," 601.
218
Jbn Bashkuwal ( 1989), 592, no. 882.
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scholarship, also presented political benefits. As noted, a regime's conservatism and
attachment to tradition could contribute to its legitimacy, especially during troubled
times. Al-Man�iir had thus stabilized his power through a campaign of orthodoxy and
persecution of heresy. 219 In this instance, and as Soravia has noted, Koranic reading
was one of the "most important sciences to which religious men could devote
themselves," rigorously orthodox and based solely on the religious texts. Mujahid
himself cultivated his reputation as an authority on recitation, and worked so that his
capital would evoke its study. He had, in fact, been formed from his earliest youth in
Koranic studies, and his patronage does seem to have been as sincere as it was
famous, but Mujahid did benefit from the prestige and legitimacy that came with his
school. Denia's reputation in religious studies attracted 'ulamii' from across al
Andalus, and its reputation spread throughout the Muslim Mediterranean.220

219
220

E. Levi-Proven<;:al, HEM, 2:217-8; Ph. Senac, Al-MansC,r. Lejleau de !'an mil (Paris, 2006), 79.
We examine 'ulama' as travelers infra, in the chapter dealing with the Muslim Mediterranean.

CHAPTER IV

PORTS, SHIPS, AND NAVAL PRODUCTION
PORTS

Maritime traffic was essential to Denia's existence, serving as a conduit for both
piracy and commerce. The taifa's ports channeled economic redistribution between
the Peninsula and the Mediterranean, while also provisioning and harboring the ships
that practiced piracy throughout the region.

The two principal axes of Denia's

Mediterranean policies were thus inextricably tied to its ports, to their development
and operation. Christophe Picard has also noted that port zones were strong symbols
of caliphal authority, and could thus confer legitimacy to those who held them.1 This
was especially true during the fitna, when de facto rulers sought to solidify their
unstable power.
Mujahid had played a central role in the 'Amirid military and civil
administration in the Sharq al-Anda/us. He sought to consolidate his position in the
region at the begim1ing of the fitna, without necessarily seeking independence.
During the power struggles and factional strife that plagued the 'Amirid clients and
other heirs to caliphal authority, Mujahid appropriated the maritime resources of the
Sharq al-Anda/us. His movements at the begim1ing of the period indicate a campaign

1

Ch. Picard, La mer, 40-1.
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to control regional ports and naval infrastructures, from the coast to the Balearic
Islands. Three sources, in fact, trace his movements through Tortosa and Valencia
before establishing his regime in Denia, a coastal itinerary that indicates an ambition
to take advantage ofthe maritime resources ofthese cities.2 Mujahid's development
ofport structures over the course ofthe century was a direct continuation ofthis goal.

Tortosa
Mujahid's time in Tortosa was most likely an extension ofhis responsibilities under
the late 'Amirid regime. Ifhe did indeed exercise the functions discussed above, he
may have been present in the region as early as al-Man�ur's bijaba, as indicated by
lbn 'IdharT.3 Alternatively, he may have been named to the area by 'Abd al-Malik,
under whom Mujahid served as one of the prime officers of the state. 4

The

anonymous Dhikr bi/ad al-Anda/us states that Mujahid rebelled in Tortosa in
400/1010.5 Al-QalqashandT writes that Mujahid made himself master of Tortosa
before leaving it for Denia, which at the latest would have been 405/1014, when he
declared the caliphate of'Abd Allah al-Mu'aytT.6 Mujahid most likely then spent a
few years in Tortosa before he was replaced by LabTb, and with whom he seems to
have shared sovereignty over the region for a considerable time.
Tortosa offered Mujahid an exceptional base from which he could build his

2

Dhikr bi/ad al-Anda/us, 201; al-Qalqashand1, 256; Akhbar duwwal muluk al-fawa 'if, 301-2.
lbn 'ldhar1, B ayan, 3:155.
4
lbn al-KhaFb, Kitab a 'ma! al-a 'lam, 121.
5
Dhikr bi/ad al-Anda/us, 201.
6 al-Qalqashand1, 5:256.
3
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power. Denia does not appear in narrative sources before the fitna, but Tortosa had
been one of the main caliphal ports during the fourth/tenth century. Independent
maritime communities occupied the coast in the third/ninth century, when sailors
from the region of Tortosa raided coastal installations and were forced to flee before
resettling in Pechina.7 The extension of Cordovan influence over the outlying coastal
regions in the fourth/tenth century reinforced Tortosa's naval importance. Almeria
was the site of the caliphal dar al-�ina 'a and naval base for the fleet and qa 'id al
babr, but Tortosa also played an important role in Umayyad maritime planning. It
served to equip and supply fleets attacking the Frankish coasts in 321/932-3, 323/9345 and 328/939-40.8 Tortosa's role as a regional arsenal is confirmed by an inscription
mounted into the cathedral walls and commemorating the establishment in 333/944-5
of facilities for the building and equipping of ships.9 The Umayyads also fortified the
town, building a citadel and walls.10 Al-RazT wrote during the same period that
Tortosa "possesses a good port that is frequented by merchants from all parts."11 Al
BakrT described Tortosa's mines that produced a kubl "comparable to that from
I$fahan," and that was exported to every country, while Yaqut wrote that its port was
a hub for commercial relations with faraway lands.12 Urban construction followed

7 Al-l:limyar1, (1975), 79-80; J. Lirola Delgado, El poder naval, 388.
8 lbn I:Jayyan, Muqtabis V, 323-4/243, 366-8/275-6; al-'Udhr1, 81.
9 E. Levi-Provern;:al, Inscriptions arabes d'Espagne, 83.
10 Al-l:limyar1, 391.
11 Al-Raz1, 71.
12 Al-Bakr1, (2003), 2:386; Yaqiit, Kitiib mu jam al-buldiin, 3:529. The kuf:,l produced in Tortosa
was most likely a kind of lead, and not antimony like the kuf:,l from I�fahan. See "al-Kul:il," £12, V,
356a.
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this port activity, including a mosque with five naves built in 345/955-6.

13

Mujahid also controlled Valencia at the beginning of the fitna, and he would
periodically exercise shared sovereignty there until the arrival of 'Abd al-' AzTz al
Man�ur in 411/1021.

His interest in Valencia came most likely more from the

region's economic resources and road connections, since Valencia's port would not
gain importance until the sixth/twelfth century.

Al-RazT wrote that the kura of

Valencia combined both land and maritime advantages, but mentions neither a port
nor maritime activities for the town. 14 Al-BakrT's Kitab al-masalik wa-l-mamalik is
known for its detailed descriptions of maritime routes, but treats Valencia only within
a limited continental context.15 Ships come and go in IdrTsT's description of the town,
while its port served for the import and export of goods. 16 Nevertheless, IdrTsT also
writes that the wood shipped to Valencia from Cullera served for housing
construction, and not for ships as in Denia. 17

In addition, al-'UdhrT describes

caravans leaving Valencia's gates for Tortosa and Denia, indicating that the town's
port structures did not suffice for its commercial needs. 18 Maritime connections with
Valencia were most likely through coastal shipping, while Mujahid's interest would
have been in the city's urban structures and road communications.

1
3

Al-l:limyarT, 391.
AI-RazT, 71.
15
AI-BakrT (2003), 2:380, 385.
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ldrTsT, Opus geographicum, 5:562; Al-l:limyarT, 97.
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IdrTsT, Opus geographicum, 5:560.
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Al-'UdhrT, 18.
14

149
Denia
Al-Raz'f described Denia's port in the fourth/tenth century as "very good and very
old."19 The port, however, did not come into its own until the establishment and
development of the taifa over the course of the following century. The ships visiting
Denia during al-RazT's time probably used the old Roman port that served as a
maritime conduit for Ondara and its hinterland. In fact, Denia's port only gained
importance through Mujahid and 'AlT's ambitions to build a sea-based power. Their
efforts led to naval and urban infrastructures capable of supporting their military and
commercial ambitions, transforming this village into a taifa capital and major
Mediterranean port.
Strabo described Denia in the first century CE as a small city with a port and
observation tower that had served as the general Sertorius' fortified maritime base a
century earlier. Denia grew as a regional center over the following centuries, acting
as an intermediary between its rich hinterland and the Mediterranean Roman
markets.20

However, as elsewhere along the Mediterranean littoral, a period of

decline began in the second half of the fourth century. Despite continued rural
settlement and the restoration of some professional sites in the third century, no sign
of activity is visible thereafter.21 Denia thus atrophied without its role of export and

19
AI-RazT, 71.
20 R. Chabas Llorens, Historia de la ciudad de Denia, 93; J .A. Gisbert Santonja, "El territorium de
Dianium - Denia - en el Alto lmperio. La Marina Alta: la producci6n agricola y poblamiento," La
Ciudades y las campos de Alicante en epoca romana, Canelobre, 48 (2003): 122.
21 J.A. Gisbert Santonja, "El territorium de Dianium," 129.
Noticeable throughout the
Mediterranean, this decline is even more palpable in the West, especially along the Iberian coast. As
an indication of maritime traffic, shipwrecks north of Denia, along the Tarragonese coast, dropped
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redistribution, and Avienus notes during the fourth century that the once-peopled city
was devoid of inhabitants. 22
Roque Chabas Llorens somewhat hyperbolically observed that Denia was
"reborn like a phoenix from its ashes" under the Visigoths, when the city appears as
an episcopal see at the beginning of the seventh century. 23 Denia did regularly send
either its bishop or his agents to councils in Toledo, but after the Muslim conquest, al
Rait is the only author to mention Denia before the fifth/eleventh century. Denia
experienced the same fate as other coastal cities, the victims of an economic crisis
aggravated by the redirection of road networks thenceforth oriented inland by the
needs of the Cordovan capital.24
from eighty-six during the third century to thirty-two in the sixth, a 63% reduction; A.J. Parker,
Ancient Shipwrecks of the Mediterranean and the Roman Provinces, BAR International Series, 580
(Oxford, 1992) I 3-15; M. McCormick, Origins of the European Economy. Communications and
Commerce, A.D. 300-900 (Cambridge, 2001), 67, n. 7. Paul Reynolds notes that Carthaginian
ceramics were exported to Alicante until the sixth cenh1ry, with the withdrawal of Byzantine
commercial stimulus: P. Reynolds, Trade in the Western Mediterranean, AD 400-700: The ceramic
evidence, BAR International Series, 604 (Oxford, 1995), 139. This decline in maritime traffic is
reflected by a similar decline on the coast, where the number of rural sites diminished by 63%. As
McCormick states, the coincidental correspondence between rural sites and shipwrecks should not be
exaggerated, but they do indicate a drastic trend symptomatic of the crisis that struck the Western
Mediterranean; M. McCormick, Origins, 67, n. 7.
22
Cited by R. Chabas Llorens, Historia, 8 I. Avienus may indicate another cause of Denia's decline,
since he notes that the city was surrounded by shallow, swampy waters, possibly the same as those
described by al-' Udhr1 (p. 19) six centuries later. M. McCormick (pp. 38-9) notes a rise in malaria
during Late Antiquity in conjunction with the abandonment and negligence of agricultural lands and
thus the extension of marsh or swamplands where mosquitoes would have proliferated. An outbreak of
malaria may have contributed to Denia's depopulation.
23
R. Chabas Llorens, "La ciudad de Denia, (bosquejo hist6rico)," El Archivo. Revista literaria
semanal, 1 (Deni a, 1886-7): 372.
24 Pierre Guichard has noted an urban degeneration accompanied by a "severely affected
demography" in the eastern parts of the peninsula. He likewise underlined the region's isolation vis-a
vis Cordoba and the Peninsula's economic, political and cultural heart; P. Guichard, Stnictures
sociales « orientales » et « occidentales » dans l 'Espagne musulmane (Paris, 1977), 191-3; P.
Guichard, "Le peuplement de la region de Valence aux deux premiers siecles de la domination
musulmane," MC. V, 5 (1969): 119; P. Guichard, "Animation maritime et developpement urbain des
cotes de l'Espagne orientale et du Languedoc au Xe siecle," in Occident et Orient au X' siecle. Actes du
IX' congres de la societe des historiens medievistes de l 'enseignement superieur public (Dijon, 2-4 juin
1978) (Paris, 1979), 188; P. Guichard, "Les debuts de la piraterie andalouse en Mediterranee
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Archeological research on the Roman town of Dianium, on the north-west
slope of the current castle's hill, the south-west side of which housed the Islamic city,
shows signs of regression beginning in the fifth century. Buildings that had once
lined the fourth-century imperial road housed graves within their ruined walls a
century later.25 In addition, there are no archeological traces of urban dwellings
during the period between the Roman city's abandonment and the late fourth/tenth
century.26 Al-RazT's description thus does not attest to Denia's urban survival, only
the continued use of one of the rare well-equipped harbors along the coast between
Almeria and Tortosa.
Denia's coastal population most likely migrated inland, settling a few
kilometers away around Ondara. In fact, al-Zayyat's Dhikr al-aqatim wa ikhtilafuha,
which was written towards the tum of the fifth/eleventh century, gives a confused
spelling for the town and port that faces the Balearics Islands. In the manuscript 2186
from the French National Library, the text reads 0).l,! ¼�, "the city of Y.dara", while
another version notes ¥1..i r�I 4-:i.lc.\j .J 0.)y,I ¼�, "the city of Ayrarah, whose capital
today is Denia."27 A few pages later, the geographer places 0)� (B.dhara) facing
Majorca and Minorca.28 Although the text's editor gives "Denia" as the translation
for each of these variations, he also notes their discrepancies in the footnotes,
occidentale (798-813)," R.O.M.M., 35-1 (1983): 57; P. Guichard, "Les zones littorales de la region
orientale d'al-Andalus aux VIII°-Xl e siecles," Castrum 7, 273-290; P. Guichard, "Villes et campagnes
aux premiers siecles de !'Islam dans le Sharq al-Andalus," in Vil/es et campagnes de Tarraconaise et
d'al-Andalus (Vf-Xf siecles) : la transition, ed. Ph. Senac (Toulouse, 2007), 263-273.
25
S. Gutierrez Lloret, Cora de Tudm,r, 223.
26
R. Azuar Ruiz, Denio islamica, 59.
27
Al-Zayyat, Dhikr al-Aqa/Tm wa ikhtilafuha (Tratado de geograjia universal), ed. F. Castello,
(Barcelona, 1989), 24a and n. 541.
28
Al-Zayyat, 30a.
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conjecturing on a possible confusion with Orihuela. However, given its location,
Orihuela would have more naturally been linked to the ports of Alicante or Cartagena.
In addition, the Arabic spelling of Orihuela, :u..,:U..,i, is only vaguely similar to the
three variations in al-Zayyat's Dhikr.

It seems in fact more likely that the

seventh/fourteenth-century transcriber would have made a mistake with Ondara, •)�i,
and that at the tum of the fifth/eleventh century, Denia had become the simple
maritime outlet for Ondara to the point of taking on the inland town's name.29
Ondara likewise replaced Denia on the administrative level, at least under the
'Amirids.

In 374/985, al-Man�ur and his army were en route for Barcelona.

Stopping in TudmTr, they were sumptuously received by a local notable, A}_imad b.
'Abd al-Ra}_iman b. Marwan b. Khattab. 30 Al-Man�ilr rewarded the dignitary for this
generosity by awarding his son jurisdiction over the cities of Valencia, Ondara,
Tortosa, and the islands of Ibiza, Majorca and Minorca.31

Al-'UdhrI does not

mention Denia among the cities handed over to the Banu Khattab, even though it was
in the designated area. Instead, he cites Ondara, a clear sign that the inland town had
administratively replaced Denia. A Berber attack that ruined the city at the beginning
of the fitna likewise confirms, and ended, Ondara's importance as an inland
settlement. 32 Rafael Azuar Ruiz notes that this attack, along with the imminent
arrival of Mujahid in Denia and his use of its port as a "fundamental base for the

29 M. de Epalza, "L'Estructuraci6 comarcal de la marina d'Ondara en epoca arab (textos
toponims)," Aguaits, 10 (1994): 10.
30 Al- 'UdhrI, 15-6; lbn al-Ab bar, Kitiib al-1:,ulla al-siyarii ', 2:311-3.
31 Al-'UdhrI, 15-6.
32 Al-1:limyarI, 31/39.

33

conquest of the Islands," led to Denia's rebirth as an Islamic city.

Mujahid chose the port partly because of its natural advantages. Its location at
the entrance to the Gulf of Valencia under the protection of the Montg6 made it an
indispensable stopover for ships travelling along the coast, despite navigational
difficulties caused by underwater rocks.34 The surrounding marshes eased the city's
defense, especially from sieges. 35 The taifa's naval and urban infrastructures would
capitalize on these assets.
Some form of fortification may have topped Denia's hill before Mujahid's
arrival. J.A. Gisbert estimates work on the alcazaba that dominates the town began
in the second half of the fourth/tenth century, but this hypothesis is unconfim1ed and
R. Azuar Ruiz posited origins concomitant with the taifa itself.3 6 Nevertheless, the
hill's strategic location over this essential anchorage could have justified a basic
fortification similar to the one built by the Umayyads at Almiserat, at the entrance to
the Gallinera valley.

Almiserat's control over a major communications corridor

seems linked to the gradual extension of Cordovan control over the Sharq al-Anda/us
during the fourth/tenth century. In fact, the series of caliphal constructions along the
littoral, including the shipyards at Almeria and Tortosa, and perhaps the ribafls at
Guardamar and San Carles, would have logically included Denia's hill, though we
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R. Azuar Ruiz, Denia islamica, 63.
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cannot be certain without further information.
Mujahid augmented the city's defenses, as described by both al-'UdhrT and
IdrTsT. 37

Denia's alcazaba served until the nineteenth century, and numerous

transformations over time completely altered any remains of the fifth/eleventh
century Islamic fortification. 38 Archeological research around the Torre de Mig has
however unearthed traces from the taifal period. 39 Mujahid also protected the city
with an "intelligently built" wall that projected out into the sea. Geographers thus
agree that taifal Denia was well fortified. 40
Denia was best known for its port, begun as well under Mujahid. The Roman
port situated north-west of the castle had probably fallen into disrepair, which would
explain why Mujahid created the Islamic port to the south.41 Sub-aquatic archeology
confirms the Islamic port's location south-east of the castle, facing the El Forti
maritime district, itself begun ex nihilo in the fifth/eleventh century. 42
Al-BakrT notes Denia's port and its place within the network of regional
maritime itineraries, while the sixth/twelfth-century geographer Yaqut writes that
Denia's port was pleasant, and a subsequent anonymous author working with
fifth/eleventh-century sources communicates the port's importance. 43 Ships (sufun)
37
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left Denia for the "farthest Orient," according to ldrisI, while al-I:IimyarI and
Mul)ammad b. Ibrahim al-KutubI evoke ships coming and going in the busy port. 44
Geniza documents also confirm the port's importance, describing ships travelling as
far as Alexandria.

Mujahid and 'AlI's efforts over the course of the century

transformed the scale of their port, building maritime traffic and establishing a center
for ships practicing long-distance commerce.
Mercantile activities were not, however, the sole occupation for ships
frequenting Denia's port. IdrisI and al-I:IimyarI write that "the fleet left from [Denia]
to carry out raids," giving the impression that Denia was a major center for Islamic
piracy. 45 Piracy was an active policy under Mujahid and 'AII, practiced on a grand
scale. Other AndalusI ports also harbored pirate ships, notably Tortosa and Almeria,
but Arab geographers recognized Denia's particular role in the guerre de course.
Pirate and corsair fleets overshadow more elective forms of maritime
commerce indicated in the Geniza, notably in al-I:IimyarI's description, which does
not mention ships leaving for the Orient. The geographer writes that boats came and
went from its port, but he does not specify their activities, whether they were
merchants vessels or pirates. Nevertheless, ships sailed to Alexandria for commerce,
even if that included commercializing booty such as the human captives that most
likely made up a large part of Denia's exports to the East. Guerre de course and
commerce were intermixed, and a clear distinction between the two is largely
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impossible and pointless. More important is an understanding that Denia's rulers
practiced a balanced maritime policy, that ships leaving their port spread Denia's
influence throughout the Mediterranean, often adapting their activities according to
the circumstances.

Secondary ports
Denia dominates geographers' descriptions of the taifa, but the ensemble of
secondary ports was almost as important in the network of economic redistribution.
The Balearic Islands, and especially MadTnat Mayurqa, projected the taifa out into the
sea, while peninsular ports helped enlarge Denia's sphere of influence and the
economic power it could drain from its hinterlands.
MadTnat Mayurqa's role in Mujahid's plans was almost as essential as
Denia's.

Its port was an essential stopover for ships travelling across the

Mediterranean. It provided an outpost for the invasion of Sardinia and retained this
importance in the subsequent maritime jihad. Majorca occupied a key position in
many maritime itineraries, and offered Mujahid dominant control over a large part of
the Western Mediterranean.
In addition, Umayyad authorities had progressively improved naval and urban
infrastructures on the Island since its conquest in 290/902.

'I�am al-KhiwalanT

enjoyed Cordovan support for his active urbanization and Islamicization, building

mosques and bath houses.46
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He also sought to improve maritime commerce by

establishing merchant houses (funduq). The Umayyads made Madinat Mayurqa into
their Mediterranean outpost, a stopover for the caliphal fleet en route for raids against
the Frankish coasts. 47
Madinat Mayurqa served not only as a supply point for peninsular fleets, but it
also became a base port for the Umayyad guerre de course.

Beginning around

350/961-2, the governor al-Muwaffaq began maintaining a fleet to conduct his own
raids against Christian coasts.48

Successive governors continued this policy,

assiduously pursuing maritime jihad, supported by al-Man�ur and his sons, until the
death of Muqatil in 403/1012-3 allowed the Islands' direct annexation to Denia.
Mujahid knew Majorca offered him a caliphal port capable of launching an
expeditionary force, and which probably harbored at least part of the fleet built up by
the Islands' governors.
Majorca and the Balearics were also well known throughout the
Mediterranean for the quality of their horses, mules and asses, vaunted by the
geographer Ibn I:Iawqal in the fourth/tenth century and by al-ZuhrT two centuries
later. 49 Balearic equine production represented both a fiscal and strategic resource for
Mujahid, one that he put to use soon after taking control of the islands. According to
Ibn al-KhatTb, Mujahid imposed a fiscal reform on the islands, offering horse breeders
46
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an obligatory five-dinar price per horse and fierce penalties for any who resisted.so
This reform represented political, economic and military benefits to the newly
developing taifa. Firstly, by subjecting elite landowners to state financial pressures
and oversight, Mujahid cemented his control over the Balearics.

Secondly, the

derisory price paid would allow him to resell the animals for profit on the
international market. Thirdly, the horses would serve in military campaigns, notably
for the thousand-member cavalry (foris) used in the Sardinia invasion. Mad1nat
Mayurqa served thus as an essential staging point for the expansion of Mujahid's
Mediterranean campaign, adding an important military and naval contribution to
Denia's resources.
The Sardinia invasion ultimately failed, but Mujahid adapted his policies to
the reality of a Mediterranean that he could not master, and piracy replaced military
conquest in his overall strategy. The Balearic Islands remained an integral part of this
modified approach, acting as the taifa's maritime outpost and ent ry point for its
sphere of influence. As a major hub for maritime traffic, only one day's sail from
Barcelona, Madinat Mayurqa became one of the principal centers for maritime jihad
under Mujahid and 'Ali's successive governors.st
Madfaat Mayurqa was not the only Balearic port, and ships travelling from
Denia first passed Ibiza after a day's sail.s2

According to S. Martinez Lillo,

50 Ibn al-Kha\Tb, Kitiib a 'miil al-a 'liim, 251.
51 lbn Khaldun (Kitiib al-lbar, 4:355) uses the termjihiidfi-l-baf:,r, while al-QalqashandT (256) writes

that lbn Mujahid supported the numerous raids on the sea: � ..1.1>� 0! � u:il:i..l! _p.,JI � _,_jill fo ulS J
_,_jill_
52 Ibiza was visible from the Montg6 on a clear day. Al-BimyarT, 76/95, 198/240; IdrTsT, Opus
geographicum, 5:557, 582.
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underwater archeological finds around Ibiza have produced ceramic pieces indicating
commercial relations with Denia, Altea, Valencia, Murcia and perhaps the Maghreb. 53
Al-ZuhrT indicated that olives were shipped to Ibiza from Seville, Almeria and
Jativa. 54 Yaqut wrote that Ibiza's wood served in the construction of ships, the same
wood that al-I:IimyarT qualified as "excellent for the construction and rigging of
ships."55 Ibiza thus could have contributed to Mujahid's fleet, or at least to the
number of boats visiting his ports. Farther east, the island of Minorca was only one
day from Barcelona, and four from Sardinia, offering a useful staging point and last
extension of Denia's power three days' sail into the sea.56
Mujahid was also able to extend his power over the key ports of northern
TudmTr.

These ports offered Denia the opportunity of integrating the economic

networks south of the Jibal Balansiya. This mountainous region had initially made
political or economic dominance of TudmTr unrealistic for Denia. Roads allowed
only limited traffic, and most do not seem to have developed before the fifth/eleventh
century. Thus, the anchorages and ports along the TudmTr coast allowed Mujahid
practicable access to the kura's economic networks.
Alicante was the most important of these ports, especially since its maritime
infrastructures made it one of the rare equipped harbors between Tortosa and
Almeria.

The port was likewise accessible from the main road network, more

accessible in fact than Denia, and supplied a relatively prosperous Roman settlement.
53
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A light industry tied to glass production juxtaposed the port in late Antiquity, and
Carthaginian ceramics were imported there until the sixth century.57 Nevertheless,
Alicante suffered the same rupture as the rest of the Iberian coast. Although it was
one of the seven cities in the eighth-century Theodomir Pact, urban activity does not
reappear in Alicante until the end of the third/ninth century.58
Alicante was part of the Iberian littoral renewal that began in the fourth/tenth
century. Alicante's port was not its only source of activity, and sources from this
time period show that the relationship between the port and Alicante's hinterland was
an essential part of its success. The geographer al-RazI, in fact, does not mention
Alicante's port, placing the settlement inland in the Sierra de Benicadell and
centering its economy on the production of silk fabrics. 59 Al-MuqaddasI, who died
towards the end of the fourth/tenth century, likewise omits Alicante's maritime
character, writing that Alicante was "encircled by a wall" and situated in the
countryside. 60 R. Azuar Ruiz has justly noted that these descriptions concentrate on
Alicante's influence on the surrounding territory, rather than its relationship with the
sea.61 The fourth/tenth-century Cordovan society for whom al-RazI wrote was more
concerned with Alicante's place in the region's unruly network of fortifications and
local elites.

Ibn I:Iayyan however understood Alicante's important role as a

57 P. Rosser Liminana "La ciudad de Alicante y la arqueologia del poblamiento en epoca medieval
islamica," Urbanismo medieval def pals valenciano, 33; P. Reynolds, Trade, 139.
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3, ed. M.J. de Goeje (Leiden, 1967), 235.
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structuring point between the maritime and peninsular systems. In describing 'Abd
al-Ral)man Ill's campaign against the Bam1 Shaykh in 316/928, Ibn I:Iayyan writes
that the vizier Al)mad b. Ishaq al-QurashI took "the city of Alicante which is on the
Mediterranean, and all its subject l:zu$iin and the surrounding fortifications."62 The
relationship between the region's cities and l:zu$iin evolved over the course of the
fourth/tenth century, influenced in large part by the state's efforts to impose a fiscal
system, but commercial and economic factors also strengthened ties between rural
communities and zones of urban influence.63 The economic pull of Alicante's port on
the Vinalop6 valley comes through in Ibn I:Iayyan's description of its political ties. In
addition, geographers regularly describe the short distance between Alicante - which
was not on the main route - and Elche, the principal urban and cultural center for the
Vinalop6 valley; regular traffic circulated between the two, despite Elche having its
own port nearby in Santa Pola. 64
The Vinalop6 valley channeled northern Tudmir's products along the Via
Augusta towards Alicante. A series of roads that grew over the fifth/eleventh century
linked its port to the southern Jibal Balansiya. 65 Alicante benefited from its maritime
and commercial position, exporting the quality silk produced in the surrounding
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mountains.

66

At least some of the fabrics mentioned by al-MuqaddasT among al

Andalus' exports must have transited through Alicante. 67 The fourth/tenth-century
eastern geographer al-l�takhrT knew of Alicante in its maritime context and situated it
on the coast along with Pechina, Valencia and Tortosa, facing the Maghreb. 68 A
century later, al-BakrT wrote that Alicante was five days sail from the North-African
coast, while IdrTsT indicated the coastal distance between the port and Denia.69
Bringing northern TudmTr into Denia's territory offered Mujahid better access
to its road networks, as well as the regional economic activity that stimulated
Alicante's growth as it circulated through its port. Despite its small size, the city
enjoyed the standard signs of urban life, including a market, a grand mosque and a
kasbah. 70 Its port was part of the Mediterranean commercial networks, exporting
esparto "to all the countries on the sea."71 Naval shipyards serviced this maritime
traffic, producing a variety of boats for short and long-distance travel. 72 Alicante had
thus become a major port, most likely centered more on commerce than piracy, given
its distance from the principal Christian shipping lanes. Exports towards "all the
countries on the sea" seem also to indicate direct traffic, and not simply coastal
shipping towards Denia or Almeria.
Mujahid and 'AlT could also depend on a series of secondary harbors, most of
66
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them probably unequipped, that were likewise tied into the Mediterranean networks.
Al-Bakr'i indicates relations between Santa Pola, Moraira and Javea with the North
African ports Tanas, Sharshal and al-Batal. 73 Calpe and the Pen.on de lfac also served
as harbors, while shipwrecks off the coast of Altea point to exchange with the
Balearic Islands.74 North-African ceramics discovered near Villajoyosa, along with
Fatimid money in Benidorm, bear additional witness to the level of exchange between
the two Mediterranean coasts. 75
These secondary sites simplified access to Mediterranean markets for the
villages that began to repopulate the littoral valleys in the fifth/eleventh century. A
direct relation most likely exists between this maritime activity and new coastal

73 AI-Bakr1, 81-2/163-5. AI-Bakr1 does not actually write Javea, but the Montgo. Nevertheless,
Javea 's place under the southem flanks of this mountain, along with archeological signs of urban
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74
Idr1s1, Caminos, 70196; Ya'qub1, Les Pays, French trans. G. Wiet (Cairo, I 937), 217-8; C.
Aranegui, A. Bazzana, "Vestiges de structures defensives d'epoque romaine tardive et d'epoque
musulmane au Pefion d'lfac (Calpe, Province d'Alicante)," MC V., l 6 (1980): 421-436. For a
dissenting view of the date for this site, see 8. Pavon Maldonado, "Calpe y al-Askar (Alicante). Sobre
el habitat medieval de] Pefion de Ifach y al-Askar o Madinat al-Askar," Sharq al-Anda/us, 14-15
(1997-8): 81-106. M. de Epalza associates al-'Askar with Callosa d'En Sarria, tying it to the harbor
Mascarat, between Altea and Calpe: M.J. Rubiera Mata, M. de Epalza, Los nombres arabes de
Benidorm y su comarca (Alicante, 1985), 43-50. Andre Bazzana's hypothesis that lfac was the site al
'Askar mentioned by Ya'qub1 does not seem correct, nor does M. de Epalza's competing theory that
al-'Askar was Callosa d'En Sarria / Mascarat. Recent unpublished archeological research seems to
point more logically towards the site Castellar de Morera, near Eiche. For shipwrecks off the coast of
Altea, see S. Martinez Lillo, "La arqueologia y el mar," 18, 20.
75
J.R. Garcia Gandia, S. Llorens Campello, G. Perez Boti, "L'Almissera : territorio castral y espacio
mral en epoca islamica," in De la medina a la vi/a: Aetas II Jornadas de Arqueologia Medieval, eds.
F.J. Jover Maestre and C. Navarro Poveda (Alicante-Petrer, 2004), 92; C. Domenech Belda, Dinares,
dirhames y fetuses, 191.

settlements such as Almissera near Villajoyosa.76 Coastal access also offered Denia's
rulers more effective fiscal control over populations poorly linked with the taifa
capital.77 With its control over the coast, Denia thus multiplied possible outlets for
piracy and maritime trade, while improving ties with its own fiscal territories.

SHIPS

Ships were essential tools for the taifa of Denia. They were vehicles for its rulers'
policies, through piracy and commerce.

The natural resources necessary for

producing and maintaining Denia's fleet or the ships that came through its port were
thus fundamental to its survival, and exerted considerable influence on its history.
Stable access to the wood used in ship construction was a priority for Denia, and was
a factor in the ultimate success of its rulers' maritime ambitions.

The wood

transported to the taifa' s ports fed a number of dockyards, themselves an integral part
of the taifa's existence.

Wood
Many authors have underlined the importance of wood in the Mediterranean
economy. The shortage of wood used in ship construction, and especially for masts
and yards, heavily influenced economic exchange, exercising a kind of "tyranny over

76 J.R. Garcia Gandia, S. Llorens Campello, G. Perez Boti, "L'Almissera," 83-105. Infra, ch. 8.
77 Even in the nineteenth century, travel between Denia and Alicante was easier by boat: V.
Castaneda y Alcover, Relaciones, I :33; J. Costa Mas, El Marquesat de Denia, 549.
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commercial routes."

78
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The imbalance in the supply of wood between the Christian

and Muslim worlds has sometimes been associated with the decline of Muslim naval
power. 79 P. Horden and N. Purcell, however, have called for a more nuanced view,
especially given regional Mediterranean diversity. 80 The demand for wood in Muslim
shipyards often did outstretch local supply, explaining in part interest in the islands of
Crete, Sicily and Sardinia, but the same was true for Pisa and Genoa who accordingly
oriented their naval campaigns. 81 Claude Cahen expressed this universal need for
naval powers, explaining that the ideal place for a port and arsenal was next to a
forest, or at least at places along the coast with easy access to wood. 82 A major part
of Denia's success was thus the favorable conjunction of its port and shipyard with
stable access to wood.
The surrounding forested mountains certainly explain the establishment of a
caliphal arsenal in Tortosa, as well as Mujahid's interest at the beginning ofthefitna.
Al-Raif cites the timber exported from its port, while Idr1s1 and al-I:IimyarT admired
the incomparable height and density of its pine forests. 83 In addition to the wood, it is
O.R. Constable, Trade and Traders,337; Th. Glick, Islamic and Christian Spain,107.
79 The work of Maurice Lombard has largely informed the historiography on this subject: M.
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in Sardegna, Mediterraneo e Atlantico tra ii Medioevo ed Eta moderna. Studi storici in memoria di
Alberto Boscolo, v. 2 (Rome, 1993 ), 111 .
82 C. Cahen, "Ports et chantiers navals,"306.
83
AI- RazT, 72; ldrTsT, Opus geographicum, 5:555; Al-1:limyarT,1 24/151 .
78

166
likely that a number of the large boats (al-marakib al-kibar) built in Tortosa were
shipped to other ports as merchandise.84 Mujahid's initial time in Tortosa would have
furnished him with ample resources for building a fleet, while Tortosa's wood partly
explains the close relations maintained by Denia's rulers throughout the century.
Denia could count on two sources of timber for its ships, in addition to what
its hinterland could supply. The mountains near Cuenca produced large quantities of
pine that was cut and transported down the Jucar River to Alcira and then Cullera on
the coast.85

Boats carried the wood from Cullera to either Denia or Valencia.

Although Valencia did have a port, ships were not built there, since IdrisI specifies
that the wood served for residential and urban construction. In Denia, however, the
shipyard transformed the wood into large and small ships (al-sufun al-kibar wa-l
marakib al-�ighar). 86 Part of Denia's timber thus came from Cullera, though troubled
relations with Valencia may have occasionally disrupted supplies.87
Baeza and Segura were essential points in the south-eastern AndalusI road
network, worthy of Denia's interest. Nevertheless, the Sierra de la Segura was also
densely forested, with "enough wood to supply all of Spain."88 Transporting the
wood by land would have been difficult, but the Segura River descends from the
Sierra and empties into the Mediterranean near the ribat of Guardamar, slightly south
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of Alicante.

89

Control of northern TudmTr and strategic points from Orihuela to

Baeza meant a stable supply of timber for Alicante's shipyards, and possibly a
supplemental supply for Denia.
The taifa of Denia could likewise count on the Balearic forests for its naval
needs. Al-1:IimyarT and Yaqut both note the excellent wood used for ship construction
on lbiza.90 The Majorcan shipyards would seem to indicate ample timber supplies,
though some may have been imported. Finally, Mujahid would have been neither the
first, nor the last, to include the Sardinian forests in his plans for conquest of the
island.91
Denia was thus one of the few Mediterranean maritime polities with an ample
wood supply. The taifa's rulers may have reserved the commercial rights over export
towards the central Mediterranean ports, given the resource's lucrative and strategic
importance. The creation and maintenance of numerous naval shipyards throughout
the taifa reflected the taifa court's desire to fully exploit this valuable resource, and in
the process provided the means necessary to carry out its maritime ambitions.

89
The mouth of the Segura explains in fact, at least partly, the ribaf's location: R. Amar Ruiz, "De
ribat a rabita," 225.
90
Al-l:limyarT, 198/240; Yaqiit, 4: I 000-1.
91 Giovanni Oman wondered what role Muslim settlements on Sardinia might have played in the
Mediterranean wood trade; G. Oman, "Vestiges arabes en Sardaigne," in If' Congres international
d'etudes nord-africaines, Aix-en-Provence, 27, 28 et 29 novembre 1968, R.O.M.M., special edition
(1970): 183.
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Dar al-sinii 'a
Fourth/tenth-century Umayyad efforts to develop the Mediterranean coastline
included the construction of arsenals at strategic points. Certain criteria detem1ined
which ports were chosen for these sites: a stable sufficient supply of wood, a
maritime population for building and operating the fleets, and a geographic location
in line with Cordova's maritime policies. Tortosa was close to Christian targets,
while Almeria faced the North-African coast. The port structures became regional
political and military capitals, as well as major poles for economic activity. The
shipyards represented a significant investment for the state, and became prized
possessions in the race for power that followed the Cordova's fall.
The caliphate's principal diir al-.yinii 'a, Almeria, thus became one of the most
powerful taifas.92 Pechina had been an ideal site for caliphal maritime plans at the
beginning of the fourth/tenth century; its maritime population furnished qualified
crews and workers, while the Babriyyiin elite supplemented caliphal investments
through their own participation, eventually integrating leadership roles in the fleet and
even caliphal administration.93 Almeria's diir al-.yinii 'a was not simply a shipyard,

92 Ch. Picard, La mer, 25-7.
93 Note for example the Banu Ruma(Jis and their important role in the evolution of caliphal maritime

politics. Mu(Jammad b. Ruma(Jis was initially a private participant contributing his own ships to naval
expeditions, later taking on the role of fleet admiral, while his son, 'Abd al-Ra(Jman, also became
governor of llbTra; Ch. Picard, La mer, 25; Ch. Picard, "Ba/:lriyyfin, emirs et califes: l'origine des
equipages des flottes musulmanes en Mediterranee occidentale (VIiie-Xe siecle)," Medieval
Encounters, 13 (2007): 437-48; E. Levi-Provenc;:al, HEM, 3:109.
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while its port was not reserved for the Umayyad navy. M. Sanchez Martinez indeed
noted that al-'Udhr1 uses the term dar al-$ina 'a in its fullest sense here, as a "house of
manufacture and industry," especially since the geographer also describes a
commercial and industrial zone that attracted merchants from far away. 94 Thus, when
Khayran took control of the city in 405/1014, he inherited naval, port and urban
infrastructures that he could quickly put to use in consolidating his position.

In

addition, as the seat of the qa 'id al-babr, whose power had been compared even to
the caliph's, Almeria offered Khayran a powerful tool of political propaganda. 95
Arabic sources do not provide details on ship production in Almeria under the
Slav emirs, but Khayran does seem to have maintained a fleet, since he lost a naval
battle against Mujahid. 96

Almeria continued as a major port and naval center

throughout the taifa period and beyond, and the Banu $umadib - al-Mu'ta�im 111
particular - maintained a noteworthy fleet.97
Tortosa was likewise a site with numerous political, military and economic
benefits. The nearby pine forests and its port's location on the "path of those from
France" made it an ideal choice for a caliphal arsenal. 98 Cordova could also count on
a population as capable as Almeria's, since members of Tortosa's coastal population

M. Sanchez Martinez, "La cora de IlbTra [Granada y Almeria] en los siglos X y XI, seg(m al
'UghrT [l 003-1085]," Cuadernos de Historia de/ Islam, 7 (Granada, 1975-6), 47, n. 70; al-'UdhrT, 86.
95
E. Levi-Provens;al, L 'Espagne musulmane au X' siecle (Paris, 1932), 85; lbn Samak, al-Zahrat al
manthrira fi al-nukat al-akhbar al-mathrirah, ed. M. MakkT (Cairo, 2003), 129; Ch. Picard, La mer, 41.
96
Abu al-'Ala' al-BaghdadT wrote a poem for Mujahid to celebrate the victory: lbn Bassam,
Dhakhfra, 4: 12-3; al-OabbI (1989), 633, no. 1384.
97
According to al-FatJ:i b. al-Khaqan, al-Mu'ta�im was interested only in watching his fleets and
cared only for his boats and fast ships: H. Peres, La poesie anda/ousie, 215.
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Al-RazT, 72, for citation.
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had established Pechina's maritime community.
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The Babriyyun along the Tortosan

coast similarly practiced piracy and participated in naval expeditions against Christian
targets. ' 00 As in Almeria, Umayyad investment in Tortosa was gradual, increasing as
Cordova adopted the guerre de course as a maritime policy and came to rely on
coastal populations. In fact, the establishment of caliphal shipyards in Tortosa in
333/944-5 - probably an officialization of pre-existing structures - coincided with
major naval campaigns against the Christian Catalan and Provern;:al coasts. 101
Mujahid left Cordova on the death of Mul)ammad b. 'Abd al-Jabbar al-MahdT
in 400/1011, heading towards the Sharq al-Anda/us and Tortosa, where he more than
likely controlled the port's naval resources. Mujahid was probably moving back into
a position that he had occupied under the 'Amirid regime, and thus into a position of
personal power. 102 Tortosa would have been an ideal base for Mujahid during the
early days of the fitna, far from the civil war in which he seems to have taken little
interest, while he likely continued to pursue the guerre de course that he had
heretofore helped lead. 103 It is not possible to evaluate the resources at Mujahid's
disposal in Tortosa, but his ability to initiate ambitious maritime plans, invading the
Balearics and sending one hundred ships against Sardinia, indicate a strong naval
99 Al-l:limyarT (1975), 79-80.
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Note, for example, the fleet of 300 hundred ships that left Tortosa to participate in the conquest of
Sicily; lbn 'ldharT, Bayiin, I: I 03-4; M. Taibi, L 'Emirat Aghlabide, 432-3.
101
Ch. Picard, La mer, 28; al-'UdhrT, 81-2; E. Levi-Provem;al, Inscriptions, 83-4; lbn ]:layyan,
Muqtabis V, 323-4, 366-8.
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Similarly, the vizier 'Abd al-RaJ:iman b. Yasar headed for his ministerial seat, Valencia, when
trouble began in Cordova: lbn Bassam, DhakhTra, 3: 19.
103
Mujahid may have been involved in the attack on Pisa by a "fleet from Spain" in 1011: Anna/es
pisani, 238. An independent attack is unlikely, given the seemingly large-scale campaign, but another
of the northern taifa ports could also have contributed. lbn Khaldiin writes that Muqatil, the Umayyad
governor in Majorca was particularly active and did not die until 403/1012-3: lbn Khaldiin, Kitiib al
'ibar, 4:353.
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foundation for the taifa ruler.
Mujahid abandoned Tortosa, though it is not clear under what circumstances.
Although he held Tortosa and Valencia at the beginning of the fitna, an anonymous
chronicle states that Mujahid left Valencia for Denia after the rebellion of Mubarak
and Mu?affar, while al-QalqashandI writes simply that he left Tortosa for Denia. 104
Mujahid and the Slav rulers of Valencia do not seem to have maintained relations, but
the sources indicate no real conflict between them. 105 In addition, Mujahid exercised
joint sovereignty over Valencia with Labib, the Slav who had succeeded him in
Tortosa, and supported him in a conflict against Ibn Hiid. Mujahid's departure from
Tortosa does not thus seem to have been forced, but more deliberate and dictated by
his expansionist Mediterranean ambitions.
Mujahid must have been familiar with Denia's port and stable supply of
wood. He also knew that within a day's sail, Ibiza and then Majorca offered an ideal
outpost for the fleet that he would send to conquer the Mediterranean, though he
would need to establish his rule there first. Mujahid's plans necessitated considerable
means - Ibn al-Khatib mentions 120 ships for the conquest of Sardinia - and he no
doubt invested heavily in Denia's naval structures to produce and maintain an
adequate fleet. Rubiera Mata logically advances that 'Abd al-Ral)man III established
104 Dhikr bi/ad al-Anda/us, 201, 217; Akhbar duwwal muHik al-fawa 'if, 301; al-QalqashandT, 256.
105 Mujahid harbored 'Abd al-'AzTz b. Aflai) when Mubarak chased him from Jativa. Otherwise,

Mubarak and Mu?:affar seem to have associated more readily with Mujahid's rival, Khayran, perhaps
as a protection against Denia. Khayran struck money in his own name in Valencia in 404/1013, while
in 407 the Valencian Slavs issued coins in the name of 'AIT b. Bammud, whose caliphal rise had been
helped by Khayran: lbn al-KhatTb, Kitab a 'ma! al-a 'lam, 259; A. Canto Garcia, T. b. 1:1. lbrahTm,
"Suplemento," 132; A. Prieto y Vives, Reyes, 182, ns. 138, 139; A. Vives y Escudero, Monedas, 115,
ns. 805, 806.
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a caliphal arsenal in Denia, but no source offers concrete support for this
hypothesis. 106 An inscription attests the dar al-�ina 'a in Tortosa, and the caliphal
fleet used it on more than one occasion. 107

MadTnat Mayurqa's arsenal is not

specifically mentioned before the Pisan attack in 1115, but its port did service the
caliphal fleet in 323/935, and Ibn Khaldiin writes that the island's governor after
350/961-2 built a fleet there to attack the Frankish coasts. 108 Denia's shipyards, on
the other hand, do not appear in the sources before the fifth/eleventh century, and
were thus probably more the result of Mujahid's need for ships than an earlier
Umayyad building program.
A nineteenth-century map of Denia labels a space between the El Forti zone
and a wall to the south as darsena, derived from the Arabic dar al-�ina 'a 109
Archeological research in the area has confirmed the cartographer's drawing.110 J.A.
Gisbert Santonja estimates that the "construction and definition of the walls" for the
El Forti zone date from the end of the fifth/eleventh century, while no indication is

M.J. Rubiera Mata, La taifa de Denio, 26. Subsequent authors have adopted this position,
without offering additional information: R. Azuar Ruiz, Denio islamica, 63; A. Fernandez Izquierdo,
J.A. Gisbert Santonja, "lnvestigaciones arqueol6gicas subacuaticas en las costas de Denia," 79-88; A.
Espinos Ruiz, M. Gomez Bravo, "Prospecci6n arqueol6gica subacuatica en el puerto de Denia
(Alicante) : resultados cientificos y propuesta metodol6gica," Cuadernos de arqueologia maritima, 3
(1995): 63-103.
107
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108
Liber maiolichinus de gestis pisanorum illustribus, F.S.1., 29, ed. C. Calisse (Rome, 1904), 125,
127; lbn I:Jayyan, Muqtabis V, 366-8; lbn Khaldun, Kitiib al- 'ibar, 4:353.
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J.A. Gisbert Santonja, V. Burguera Sanmateu, J. Bolufer i Marques, La ceramica de Daniya, 53
and lam. Ill-I. The map image, also reproduced in J. !vars Perez, La ciutat de Denio, 45, does not
carry the legend corresponding to the letters designating specific points on the map. We have thus
chosen to adopt the Catalan term used by the authors of these studies.
110
J.A. Gisbert Santonja, V. Burguera Sanmateu, J. Bolufer i Marques, La ceramica de Daniya, 53-5;
J.A. Gisbert Santonja, "Ddniya y la Vila de Denia. En tomo al urbanismo de una ciudad medieval," in
Urbanismo medieval def pals valenciano, eds. R. Azuar, S. Gutierrez and F. Valdes (Madrid, 1993),
79-80
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given for the walls to the south of the dockyards.

111

It is thus difficult to associate the

site with the beginning of the taifa, and even less so with the Umayyad regime. As
presented, the structure seems more the result of Denia's maritime success, part of the
urbanization that characterized the city over the course of the fifth/eleventh century.
Whatever structures may have existed before Mujahid's arrival, his initial
plans for Mediterranean dominance and even subsequent more modest ambitions
necessitated a reliable and substantial production.

Mujahid must have invested

considerable means to launch the fleet described by Ibn 'IdharI and Ibn al-Khatib for
the invasion of Sardinia, even if the figure of 120 boats is certainly exaggerated.112
lbn al-Khatib also notes that only five ships (mariikab) and four small boats
(qawiirib) returned from the failed expedition, and Mujahid would have needed to
replace those vessels: his conflict with and victory over Khayran soon thereafter
indicates that he was able to mobilize the necessary means.113 The guerre de course
sponsored by Mujahid and 'AII likewise required a large and easily renewable fleet.
Commercial vessels were also needed, though most corsair vessels doubtless
performed double service. Developing and exploiting the taifa ports' commercial
resources relied on the production of ships - themselves commercial products - to
transport merchandise. Denia's arsenal made full use of its timber supplies, as well as

111 J.A. Gisbert Santonja, V. Burguera Sanmateu, J. Bolufer i Marques, La ceramica de Daniya, 50;
J.A. Gisbert Santonja, "Daniya y la Vila de Denia," 78.
112 lbn 'ldharT, Bayan, 3:116; lbn al-KhatTh, Kitab a 'ma! al-a 'lam, 251-2. Note that the fleets led by
the admiral Mul_rnmmad b. Rumal_iis against the Frankish coasts included only eighteen and thirty-six
ships: Al-'UdhrT, 81-2.
113 In addition to the panegyric poem cited above, Jbn l:lazm notes a conflict between the two taifas in
which all access to Almeria was cut off, including sea routes; lbn 1:lazm, Tawq al-1:wmama, ed. 'A.al
R. al-Mu�\awT (Beirnt, 2004), 162-3.
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the workforce furnished by local maritime populations.
Denia's arsenal was central to the town's infrastructure and identity,
producing the ships that extended the taifa into the sea. IdrTsT's description of Denia
insists on its maritime character, which the geographer ties to its naval production:
"Ships travel to [Denia], where many of them are made, since the town possesses an
arsenal for manufacturing ships. The fleet departs from Denia to raid [Christian
coasts], while vessels sail for the farthest Orient."114 Al-1:IimyarT's reprisal strays
little from IdrTsT's text, though he chooses to link the taifa's warships directly with the
arsenal.115

Al-I:IimyarT does not mention ships sailing for the East, but IdrTsT's

description shows that boats built in Denia served not only for piracy, but also for
long-distance commerce with Eastern markets.
Mujahid and 'AIT could also rely on regional shipyards that responded to the
local needs of secondary ports. Alicante produced boats for various uses, though
descriptions do not mention piracy.116 Alicante's arsenal does not appear in sources
prior to the taifa period, and so probably grew out of the port's participation in the
economic expansion of the Sharq al-Anda/us, and perhaps a desire on the part of
Mujahid and 'AIT for an additional supply of ships using the timber from Segura.
The Balearic Islands also produced ships. Ibiza's forests furnished timber for
building and repairing the vessels that transited through its port following the

"u-llui-JI cfa �J JP J_,h...YI cfa �Jui-JI ol..;,,j) ).i 4;,Y IAfoi 4 4-! Jui-JI 4-:!l) .)W �.i.. � J
.jy:...ll �\." ldrTsT, Opus geographicum, 5:557.
115
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IdrTsT, Opus geographicum, 5:558; Al-l:limyarT, 170/205.
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transversal Mediterranean shipping lanes, whether for piracy or commerce.

117

Madinat Mayurqa's naval production was perhaps more important, and furnished a
sizeable fleet for the local governor. Mujahid did not establish the Majorcan arsenal,
since Ibo Khaldun evokes numerous maritime raids launched by the Islands'
governors in the second half of the forth/tenth century.118 These governors were all
Saqaliba clients of the caliphate, carrying out state policies that were generously
supported.

The maw/a al-Muwaffaq took charge of Majorca in 350/961-2, and

commissioned the construction of warships (al-asa(i[) to attack the Frankish coasts.119
His successors likewise pursued an aggressive campaign of raiding Christian lands,
and must have also produced ships to continue his policies. The Majorcan darsana
remained in service over the course of the fifth-eleventh century, and was the site of
violent clashes during the Pisan and Catalan attack of 1115.120
Mujahid must have considered Majorca's arsenal in his plans for conquering
Sardinia. He could use the port and shipyards to prepare the invasion, just as the
caliphal expedition of 323/935 had regrouped and supplied there before continuing on
to the Catalan and French coasts. 121 Even if the 120 large and small vessels described
by Ibn 'IdharT and Ibn al-KhatTb is an exaggeration, it indicates a fleet large enough to
drain the naval resources of more than one arsenal. 122 Mujahid spent five months in
Denia between declaring the caliphate of al-Mu'aytT and departing for the Balearics,

Al-l:limyarT,198/240; Yaqut,4:1000-1.
Ibn Khaldun,Kitab al- 'ibar, 4:353.
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120
Libermaiolichinus, 125,127.
121
Ibn J:Iayyan, Muqtabis V, 366-7.
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during which time he must have added to any ships he had brought from Tortosa.
Nevertheless, a stop in the Balearic dockyards would have augmented his fleet and
allowed for last minute preparations.
Mujahid and 'Alt later named governors known for their pursuit of the guerre
de course, and the Balearic Islands remained a major stopover for Mediterranean
shipping. 123 These two activities, which were not mutually exclusive, stimulated
naval production on Majorca and Ibiza. In fact, the economic profit from piracy and
commerce must have financed a large part of the urbanization and fortification of
Majorca and its darsana over the course of the century.
Mujahid and 'AlT's Mediterranean policy relied on the naval production of
Denia, Alicante and the Balearic Islands.

The ships helped commercialize the

products attracted by the taifa's ports, and were themselves commercial products.
The arsenals likewise provided the basic tools for Denia's guerre de course, which in
tum financed the taifa court and, as remarked E. Levi-Provern;:al, was "at the origin of
Mujahid's immense fortune." 124

The Fleet
Denia's rulers needed arsenals that could adapt to both axes of their Mediterranean
policy, commerce, and piracy. Naval production in the taifa's arsenals was logically
a state prerogative, and its rulers' interests dictated the construction and
commercialization of ships. Al-ijimyarT associated Denia's arsenal with maritime
123
124

lbn Khaldun, Kitab al- 'ibar, 4:355.
Al-l:limyarT, trans. p. 95, n. 2.
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violence, but this neglects what must have been equally important commercial
activities. Denia's rulers certainly maintained a fleet for offensive and defensive
purposes, but most ships must have been destined for more ambiguous use. These
ships could be sold or rented out for commercial ends, or entrusted to captains who
adapted their economic activities - commerce or piracy - according to circumstances.
Maritime magnates close to the state were probably issued the right to build their own
ships, while in times of need the emir, like the caliph before him, could requisition the
vessels and their crews. 125
It is difficult to describe precisely Denia's fleet under Mujahid and 'Ali IdrTsT
and Al-I:-IimyarT report that Denia was the port of call for the fleet that raided
Christian coasts. However, this "fleet" was likely an aggregate of official and semi
official vessels, augmented by independent elements. Maritime violence over the
course of the fourth/tenth century had become a state affair, often in conjunction with
independent members whose resources completed official navies. 126

The state,

however, furnished the core of this fleet as well as its command. Such would seem to
have been the case in Denia, as well as in MadTnat Mayurqa, where Mujahid and
'AlI's governors also practiced piracy on a grand scale.
The invasion of Sardinia mobilized a fleet of 120 large and small ships to
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See for example the ships and crews requisitioned by 'Abd al-Ra}:!man III to patrol the waters
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transport one thousand horsemen.
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In companson, the caliphal fleet led by

Mul)ammad b. Rumal)is against Barcelona in 328/939-40 counted twelve warships
(markab l;arbiya), four lighter warships (shawna) and two scout ships (Jattash). The
caliphal fleet that attacked the Frankish coasts three years later left Almeria with
thirty warships and six light warships. 128 The purpose for these different expeditions
was not the same, since Ibn Rumal)is was seeking booty and acts of submission
instead of conquest. In addition, maritime expansion over the century must have led
to larger fleets.

At the end of the fifth/eleventh century, the poet Abu Bakr b.

Mul)ammad b. 'Isa b. al-Labbana eulogized the emir of the Balearics, Mubashir Na$ir
al-Dawla, writing that the emir's fleet threatened to spill the port's waters, the same
port that had harbored the entire caliphal fleet a century and a half before. 129 In
addition, while the Liber Maiolichinus does not give precise figures for the Pisan
attack on Majorca in 1115, the number of different vessels described, of which eight
are precisely named, indicates that more than thirty boats were used, not counting
those from Barcelona. 130 Mujahid must have brought together a similar fleet for his
invasion of Sardinia.
'AlT, and perhaps also his father, also maintained vessels for personal
commercial use. Historians have noted the implication of political elites in maritime
lbn 'ldharT, Bayan, 3: 116; lbn al-KhatTb, Kitab a 'ma! al-a 'lam, 251-2.
Al-'UdhrT 81
129
lbn Bassim," Dhakhfra, 3:522; M.J. Rubiera Mata, "El poeta lbn al-Labbana de Denia en
Mallorca," BSAL 39 (1983): 506; 1 1.- Peres, La poesie andalouse, 216.
130 "Hoc varie fiunt diviso robore naves: galli, drumones, garabi, celeresque galee, barce, currabii,
lintres, grandesque sagene et plures alie variantes nomina naves." Liber maiolichinus, 10 It is
interesting to note the Arabic origin for a number of these terms, such as garabi I ghurab and currabii I
qarib: B. Kreutz, "Ships, Shipping, and the Implications of Change in the Early Medieval
Mediterranean," Viator, 7 (1976): I 02.
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commerce, the product of the political and economic interests of Mediterranean
rulers.131 The fragmentation of the centralized regimes of al-Andalus and North
Africa led to the creation of economic and political centers along their coasts. The
rulers of these new centers drew much of their power from their maritime military
and economic resources. In addition, the prohibitive costs of building and equipping
vessels must have restricted production to only the most affluent.
'Ali's well-known interest in money and commerce naturally extended into
maritime affairs. His boat, markab Mujahid, or markab Ibn Mujahid, repeatedly
appears in the documents of the Cairo Geniza. 132 He likely used his own vessel to
ship food to the Fatimid caliph, al-Mustan�ir bi-Llah, in 447/1055-6. This famous
episode openly combined economic and political interests, since diplomatic letters to
the caliph and his vizier accompanied the shipment, while the vessel itself returned
laden with jewels and other riches.133 The markab Mujahid could also be a vehicle
for ordinary commerce, since one letter relates a purchase of flax, and another notes
its arrival simply because no Jews were aboard.134

In fact, the participation of

political elites in maritime shipping was so banal that a letter mentions the arrival of
'An's boat, along with boats owned by "the Am[I]r [of al-]An[d]alus" and the Zirid
ruler Tamim b. al-Mu'izz.135
The sources do not usually specify which type of vessel was used: the general
131
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term markab - literally "mount" - is most often employed, in both military and
commercial contexts. 136 More precisely, marakib are often associated with qawarib
(s. qarib), smaller open vessels with oars used to transport goods and passengers
between larger ships and the docks. 137 Two bacini from the church of San Piero a
Grado in Pisa, produced in the first half of the fifth/eleventh century in Madinat
Mayurqa, illustrate the combined use of these two types of ships. 138 The two images
are similar, with large sailboats with castellated stems in front of which smaller boats
with oars transport passengers. On one of the bacini, the qarib has a small triangular
sail. The slight difference between the two suggests that this was a common theme,
often repeated, and thus illustrates ships well known by the Mediterranean
community. 139 A fifth/eleventh-century plate from Qayrawan discovered in Denia's
El Forti district portrays a similar ship. 140 Given the commonality of this theme, 'Alf
likely used a comparable vessel.
IdrTsT writes that Denia's arsenal produced sufun (s. saftna). This term 1s
almost as general as markab, but seems to refer to vessels destined more for
commercial use. 141 Thus, while the fleet, al-usful, left the port for raiding, the sufun
built in Denia left "for the farthest Orient."142 The marakib al-safariya, or travelling
136
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ship, from Alicante most likely filled a similar purpose.

143

On the other hand, another

type of ship produced in Alicante raises some questions. IdrTsT uses the term al
barar'iq, but P.A. Jaubert notes a variant al-zawariq, "small boat." 144 Al-barraqa can
refer to a ship carrying Greek fire, leading E. Levi-Proven9al to translate it as
"fireship." Christophe Picard, however, notes that sources tend to specify when ships
actually carried material for Greek fire. 145

It would seem then more logical to

conserve the variant, and understand that Alicante's shipyards produced large ships
for inter-coastal commerce and smaller ships for shorter routes.
The markab on the bacini could serve for piracy, but most sources indicate
that there were specific ships used for the guerre de course. The singular al-usfiil
does not refer to a particular boat, but to an ensemble of ships destined for naval
warfare. Its plural, asaf'il, on the other hand, refers to heavy warships, like those built
in the Balearics by the governor al-Muwaffaq. 146 Ibn al-KhatTb writes that Mujahid
left for Sardinia with 120 marakib, but Ibn 'IdharT writes qifa 'a kibar wa sighar,
"large and small warships." 147 According to S.D. Goitein, qafa 'i were lighter than
asaf'il, and Christophe Picard specifies that they were more rapid and maneuverable
because of their combined sails and oars. 148

Geniza documents describe the

combined use of asaf'il and qafa 'i against convoys and land-based targets.
Most ships probably transported passengers and commercial products, but
143
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they were also ready to take advantage of fortuitous circumstances. On the other
hand, Goitein notes that mariikib al-barbiya were not restricted to warfare, since
some sources mention commercial goods being loaded on them.149 Mujahid and 'AlI
could thus rely on a fleet with a variety of ships built in the arsenals of their taifa with
a stable supply of timber ensured by their political and diplomatic efforts.

149

S.D. Goitein, Mediterranean Society, 1 :307.

CHAPTER V

DENIA AND THE CHRISTIAN WEST
Denia's transformation into a thalassocracy, based on its Mediterranean resources and
the different communications networks necessitated a policy towards the Christian
world that incorporated both war and diplomacy. This policy evolved out of the
practices of the 'Amirids and Umayyads, and which Mujahid had actively pursued
before the fitna. The Byzantine embassy received by Al-Man$iir's son, 'Abd al
Malik al-Mu?affar, in 393/1003, illustrates how the 'Amirid administration balanced
the different aspects of its relations with the Christians.1

The embassy offered

AndalusT sailors captured by the Byzantine navy as part of negotiations for a treaty
between the two powers.

The 'Amirids then had chosen to continue Cordova's

Mediterranean policies, pursuing relations that would likely yield financial profit,
while also promoting naval activities against Christian coasts. Al-Man$iir and his
sons supported the governor of the Balearics, Muqatil, in his ''jihad on the sea,"
without neglecting diplomacy.2 When Mujahid inherited part of the 'Amirid power
structure, he broke with this policy, seeking to build a Mediterranean state through
outright conquest couched in jihad. Mujahid's failure in Sardinia forced him to
reevaluate his ambitious plans, and he returned to the policies of this fonner patrons,

1

2
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pursumg his guerre de course against Christian coasts and vessels while also
exploring the possibilities of commerce and diplomatic entente.
Mujahid and 'AlT reinforced Denia's place in the Mediterranean networks,
even bringing some under their control. Balanced diplomacy allowed them to ensure
and improve economic and sometimes political exchange with the Latin West.
Denia's rulers thus opened their ports to Christian ships, welcoming merchants from
Pisa, Barcelona and elsewhere.

Communications with their peers in these cities

allowed them to reinforce ties. This policy reposed on a combination of conflict and
dialogue that adapted to the taifa's interests as well its individual interlocutors. Pisa
and Barcelona thus occupied different places in Denia's political strategy. Beyond
the religious divide that informed the guerre de course, the Italian ports offered
economic opportunities through booty and commerce. Actual political exchange with
Pisa or Genoa was minimal. Barcelona, on the other hand, because of its proximity,
and especially because of its role in Iberian geo-politics, was an important political
partner for Denia.
The maritime routes that Mujahid and 'AlT sought to dominate through
conquest and piracy also served ships and merchandise from a Christian West that
was in full expansion. The taifa's expansion fed in part on this expansion, its ports
harboring Christian merchant vessels and pirates who preyed on them. Mujahid's
Mediterranean ambitions and desire to control the maritime lanes however, were
countered by this same growth. Latin ports transformed defensive measures taken
against Muslim attacks into offensive operations, reinvesting booty and profits into
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maritime infrastructures capable of limiting Muslim aggression, while developing in
parallel mutually beneficial commerce.

ITALY AND THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN

Mujahid's Mediterranean ambitions informed his relations with the Italian Peninsula.
His principal aim at the beginning of his reign was building a maritime caliphate that
stretched from Denia to Sardinia and beyond. The conquest of the Balearics was
simply a step in his plan of Mediterranean conquest, as was in fact the very
establishment of the taifa in Denia. Mujahid had used the first years of the fitna to
affirm his hold on power structures entrusted to him under the 'Amirids, but had few
options for long-term growth. The Andalusifitna and rival powers left little place for
Mujahid on the Peninsula, but his experience as a 'Amirid officer indicated the only
direction for expansion beyond a petty regional polity. The maritime route from
Iberia to the Central Mediterranean led from Denia to the Balearics and then Sardinia
before reaching the Italian coast, Sicily and Ifriqiya. Conquering the Balearics was
then an essential step in establishing Muslim government in Sardinia, which would
offer Mujahid prestige, substantial territory and especially control over the Western
Mediterranean maritime networks.
Historians often present the fifth/eleventh century as a turning point in relations
between the Christian West and the Muslim World. Control over the Mediterranean
slipped from Muslim to Christian hands over the course of the century. Ibn Khaldun, in
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a famous passage, reports that at the beginning of this period, the Christians could not
even float a plank on the sea. By the end of the century, however, Muslim jurists
considered the journey East for the pilgrimage perilous enough to discourage its
practice, partly because of Christian pirates.3 Biographic dictionaries list at least three
'ulama' captured or killed on the high seas by the Rum during this time, and the
geographer al-BakrT describes necessary measures taken to protect the North-African
coast against their incursions.4 Attacks by Pisa and Genoa on Bone, al-Mahdiyya,
Palermo, Tortosa and Valencia over the course of the century - carried as much to
extend their commercial influence as to end Saracen piracy - illustrate the Italian cities'
ambitions and growing capabilities.

Italian expansion was as economic as it was

military, and Muslim maritime potential crumbled almost in inverse proportion to the
Italians' rise. Denia's expansionist and economic ambitions belong in this context, in a
transitional chronology and at the crossroads of commerce and conflict.

3 lbn Khaldiin, Kitab al- 'ibar, I :456; H.S. Khalilieh, "The Legal Opinion of Maliki Jurists Regarding
Andalusian Muslim Pilgrims Travelling by Sea during the Eleventh and Twelfth Cenhtries CE,"
Mediterranean Historical Review, 14.1 (1999): 61-5.
4 Ibn Bashkuwal, 548, no. 809, and 719, no. I 028; al-}:lumaydT, 274, no. 332; al-BakrT, 30, 39, I 22.
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Conquest and Piracy

Sardinia
Mujahid's declared al-Mu'aytT's caliphate in 405/1015 as an initial step in his
campaign to conquer Sardinia. 5 The newly-named caliph brought legitimacy to the
project, and allowed Mujahid to establish his authority over the Balearics, to reform
fiscal policy, to issue money and to assemble an expeditionary force. These were, in
fact, all measures calculated as part of the invasion, which would also help maintain
Mujahid's hold on his AndalusT territorial base. The Sardinia campaign is a key to
understanding Mujahid's plans and ambitions at the beginning of his reign. It was the
motor behind his first independent military and political actions and marks the beginning
of his reign as the ruler of this own polity.
Pisa and Genoa pushed back an initial attack on Sardinia in 405/1015. 6 Mujahid
returned the following year at the head of 120 ships and 1000 horsemen (foris). 7 This
was perhaps not the first time that Mujahid had troubled the island or even the
Tyrrhenian ports. The Pisan annals describe an attack on their city in 1011 by a "fleet
from Spain," while an anonymous compilation claims that Mujahid attacked Sardinia
several times before conquering it. 8 Ibn Khaldiin writes that the governor Muqatil held
the Balearics until 403/1012-3, but Mujahid could have launched expeditions from
5
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another Sharq al-Anda/us port, such as Tortosa. Mujahid thus seems to have continued
9

the 'Amirid maritime campaigns against the Riim coasts that had resulted in the capture
of the AndalusI sailors returned to 'Abd al-Malik in 393/1003.

The difference in

406/1016, however, was that Mujahid was intent on conquest, on creating a
Mediterranean polity out of Denia, the Balearic Islands, Sardinia and the routes that
linked them.
The 406 expedition targeted the southeastern coast of the island, attacking the
judicature of Cagliari, which Mujahid adopted as his territory. 10 A twelfth-century Pisan
epic poem, the Liber maiolichinus de gestis pisanorum illustribus, states that Mujahid
controlled the plains from the mountains to the sea. 11 According to the manuscript of
Ibn al-Athir's al-Kami! fi-l-tarfkh used by Michele Amari in his Biblioteca islamo
sicula, Mujahid killed many men in his conquest, and notably a certain Malut. 12 Alberto
Boscolo hypothesized that this "Malut" could be a defonnation of "Salut", or Salusio,
the ruler of the Cagliari judicature. 13 Boscolo likewise claims that Mujahid appropriated
the judge's properties, located about twenty kilometers east of Cagliari. 14 This was thus

9 lbn Khaldun, Kitiib al- 'ibar, 4:354.
10
Eleventh-century Sardinia was nominally under Byzantium, but de facto power lay with the four
kings, or judges of Cagliari, Torres, Arborea and Gallure. J.-M. Poisson, "Chateaux, frontieres et
naissance des judicats en Sardaigne," in Castrum 4, 309-320. lbn al-KhatTh notes that before the
conquest the island was divided between four kings who served the "rnler of the great land": lbn al
KhatTh, Kitiib a 'miil al-a 'liim, 253.
11
Uber maiolichinus de gestis pisanorum illustribus, ed. C. Calisse (Rome, 1904), 41.
12 M. Amari, Biblioteca islamo-sicula. Ossia raccolta di testi arabici che toccano la geografia, la
storia, la biografia e la bibliografia de/la Siclia, (Turin and Rome, 1880), I :358.
13 A. Boscolo, La Sardegna bizantina e alto-giudicale (Sassari, I 978), 125; F. Artizzu, La Sardegna
pisana e genovese (Sassari, 1985), 14. Corrado Zedda has raised doubts concerning this identification:
C. Zedda, "Bisanzio, !'Islam e i Giudicati: la Sardegna e ii mondo mediterraneo tra VII e XI secolo,"
Archivio Storico e Giuridico Sardo di Sassari, new series, IO (2006): 92-3.
14
A. Boscolo, La Sardegna bizantina e alto-giudicale, 125.
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a veritable conquest, by which Mujahid eliminated and replaced the previous ruling
power.
Mujahid brought Sardinia into the dew al-Islam, imposing the jizya on the
island's rulers and building fortifications to protect his new lands. Mujahid intended his
occupation of Sardinia in 406/1016 to be permanent. It is in fact possible that his forces
had not been entirely chased from the island the year before, and that he was merely
bringing reinforcements. Once he had eliminated the local Byzantine forces, Mujahid
set about solidifying his position and the Pisan annals state that he built cities using local
slave labor. 15 Perhaps as a message to the local population, some were buried alive in
the walls of his new fortifications. Mujahid most likely kept his forces in the more
fertile southeast with easier access to the coast, an area that coincided with the judicature
of Cagliari, freed up by Salusio's death. 16 Indeed, a charter from 1081 donating land in
the area of Cagliari places some of the land in the area of a 'castro de Mugete,' and
'Mugettus' or 'Mugietus' were common Latin transcriptions of the taifa ruler's name. 17
Although the actual site has not been located, archeological work in the 1970's may
have unearthed remnants of Mujahid's fortifications within the same area near
Quarticciu, along with what the archeologist believed to be Roman baths adapted to
Arab tastes. 18
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Mujahid's plans to permanently settle in Sardinia seem evident,
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especially since he sent for his mother, aunt, son and the rest of his household. He may
even have intended to establish the capital of al-Mu'aytI's caliphate on the island.
Conquering Sardinia meant extending the limits of Mujahid's rule, and the
Italian coast itself became a frontier to exploit for booty andjihad. Thietmar, the bishop
of Merseburg at the beginning of the fifth/eleventh century, reports that Mujahid
established a base near Luni, on the coast between Pisa and Genoa.19 However, while
the Sardinian conquest was clearly an expansion of the dar al-Islam and the caliphate of
Denia, Luni was a colony like Fraxinetum or Garigliano, intended as a raiding base.
Saracen pirates had easy access to the Tuscan and Ligurian coasts from Luni, and could
also prey on maritime traffic transiting through its port.20 Mujahid invested ruins
outside the town from which he raided the surrounding countryside, "abusing" its
women.
An already existing Muslim population may also have strengthened Mujahid's
position in the southeast of the island. He could even present the conquest as an action
to protect fellow Muslims. A Muslim community lived in Olbia, on the northeastern
coast, as indicated by a funeral stele discovered there in 1847.21 Corrado Zedda has
advanced the idea that a Pisan expedition against Olbia in 1003 could in fact have been a

dissenting view of Boscolo's finds, see D. Salvi and S. Grete, "Localita : Is Concias." in "lnsediamenti
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police action against Saracen pirates.

22

The eastern coast from Arbatax southward

appears on medieval maps as Sarabus, a deformation of medieval Sard for "the Arabs,"
while some historians claim that the name Arbatax comes from MaghribI Arabic
arba 'atash, or fourteen, a reference to a series of Byzantine fortifications that lined the
coast. 23 Eleventh century donation charters from the area mention 'liberus de paniliu',
semi-free Christian children of Muslim slaves. 24 In addition, the region was one of the
last penetrated by either Greek or Latin monasteries. Numismatic evidence suggests a
stable Muslim community north of Cagliari in the eighth century, although it is not clear
whether there was a subsequent uninterrupted presence. 25
Archeological evidence also points to Muslim communities in the southern parts
of the island. Two fragments of mqiibriyya funerary steles dated possibly from the
fifth/eleventh century were unearthed near the prefecture in Cagliari. 26

More

archeological traces were found a few kilometers to the northwest, in the village of
Assemini. 27 The church of S. Giovanni in Assemini may even have served as a mosque
before being transformed into a Christian sanctuary during the fifth/eleventh century. It
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has a quadrangular structure, in which the internal space is divided into nine parts by
four pillars, with a small apse in the southeastern wall. Although elements ofthe current
structure resemble area churches such as S. Satumo in Cagliari, the basic plan is unique
for the island and the church was most likely rebuilt adapting to original elements during
the first half of the fifth/eleventh century.28 This then leaves the possibility that S.
Giovanni was in fact originally a mosque. The church's basic structure resembles
primitive North African mosques, while the semi-circular apse, which is found in only
two other churches on the island, is consistent with the mi/:,rab in a mosque's directional
orientation.29
In addition, two Muslim funerary steles similar to North African and Sicilian
works, from Assemini and dated to the later fifth/eleventh century, indicate a
community large enough to support a skilled sculptor.30 The best-preserved stele was
carved for Mariam, daughter of' Atiyya al-Sarraj. In a village with approximately thirty
to fifty inhabitants, the Muslim community indicated must have composed a
considerable percentage of the local population.31 This community then, as well as
those in Cagliari and Olbia, seems to have lived alongside the Christian population.
Mujahid's conquest, however, would have overturned roles, bringing the Muslims out
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Mujahid could then present himself as a protector of

believers threatened by infidels.
Bringing Sardinia into the taifa of Denia also expanded opportunities for Muslim
piracy in the Western Mediterranean.

Mujahid could facilitate traffic for pirates

recognizing his authority, offering harbors from one end of the basin to the other, with
the key port of Cagliari serving as a junction for routes travelling to Sicily, al-Andalus or
the Italian coast, where Mujahid had also established the beachhead at Luni. Even if
conquest was not his intention with this last colony, it did represent an aggressive form
of piracy, justified not only by the search for booty, but also by jihad. Piracy and the
guerre de course were, in fact, among the major corollaries of this conquest, and were

among its principal motivations. 32
In addition to these economic and nautical reasons, conducting jihad against
Sardinia could also contribute to Mujahid's claims to power. Indeed, with the collapse
of the Cordovan regime, Mujahid could no longer justify his position through his ties
with the Umayyad caliph, and without that legitimacy, his temporal authority could only
be regarded as illicit and wanting stability. 33 Although Mujahid had created a puppet
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caliphate, leading the Jihad against Sardinia could only help his image, given that holy
war was one of the obligations of a Muslim ruler. 34 The first Spanish Umayyad caliph,
'Abd al-Ral;man III, had understood the importance of jihad in establishing his
credentials as a good Muslim ruler, an essential piece in the construction of his
caliphate. 35 His example was closely followed by al-Man�ur, whose chief ideological
tool was, in fact, his successful yearly raids against the Christian North. The sense of
his laqab, the victorious, underlines significantly the importance of jihad m
legitimizing his effective usurpation of temporal power as l:,ajib to Hisham II.
Mujahid's invasion of Sardinia contributed in the same way to his legitimacy.
His biographers are consistent in their respect for him in regards to this conquest,
despite its eventual failure, with Ibn al-KhatTb praising him before Allah for his pious
action.36 Mujahid validated his power with this expedition and his subsequent guerre
de course, receiving jurisdiction over the lands he himself had brought under Islam37.
The expansion of Denia's borders came at the expense of the Italian port
cities. A state's territoriality can be defined in part by its ability to impose fiscal
policy, and so extract revenue. For a "traditional" state, this means lands that are in
some manner or another subject to its fiscal authority, whether directly or indirectly,
as with feudalism in the Latin West. For maritime states however, such as Pisa,
Genoa and also Denia, such revenue constituted only a fraction of their wealth,
completed by tolls, customs duties and the commercial activities of their elites.
34
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Control of maritime lanes and networks, or at least access to them, thus touched at the
integrity of the state.

Mujahid had in fact gained control over those maritime

networks with his conquest of Sardinia.

Whether they were travelling towards

Sicilian warehouses, Barcelona or the Sharq al-Anda/us, Italian ships would have to
pass through the taifa of Denia. Mujahid was thus capable of limiting their access to
the maritime lanes, threatening therefore their livelihood and possibilities for growth.
The conquest also raised concerns on the continent, as it represented a threat to
the Church, an expansion of dar al-Islam to the detriment of Christendom. Indeed, two
later Pisan chronicles state that Pope Benedict VIII granted privileges to those who
agreed to sail against Mujahid, sending the 'vermilion bam1er' to accompany them.38
Ranieri Sardo even goes as far as to say that the pope sent his legate to preach the
crusade against the Saracens. However, the subsequent dispute between Pisa and Genoa
over Sardinia pushed both sides to invent historical justification for their possession of
the island. Both chronicles in fact describe aggression by Mujahid over the next decade
and as late as 1050 - six years after his death - , with Pisan responses in each case and a
renewal of Papal privileges for their efforts in 1050, but the attacks left no trace in
Arabic sources and were probably invented to strengthen the Pisans' case for possession.
However, despite Ranieri Sardo's fourteenth-century anachronistic use of the
crusade, the papacy was in fact aware of, and concerned about, the situation. A Sard
cardinal, Ilario Cao, was influential in Benedict VIII's curia, and would no doubt
have tried to persuade the Pope to act against this Muslim aggression so close to
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Ranieri Sardo, Cronaca di Pisa, 14; Breviarium Pisanae Historiae, 167.

home.39 Moreover, Thietmar, the eleventh-century chronicler, states that Benedict VIII
called upon the defenders of the Church to chase away the Saracens who were attacking
the coast near Luni.40 Thietmar, in fact, makes quite clear the idea of a clash between
the defenders of the faith, and the inimicos Christi, and places Mujahid in direct
confrontation with the pope. To illustrate this personification of the struggle between
Islam and Christianity, he relates a story wherein Mujahid would have sent the pope a
sack of chestnuts as a metaphor for the number of Muslim warriors he would unleash on
the continent. Benedict VIII's response was to send a sack of millet to show the number
of Christian warriors that awaited him.

Although the authenticity of the story is

doubtful, it is evident that while Pisa and Genoa were also concerned about the
economic ramifications of the conquest of Sardinia, Mujahid's jihad had sparked a
religious response on the part of the papacy, who most likely did charge the Italian
ports with protecting the peninsula from Muslim aggression.
The Pisan and Genoese response was decisive. Their fleets converged on
Mujahid's Sardinia settlement while he was returning from Majorca with this family.
Mujahid's ultimate defeat, however, was as much an act of nature as the result of the
combined fleets of Pisa and Genoa. Outnumbered, Mujahid sought to flee when his
fleet was smashed by a storm against the rocks of an ill-chosen cove.41 The Pisans
and Genoese were easily able to pick apart the remains, and captured Mujahid's

39 A. Boscolo, La Sardegna bizantina e alto-giudicale, 127.
40 Thietmari chronicon, 851.
41 lbn al-KhatTb, Kitab a 'ma! al-a 'lam, 25 I; lbn Bassam, Dhakhfra, 4: I 83; al-l:{umaydi, 353-4; Al
I)abbi, 457-9, no. 1379.
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mother and his future heir.
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His mother would choose to remam among "her

people," indicating the taifa ruler's possible ethnic ongms, while his son would
remain a hostage for a number of years. Of the 120 ships that left for the expedition,
only nine returned to Madfaat Mayilrqa.

Guerre de course
Ibn Bassam wrote that the Christians had thus "chipped [Mujahid's] sword."43
His defeat signaled the end of his grand aspirations, and Mujahid made no new
attempts at establishing a caliphate across the Mediterranean. It did not, however put
an end to Mujahid's naval activities or Denia's implication in the Mediterranean.
Both he and 'Ali continued their support of piracy, using it as a political and fiscal
tool, and making Denia one of the principal ports for the guerre de course. A century
later, IdrTsT would still describe Denia as an arsenal and base for raiding fleets.
Muslim raids continued to plague Sardinia over the course of the century,
many of them from Denia. From 1044 to 1056, two AndalusT scholars, both of whom
sailed out of Denia, were killed in armed conflicts around the island, one of whom
was explicitly there onjihad. 44 A Sard adaptation of the life of S. Satumo from the
late eleventh century includes a prayer for protection from Muslim attacks, while a
life of S. Gavino transforms a local Roman martyr's story to one of Muslim

42

Liber maiolichinus, 42-3; Thiemari chronicon, 851.
Ibn Bassam, DhakhTra, 4: I 83.
44
Ibn Bashkuwal, 369, no. 800; al-}:lumaydT, 304, no. 697.

43

persecution.
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Nor were the Ligurian coasts free from attack, for a Genoese charter

from 1056 requires foreigners to help survey the coasts and aid the city in case of
Muslim aggression.46 For these attacks, Corsica may have served as a staging base,
as Gregory VII charged the bishop of Pisa with ridding the island of invading "evil
men."47 In fact, without advancing the idea of a new i�vasion of Sardinia, there may
be some truth in the Pisan descriptions of attacks by Mujahid in 1019, 1021, and
1028.48 Finally, in an 1150 peace treaty with Pisa, Valencia, whose territory now
included Denia, promised to freely admit, and exact no tribute from Pisan vessels
traveling to Sardinia. 49
Muslim pirates, moreover, did not limit their attacks to the Italian coast and
islands. Saracen incursions had plagued the monastery of Lerins off the Provern;;al
coast since the eighth century, the most famous of which resulted in the martyrdom of
Saint Porcharius in 732.50 In the 1046, pirates from the Sharq al-Anda/us attacked the
monastery, killing the abbot Aldebertus and taking numerous monks away as human
booty to sale them in the markets of Denia and Tortosa.51 The abbot Aldebertus II
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began fortifying the island in 1073, but it was again devastated in 1107, when Pope
Honorius II offered indulgences equivalent to pilgrimage to the Holy Land for anyone
who served there as a man-at-arms for three months. 52 The taifa's ports were not the
only harbors for pirates, but Majorca did launch ships against the Frankish coast,
causing in one instance the town of Elne to move its church inland to avoid further
damage. 53 Moreover, Pisa and Barcelona invaded the Balearics in 1114-5 in large
part to end its piracy campaigns. The 1107 attack on Lerins then was probably at
least sanctioned by Mubashar Na�ir al-Dawla, ruler of Madinat Mayurqa and former
client of' AlT b. Mujahid, in a clear continuation of the former taifa's practices.
Mujahid, and later 'AlT, invested considerable resources in preparing for the
Sardinia invasion, and then in maintaining a fleet to raid Christian ports, coasts and
ships. Despite their costs, these actions brought numerous benefits for Denia's rulers.
The raids and attacks helped legitimize their power as a form of jihad. The material
and human booty brought monetary wealth, perhaps directly if the ship belonged to
them, as a tributary fifth of the prize for their share as Muslim rulers (khums), or even
as taxes. Denia's economy, and its court, were in many ways supported by this
maritime jihad.
Nevertheless, and despite this violence, not all ships left Denia to attack
Christian targets. Mujahid and 'Ali participated in the Mediterranean commercial
economy, sending their ships to the various Muslim ports as far as Alexandria and
perhaps Tripoli. Perhaps more surprising, Denia's rulers concomitantly cultivated
52
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and maintained economic, diplomatic and even personal relations with the same ports
that they assaulted.

Diplomacy and friendship
Mujahid and 'AlT also built their state through economic relations with the Muslim
and Christian worlds. Communications between Denia and the ports of Pisa and
Barcelona contributed to the composition of the western Mediterranean networks.
Denia's ships participated in the different networks that arose with the renewed Latin
Mediterranean presence that began in the later fourth/tenth century, and the taifa's
ports likewise attracted Italian and Catalan ships. The taifa thus emerged in part
thanks to an emerging economy with different ports of the Western Mediterranean
basin, be they Muslim or Christian. In fact, even if Mujahid's failure in Sardinia was
due to the growing maritime power of Pisa and Genoa, commerce with these same
ports helped fuel Denia's rise as one of the most important taifas. In parallel with this
commerce, Mujahid and 'Ali maintained personal relations with the elite in these
towns. The political and economic elites in Mediterranean ports, and their political
and economic relations, were often indistinguishable.54
Mujahid helped enlarge the diir al-Islam through his conquest of Sardinia.
Piracy filled his coffers and replicated al-Man$Gr's legitimizing yearly raids. Mujahid
policies brought him in direct conflict with the Christian ports of the Tyrrhenian Sea.
Nevertheless, Mujahid needed these ports and their commerce. Piracy would be
54 O.R. Constable, for example, has noted in the Geniza documents merchant vessels belonging to
Muslim mlers, including 'AIT b. Mujahid. See above and Trade and Traders, 122-3.

201
anemic at best if not for maritime traffic, even if human booty was the most lucrative
prize. And piracy had been part of Mujahid's plan in conquering Sardinia, but Denia
was no longer simply a pirate port living off the booty brought in from expeditions
against the Christian coasts. It had become part of the process that was regenerating
commerce in the Western Mediterranean and ports like Pisa.

Diplomatic relations
As the twelfth century began, Pisa embarked on one of its most important
putative expeditions, against the last remaining taifa kingdom, the Balearic Islands.
The Islands had splintered off from Denia in 468/1076 when the taifa kingdom had
surrendered to the Banu Hud of Zaragoza. The ruler, Mubashr Na�ir al-Dawla, was a
client of Mujahid and then 'Ali, and therefore a member of the 'Amirid faction and
clan. He had assiduously continued the privateering policies of his former patrons,
which the combined fleets of Pisa and Barcelona intended to stop. 55 When news
came to MadTnat Mayurqa of the impending expedition, Na�ir al-Dawla sent a letter
to his acquaintance in Pisa, Peter, great-grandson of Ildeberto Albizone, with the
kindest words of friendship. 56 He asked Peter to remember the pact that had existed
between his ancestor and Mujahid and that he, himself, had maintained for so long.57
Indeed, the failed invasion of Sardinia had marked the end of Mujahid's plans for a
55
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Mediterranean polity, but it had also provided the beginnings of a personal
relationship between the 'Amirids of Denia and a prominent Pisan family, one that
would continue through generations.
During Mujahid's attempt to escape from Sardinia, his fleet was destroyed and
members of his household, including his mother and son, were captured by the
Pisans. 58 His mother, Jud, chose to remain among "the people of her religion," but
Mujahid was able to ransom the other prisoners, except his son, 'Ali. 59 'Ali remained
with the Christians for sixteen years, speaking their language, wearing their clothes
and even practicing their religion. As tribute to the emperor, the Pisans sent him to
Henry II in Germany. 'Ali, however, did not remain long at the imperial court, for
Henry, who "cared greatly for Peter's ancestor," placed 'Ali under Ildeberto's
supervision in Pisa. 60 According to the Liber maiolichinus, Ildeberto, in fact, had
requested that 'Ali be sent to him. Mujahid was finally able to arrange 'AlI's release
in 423/1031, thanks mediation by the Barn} I:Iammad and a ten thousand dinar
ransom. 'Ali must have stayed for so long in Pisa as diplomatic hostage, and not
because his father, known to have paid a thousand dinars for a book dedication,
Would not raise the ransom. Mujahid may even have limited further actions against
Sardinia and Pisa because of this son's captivity in Pisan hands.
'Ali may have been a hostage in Pisa, but he seems to have been treated with
honor, and perhaps even familiarity. The author of the Liber maiolichinus certainly
58
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seems to intend this when he juxtaposes Ildeberto's request for 'AlT from the emperor
with his subsequent liberation: the "dearest of gifts" for his father. As a result of this
gesture, Ildeberto's family and the 'Amirids of Denia were linked as brothers: Albicio
61
quare successoresque vocantur mugetz
A,,:
'firatres successorumque suorum.

The chronology is not explicit, and sixteen years went by between 'AII's
capture and liberation. When exactly Ildeberto would have made his request is thus
not clear, nor is the amount of time that 'AlT spend in the imperial court before
returning to Pisa. Ibn Bassam writes that a member of the Banu I:Iammad helped
negotiate 'AlI' s release, but the Liber maiolichinus gives Ildeberto the entire credit.62
A more likely scenario probably involves Mujahid effectively working through the
Banu I:Iammad, but building ties with Ildeberto and his Pisan connections through the
process.
Throughout the next two centuries, Ildeberto's family's interests would be
linked either with the 'Amirids or their successors, following often the same paths.
Na$ir al-Dawla's epistolary exchange with Peter indicates an uninterrupted
relationship between the two families over the course of the eleventh century.
Moreover, the Albizone family was often involved in relations with the Muslims or
Spain during the twelfth. During the Balearic campaign, Peter, Ildeberto's direct
descendant, negotiated with the Na$ir al-Dawla, though he was unable to save the
Muslim ruler.63 In 1161, Ardecase, sixth in the family line since Ildeberto, was sent

Liber maiolichinus, 43.
Ibn Bassam, Dhakhfra, 4: 183.
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by Pisa as an ambassador to the Balearic Islands, while in 1157, his cousin, Bulso,
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served as a witness in the marriage between the niece of the count of Barcelona and
the local ruler of Arborea in Sardinia.64 The Albizone family then, like their fellow
Pisans, expanded their interests in the Western Mediterranean, through diplomacy and
friendship, capitalizing perhaps on personal ties they had built with Denia.
Given his magnanimous treatment of 'An, Ildeberto may also have been
responsible for Mujahid's mother. No Latin sources speak of her beyond her capture,
unless we count Thietmar having her beheaded, but an epigraph on the Pisan
cathedral commemorates the tomb of a Majorcan queen taken as prisoner.65
Although the inscription does not in fact mark the queen's tomb, a thirteenth-century
Luccan manuscript describes the queen's tomb inside the cathedral. 66 The capture of
the mother of the "tyran Musetto" was among the city's foundational myths. It is not
surprising that a plaque commemorated this on the cathedral fa<;;ade, along with
another inscription celebrating Mujahid's defeat. What is interesting is her burial
inside the cathedral, marking a certain importance or recognition. It would not be
unreasonable to suppose that with Ildeberto's help in Pisa, Mujahid's mother
maintained a lifestyle consistent with that which she had enjoyed at the royal court in
Denia.
Given so few indications, it would be easy to consider exaggerated Ildeberto's
personal ties with Mujahid and Denia. Nevertheless, he was personally involved in
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'AlT' s transfer from the imperial court and his subsequent release, actions that would
have led to relations with the Denian ruler. The relationship between Mujahid and
6

1ldeberto is in fact indicative of the ties between Pisa and Denia. Despite piracy,
conquest and religious conflict, commerce also linked the two communities.
Ildeberto, in fact, provides not only an illustration of the diplomatic ties between Pisa
and Denia, but, through one single donation, he also created an important vestige of
their commercial relations.

Commerce
On the nineteenth of January, 1028, Ildeberto Albizone, for his soul and in
memory of the emperor Henry II, founded the female Benedictine monastery of San
Matteo on his lands immediately outside the Pisan pre-communal walls.67

San

Matteo was in fact one of many churches built in Pisa during the eleventh century as
the city expanded beyond the restricted Roman civitatis. Their construction alone is
proof of the expanding economic resources of the Tuscan city. Over the century, the
churches and monasteries became nodes of peripheral urban settlement, causing the
city walls to stretch around these outlying settlements until a new wall was necessary
at the end of the century. Indeed, the eleventh century saw a complete reorganization

67
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of the Pisan urban structure in response to the city's re-integration into the
Mediterranean commercial networks. 68
Beyond the edifices themselves, many of the churches built during this period
provide more direct evidence for trade with the Muslim world. San Matteo, along
with San Zeno, San Pedro a Grado, San Sisto, and the cathedral incorporated Islamic
ceramic lusterware plates or open bowls, known as bacini, into their fa9ades as
architectonic decorations, this in clear
imitation of ceramic tiles used to ornament
North African mosques. 69 As the bacini
were incorporated into the facades at the
time of construction, they are datable and
themselves proof of exchange with Muslim
cultures of the Mediterranean. In addition,
Pisa was not the only city to use bacini as architectonic decorations. Eleventh
century churches in Lucca and Pavia used the ceramics, as did churches on Corsica
and Sardinia. 70 Over the century and into the next, the practice spread, so that from
Genoa to Rome bacini became common on church fa9ades.
G. Berti, "Pisa: ceramiche e commerci (2° meta-I O meta XIV s.)," I Congresso nazionale di
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The eleventh-century bacini are a concrete sign of contact between Italy and
the Islamic world, but they were long thought to be the product of successive waves
of importation, possibly as booty from military expeditions, and would have served
solely as decorations.71 Historians have also suggested that the bacini were perhaps
traded on a small scale, as elite luxury goods, or that they were examples of a gift
culture within the Western Mediterranean. This perception changed, however, with
the results of archeological digs at Piazza Dante and Piazza dei Cavalieri in Pisa in
1991 and 1993. 72 Both sites were in lower middle-class neighborhoods, characterized
by merchants and lesser artisans, representative of eleventh-century Pisa's redefined
urban structure. 73 The digs unearthed 493 pieces of Islamic ceramic-ware, creating a
total of 540 with the 47 bacini. Although 66% of the pieces were similar in form to
the bacini, 33% were closed forms, meaning bottles or pitchers.

Moreover, the

Islamic ceramics accounted for 7% of the total ceramics found. The majority of the
Islamic ceramics unearthed was lusterware, and so not intended for common, daily
use, while the vast majority of the ceramics unearthed was comprised of non-vitrified
local production.

The percentage indicates that, while uncommon, sophisticated
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Islamic ceramics were readily available to a non-elite local population. Non-vitrified
imported pieces were also found, various sizes of jars, an indication that perishable
goods were also being imported from the Muslim world. 74
The quantity of pieces then proves that the bacini were not merely booty or
elite luxury imports. In addition to the theory that the bacini were war trophies,

David Abulafia also advanced the idea that they may have served as ballast in Pisan
ships returning from Muslim ports. 75 The smeared aspect of some bacini would seem
to indicate that this was true in certain cases, as it is hard to believe that such pieces
could have fetched a price worthy of their transport. The majority, however, are
exemplary pieces of Islamic ceramics, comparable to those found in the areas of
production. 76

These pieces then were expressly transported to Pisa for their

commercial value.
The bacini were incorporated in the church fac;; ades at the time of their
construction, as indicated by how they were fixed into the walls. 77 The construction
dates for the edifices thus provide a terminus ante quern date for the ceramics. 78 With
advances in ceramic typologies and classification of clay and soil types used for
74
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ceramics, archeologists and historians have been able to determine to some extent the
specific origins of the imported wares.

Percentages between the bacini and the

archeological finds are similar, with consistently over 70% imported from Sicily or
Tunisia, and 15 to 20% from al-Andalus; the remaining imports from Egypt and the
Eastern Mediterranean disappeared after the second half of the fifth/eleventh
century. 79 The majority share represented by Sicily and Tunisia easily correlates with
Pisa's military expeditions against Reggio, Palermo and Buna, proof of that region's
importance for Pisan commerce. Forty-eight pieces of ceramic ware came from al
Andalus in the first half of the fifth/eleventh century. 80 Of those, the majority most
likely was produced in the region around Murcia, while six were produced in Madinat
Mayurqa. 81
Muslim vessels were not absent from Italian ports, although their presence
seems to be somewhat rare. The bishop of Pisa complained in the later half of the
century of 'sordid pagan' ships in his city's harbor. 82

An early twelfth-century

Genoese list of tariffs that makes reference to eleventh-century currencies sets higher
prices for Muslim ships entering the city's port. 83 It is more likely however, that
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Pisan ships were the chief purveyors of these wares. The military expeditions alone
show the importance that the Pisans placed on keeping sea-lanes and markets open to
their vessels. In addition, Pisan merchants were so common in North African ports,
that theirs was an accepted form of currency. 84

Graziella Berti, the foremost

specialist on the Pisan bacini, has suggested that the ceramics were not bought
directly from their areas of production, but from a central trading emporium offering
the collective goods of the Western Mediterranean. 85 This seems to be the case for
the majority of the pieces, and would explain the high percentage of ceramics from
Sicily and Tunisia. This would also correlate with patterns of Mediterranean trade
indicated in the letters of the Cairo Geniza wherein Sicily emerges as a major transit
point for the transport of goods. 86
Some, however, may represent a more direct trade relationship. As stated
above, the Majorcan ceramics represent only six of the total AndalusT pieces imported
to Pisa. Those pieces, however, all date from the first quarter of the fifth/eleventh
century, and so represent six out of eleven total AndalusT bacini from that period.
Likewise, examples of continental AndalusT ceramics have been found in North
African archeological digs, whereas the only Majorcan pieces found outside of Al
Andalus are among the Pisan bacini. 87 The possibility exists then that certain Pisan

S.D. Goitein, Mediterranean Society, 1 :44; Tangheroni pointed out however that Pisa, in fact, did
not mint its own money at this time; M. Tangheroni, 82.
85
Piazza Dante, 125.
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S.D. Goitein, letters of Medieval Jewish Traders, 83; S.D. Goitein, Mediterranean Society, I :212;
O.R. Constable, Trade and Traders, 34-5.
87 R. Azuar Ruiz, 98.
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merchants, such as Ildeberto Albizone, may have conducted direct trade with the
Balearic Islands during the years probably following Mujahid's invasion of Sardinia.
Economic relations between Pisa and Denia began sometime in the first half
of the fifth/eleventh century. The two states had begun to expand their spheres of
influence before that, but they did not enter into real contact before the Sardinia
invasion. Pisa's interests lay initially and primarily to the south, as indicated by the
ceramics from Sicily and lfrTqiya discovered there. Pisan merchants were present in
central Mediterranean markets, where they would have made their first pacific
contacts with vessels from Denia. The commercial activities of the two ports crossed
along the North African coast, in Bijayya, Biina and al-Mahdiyya. Both cities had
documented contacts with that region during the same period. It is not surprising then
that 'AlT's release would be negotiated through the Banu I:Iammad, and that those
negotiations would then lead to more direct contact. Piracy characterized relations
between the two coasts, but it was in fact part of the larger economic networks that
linked them. Most trade was probably conducted through MadTnat Mayurqa during
the fifth/eleventh century, but Pisan interests looked towards the Sharq al-Anda/us
coast. If the bacini are any indication, commerce with the AndalusT coast accounted
for 15 to 20% of Pisan activity over the course of the century. Pisan participation in
the attack on Tortosa in 1092, and their lead in the invasion of the Balearics in 1114,
was meant to improve access to those same ports and to eliminate the pirates that
disrupted maritime routes in the region.
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BARCELONA

Denia's relations with the Catalan county of Barcelona, like those with Pisa, were
complex. In Barcelona's case, however, common interests played an even larger role.
Religious antagonism similarly came into play, as did the competition between two
states intent on expanding into new territories and taking full advantage of
commercial possibilities.

Individual exchange between the two courts was more

prevalent, entering at times into personal relations between sovereigns conscious of
their mutual political and economic interests.

Relations between Denia and

Barcelona were also part of the larger dynamic that would grow into the Reconquista,
overturning the balance between the Peninsula's Muslim and Christian powers.
The Christian North began reinforcing its economic and military power just as
the fall of the caliphate and political fragmentation weakened al-Andalus.88 The
Christian polities became the dominant force in the Peninsula, and their relations with
the Muslim kingdoms to the south were increasingly characterized by raids, demands
for tributary payments and conquest. Despite this, Denia and Barcelona cultivated
non violent relations throughout the fifth/eleventh century. A close reading of the
sources reveals that a simplified vision of Muslim-Christian relations, limited to
conflict, is insufficient and incorrect.

The rulers of the two cities exchanged

88 The standard work on the Catalan counties during this time, and especially in this context of
renewal, is P. Bonnassie's La Catalogne du milieu du Xe a la fin du Xie siecle : croissance et
mutations d'une societe, 2 vols. (Toulouse, 1975). We should note that recent studies have shown that
the Umayyad caliphate's decline began before the fitna, which was more the result than the cause of
growing weakness and internal divisions.
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em1ssanes and treaties, maintaining even personal relations while economic and
political interests linked their states.
Denia and Barcelona both sought to exploit their ports and serve as conduits
between the Peninsula and the sea. Their policies were thus both marked by the need
to develop and protect their maritime interests, balanced with political concerns
inland. Both states sought to expand their control of littoral resources in the Sharq a/
Anda/us. Mujahid's Mediterranean ambitions, along with the need to counter the
Barn} Hud of Zaragoza, led him to build a rapport with the county of Barcelona,
though without renouncing piracy and occasional conflict.

Barcelona's counts

likewise applied forceful policies, exacting tribute from bordering taifas, while also
developing economic interests in the maritime lanes that passed through Denia's
waters. Barcelona thus had to play a balanced game, seeking an entente with the
leading port along the Sharq al-Anda/us, and intervening more directly in AndalusI
ports closer to home. The Catalan counts thus sought from the beginning of the fitna
to maintain a constructive dialogue with the Saqaliba taifas along the Mediterranean
coast.

The fitna, Barcelona and the Saqaliba taifas
In a document dated to 1012 from San Cugat de Valles, the abbot of the monastery
praises Count Ramon Borrell for his audacious attack on Cordoba, through which
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"God granted tranquility to the Christians."

89

The attack in question was the famous

expedition of 1010, in which the Catalans helped to expulse the Berbers from the
caliphal capital. Despite the abbot's religious rhetoric, the conflict was not uniquely a
conflict across religious lines. The abbot neglected to mention that the Slav Wac;lib
had recruited Ramon Borrell and his Catalan army as mercenaries to fight for the
Umayyad contender al-MahdI.90
This was not the first time that Muslim rulers had incorporated Christian
mercenaries into the fitna.

The Castilian count, Sancho Garcia, had aided the

opposing Berber faction the previous year in exchange for a string of fortresses along
the Duero border.91 Both al-Mahdi and Wac;lib had also tried to recruit the Castilian,
but the Umayyad cause was outbid, and Sancho Garcia was convinced to throw his
lot in with the Berbers. The count's support enabled the Berbers to defeat Wac;lil)'s
forces outside Alcala de Henares, and to oust al-Mahdi from Cordoba.
Al-Mahdi's hastily acquired Catalan allies were largely responsible for his
subsequent riposte and short-lived victory. From Tortosa, al-MahdT's f:,ajib, Wac;lib,
negotiated an alliance with the Catalans. Wac;lib's proposal coincided with, and may
even have sparked, a council of the Catalan bishops and magnates, who then
deliberated over the proposed expedition against Cordoba.92

Much like Sancho

Garcia with the Berbers, the Catalans profited handsomely from the Umayyad's

"Jnde dedit Deus tranquillitatem super christianos." J. Ruis Serra (ed.), Cartulario de "Sant
Cugat" de! Valles (Barcelona, 1946), v. 2, doc. 449, p. 95.
90
Jbn 'ldharT, Bayiin, 3: 93-4; Primera cr6nica general de Espana, ed. R. Menendez Pidal (Madrid,
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1955), 457.
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Ibn 'IdharT, Bayiin, 3:86; Primera cr6nica general, 454.
92 S. Sanpere y Miquel, "El aiio de los Catalanes," Revista de ciencias historicas, 4 (1886): 40.

215
desperate situation. Wa<;lil) promised the counts Ramon Borrell and Armengol I of
Urgel one hundred dinars per day, plus food and wine, while their nine thousand
followers received two dinars per day, plus food and wine. 93 The mercenaries were
also to receive any spoils taken from the Berbers, as well as, perhaps, the town of
Medinaceli, whose mosques they sprinkled with wine and converted into churches.
The Catalans' losses were substantial in the ensuing two battles outside
Cordoba, including the deaths Ramon Borrell's brother Armengol I of Urge!,
Adalbert, son of the viscount Guitard, and the bishops Odon, Arnulfo and Aecio of
Gerona, Vic and Barcelona. 94 Nevertheless, those who survived the first battle were
richly rewarded. They were given more or less free reign in Cordoba, blaspheming
Muhammad and womanizing to their hearts' content. 95

Furthermore, the local

population was taxed to pay their fees. Their glory was short-lived, however, as a
second battle in the Guadiro valley saw one third of their forces killed. In fact, many
also drowned while crossing the river, perhaps because their belts were so heavy with
dinars that the spoils collected by the Berbers were inestimable. 96
Cutting their losses, the Catalans returned home, despite pleas from Wa<;lil)
and al-Mahdi, who undoubtedly saw their imminent defeat in this departure. As Peter
Scales has remarked, the expedition was a "fiasco" for the Catalans.97

It was,

however, highly profitable for those who did survive, and did indeed mark a turning
93 Ibn 'ldharT, Bayon, 3:93-4.
lbn 'ldharT, Bayon, 3:89; Cartulario de "Sant Cugat", doc. 431, pp. 74-6; Primera cronica
general, 456; Sanpere y Miquel, "El ano de los Catalanes," 48, 50; P. Scales, The Fall, 194.
95
Ibn 'ldharT, Bayon, 3:96-7.
96 lbn 'ldharT, Bayon, 3:98.
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point m Catalan-Muslim relations.

Al-Man�ur had practically completed the

subjugation of the Christian kingdoms before his death in 1002, to the point of
demanding their military contributions in his actions against their refractory co
religionists.

However, the implosion of the Umayyad caliphate allowed the

Christians to offer their services, not as tributary charges, but as mercenaries. From
this point on, the flow of money reversed. In the form of mercenary fees, and then
tribute, the Catalans exploited the internal divisions of the erstwhile caliphate, first
through services rendered and then extortion.
Even more significant, at least for the purposes of this study, was the pattern
of alliances established by the Cordoba expedition.

The Catalans continued to

involve themselves in the fitna, while supporting the Saqaliba, or Slav faction.
Expeditions are also documented for 1013, 1017 and 1024. The Catalans, in fact, were
well aware of the factional divisions in thefitna, and consistently aided the Slavs. Even
from the 1010 expedition, documents specify action against the Berbers, "contra
babaras naciones", or "ad expugnandas catervas barbarorum."98

Although this

distinction is not systematic (sometimes expeditions are simply "ad Spaniam," and the
abbey of San Cugat praises Ramon Borrell for acting against both Saracens and Berbers,
"sarracenos atque barbaros"), in each of the expeditions mentioned, Barcelona sided
with the Saqaliba. 99
The "fiasco" of 1010 may have dissuaded the Catalans from immediately re
embarking on another expedition ultra Corduba, but they did not remain for long on the
98
99
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edges of the conflict. A will from the cathedral of Vic, dictated in July IO I 3 and
published in February 1014, speaks of another expedition contra Spaniam, in the
company of Ramon Borrell, other counts, bishops and viscounts. ' 00 This mission
coincided with the rise of 'Ali' b. I:Iammud, whose rebellion is attested by a Ceuta
minting in that year, and whose early machinations against the Berbers were supported
by the Slav faction. 1 01

The Catalan intervention possibly came in support of the

I:Iammudids' Saqaliba supporters.
'AlT, however, quickly alienated his Slav supporters by bringing the Berbers
back into power, and he lost the Catalans' support along with that of the Slavs.
Khayran, the "muddled and unscrupulous" Slav leader who had succeeded Wac;lil),
headed the movement to oust the I:Iammudid leader from Cordoba102 • From his own
conquered territories around Almeria, Khayran organized a coalition of other Slav rulers
with Mundhir b. Yal)ya of Zaragoza, through whom he garnered a pledge of troops from
the recently widowed Ermesinda, countess of Barcelona. '03
The Saqaliba coalition propped up an obscure Umayyad pretender from
Valencia, 'Abd al-Rabman al-Murtac;la, in whom they hoped to have found a docile and
malleable candidate. 'AlT's murder at the hand of three palace eunuchs brought his
brother, al-Qasim b. I:Iammud, to the throne, but also provoked the Slavs to proclaim
their candidate caliph. The Catalan contingent followed Khayran to Granada, where
they were to face the I:Iammudids' Zirid Berber allies. However, as often happened with
100
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fitna-era puppet caliphs, al-Murta9a proved to be less than manageable, much to
Khayran's and the other Slavs' disappointment. 104 Outside the walls of Granada, the
Slavs, along with their Catalan mercenaries, abandoned al-Murta9a to defeat and
eventual death. The Catalans returned home, without having given battle, and once
again richly rewarded.
These early mercenary expeditions were not the arbitrary result of pecuniary
ambition. The Berber factions were equally solvent, and, as demonstrated by Sancho
Garcia's case, just as willing to engage Christian mercenaries. The Catalans had their
choice of economic benefactors. In fact, the Sharq al-Anda/us, under the power of the
Saqaliba, had become an essential zone for the Catalans' political and economic

projects. As Pierre Bonnassie observed, the rulers of Barcelona aligned themselves with
the Saqaliba in each of these conflicts in order to construct a closer relationship with the
rulers of the maritime provinces. 105 With the beginning of the fitna, the Slavs had
established a strong base on the eastern seaboard of the Iberian Peninsula. Wa.9il) had
been governor of the Upper Marches, adjacent to the Catalan lands, and had used
Tortosa as a base for his negotiations with Ramon Borrell. Within two years of the
fitna's outbreak, the Slav clients who ruled the Sharq al-Anda/us as officers of the

Umayyad state, among whom Mujahid was one of the most important, had solidified
their hold over the cities of Tortosa, Valencia, Denia, Almeria and Murcia, essentially
dominating the entire coast. 106
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The counts of Barcelona were well aware of the importance of trade and
relations along the eastern seaboard. As early as the tenth century, the Catalan count
Sufier collected rents from transhumances between Barcelona and Tortosa. 107 The
tenth-century AndalusI geographer al-RazI noted in his description of Muslim Tortosa
that its port was "frequented by merchants from all parts," and was "on the way of those
from France." 108 In 1011, Ramon Borrell ceded rights to wood along his southern
coastal borders to merchants or fishermen passing along the coast. 109 The act referred to
merchants aboard "any lawful vessel" practicing coastal shipping. This applied, no
doubt, to those merchants traveling north from Tortosa, apparently in large enough
numbers to attract the count's attention.

Conscious of this trade in Barcelona's

burgeoning commercial interests, Ramon Borrell, together with his wife and son's
regent Ermesinda, sought to encourage a relationship that was profitable to all involved.
The Catalans then, mindful of their own interests, sought to establish and maintain a
relationship with the new Saqaliba kingdoms in part through military support.
This policy continued throughout the eleventh century, contradicting the view in
traditional Catalan historiography of this period as a time of conquest and victory over
the Muslims. Bonnassie, in fact, has demonstrated the inaccuracy of this nationalist
myth, arguing that the counts Berenguer Ramon I and then Ramon Berenguer I practiced
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a policy of entente and stability with the frontier taifas. Motivated by the double profits
ofparias (tribute paid by taifas to the Christian kingdoms) and commerce, the Catalan
counts sometimes carried out this policy to the detriment of their own reputation and
authority.110 The counts of Barcelona exercised a veritable protectorate over the taifas
of Lerida and Tortosa in exchange for their regular tributary payments. When the taifa
of Zaragoza was divided in 1046, Barcelona supported Yusuf b. I:Iud al-Mu?,affar of
Lerida against his brother al-Muqtadir of Zaragoza. Likewise, when LabTo, Slav ruler of
Tortosa, faced rebellion due to his fiscal policies, he called on Barcelona for help against
his own subjects.111 Thus, instead of practicing a policy of bellicose expansionism, the
Catalans used their military power to extract parias from their Muslim neighbors, who
in turn benefited from Catalan protection. Barcelona maintained relatively peaceful
borders (although occasional skirmishes, raids and small conflicts continued), reaping
the benefits in the fonn of mancusos de aura through tribute and economic exchange.
The counts of Barcelona cultivated their border relations without necessarily seeking to
geographically expand their power, probably because the resultingparias and commerce
were more lucrative and less costly than any profits possible through conquest.
While this political entente characterized the Catalan borders, an even more
particular relationship evolved between the rulers of Barcelona and Denia. Indeed, there
seems to have been an exceptional level of dialogue between the two Mediterranean
ports, built both on their common interests and personal ties, and structured in part by
mutual threats. Denia was in fact beyond Barcelona's borderlands, perhaps too far for
110
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Catalan forces to easily demand regular payment ofparias. Nevertheless, although they
were separated by land, they were linked by maritime routes essential for the survival of
each. This perhaps explains why Barcelona and Denia developed the relationship that
we shall see below. Throughout the fifth/eleventh century, the rulers of both polities
held a common accord by maintaining a mutually comprehensible dialogue through both
violent and pacific means.

Piracy and Catalonia
While the counts of Barcelona organized expeditions to ensure the regular payment of
parias by their tributary neighbors, Mujahid built Denia into an infamous haven for

piracy and maritime violence.

The Tyrrhenian Sea, moreover, was not the only

theater of involvement for Denia's ships. "Cordovan Moors" raided Narbonne in
1018.112 Ademar of Chabannes notes that these Cordubenses Mauri did not speak
Arabic, but "in the manner of little dogs."113 Given this remark, and the use of the
term Mauri, the raiders were probably Berbers, members of the Ba(lriyyiin settled
along the Sharq al-Anda/us coast.114 Denia was not the only harbor for Ba(lriyyun
pirates, but direct action was taken against Mujahid only a few years later to cease
raids along the Catalan coast from his port.

112 Ademari Cabannensis chronicon, Corpus Christianorum, 129, ed. R. Landes and G. Pon
(Tumhout, 1999), I 71, c. 52.
113 "Loque/a eorum nequequam erat Sarracenisca, sed more catulorum loquentes:" Ademari
Cabannensis chronicon, 171, c. 52.
114
See P. Guichard, "Les debuts de la piraterie andalouse en Mediterranee occidentale (798-8 I 3),"
R.O. MM., 35.1 (1983): 55-76, for the use of mauri to denote Berber pirates.
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Sometime between 1018 and 1023, Roger of Tosney led a group of Normans
to the Spanish Mediterranean coast and expelled Muslim pirates menacing the
Catalan waters, a situation analogous to the Norman descent on Salemo two decades
earlier. Ademar of Chabannes, the sole complete chronicler of Roger's exploits,
places the Norman in the role of independent adventurer, arriving to save the Catalan
lands from infidel attacks.115 The account describes Roger splitting a captive Muslim
in half and roasting him on a spit, "like a pig." He offers one half to the rest of his
captives while pretending to eat the other half in an adjoining tent, before allowing a
captive to escape and spread the word among the Muslims. The ensuing terror leads
Mujahid (or "Museto"), to make peace with the countess Ermesinda, widow of
Ramon Borrell, and agree to pay an annual tribute. In return, the Catalan countess
offers the Norman the hand of her daughter Estefania in marriage. 116
The details of Ademar of Chabannes's account pose a few problems, but the
underlying facts seem based in reality. The feigned cannibalism is too common a
theme to be convincing (al-TurtfirshT writes of a similar episode, but with a Muslim
officer in Tosney's place), and a subsequent description of a victory over five
hundred Saracens by Tosney's group of forty is certainly exaggerated.117 Nineteenth
and even twentieth-century historians tended to focus on the pre-crusading aspects of
Ademar's account, while expressing reservations about its reliability.
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Runciman saw Cluniac maneuvermg behind Tosney's arrival, and Marcelin
Defoumeaux viewed him as prefiguring the French expedition against Barbastro. 118
Ademar's account, however, does appear based on facts.

Oderic Vitalis

referred to Tosney as "Hispanicus," and William of Jumieges briefly noted that he
killed many pagans in Spain. 119 The Chronicon Sancti Petri Vivi Senonensis also
describes Tosney's adventure, although it credits him with the conquest of and
fifteen-year reign over Gerona and Tarragona.120 This reign is implausible because,
among other reasons, the Book of Saint Foy places Tosney back in Normandy by
1027. 121 The account of Tosney's marriage with Estefania is also problematic, as it
appears in no other source concerning the Norman or his Catalan bride. However,
this diplomatic marriage between Ramon Borrell's orphaned daughter and a scion of
an upwardly mobile Norman family is certainly not impossible.122
Pierre Bonnassie wondered about the tribute that Mujahid paid for Tosney's
departure. He compared Tosney's band to other Norman adventurers roaming the
Mediterranean at the time. While claiming to fight the Saracens, these travelers spent

118

S. Runciman, A History of the Crusades, vol. I, The First Crusade and the Foundation of the
Kingdom of Jerusalem (Cambridge, 1953), 90; M. Defoumeaux, Les Franr;ais en Espagne aux XI" et
Xii" siecles (Paris, 1949), 129-31.
1 9
1 Oderic Yitalis, Historiae ecclesiasticae, libri tredecim, t. 2, ed. A. Le Prevost (Paris, 1840), 64;
William of Jumieges, Gesta normannorum ducum, ed. J. Marx (Paris, 1914), 157.
12
° Chronique de Saint-Pierre-le-Vif de Sens, dite de C/arius (Chronicon Sancti Petri Vivi
Senonensis) (Paris, 1979), 112.
121
Liber miraculorum sancte Fidis, ed. L. Robertini (Spoleto, 1994), 183-4. Tosney's disorderly
behavior does not seem to have been uniquely directed at pagans. Both the Liber miraculorum sancta
Fidis and the chronicle of Sens describe ambushes or attempted ambushes by his Christian enemies, in
one instance forcing him to leave Spain, and in the other preventing him from traveling to Conques.
122
Historians, moreover, do not agree on the veracity of this marriage. S. Sobreques and L. Musset
write doubtfully of it, while M. Aurell sees no reason to exclude it. S. Sobreqes Vidal, Els Grans
comtes de Barcelona (Barcelona, 1961), 39; L. Musset, "Aux origins," 53; M. Aurell, Les Noces du
comte. Mariage et pouvoir en Catalogne (785-1213) (Paris, 1995), 56.

just as much time perturbing local affairs.
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He thus proposed the possibility that

Mujahid could have paid tribute to Tosney through the countess Ermesinda,
purchasing the Norman's departure for everyone's benefit.

Ermesinda's role as

intermediary and a temporary or occasional tributary payment is certainly possible.
At any rate, Tosney was attracted to the Iberian Peninsula because of Mujahid's
privateering, who perhaps exacted tribute payments of his own, much like the Muslim
besiegers of Salemo who drew the first Normans to Southern Italy. 124
Tosney's activities not only illustrate the rambunctious behavior of early
medieval Normans, but also clearly shed light on Denia's campaigns along the
Catalan coast and maritime routes that linked Barcelona with the rest of the
Mediterranean.

While Tosney affronted numerous Saracens, Ademar specifically

mentions only Mujahid, or "Museto." During the period between 1018 and 1023,
Mujahid not only ruled over Denia and the Balearic Islands, but also cooperatively
over Valencia and Tortosa, sharing those two cities with his fellow Siqlabf, Labib. 125
In a position to dominate the eastern coast, Mujahid promoted economic development
through involvement in Mediterranean maritime markets, while using the major
Sharq al-Anda/us ports as bases for his corsair activities. He thus established for
himself a reputation of infamy that penetrated as far as Ademar's monastery of Saint
Cybard in Angouleme.
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Mujahid personally supervised this guerre de course from Denia, while also
naming as governors of the Balearic Islands men who would incessantly administer
his campaigns of "maritime jihad." 126 Thus, despite the conscious rapprochement
between the rulers of Barcelona and Denia, a parallel policy of economic and
religious violence developed.

Moreover, this policy did not stop when 'AIT b.

Mujahid took over the kingdom after his father's death in 436/1044. His nominee as
governor of the Balearic Islands, Mubashar Na$ir al-Dawla, continued to raid
Christian ports and ships even after the fall of Denia in 468/1076, until the joint fleets
of Pisa and Barcelona put an end to his activities in 1115. 127
Muslim piracy was prominent in the Western Mediterranean during the
eleventh century, and while Denia was not the sole practitioner, its ports certainly led
the way in campaigns against the Christian coasts. In 1041, countess Ermesinda and
her brother, Peter, bishop of Gerona, ceded fortifications near Benedorn1iens to the
monks of Saint Felix de Guixols so that they could protect the coast and the Aro
valley against Saracen attacks. 128 In 1069, the city of Elna, south of Perpignan, was
forced to move its church inland because of the frequent Muslim attacks launched
from Majorca. 129 Denia's corsairs and pirates did not exclude Catalan possessions
lbn Khaldun, Kitab al- 'ibar, 4:355.
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from their campaigns, but, paradoxically, this did not prevent parallel positive and
complementary relations.

Real dialogue, built on diplomatic and personal ties,

existed between Denia and Barcelona. Economic ambitions underlay this dialogue,
underwritten by gold.

Auro de Spania
The Catalan economy was transformed over the course of the eleventh century.
While this growth cannot be attributed to one single phenomenon, the influx of gold
from Muslim Spain fed much of the Catalan development in the first half of the
century. 130 Scholars studying the provenance of these mancusos have demonstrated
the Sudanese origins of gold minted under Umayyad authority, imported first by
Catalan mercenaries during the first few decades of the eleventh century and then
obtained by means of parias. 131 As P. Bonnassie explains, diplomatic sources are
often careful to specify which mancusos are used, sometimes allowing historians to
determine the origin and date of the coins exchanged. Thus, the bajibs Ja'far and
then al-Man�ur minted the mancosus iafaris and amuris that are first mentioned in the
quad fuit consilium reverendi Domini Berengarii bonae memoriae tune Elnensis Episcopi & sui
capituli & promorum hominum dictae civitatis quad dicta Ecclesia cathedralus mutarerunt in villa
superiori Elnensi." P. de Marca, Marca hispanica sive limes hispanicus (Paris, 1688) (reed.
Barcelona, 1998), col. I I 48, CCLXXII.
130 P. Bonnassie, La Catalogne, 372-9.
131 P. Bonnassie, La Cata/ogne, 376-8; J. Devisse, "La question d' Audagust," in Tegdaoust I.
Recherches sur Aoudaghost, ed. D. Robert, S. Robert, and J. Devisse (Paris, 1970), I 09-156; J.
Devisse, "Routes de commerce et echanges en Afrique occidentale en relation avec la Mediterranee.
Un essai sur le commerce africain medieval du Xl°-XV1° siecle," in Navegazioni mediterranee e
connessioni continenta/i (secoli XI XVI),
ed. R. Ragosta, (Naples, I 982), 169-244; M. Barcelo, "L'or
d'al-Andalus circulant als comtats Catalans entre 967 i 1100; un or vist i no vist?," in Symposium
numismatico de Barelona (Barcelona, 1979), 313-27; A. Balaguer, "Parias and myth of the mancus,"
Problems in Medieval Coinage in the Iberian Peninsula, 3, ed. M. Gomes Marques and D.M. Metcalf
(Santarem, 1988), 499-545.
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documents. These were in fact the dinars that Ramon Borrell and his fellow Catalans
brought back from Cordoba.

After the fall of the caliphate, caliphal monetary

production ceased, though it was sporadically replaced by a few taifal mints.132
During the fitna, only the ijammiidids, and to a lesser extent the TujTbids of
Zaragoza, issued dinars. These coins appear in Catalan sources as mancusos ceptinos
(Sebta or Ceuta), and mancusos almanzoris (Mundhir al-Man�iir of Zaragoza). These
account for the majority of the names in the texts beyond the general mancusos de
oro cocto, or even aura de Span;a. On a few occasions, however, the texts deviate
from this standard, and indicate other paths taken by the gold from African mines to
Catalan coffers.
While the mercenary interventions of 1010, 1013 and 1017 flooded Catalonia
with mancusos iafaris and amuris, the expedition of 1024 introduced another source
of gold. The only explicit trace of this expedition in the sources is found in the will
of a certain Seniofredo, who died of wounds received while he was "in expedicionem
in lspanie partes contra sarracenos." 133 Seniofredo was not the only one to suffer
during this expedition, as his testament also mentions a captive, Guilelmo, who was
to inherit from the deceased if he ever came back. The deceased's testament specifies
that he had been in al-Andalus on an expedition against the Saracens, and was most
likely paid for his services.

In fact, a few months after the publication of

Seniofredo's will at San Cugat, a document from the same monastery specifies the
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payment of an ounce of Valencian gold. The quantity of Valencian gold necessary

for it to become a trading currency in the first quarter of the eleventh century could
only have been imported through mercenary payments.
Bonnassie hesitated in naming this expedition alongside the others, probably
because it left no trace in the narrative sources. In fact, there is no mention in the
Latin and Arabic sources of a specific conflict in the Sharq al-Anda/us that would
have necessitated the services of Catalan mercenaries. Conflicts further afield could
have attracted the mercenaries' attention, and Seniofredo's expedition could have
been directed against often-targeted Zaragoza. However, the mention so soon after
the expedition of this uncia auri Valencie seems to indicate a link between the two 134.
Although the link is tenuous, it is possible to tie this money to the tribute paid
by Mujahid in exchange for Roger of Tosney's departure during the same period.
Tosney's marriage to Ramon Borrell's daughter indicates that he probably stayed in
the region for some time. If Tosney was indeed tied to the house of the counts of
Barcelona, Catalan mercenaries and soldiers could very well have participated in his
expeditions, and helped to assure the payment of tribute until Tosney's departure for
this native lands.
The document, however, specifically mentions Valencian gold, and not gold
from Denia. Nevertheless, it is difficult to know what exactly is intended in the text,
since the taifa of Valencia minted neither gold nor silver at this time. Indeed, with the
exception of the I:Iammudids and TujTbids, monetary production ceased with the fitna,
134
S. Sobreques does cite this expedition as proof of conflict between Barcelona and Zaragoza: S.
Sobreques, El Grans comtes, 43.
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and did not return to Valencia until 422/1030-1.

135

In 1024, there were no gold coins

being minted in Valencia, and Valencian gold does not appear in Latin sources until
the 1060s. 136 The document in question does not specify the gold's mint, but rather
its provenance, just as other documents simply state aura de Spania. Because of
fluctuating borders and the oftentimes communitarian sovereignty exercised by the
$aqaliba over their territories, distinctions between each of the Sharq al-Anda/us
taifas were not clear in the early days of the fltna. 137 Muslim geographers were
unclear as to whether Denia belonged in the districts of TudmTr or Valencia, and
Mujahid did indeed work to link his city with the ports of Tortosa and Valencia. 138 It
is understandable, then, that Catalan scribes would have considered that the tribute
paid came from Valencia instead of the taifa of Denia, a kingdom they barely knew
and which often included Valencia in one way or another.
This is indeed a bit conjectural, but it would not be the only time that money
from Denia made its way to Catalonia. Two dirhams minted under 'Alf in 447/10567 were discovered in a coin hoard near Barcelona, alongside pieces from three other
taifas. 139 Denia dinars are also mentioned in a document dating from the 1040s.
Descriptions of payment in dinars usually specify only "pieces of gold from Spain,"
5
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T. Ibrahim, "Adiciones a la numismatica de los taifas <lei Sarq al-Anda/us (404-478/1013-1085),"
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Ramon Berenguer I, vol. 3 (Barcelona, 1999), doc. 630, p. 1138.
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Historia de Espana Menendez Pidal, t. VIII-I, ed. M. J. Yiguera Molins (Madrid, 1994), 59.
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or perhaps mancusos amurinos et iafarinos et cetinos.

140

230
While the specification of

other mints remains uncommon, Denia is the only taifa, besides Zaragoza, whose
money appears in a document before the second half of the century.
Denian gold appears only once in the sources: towards the middle of the
century a piece of land in the county of Urgel was sold for the price of five ounces of
auro denesco. 141 The act does not specify the date, but does mention the initial sale
of the allodium by either the count Annengol III or his mother and regent, Constance.
The sale probably took place then before the middle of the century, since the young
count, who was born in 1032, must have assumed his full powers before then. The
document describes the payment as concluded, so we can assume that Denian gold
really was used for the transaction, and not just as an abstract value.
Denia produced a small very amount of gold coins, minute when compared to
the taifas of Ceuta, Zaragoza, or even Valencia. In fact, there was a total hiatus in
coin production between the beginning of Mujahid's reign, represented by the
specimens from Aluta between 401/ l 011 and 406/ 1016, and the last two years before
his death. 142 Mujahid returned to coin production in 435/1043-4, in order to associate
the names of his two sons, 'Alt and Hassan, with this legitimizing privilege. In fact,
Mujahid chose to mint not only dirhams, but also a comparatively large quantity of

J.M. Salrach, El pergamins, doc. 312; Col.lecio diplomatica de la seu de Girona (817-1100), ed.
R. Marti (Barcelona, 1997), doc. 242, p. 251.
141
J. Soler Garcia, "El Cartulario de Tavemoles," Boletin de la Sociedad Castellonense de Cultura,
37 (1961): doc. 24, pp. 71-2.
142
A. Prieto y Vives, Los Reyes, 181, 192.
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dinars, as a way to underscore the legitimacy of his successors.
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'AlT succeeded his

father in 436/1044, but did not mint dinars until 443/1051-2. If this aura denesca was
indeed dinars from Denia, they must have been from Mujahid's 435/1043-44
em1ss1ons.
This Denian gold could have found its way to Catalonia through trade.
Despite the conflicts that existed between the Christian kingdoms and the Muslim
taifas, the frontier between the two worlds was not hermetic and did not prevent
commercial and constructive exchange. 144 Both road and maritime networks linked
Denia and Barcelona, and Denia's port may well have served as a transit point for
Sudanese gold on its way north. However, it is also possible that this aura denesca
served as a diplomatic tool at a time of weakness for Mujahid's court.
The last years of Mujahid's reign were marked by a relative calm in his
relations with the surrounding taifas. Taifa relations, nevertheless, were never stable,
and a dynastic succession was rarely without contention, contestation, and perhaps
opportunistic intervention. 145 The imminent succession could have been the occasion
for a diplomatic tributary payment, symbolically made with coins carrying his sons'
names. This would have helped to ensure Catalan benevolence after the father's
death.
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Diplomacy and personal ties
Denia's gold created ties with Barcelona's court, but this same court also maintained
relations with others taifas, and built alliances with Lerida and Tortosa in part through
their parias payments. 146 Denia's gold alone does not seem to indicate a particular
relationship between Barcelona and Denia. On three occasions, however, sources
reveal a dialogue between the two states characterized by both violence and mutual
benevolence.
Besides the maritime raids discussed above, Denia's ships campaigned
beyond the Catalan coasts. The French monastery of Lerins was the victim of a
Saracen attack, in 1046, when pirates from the Sharq al-Anda/us raided the
monastery. 147 The abbot Aldebert I was killed and many of the monks were carried
off as human booty to be sold in the slave markets of Tortosa and Denia. The
hagiography of Isamo, abbot of Saint-Victor in Marseilles describes the attack and
the eventual rescue of the unfortunate monks. The survivors from Lerins sent the
saintly monk to Spain to buy back their brothers, hoping that the Iberian properties of
Saint-Victor and the abbot's personal ties would help the mission. Isamo gained an
audience at the Barcelona court where he pleaded his cause before the count Ramon
Berenguer I, the count's first wife Elizabeth, and his advisor Gombal of Besora. The
count and his court were moved by Isamo's words (and probably by the political and
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economic interests that he represented) and offered to help him in his efforts to
liberate the captives.
Barcelona's involvement sheds light on its relations with the taifas of the
Sharq al-Anda/us. The Catalan court sent two groups of envoys accompanied by
Isamo, one to Tortosa and the other to Denia. The writer specifies that Ramon
Berenguer and his wife sent legates to Denia, while Gombal de Besora sent agents to
Tortosa. 148

In each case, the negotiations were successful and the monks were

liberated, but the author's details concerning the two missions are at times
problematic. Isamo is specifically mentioned as having accompanied both missions,
although it is hard to understand why two different groups of legates would have been
necessary. The author expressly mentions negotiations with 'Alf b. Mujahid, or
"Ala"io," but simply names the ruler of Tortosa as "Agalifo", clearly a variation of
caliph. Tortosa's line of taifa rulers is not the easiest to establish, but there was
certainly no caliph there at the time. It is unclear, then, whether there really were two
missions, or whether we should assume some confusion on the part of the
hagiographer.

Nevertheless, the importance accorded Isamo's mission by the

Barcelonan court is certain, as 1s the personal involvement of its rulers in their
relations with the taifas.
Gombal of Besora was one of the key figures in the courts of Ramon Borrell,
Berenguer Ramon I and the regency of the countess Ermesinda. 149 Gombal was one
of the countess's most trusted advisors, and his participation in the story implies her
148
149
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i
own_ s Ermesinda maintained amicable relations with the taifa kingdoms, and her
first regency during Berenguer Ramon I's minority coincided not only with the 1017
Catalan mercenary expedition to Granada, but perhaps also with the intervention in
Tortosa on Labib's behalf. Ermesinda owned a signet ring with her name in Latin
and Arabic characters, which was most likely used in diplomatic correspondence with
her Muslim counterparts.1s1 Ermesinda participated in the monks' liberation through
Gombal, using the contacts that she had built over time, and demonstrating the
influence she held beyond the borders of Christendom.
The hagiographical account, however, centers on Denia and gives the
impression that the prisoners and the bulk of the negotiations were held there. The
Barcelonan legates were accompanied by Isarno, who easily recognized the
unfortunate monks from Lerins. Ramon Berenguer's representatives informed 'AlT
that if the monks were not freed, the count would break the peace that existed
between them and declare war on land and on sea.1s2 'AlT yielded before the count's
threats, and turned the monks over to their colleague.
If the hagiographer's account is correct, including the treaty referred to by the
count's envoys, this accord fits with the pattern of alliances maintained by Barcelona,
and perhaps ties in with the dinars discussed above. The counts of Barcelona were
careful to maintain a policy of peace on their borders, using the parias as a diplomatic
tool and security in their relations. When considered with the Denian dinars spent in
150
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Urge] during the same time period, this would seem to follow the same pattern. Even
if Denia was not regularly solicited as a tributary state, as its absence from lists of
taifas paying parias would seem to indicate, this incident involving the monks from
Lerins along with the Denian dinars demonstrates that there was a negotiated peace
between the two states expressed at least in part through a tributary payment. 153
Furthermore, it should also be noted that the point of dissention in this case was not
situated along the classic Muslim-Christian religious boundary, but rather involved
diplomatic agreements that the count was willing to risk for reasons probably tied to
the political and economic influence of the Saint-Victor monastery.
Ramon Berenguer was not the only ruler involved in this diplomatic dialogue.
'AlT b. Mujahid, ruler of Denia since his father's death in 436/1044, also sought to
maintain the profitable peace that existed between the two states.

Ibn Bassam

remarked that 'Alt paid more attention to commerce than he did to fortifications, and
that his love of dinars and dirhams brought about the fall of his state. 154 It is not very
surprising, then, to see that he preferred to liberate the captured monks rather than
risk a war that would only have hurt his commercial activities and reduced the taxes
he could collect on the commerce of others.
Mujahid was quite conscious of the commercial networks that linked the
various ports of the Western Mediterranean, and he directed much of his energy to
exploiting their possibilities. Nevertheless, his son and successor, 'Alt b. Mujahid,
153

Note for example that an agreement signed with the count of Cerdagne in 1058 explicitly names
Zaragoza, Lerida and Tortosa as tributary states, but does not mention Denia: Els pergamins, vol. 2,
doc. 30, pp. 974-6.
154
lbn Bassam, al-DhakhTra, 4: 184.

236

must have sensed even more the interconnectivity of the Mediterranean and its

common commercial culture. 'An was most likely even less reticent than his father
to deal with the Christians, having been raised among and as one of them during his
Pisan captivity.

'An could have become familiar with members of the Western

Mediterranean mercantile population during his years in the Albizone household, and
he would have at least witnessed Pisan commercial relations with the ijammadids of
the Central Maghreb. In addition, he traveled shortly after his liberation to the ZirTd
court in IfrTqiya, one of the most important centers for Christian-Muslim trade in the
Mediterranean. 155 'An, then, must have taken this incident as seriously as did the
Catalans. The profits from a few slaves was nothing compared to the risks he ran in
his relations with the growing market to the north - not to mention the simple threat
of military action. 'An sought to protect a relationship that was even closer than one
simply bonded through parias, one that went beyond the limits of a simple tributary
pact. This personal relationship between the courts of Denia and Barcelona becomes
even more evident in the light of two documents: the first is a letter from 'An to the
countess Almodis, and the second a treaty signed between the two states concerning
Denia' s Christian subjects.
The first document is unfortunately only the fragmentary preamble of a letter
from 'An b. Mujahid to the countess Almodis, third wife of Ramon Berenguer I. 156
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H.R. Idris, La Berberie orientate sous !es ZirTdes (X"-Xlf siecles) (Paris, 1962), v. I, 176; lbn al
Abbar, Kitab al-takrnila li-kitab al-!iila, ed. A. Bel et M. b. Cheneb (Alger, 1920), no. 121, p. 52.
156
ACA, Cancelleria, pergs. Ramon Berenguer I, n. 182 dors (Els pergamins, v. 2, doc. 776, pp.
1325-6). The text reads as follows: Regina preclara vel gloriosa, dornna Ada/mus, honorificet earn
Deus suus. Arnicus fide/is, Gali, pro/is Mugehid.

237
The document is not dated, but must be from between 1052, the year of Ramon
Berenguer's and Almodis' marriage, and 1056, the date of a convenen9a written on
the back of the letter. 157 The letter was written in a pseudo-Visigothic hand and
translated from Arabic to Latin by a Mozarabic scribe working in the Denian court. 158
Although it is only a scrap of the original, the fragment points to a personal and even
familiar relationship between the two courts. 'AlT warmly addresses the countess, and
does not forget to send his regards to the count. It is obvious by the letter's language
and tone that their acquaintance was, at least to some degree, personal as well as
diplomatic. 'AlT, then, built personal ties with the Barcelonan court, probably initially
under his father, and then on his own as ruler.
'AlT was not, however, the instigator of this particular epistolary exchange, as
the document mentions an earlier letter sent by the countess. Almodis confided the
delicate mission of diplomatic courier to Bernard Amat, a faithful associate of the
court.

Amat unswervingly supported the count and countess and was active in

executing certain aspects of their policies. This correspondence, then, must have
concerned matters more important than the preamble seems to indicate.

It is

In Dei nomine et eius gratie. Prolonget Deus, o regina preclara vel gloriosa, tuam salvationem et
prate/et tuam iucumditatem adque retineat vet salbet te. Comex excellentissimus meus amicus vel
gratus, honor/fleet eum Deus. Pervenit ad me, o regina gloriosa, tuam paginam preclaram cum
Bernardo Amato, tuo ji.dele, salbet eum Deus et sten cum illis super tua amicitate vel dilectione in me,
vel tua sinceritate ad me, et tua loquutione obtima de me, et Deus scit quad sum ad te in duplo de hoc
quad mici diligis, vet in tua sinceritate quad ad me relines, vel est Deus super me test!ficator quad a
secolo tuam karitatem in anime mee vel custodio ac rego tuam in corde meo sodalitatem, et tibi gratias
multimodas refero pro confirmatione mea amicitate contra comite magno conserve! eum Deus de celo,
et iarn audibi, o regina gloriosa, tuam laudantiam me adque obtima tua dictione in me, et ego
retribuam tibi super illud cum plu ...
157
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impossible to know the exact contents of the damaged letter, but it is interesting to
note the circumstances surrounding it.
Ramon Berenguer I was in the midst of suppressing two rebellions, and his
control over the Catalan lands was extremely tenuous.159 The count's grandmother,
Ermesinda, was in open rebellion. She had taken advantage of his offhand dismissal
of his second wife, Blanca, in favor of Almodis, to usurp the young count's rights in
her own fief of Gerona and to mount a coalition of the older Catalan nobility against
her grandson. Mir Geribert, "prince of Olerdola," was leading an insurrection of
Catalan nobles who were disgruntled by a court with too many pretensions and whose
policies of appeasement with the Muslim south prevented them from practicing as
feudal warriors.160 Mir Geribert knew that the parias were a fundamental part of
Ramon Berenguer I's power base, and so sought to spread his insurrection by
convincing Barcelona's tributaries to break off their payments. It is no accident that
the royal archives show a substantial growth in fidelity oaths in these years, as the
count and countess attempted to shore up their positions vis-a-vis Mir Geribert and
Ermesinda.
'AlT's letter to Almodis takes on greater significance in this context. Bernard
Amat's role as courier shows that the letters exchanged were politically significant,
and not just personal correspondence. Perhaps the countess sought assurances from
'AlT, like those she had received from her own nobility through their oaths of fidelity.
Almodis, perhaps, was worried about a possible taifal movement taking advantage of
159
160
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the divisions within the Catalan ranks. If such was the case, 'AlT's response was
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certainly reassuring, and this fragment was probably part of a reiteration of the
diplomatic and personal relations that bound the courts of Denia and Barcelona.
If this letter were the only tangible example of the relations between the two
states it would be difficult to situate it within the larger scheme of the intercultural
political dialogue they maintained. However, when considered alongside the second
document mentioned above, it becomes evident that the taifa's rulers actively worked
to build a mutually beneficial relationship with the counts of Barcelona.

The I 058 treaty between Denia and Barcelona
In November of 1058, Ramon Berenguer I, count of Barcelona, along with
Guislabert, bishop of Barcelona, consecrated the city's newly constructed cathedral,
Santa Eulalia. The dedicatory document confirms Barcelona's episcopal limits, and
includes the dioceses of Denia, the Balearic Islands and Orihuela. 161 It furthermore
explains that this exclusive authority was granted to the Bishop of Barcelona in a
treaty signed with Mujahid and then renewed by his son, 'Al'i. A month later, on

J. Baucells i Reig, A. Fabrega i Grau, M. Riu i Riu, J. Hernando i Delgado, C. Batlle i Gallart,
Diplomatari de l'Arxiu Capitular de la Catedral de Barcelona. Segle XI (Barcelona, 2006), v. 3, doc.
973, pp. 1544-1550. The section concerning Denia reads as follows: Preterea nos supra dicti omnes,
excomunicando sub anathematis interdictione, confirmamus Mayorcas et Minorcas insulas Baleares et
episcopatum civitatis Denie et episcopatum civitatis Orioleaf et earum ecclesias omnes et quantum
pertinet ad clericatus ordines,ut omnes episcopi, presbiteri et diachoni aliique clerici, in prelibatis
insulis et in prefatis locis commorantes, a minima usque ad maximum et a puero usque ad senem, ab
hodierno die et deinceps minime conentur deposcere ab alio aliquo pontiflcum u/lius ordinationem
clericatus neque crismatis sacre confessionem neque aliquem cu/tum u/lius clericatus nisi ab episcopo
barchinonensi, aut ab illo cui ipse preceperit sive permiserit, sicut ilia scriptura testatur quam inde
Muiehid et filius eius Aly, hismaeliteal quondam, fecerunt et Guilaberto episcopo barchinonensi
dederunt et tradiderunt.
161
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December 26 \ the bishop ratified the renewed treaty, which was signed by 'AlI, and

which granted these rights to the episcopal see.162 The treaty demonstrates how
religion could be used as a political and diplomatic tool. It also testifies to the
persistent existence of Christians within the Muslim kingdom of Denia. 'AlI was
offering a piece of legitimizing propaganda to the Catalan court, which had only
recently managed to quell two rebellions. He was also consolidating connections that
could only improve his economic interests.
162
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ecclesias et episcopatum prefatanim insularum et predicte urbis Denie iuri et diocesi sancte sedis
barchinonensis, eodem videlicet modo quo genitor suus Mugehid precatu prenominati pontificis
impertivit universa hec sedi pre/acute. lnpertitionis autem predictantm ecclesiarum et episcopatus
earumdem istoria digna cognitu ita se habet:
In Dei omnipotentis nomine. Ego Ali dux urbis Denie et insularum Balearum, Mugehid iam dicte
urbis olim ducis proles,assensu filiorum meorum et ceterorum ismaelitantm in meo palatio maiorum,
contrado atque largior Sedi Sancte Crucis Sancteque Eulalie barchinonensi et predicto presuli omnes
ecclesias et episcopatum regni mei, que sun! in insulis Balearibus et in urbe Denia, in perpetim
abinceps maneant sub diocesi predicte urbis barchinonensis et ut omnes clerici, presbiteri et diachoni,
in locis prefatis comorantes, a minima usque ad maximum, a puero usque ad senem, ab odierno die et
tempore minime conentur deposcere ab aliquo pontificum ullius ordinationem clericatus,neque
crismatis sacri confectionem, neque cultum aliquem ullius clericatus nisi ab episcopo barchinonensi
aut ab ipso cui ille preceperit. Si aliquis, quad absit, hoc largitionis donum improbo nisu anullare vel
disrumpere conatus fuerit, celestis regis iram incurrat et ab omni lege penitus exors fiat. Et
postmodum hoc maneat indiscussum atque firmum omne per evum. Facta carta donationis VII
kalendas ianuarii, anno prescripto apud urbem Deniam, iussu Ali et assensu filiorum suorum
maiorumque suonim inferius corroboratorum.
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This treaty is the only one of its kind of which we are aware for the Iberian
Peninsula.

It goes well beyond the limits of a uniquely political treaty. In the

agreement, which was signed by 'AlT and other dignitaries from his court and by the
bishop of Barcelona, Guislabert, and other Christian authorities, 'AlT grants the
Barcelonan see exclusive spiritual jurisdiction over the Christians "of the Balearic
Islands and the city ofDenia." In exchange, the Christians ofDenia were to mention
'Al'i's name in their churches during the khutba, or weekly sermon. Unfortunately,
the original document is not extant, but it does exist in two copies, one in the archives
ofthe Barcelona cathedral, the other in the Vatican archives. Both copies were made
in the thirteenth century in response to a dispute between the bishops of Barcelona
and Tortosa over diocesan authority in the Balearic Islands. 163 The treaty consists of
a Latin text, followed by another in Arabic, with a Latin gloss added for the Vatican
judges. The Arabic text was written in shawwal 449, November/December 1058,
about a month before the ratification in Barcelona on December 26 t\ and probably in
preparation for the cathedral's consecration.
Although each section claims to mirror the other, the Latin and Arabic texts
are not identical, and in fact treat completely different aspects ofthe agreement. They
are, however, complementary enough to establish the treaty's basic content. The
Latin text explains that 'AlT had given exclusive rights in ecclesiastical matters in his
territories to the Barcelonan see, but makes no mention of 'AlT's stipulations.
Similarly, the Arabic explains only that the Bishop Guislabert had agreed to have
163

The document in the Barcelonan archives was copied by the same scribe, Peter of Sages, who
copied on the same occasion the consecratory act for the cathedral.
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'Ali's name proclaimed from the pulpits of the Christian churches and cathedrals of
the taifa of Denia. These discrepancies and the dubious circumstances surrounding
the copies have caused researchers to call the treaty a forgery, a thirteenth-century
invention meant to sway papal judges. 164 The differences between the two texts,
though, are not grounds for dismissing the entire document. The Latin and Arabic
texts in bilingual treaties were habitually dissimilar. The thirteenth-century bilingual
treaty between the Valencian Muslim lord al-Azraq and Prince Alfonso of Aragon
presents two different texts, each with a distinct vision of the agreements surrounding
the treaty. 165 The differences present in the 1058 treaty are similar, with each side
providing the details essential to its interests. In fact, according to John Wansbrough,
discrepancies in bilingual treaties most likely simply reflect "a degree of informality
in the drafting of[ ...] international treaties." 166
Although the Latin text was probably modified - or perhaps even completely
rewritten - in order to better plead Barcelona's case, it is not completely devoid of
authenticity. Discrepancies between the Barcelona and Vatican copies are minimal
and inconsequential. A search of the recently published cathedral archives reveals
that all but one of the treaty's witnesses also signed other documents. Excluding
those who only also signed the cathedral's consecratory act, which is perhaps suspect
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M. Barcelo, "La qiiesti6 dels documents d'un suposat acord entre 'Ali b. Mujiihid i el bisbe
Guislabert de Barcelona," Revista de! Jnstituto de £studios Alicantinos, 39-2 (1983): 7. Barcelo
publishes at the end of his article photographs of both versions of the treaty, and also provides the
Latin and Arabic texts.
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for having been copied on the same occasion, seven of the witnesses can be found
elsewhere. 167
Maria Jesus Rubiera Mata was able to add to Juan Ribera's list of verifiable
witnesses from the Arabic text: among the witnesses were Mul).ammad Mu'iz al
Dawla and Mujahid Siraj al-Dawla, two of 'Alf's sons, and Mul).ammad b. Muslim
and Abu al-A.$bagh b. Arqam, a minister and a secretary from Denia's court. 168 Two
of Mujahid's clients, 'Alam and Salama, also signed the treaty. A dishonest scribe
may have borrowed the Latin signatures from other documents at his disposal in the
cathedral archives, but it is hard to imagine a similar falsification for the Arabic
signatories.
While the copies of the Latin text are acceptably similar, the Arabic copies
present some variations that indicate slight alterations, or at least interpretations, at
the time of their transcription. Some of the witnesses' names differ between the two,
though this seems to be the result of misreading or carelessness on the part of the
scribes who, especially for the Vatican copy, do not seem to have mastered Arabic.
The Barcelona version states that "Guislabert, the bishop of Barcelona" has agreed to
the terms of the treaty, while the Vatican version reads more generally, "majlis of the
bishop of Barcelona," a direct translation of sedes. Moreover, while the Barcelona
text simply states that the Arabic repeats "the above writing", i.e. the Latin text, the
Vatican version specifies that the preceding writing was '"ajamz', or not in Arabic.

167 J
. Baucells i Reig, Diplomatari, docs. 364, 498, 595, 735, 873, 988, I 007, 1008, 1034, 1183,
1559, 1584, 1648, 1682.
168
M. J. Rubiera Mata, La taifa de Denia, 104.
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These differences are not contradictory, and in fact seem to confirm the existence of
an original document from which they were copied, one whose details were either
glossed over or modified at different points in the two texts. There thus seems to be a
core element of authenticity for these versions of the treaty, and by comparing the
Arabic and Latin versions, it is possible to reconstruct the essential elements of the
original agreement.
Critics have, however, questioned the treaty's veracity based on the supposed
absence of Christians from fifth/eleventh-century Denia. Richard Bulliet's study of
Islamic conversion rates argued that the majority of the population in fifth/eleventh
century al-Andalus was Muslim, albeit with a substantial Christian minority.169
Bulliet's study, however, glosses over regional differences, lumping centers such as
Cordoba, with its own Episcopal see, with outlying regions devoid of documented
church structures. This breakdown in regional ecclesiastical representation is in fact
the basis for Mikel de Epalza's theory concerning the complete absence of Mozarabs
in the Sharq al-Anda/us. Perhaps the most extreme in this debate, Epalza bases this
rupture in the local Christian community on the absence of bishops, since Christians
must be baptized by priests who in tum must be anointed by bishops. The Christian
community thus would have disappeared within a few generations, well before the
1058 treaty. Epalza, however, as well as his colleague at the University of Alicante,
Rubiera Mata, supports the document's authenticity, labeling Barcelona's newly

169

R. Bulliet, Conversion to Islam in the medieval period: an essay in quantitative history (Harvard,
1979), 124.
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acquired parishioners as "neo-Mozarabs": slaves, soldiers, merchants, and travelers
who were not descendants of the Christians conquered earlier. 170
Epalza's theory, however, seems to oversimplify the transmission of Hispano
Christian culture. Given the treaty itself, as well as other evidence, it seems more
likely that the taifa of Denia supported a real and permanent, though perhaps minor,
Christian community. The geographer al-'Udhr1 refers to the southern regions of the
taifa as the land of the muwallacffn, or neo-Muslims, underlining the recent adoption
of Islam in those areas. Furthermore, the Balearic Islands had only been brought
under effective Muslim authority at the beginning of the tenth century, hardly enough
time to have converted the entire population, especially given the fact that the islands
were treated as a peripheral zone by the central Cordovan govemment. 171 Pierre
Guichard cited Maria de! Carmen Barcelo Torres's study of religious minorities in
post-Reconquista Valencia in order to argue for the "reasonable and prudent position"
that indigenous Christian communities still existed at the end of the fifth/eleventh
century, though perhaps without an ecclesiastical framework. 172
Moreover, members of Denia's Christian community under 'AH's reign were
educated and even literate in Latin. When riots forced dhimmz administrators from
Granada in I 066, the Christian katib Abu al-Rabt' fled to Denia, where he stayed
170

M. de Epalza, "Falta de obispos y conversion al Islam de los cristianos de Al-Andalus," Al
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until he was recalled a few years later.173 The letter fragment from 'An to Almodis
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was written in a Visigothic script that was clearly not the work of a northern-Christian
hand. The Denian court, then, must have employed Mozarabic scribes. Denia was
thus home to a Christian community, composed both of indigenous elements and
immigrants from other regions of al-Andalus, and augmented by "neo-Mozarabs."
Thus, while there are obviously discrepancies in the extant documents, the treaty's
overall integrity is clear, and testifies to the presence of a Christian community in
Denia, as well as to the relations that existed between Denia and Barcelona.
The Latin gloss explains that the document in question was a renewal of an
earlier treaty signed with 'Ali's father, Mujahid, who had confided spiritual authority
over the Christians of the Balearic Islands to the Barcelonan see after a personal
intervention by Guislabert. 'An then enlarged the area concerned to also include the
city of Denia. Thus, if we accept Guislabert's intervention, Mujahid would have
signed an agreement with Barcelona sometime after 1034, when Guislabert became
that city's bishop, perhaps in exchange for Barcelonan aide during one of his many
conflicts with Valencia. The treaty may also have been arranged in conjunction with
the tributary payment discussed above. This renewal is not mentioned in the Arabic
text, but it would have been in Barcelona's best interests to backdate its influence in
the region as much as possible, and to explain the process by which it had gained
these rights. The Muslims, however, may not have deemed this information pertinent
enough to include.
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Conversely, while the Arabic stipulates that'Ali's name was to be pronounced
and honored from all the Christian pulpits in his kingdom, the Latin text is devoid of
any reference to this. This would have been essential for 'Ali, as the weekly prayer in
the name of the ruler was a key method of legitimacy propaganda.

The text

specifically uses the word "khutba," making 'Ali's intentions even more evident.
Denia's Christian subjects would have been quite familiar with basic Muslim political
and religious protocol, and would have understood the significance of this stipulation.
Proclaiming 'Ali's name from the church pulpits would have made it clear to the
Christians that, while their souls belonged to Barcelona, the rest belonged to Denia.
'Ali could thus be sure that he would not be sacrificing any of his sovereignty through
this treaty, and that his temporal authority would be acknowledged by his Muslim and
Christian subjects alike. On the other hand, it is not surprising that the Latin text
would omit this.

Explicitly acknowledging Denian political power over the

Christians would have been counterproductive for Barcelona's case before the
Vatican judges. It would be easy to understand, even had it been included in the
original, that such a precision might have been misplaced somewhere between
Barcelona and Rome.
Although at first glance the treaty may seem based on an unequal relationship,
with 'Ali making concessions to the Catalan court, both sides profited. The two
dirhams minted by 'Ali in 448/1056-7 and discovered near Barcelona may indicate a
tributary payment in conjunction with the treaty.

However, an accord signed in

November 1058, in which Ramon Guifre, count of Cerdania, promises aide to Ramon
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Berenguer in obtaining parias, specifically mentions Zaragoza, Lerida and Tortosa,
but not Denia. Closer examination of both the Arabic and Latin versions of the
treaty, in fact, shows that there were clearly benefits for both sides. One such gain for
both parties was in the area of legitimacy. At the beginning of 1058, when the treaty
was signed, Ramon Berenguer I had only recently quelled open rebellions within his
lands. Since the treaty was in fact a renewal of a previous agreement signed by 'AH's
father, it is possible that Ramon Berenguer I may have solicited the renewal to
cement claims to legitimacy through his actions to protect Christians under Muslim
rule. It may even be possible that 'AH's letter to Almodis was part of the negotiations
concerning this matter. Moreover, the dedication of Santa Eulalia, the cathedral of
Barcelona, included the terms of the treaty.

This clearly linked Berenguer's

patronage of the cathedral with his success over the Muslim kingdoms to the south,
thus again bolstering his spiritual and political legitimacy. Beyond the gains in souls,
then, it is clear that Ramon Berenguer I stood to benefit from what was the product of
personal relations with the rulers of Denia.
'AH's gains are perhaps less clear at first. Nevertheless, while the Denian
ruler indeed conceded immediate spiritual authority over his Christian subjects to the
see of Barcelona, he did not undermine his own political power.

In fact, by

specifying that his name be proclaimed as part of the weekly service, 'AH was
actually directly involving the Christian church in the legitimation of his rule.
Indeed, in the same way that the mention of the ruler's name in the weekly khutba
prayer lent him the spiritual authority necessary to rule as a regional successor to the
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fallen caliphate of Cordoba, the terms of the treaty would ostensibly legitimize his
rule in the eyes of his Christian subjects. 174
Furthermore, by establishing an official structure around the Christian dhimmf
community, 'AII was comparing his rule to the erstwhile caliphate, which had
maintained an ecclesiastical hierarchy for its Christian subjects. In fact, 'AII's desire
to maintain the dhimmf communities under his rule is underlined by an equally
important Jewish community. The Sefer ha-Qabbalah mentions a respected Jewish
rabbi from Denia, whose replacement, sent from Barcelona, himself became an
authority among AndalusI rabbis. 175 Indeed, like the caliphs of Cordoba, 'AII gained
the notoriety that came with a dhimmf community under his own rule. In addition,
providing that community with a functioning structure would have made the
collection of the jizya tax on non-Muslims more efficient and perhaps more lucrative,
no small factor for a ruler often accused by his contemporaries of overly concerning
himself with monetary matters.
Lastly, the two cities were also ensunng smoother commercial relations
between their ports. Denia did have an indigenous Christian community, but its port
must also have welcomed a good number of merchants, mercenaries and other non
Muslims. lbn Sida wrote that in Denia, he was surrounded by people who did not
speak Arabic. 176 This is often assumed to mean Saqiiliba and slaves, but is it not
174
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possible that he also meant foreign merchants who came to do business with Denia's
Muslims? It was in the interests of both sides of this treaty to be sure that there was
an official structure to watch over these foreigners. Barcelona could thus be sure of
the spiritual well-being of its subjects during their time in this Muslim taifa, and knew
that the treaty offered them recognition in the eyes of the Muslim court.

An

ecclesiastical structure could also have provided a spiritual and social service, easing
communications among resident and non-resident Christian merchants and with the
state. Mediterranean maritime commerce profited from a certain level of tolerance
during the fifth/eleventh century, especially among the ports of the Sharq al-Anda/us.
The recognition offered by this treaty, however, would help ensure that merchants
perceived Denia as particularly welcoming, and this could only help to promote
commercial activities and fiscal abundance.
The treaty takes on more meaning when placed in the contemporary Iberian
context.

Barcelona may have negotiated the agreement as part of its campaign

against AJ:imad b. Sulayman b. Hud al-Muqtadir of Zaragoza. In September 1058,
Ramon Berenguer I and the countess Almodis cemented an alliance with Ermengol
III of Urgel to strike against Alhagid, ducem Cesaraugusta. 177 In addition, the Sharq
al-Anda/us was becoming a zone of conflict for Zaragoza and Barcelona. Zaragoza
had begun to express its direct interest in Tortosa, its principal maritime access point.
Al-Muqtadir wrote to 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Man�ur in Valencia to protest the
assassination of Tortosa's ruler, Muqatil, killed under his orders by 'abzd from

177 J. M. Salrach, G. Feliu, Els pergamins, no. 528.
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Shortly thereafter, the death of Muqatil's successor, Ya'la al-'AmirI, in

453/1061-2, gave Zaragoza the chance to take control of Tortosa. 179 Philip Senac has
advanced that the famous attack on Barbastro in 456/1064 was in fact motivated by
Zaragoza's move towards the coast, a move that would have interfered in the flow of
gold andparias from Tortosa's port to Barcelona's coffers. 180 lbn 'IdharI does in fact
note that al-Muqtadir faced resistance from Riim soldiers during his takeover of
Tortosa, indicating a strong Catalan presence, negotiated perhaps in return for
parias. 181 The count of Barcelona seems then to have been consolidating his alliances
before embarking on an open war with Zaragoza. Denia, on the other hand, was also
maneuvering against Zaragoza, whose growing power and desire for a maritime outlet
posed a direct threat to its sovereignty. Catalan cooperation with Denia's dynasty
continued even after the taifa's fall, after Zaragoza had followed through with its push
towards the sea, since 'AlI's son, Mujahid Siraj al-Dawla, enrolled Catalan help in his
bid to retake his family's territory. 182
It is clear that the 1058 treaty was part of a larger trend.

Despite their

religious differences, and despite the gains obtained from preying on their infidel
neighbors - through piracy in the case of Denia, and through parias in the case of
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Barcelona - the ruling houses of each city maintained a relationship that was
mutually profitable. Denia, indeed, was at times a tributary state. The rulers of Denia
paid parias to Barcelona, sometimes voluntarily in exchange for military aid, and
perhaps against their will at other times as a result of Catalan military pressure.
Catalonia regularly suffered from maritime attacks, and Denia's corsairs and pirates
probably did not tum a blind eye to Barcelonan ships passing in their waters. This
was not, however, a result of the religious differences that separated them. The
Christian drive south was not uniquely motivated by religion, but was more often than
not a case of weak borders ceding to expansionist states. The fifth/eleventh century
saw as many conflicts involving Christian-Muslim coalitions as it did any kind of
dichotomous religious confrontation. The extortion money paid by the taifas to their
Christian neighbors in the form of parias, while coerced, also involved the protection
of those neighbors against both Christian and Muslim states. A prime motivation
behind the alliance between Denia and Barcelona was their common apprehension of
expansionist Zaragoza, a political situation that crossed religious lines.

It would be impossible to quantify Denia's commercial traffic with Christian ports.
Extrapolating from the few Pisan bacini and a couple of coins found near Barcelona
is at best tenuous. Nevertheless, this commerce, as well as piracy, did play a role in
the taifa's development and the overall growth of the AndalusI coast. Although the
process had begun by the end of the third/ninth century, it reached its peak under the
taifas. We should also note, however, that the fifth/eleventh century saw a change in
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the balance of power within the Western Mediterranean. Mujahid's famous exploits
and determined naval policies could not match the growing power of the Christian
fleets, who themselves practiced piracy on a grand scale against Muslim ships and
coasts. Muslim shipping did not cease because of this, but there was a marked
decrease in the West.183 Andalus'f ships sailed farther to continue their commerce
with Muslim merchants, but this was not enough to account for the economic
expansion observable along the Sharq al-Anda/us coast. In fact, Muslim markets
would simply not have been enough to fuel the region's growth. Coastal shipping
and an upsurge in inland networks could have compensated in part for the declining
state of markets in the Western Muslim Mediterranean, but they would not have
sufficed for the large Andalus'f ports. The economic resources that fed this growth,
urbanization and construction of new ports, walls and cities also came from
commerce with the Christian West.

Historians more commonly write about the

outflow of Muslim gold towards the North throughparias during this period, but part
of that gold came back through commercial exchange. The surplus that fed Robert
Lopez's "commercial revolution" also benefited Muslim ports. The expansion of
Christian participation in the Mediterranean may have meant a decline in Muslim
power, but it also helped prime the local markets and economies of Denia and the
coastal taifas.

183 S.D. Goitein, Mediterranean Society, I :56; O.R. Constable, At the Edge of the West, 90-1 ; N.A.
Stillman, "The Eleventh Century MerchanOt House oflbn 'Awkal (a Geniza study)," JESHO, 16.1
(1973): 82. Al-WansharTsT does note a Qayrawan jurist who declares the sea lanes towards the East as
almost constantly clear: al-WanshansT, Mi 'yar, I :436.

CHAPTER VI

DENIA AND THE MUSLIM MEDITERRANEAN
The principal maritime routes of the fifth/eleventh century ran between the Muslim
ports linking al-Andalus, the Maghreb, IfrTqiya, and Sicily and the Eastern
Mediterranean. Thus, despite Mujahid and 'AlT's efforts to build relations with the
expanding Christian West, commerce and maritime communication with the Muslim
shores in particular shaped Denia's Mediterranean diplomacy.
Relations with the Muslim World were necessarily different from those
outside diir al-Isliim. Notably missing were hegemonic ambitions or interreligious
conflicts.

Denia's pirates may have brought their campaigns against the Shiite

Fatimids' ships and shores, but sectarian division did not determine the nature of
relations to the same extent as the rift between Muslims and unbelievers. In addition,
while Mujahid did not hesitate to push his taifa's borders at the expense of his
AndalusT neighbors, Denia did not have the naval resources necessary to threaten the
North African dynasties. Denia thus sought more to facilitate commercial exchange
with the Muslim Mediterranean. Beyond commercial motivations, Denia's rulers
likewise favored the circulation of 'ulamii' and other scholars through their court and
port.
Unfortunately, and perhaps paradoxically, historical sources provide little
direct information concerning these relations in comparison with the Latin West.
254
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This is partly due to differences between Islamic and Latin legal traditions, and so the
absence of archival documents such as those available for Pisa and Barcelona.
Denia's participation in the Mediterranean commercial networks consisted mainly of
casual contacts and relationships that left almost no traces. Nevertheless, besides
narrative sources, Arabic historiography provides interesting variegate sources for
this period. Biographical dictionaries, tabaqiit, point to commercial and intellectual
exchange, sketching out circulatory patterns. Letters and documents from the Cairo
Geniza offer an essential complement to the fabaqiit, especially in understanding the
human networks that framed Mediterranean exchange. As a whole, these sources
indicate a coherent ensemble of commercial, intellectual and diplomatic relations, a
series of networks through which Denia's rulers and their subjects integrated the
Mediterranean.
Geographers placed Denia at six days across from Algiers, while Majorca was
three days from Bijaya. 1 Barcelona, on the other hand, was only a day's sail from the
taifa of Denia. Nevertheless, Denia's maritime lanes were more oriented towards the
opposite Mediterranean shores. Ships left its port for the Balearics, following then
routes towards the African coast, passing Maghrib1 and Ifr1qiyan ports and continuing
on to Egypt. Denia was thus regularly linked with the major ports and cities of the
Muslim Mediterranean.

Scholarly, religious and political figures followed

merchandise along the same routes, and Denia became a major transit point between
al-Andalus and the Mediterranean.

1
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INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP CONTRIBUTIONS

Denia's port was an important nodal point in a dynamic senes of networks that
channeled goods and people in activities as diverse as commerce, piracy and
scholarly and religious exchange, and often as not some combination of those three.
The rulers of Denia contributed to this movement, commanding maritime jihad,
building their court into a center for Koranic studies and probably policing waters to
ensure safe passage for ships, including their own, transporting valuable goods to and
from their port. More directly, different groups participated in this movement, from
the sailors and other members of the local maritime populations to merchants and
'ulama' drawn from perhaps further afield.

Bahriyyun
When Mujahid fled before the Pisans and Genoese in Sardinia, bis fleet shipwrecked
in an ill-chosen cove because he had disregarded the advice of Abu Kharrub, his ra Ts
al-Ba/:iriyyin. 2 Behind this title, literally "head of the sea people," lies the maritime
community that supported Mujahid for the Sardinia invasion and his subsequent
guerre de course. Mujahid's role under the Umayyad regime may have involved
naval duties, and al-MaqqarI writes that be was an experienced sailor.3 In addition,
during the interim between the fall of the caliphate and his arrival in Denia, Mujahid
would have collected the naval resources necessary to establish his state and launch
2
3

U:l:!_;.::,.,JI �.J YJY.. Ji\ <\..ic •4--i -r'Y' � ...,.,SIY'-! J.;...l.!: Al-1:IumaydT, 565, n. 829.
Al-Maqqan, The History ofthe Mohammedan Dynasties in Spain, 2:257.

his plans.
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Nevertheless, Mujahid augmented his fleet with semi-independent

elements, as had the Umayyad caliphs and 'Amirid rulers, using the local population
to command and provide crews for his ships.
Maritime communities, referred to as the Bal:zriyyiin, had occupied the Sharq
al-Anda/us coasts since the Muslim conquest, operating most often outside Cordova's
control. The term refers to a heterogeneous group that evolved over time, whose
main characteristic was their relationship with the sea. Pierre Guichard has shown
that during the eighth and ninth centuries, Berber sailors practiced piracy from this
zone, while other sources indicate that native Christian or Muwallad populations also
comprised the group.4 Maritime exiles from Tortosa had established the colony at
Pechina, which would grow into the principal AndalusI port largely through the
impulsion of the sailors themselves and their relations with the facing MaghribI
shores. 'Abd al-Ral;man III chose to establish the caliphal dar al-$ina 'a in Almeria
partly because of this maritime community, and its elite would become the heads of
the Umayyad fleet.

Umayyad policy over the course of the third/tenth century

canalized the independent piracy of the Bal:zriyyiin, without eliminating the
communities that practiced it. The caliphal arsenal at Tortosa is another example of a
state structure assimilating pre-existing elements and exploiting local human
maritime resources.

Mujahid's decision to establish his taifa in Denia followed

similar logic.
Denia's port most likely harbored an at least semi-permanent sailing
4 Supra, ch. I: Al-l:limyar1 ( 1975), 79-80.
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population before the taifa that Mujahid exploited to eqmp and direct his
expeditionary fleet for the Balearics and Sardinia. The taifa's reliance on the local
community would have operated on two levels, recruiting crews in the same fashion
as juncff for the caliphal army, while enrolling the participation of social and
economic elites to augment and lead the fleet.5 These semi-independent elements
must have accounted for a large part, if not the majority, of the taifa's naval force,
especially for the guerre de course launched out of its ports. Independent piracy on
the part of the Baf:iriyyfin would have blended almost seamlessly with official state
activities, occupying an ambiguous position between official jihad and maritime
brigandage, the difference seemingly being payment of the khums to state coffers.6 In
fact, this would have been analogous to the situation inland, where quwwad enjoyed
localized power in exchange for regular fiscal contributions, while the court could
depend on an administrative and fiscal network for its regional needs outside the
5 Ch. Picard, La mer, 129, 133, and his more recent article "Babriyyiin, emirs et califes : l'origine des
equipages des flottes musulmanes en Mediterranee occidentale (V1II'-X0 siecle)," Medieval
Encounters, 13 (2007): 413-51.
6 While maritime raids may not initially seem an effort to expand or defend Islam, Muslim jurists
considered them as such and thus bound by the rules regulating jihad. M. TalbT, L'Emirat Aghlabide,
534-5. Taibi cites MuJ:iammad b. Sal:im1n stating that ships known to conduct business with Muslims
can only be taken in their own territorial waters, while the capture of other Riim ships is licit at any
time. In an earlier article, Taibi presents a fatwa determining how to properly divide up booty among
members of a pirate company; "Interet des oeuvres juridiques traitant de la guerre pour l'historien des
armees medievales ifrikiennes (d'apres le Kitab al-Nawadir d'lbn AbT Zayd)," Cahiers de Tunisie, 153 (1956): 289-93. Ibn AbT Zayd includes these discussions of maritime raids by independent
companies, i.e. piracy, in his chapter on jihad, in which no differentiation is made between piracy and
other forms of war against non-Muslims. In the second discussion by Ibn SaJ:iniin cited by M. TalbT,
the passage refers to _,ji.ll w.,..ft c,..iSly, t!), or "four ships departing to carry out raids," hardly a
military expedition, but still considered jihad: Kitab al-Nawadir wa-l-Ziyada, ed. 'Abd al-FattaiJ
MuJ:iammad al-Hilw (Beirut, 1999), 3:172-3. Although he notes that engaging the enemy without
legitimate authority or cause is illicit, Ibn Qudama recognizes that booty from unauthorized pillaging
can be kept once the khums is paid: H. Laoust, Le precis de droit d'Jbn Qudama (Beirut, 1950), 279.
We should note that H.S. K.halilieh cites legal decisions that disapproved of attacking Christian vessels
during times of political tranquility, lest they lead to "frivolous military campaigns, the loss of life, and
the interruption of overseas trade." H.S. K.halilieh, Islamic Maritime Law, 135.
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capital.7

The Ba/:zriyyiin had been responsible for the upsurge in piracy under the
Umayyad emirate. They were, however, also active merchants, establishing markets
at Tenes and Pechina. The recent volume on the riba! of Guardamar demonstrates
that the site's origin did not come from the state's need to monitor the coast, but from
private initiatives to develop commercial routes and littoral markets. 8 The Sharq a/
Anda/us maritime communities created and maintained commercial liaisons between

the Iberian Peninsula and the Maghreb under the Umayyads. Al-Bakr1 describes in
fact fifth/eleventh-century maritime routes between the taifa of Denia and ports
between Tenes and Algiers, the same coastline frequented by the Ba/:zriyyun a century
earlier.9

Descendants of that community would have naturally continued their

activities under the muluk al-fawii 'if. 10

Merchants
The Baf:zriyyun were not the only agents in the Denia's maritime and commercial
success, nor were they the only group of merchants. 'All, and perhaps Mujahid, was
7 The Banii Maymun, in fact, transitioned from one group to the other. Members appear as regional
officials in the latter fifth/eleventh century, while the family later served the Majorcan taifa before
assuming leadership roles in the Almoravid and Almohad navies. Moreover, Mu]:iammad b. Maymun
employed his resources during the Pisan attack against Majorca. See: P. Guichard, "Recherche
onomastique apropos des Banii Maymun de Denia," Cahiers d'onomastique arabe, 1985-1987, ed. J.
Sublet (Paris, 1989), 9-22; Uber maiolichinus, 115.
8 Supra, ch. I; R. Azuar Ruiz, "De riba/ a rabita," 226.
9 Al-BakrT, 81-2.
10 Babriyyiin participation in more far-reaching trade is likewise a legitimate speculation. While no
direct evidence exists for the fifth/eleventh century, the continuity of ties between the AndalusT
Babriyyun community on Crete, part of the group expulsed from Alexandria and Cordova under al
l:lakam I, and fourth/tenth-century AndalusT scholars points to a wider maritime context than the
Alboran Sea; E. Levi-Prove11yal, HEM, 2: 145 and 3:488; lbn al-Farac;IT, Tarikh 'ulama' al-Anda/us
(Cairo, 1966), ns. 1415, 1423, 1588.
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an at least indirect participant in the Mediterranean economy. The boat of [Ibn]
Mujahid was loaded with flax in Alexandria towards the middle of the century, and
appeared again in the Egyptian port on at least two occasions, though without
mention of its cargo.11 'AlT's role though is not clear, and he was certainly not
personally trading beyond the taifa's territory.
Christian merchants in Denia are not easily traced. It is nearly impossible to
document the number of Christian merchants in Denia, but there are indications of
commercial exchange with the Latin world, most likely through Christian hands.
Muslim jurists validated the idea of safe passage (aman) granted to Christian
merchants in Islamic lands, while condemning Muslims who traded in the dar al
barb.12

The treaty signed between 'Alf b. Mujahid and Guislabert, bishop of

Barcelona, in 105 8, clearly evokes a Christian community in the taifa.13 Beyond the
political implications, this treaty would have facilitated the circulation of merchants
between the two states. Italian merchants likewise visited the taifa's markets, since
some of the ceramic ware plates used to decorate Pisan church fa<;:ades came from
Majorca and perhaps Denia. 14 Italian and Catalan merchants would have contributed
not only to market activity and the local economy, but also to state coffers, since non11 S.D. Goitein, Letters of Medieval Jewish Traders, 283; S.D. Goitein, Mediterranean Society,
I :227; Geniza Bodi MS Heb E 98 64-5, TS 8 J 20, f. 2 and ENA 2805, f. 26
12 1-1 .S. Khalilieh, Islamic Maritime Law, 125-6. In addition to risking exposure to Christian laws and
idolatry, jurists worried that Muslim merchants could enrich Christians who would then use the money
to fight Islam.
13 Infra. J. Baucells i Reig et al., Diplomatari de l'Arxiu Capitular de la Catedral de Barcelona, 3,
doc. 977, pp. 1554-1558. M. de Epalza in fact considers that the treaty refers only to "neo-mozarabs",
namely Christian merchants temporarily residing in the taifa: M. de Epalza, "Falta de obispos y
conversion al Islam de los cristianos de Al-Andalus," Al-Qantara, 15-2 (1994): 385-400; M. de Epalza,
"Los cristianos en las Baleares musulmanas," in Les Illes orientals d'al-Andalus (Palma de Majorca,
1987), 141
14 See infra, ch. 4.
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Muslim foreigners often paid toll and customs rates much higher than Muslims or
Dhimmz. 15
The Geniza documents that mention 'Alf s boat do however point to active
merchants that tied Denia into the greater Mediterranean economic system. Jewish
merchants left much clearer traces of their activities in Denia and their role as liaisons
between the taifa and the rest of the Mediterranean world. When Ramon Berenguer
wanted to kidnap his future wife Almodis from her husband in Narbonne, the emir of
Tortosa sent Jewish merchants to help in the abduction.16 This is probably because
while Muslims did not habitually frequent Christian ports, Jewish merchants would
have been more likely to know the route and destination from experience, not to
mention the fact that their status made it easier for them to circulate in Christian
lands.17 While we cannot know if these merchants were from Tortosa, Denia did
house a large Jewish community with active links across the Mediterranean. The
Sefer ha-qabbalah, a sixth/twelfth-century Iberian Jewish source mentions two rabbis
from fifth/eleventh-century Denia: the first, Isaac b. Moses, left Denia to become
gaon for a community in the East, while his replacement, Isaac b. Reuben al
Bargeloni, originally from Barcelona, became one of the Peninsula's most important
rabbis.18 This second Isaac married into the family of an Ibn Laktush, who was

15

S.D. Goitein, Mediterranean Society, I :344-5; O.R. Constable, Trade and Traders, 128-9.
Al-BakrI (2003), 397; al-l:limyarI, 42-3/54.
17
O.R. Constable mentions the hiring of Jewish merchants to rescue Muslim prisoners in Christian
occupied Barbastro for much the same reasons, citing their status as a "non-aligned entity"; Trade and
Traders, 62, citing E. Ashtor, The Jews of Moslem Spain (Philadelphia, 1973-84), 3:202.
18
Abraham b. Daud, Sefer ha-qabbalah, 82-3. Goitein (Mediterranean Society, 126) mentions
another scholar from Denia, possibly the same, named Ibn SukkarT, who became gaon for the
Baghdadi community around I 070.
16
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"among the leaders of Denia," and who seems to have been active in trade with
Alexandria since a Geniza letter mentions an lbn LaktujT arriving in a boat from
Denia. 19 The author's intended meaning for "leaders of Denia" is not clear, and while
it may refer only to the Jewish community, these figures could have played an
important role in the city or taifa itself. Heads of Jewish communities elsewhere
across the Mediterranean often occupied influential positions, and for al-Andalus
there is the example of Samuel b. NaghrTla ha-Nagid, vizier of Granada under BadTs
b. I:Iabbus.20 Mujahid's court included a Jewish doctor, Isl;aq b. Qustar, who was
knowledgeable in medicine, logic, and philosophy. 21
The documents of the Cairo Geniza provide the most substantial evidence
concerning Denia's Jewish merchant community. The very nature of this corpus
perhaps exaggerates the Jewish merchants' presence, but it does provide an essential
window into the taifa's relations with other Mediterranean ports. Jewish merchants
frequented Denia and communicated with the local community, members of which
also participated in international commerce. Towards 1025, Joseph b. Samuel al
DanT was an active merchant, with residences in Palermo and Egypt, and business
contacts in Sicily, lfrTqiya, Tripoli, and DamsTs (a village along the Nile specialized in
the production of flax). 22 In 475/1083, an l�baq b. Abraham swore an oath before the

19GenizaTS !OJ 16,f.17
David Wasserstein cites Jewish viziers in the taifas of Almeria, Zaragoza and Seville; D.
Wasserstein, Rise and fall, 197-213; D. Wasserstein, "Samuel lbn Naghr!la ha-Nagid and Islamic
Historiography in al-Andalus," Al-Qantara, 14.1 (1993): I 09-126.
21 Jbn Sa'Id, Kitiib fabaqiit al-i7mam (Livre des Categories de Nations), ed. L. Cheikho and French
trans. R. Blachere (Frankfurt, 1999), 89/159.
22
S.D. Goitein,Letters of Medieval Jewish Traders, 3 I 6-9, doc. 71. Joseph may have emigrated to
the central Mediterranean, or his family may have, but his name certainly points to Denia origins.
20

town's rabbinical court concerning a shipment of cinnabar sent to al-Mahdiyya.

23
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another document from the same period, a letter of attorney was signed before
Denia's rabbinical court before being sent on to al-Mahdiya and Alexandria.24 Two
other documents indicate regular traffic for Jewish merchants between Denia and
other Mediterranean ports. Around 1065, a merchant in Alexandria informed his
partner in al-Mahdiya of the apparently unusual arrival oflbn Mujahid's boat with no
Jewish merchants aboard. 25 In another letter, also from Alexandria, the author writes
that a ship had arrived from Denia carrying "a number of our friends," of whom four
are specifically named, and one of whom was "the son of Ibn LaktujT," perhaps the
same as mentioned above. 26 Among these men was Mukhtar al-I:IalabT, the ghuliim of
Nahray b. Nissim, one of the most important Jewish merchants of Fustat. 27 The ship
had not stopped over in al-Mahdiyya, and we can assume that Nahray had direct
relations with Denia. These letters demonstrate not only Denia's importance as a
commercial port, but also the important role played by Jewish merchants, certainly
with the Christian world, and especially with other ports around the Muslim
Mediterranean.
Muslim merchants, though, must have made up the majority of those
practicing trade between al-Andalus and the Muslim Mediterranean.

Sources,

nevertheless, are almost non-existent on the activities of this section of the
E. Ashtor, "Documentos espafioles de la Genizah," Sefarad, 24 (I 964): 76-80; Geniza TS 12.570
and TS 13J 21, f. 7.
24
S.D. Goitein, Mediterranean Society, 1:69, 407, n. 45; Geniza TS 13J 7, f. 11. The shipment was
carried aboard the markab al-bajib.
25
S.D. Goitein, Mediterranean Society, 1 :213; Geniza TS 8J 20, f. 2.
26
S.D. Goitein, Mediterranean Society, 1 :318; Geniza TS I OJ 16, f. 17.
27
S.D. Goitein, Mediterranean Society, 3:116; Geniza TS !OJ 20, f. 18.
23
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population. Legal decisions sometimes refer to problems arising from international
trade, akin to those mentioned in the Geniza documents above, but none of these
make specific reference to Denia, and they are at any rate few and far between.28
Merchants, however, were rarely just that, and can be perceived through other
activities. Bruna Soravia describes the circuit of taifa courts as a kind of scholarly
market, where 'ulamii' sold their services to the highest bidder. 29 The economic
interests of the 'ulamii' were not limited to the taifa courts, and O.R. Constable has
pointed out that many scholars also worked as merchants.30 In fact, many 'ulamii'
seem to have arrived in al-Andalus following trade more than intellectual
opportunities. lbn Bashkiiwal alone cites twenty-six scholars who entered al-Andalus
tiijiriin, or trading. 31
Denia's place as one of the prime centers of 'ulamii' activity comes partly
from Mujahid's active support of qirii'a and Koranic studies, but many scholars also
transited through the taifa's port on bajj and their way to the centers of religious
scholarship in the East. Denia was second only to Almeria in both the number of
'ulamii' specifically mentioned as having passed through the town and the number of
'ulamii' having embarked from its port. 32

When combined with the figures for

O.R. Constable cites lbn Sahl as an example; Trade and Traders, 83.
8. Soravia,"Les 'ulamii' andalous au ye siecle de l'Hegire. Antagonistes ou courtisans des muhtk
al-/awii 'if," in Saber religioso y poder politico en el Islam (Madrid,1994),296 and passim.
30
O.R. Constable, Trade and Traders, 54,79-85.
31
lbn Bashkuwal (1989),ns. 250,659,808,1317,1322,1324,1348,1377,1402,1412,1418,1457;
lbn Bashkuwal (1966),ns. 269,569,656,674,781,924,948,958,960,1311,1312,1313,1347,1402.
None of these entered Denia directly, and in fact, many if not most entered through Seville,but this
seems more the result of lbn Bashkuwal's sources than the sign of a highly commercial current among
Seville's 'ulamii '.
32
See appendix.
28
29

Mayurqa, the taifa's place as a point of departure becomes even clearer.

33
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Scholars

left from Denia or Mayurqa for Bijaya and al-Mahdiya, and continued on to
traditional centers of study in the Near and Middle East.34 Denia's port likewise
served as an entry point for scholars either returning or emigrating from the East.35
'Ulama' did not generate this traffic, and would have more likely followed
established routes, taking advantage of relevant intellectual centers along the way.
Their movements then indicate greater patterns of trade between Denia and the rest of
the Muslim Mediterranean.

THE GEOGRAPHY OF MOVEMENT AND EXCHANGE

It may seem artificial to approach Denia's relations from a geographic point of view,
dividing exchange into regional sectors, as if borders influenced movement.
Nevertheless, regional networks were the dominant mechanism for exchange, and
individual actors worked within and through them. Likewise, the rulers of Denia
tailored their diplomacy to the individual polities with whom they shared economic,
religious and political ties.

Dividing the Muslim Mediterranean between the

I:Iammadid, Zirid and Fatimid spheres thus follows somewhat artificial political
constructs, but does allow a better understanding of how actors from Denia interacted
with other regional networks.
33

The two figures cannot be combined directly though, since individuals could and did pass through
both ports on their way East.
34
Ibn al-Kha\Tb, 253; lbn Bashkuwal (1989), 122, 598, 809, 1350; lbn l:lazm, Jamharat ansab al
'arab, ed. AM. Harun (Cairo, 1971), 115/85; al-l)abbT, no. 604; al-l:fumaydT, no. 345; lbn al-'Abbar,
Takmila (Fez), no. I 21.
35 Ibn Bassam, DhakhTra, 4:65; Ibn Bashkuwal, ns. 122; 809, 882;
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The Hammadid Maghreb
Geographic proximity and established maritime circuits meant that modern-day
Algeria attracted much of Denia's economic and political attention. As noted above,
al-BakrI linked Santa Pola with Tenes, Alicante with Marsa Oqur, Moraira with
Cherchel, the Montg6 mountain near Denia with al-Batal, and Denia itself with the
port of Janabiya, just west of Algiers. IdrisI later wrote that Denia was six days' sail
from Janabiya and only three from Tenes.36 This portion of the Central Maghreb
came under the control of the Banu I:Iammad in 408/1017, whose capital, the Qal'a
I:Iammad, carried their name. The I:Iammadids do not seem to have had an active
vocation for the sea and exploiting maritime activities, and it is noteworthy that many
of the MaghribI ports were established by AndalusI elements.37 Diplomatic relations
with Denia were thus more passive and occasional, in response to specific situations
without necessarily building close ties.
Evidence for direct contact between the I:Iammadid rulers and Mujahid and
'AII is rare, but does indicate at least intermittent exchange. First contacts between
the two ruling houses date from the earliest years of both regimes. After the failed
invasion of Sardinia, Mujahid was able to ransom the female members of his
household captured by the Christians, but 'AlI was kept as a prize for the emperor
Henry II, who entrusted Ildeperto Albizone with guarding the young 'Amirid. 'AlI
thus grew up among the Christians, to be liberated sixteen years later. According to

36
37

IdrTsT, Opus geographicum, 4:582; al-1:limyarT, 188/228.
AI-BakrT, 61, 65, 70.
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Ibn Bassam, a member of the Banu ijammad helped negotiate 'Alf's liberation. The
MaghribI ports under ijammadid control were a neutral intermediate zone between al
Andalus and the Italian ports, explaining the role played by the Banu ijammad in
'AlI's liberation. Denia and Pisa would create more direct ties over the course of the
century, but North African markets would have been the initial starting point for non
violent relations between the two powers. Ports such as Bijaya and Buna did host
pirates that attacked Christian coasts, but they also attracted Italian merchants seeking
commercial contact with the Muslim world. Mujahid could thus approach the Italian
merchant house of Ildeperto Albizone through their mutual commercial relations.
Contact continued between Denia and the Central Maghreb over the course of
the century, as shown through economic and intellectual exchange. Bijaya did not
become a major port until the end of the fifth/eleventh century, when the ijammadids
moved towards the coast after the economic and political catastrophes often
associated with the ijila!I invasions. 39 Nevertheless, evidence does point to economic
exchange before that time. Archeological works on the Maghreb have not provided
clear indications of trade with Denia, but fifth/eleventh-century ijammadid ceramics
unearthed in both Denia and Madinat Mayurqa illustrate at least one end of the routes
described by al-BakrI and IdrisI. 40 In addition, ships transporting merchandise also

38

Ibn Bassan1, Dhakh'ira, 4: 183.
The actual effects of these invasions are debatable, but probably did contribute to the move away
from the already fragile and even devastated interior: H.R. Idris, La Berberie, I :269.
40
R. Azuar Ruiz, Denia islamica, 239; R. Azuar Ruiz, "Al-Andalus y el comercio mediterraneo,",
59; G. Rosse116 Bordoy, "Mallorca: comercio y ceramica a lo largo de los siglos X al XIV," C!CMMO
II (Tolede 1981), 195; J.A. Gisbert Santonja et al., La ceramica de Daniya, 122, no. 004; J. Zozaya,
"Importaciones casuales en Al-Andalus: las vias de comercio," in IV Congreso de Arqueologia
39
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carried passengers. When Mujahid wanted to banish his unruly caliph, al-Mu'aytI, he
placed him in a ship travelling to Bijaya and "the land of the Kutama," or the Central
Maghreb. 41 Biographical dictionaries mention at least two 'ulama' having lived or
studied in Denia and Madinat Mayurqa who then finished out their days "in the land
of the Banu I:Iammad," or more specifically, at the Qal'a I:Iammad. 42 Neither the
Qal'a nor Bijaya were known as religious or intellectual centers at this time, which
may explain why more scholarly exchange does not appear between the two regions.
Mujahid and 'AII probably maintained some form of contact with the Banu
I:Iammad after 'AII's liberation, but there is no extent trace of exchange beyond
commercial activities.

Nevertheless, Ibn Khaldun's description of the events

following Denia's fall may indicate continued relations. Ibn 'IdharI writes that after
deposing 'AII, Ibn Hud al-Muqtadir settled him on iqfa' lands near Zaragoza where
he lived until his death in 474/1081-2. 43 Ibn Khaldun, on the other hand, claims that
'AII fled from Zaragoza and sought refuge from Yal)ya b. I:Iammad in Bijaya. 44 We
should note, however, that lbn Khaldun is the only historian to make this claim, and
that Yal)ya b. I:Iammud did not take power in Bijaya until 515/1121, long after 'AlI's
death.

Nevertheless, this kind of contact did exist between taifa rulers and the

I:Iammadids. During the Almoravid invasion of the Peninsula, the son of Abu Yal)ya
b. Sumac;lih, the ruler of Almeria wrote to al-Man�ur al-Na�ir b. I:Iammad and

Medieval Espanola : Sociedades en transici6n, Alicante, 4-9 octubre 1993, I, Ponencias (Alicante,
1993), 119,126.
41
lbn al-KhaFb, 253; lbn Bashkuwal (1989), no. 413 ; Ibn I:Iazm, Jamharat iinsiib al- 'arab, 115/85.
42 Ibn Bashkuwal (1989), ns. 122, 1350.
43 lbn 'ldharT, Bayiin, 3 :228.
44
lbn Khaldiin, Kitiib al- 'ibcir, 4:355.

received permission to settle in Tenes.

45
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Ibn Khaldun seems then have confused these

ruling sons, but his interpretation may have seemed plausible because of other
relations between the ruling families. The I:Iammadid court attracted other refugees
fleeing the Almoravids, such as the poet Abu Bakr Mul:;ammad b. 'Isa al-DanI. 46 We
can probably then conclude that a mutual goodwill existed between the two coasts,
motivated by commercial exchange.

IfrTqiya
While relations with the central Maghreb were important for Denia, those with
IfrTqiya, and notably al-Mahdiya, were essential. lfrTqiya was the hub of activity for
the central Mediterranean, acting as a transitional emporium between Egyptian
markets in the East, and al-Andalus and the Maghreb in the West. 47 Goitein called
ties between Egypt, lfrTqiya and al-Andalus the "golden rule" of Mediterranean
shipping, and sources speak to maritime connections between lfrTqiya or Sicily and
al-Andalus as early as the third/ninth century, when ships travelled "over the sea" in
about six days. 48 The growing importance of Denia's port brought it into direct
contact with IfrTqiya beginning in the fifth/eleventh century. An ataifor produced in
Qayrawan and discovered in Denia's Forti district attests to relations that become
45 lbn 'ldhar1, Bayan, 3:168.
46 lbn Bassam, DhakhTra, 3:514.
47

S.D. Goitein, Mediterranean Society, I :212-4.
S.D. Goitein, Letters of Medieval Jewish Traders, 83. See also "La Tunisie du Xi e siecle a la
lumiere des documents de la Geniza du Caire," in Etudes d'orientalisme dediees a la memoire de levi
Provenr;al, t. 2 (Paris, 1962), 559-580; O.R. Constable, Trade and Traders, 32; Ch. Picard, La mer,
174; lbn Khurradadhbih, 87. AI-Wanshar1s1 (Mi 'yar, 8:311) cites the problem of rented boats
travelling over the sea to al-Andalus.
48
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even more evident in light of similar ceramics unearthed near Javea, Villajoyosa, Sax
and elsewhere in Denia's hinterland.49 In fact, Azuar Ruiz notes that Denia's port and
territory were the principal transit points for lfriqiyan wares and have produced the
majority of archeological pieces from that region, a clear indication of direct ties.so
The Cairo Geniza documents provide little additional information concerning
these relations, but, as Constable notes, the nature of Mediterranean exchange limited
documentary traces of this traffic.

lfriqiya was the transition point between the

eastern and western Mediterranean basins, and AndalusI merchants entrusted their
commercial goods to lfriqiyan colleagues who continued to eastern markets. The
western partners in this equation thus had no place in the Egyptian documents.s1 This
comes through in the fact that Denia's ships are almost systematically mentioned in
connection with the merchant house of Nahray b. Nissim, one of the most important
Mediterranean commercial organizations with agents in lfriqiya, Alexandria and
Fustat. Denia's relations with lfriqiya do however come to light, and in fact Denia is
the only AndalusI port specifically connected with lfriqiya in the Geniza documents:
a load of cinnabar left Denia for al-Mahdiya in 1083, while a letter of attorney was
signed first in Denia, then in al-Mahdiya before continuing on to Alexandria.s2
Maritime lanes allowed for regular traffic between Denia and the central
49

R. Azuar Ruiz, "Al-Andalus y el comercio mediterraneo," 59; J.A. Gisbert Santonja et al., La
ceramica de Daniya, I 19, n. 001; R. Azuar Ruiz, Denia islamica, 44, 48; G. Segura Herrero, J.L.
Simon Garcia, "El Castillo de Sax (Alto Vinalop6)," in Castillos y torres en el Vinalopo, ed. G. Segura
Herrero and J.L. Simon Garcia (Petrer, 2001), 96; J. R. Garcia Gandia et al., "L'Almissera: territorio
castral y espacio rural en epoca islamica," 92.
50
R. Azuar Ruiz, "Al-Andalus y el comercio mediterraneo," 62.
51 O.R. Constable, At the Edge of the West, 89-90; S.D. Goitein, Mediterranean Society, 1:211-214.
52 O.R. Constable, Trade and Traders, 77; E. Ashtor, "Documentos espafioles de la Genizah,"
Sefarad, 24 (1964), 76-7; S.D. Goitein, Mediterranean Society, 1:69; Geniza TS 13 J 7, fol. 11 and TS
12.570.
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Mediterranean, generating considerable revenue for merchants and probably rulers.
We should note in particular the remarkable quantity of Sicilian and Ifriqiyan Fatimid
coins that circulated throughout the Peninsula, and especially in the Sharq a/
Anda/us, despite local monetary production and religious and political conflicts. 53
Denia's region in fact has produced eleven Fatimid coin hoards, more than any other
taifa. The percentage of Fatimid coins in these hoards is, moreover, striking, ranging
from 13, 14 or 15% to 48 and even 80% for a hoard in Eiche. These figures are much
higher than those for hoards elsewhere, which tend to stay under 10%. 54 Monetary
circulation flowed both ways, and though we have found no taifa coins in North
African collections, AndalusI dirhams were common tender in Qayrawan, to the point
that the price of silver there was based on them. 55 Denia was not the principal
AndalusI port for ships coming from al-Mahdiya - Almeria remained the "port of al
Andalus" throughout the fifth/eleventh century - but no other taifa presents as much
evidence for economic exchange with central Mediterranean ports.
The 'ulama' community likewise linked Denia and Qayrawan. Despite its
Shiite leaders, Qayrawan remained a major center for religious studies for AndalusI
scholars. AndalusI 'ulama' on pilgrimage or simply looking to supplement their
studies followed the same easterly route that inevitably took them past Ifriqiya,
53

D. Wasserstein, "An unrecognized hoard of Fatimid silver from al-Andalus and a phantom caliph,"
Al-Qantara, 15-1 (1994): 245-252; G.C. Miles, Fatimid Coins, 3; C. Domenech Belda, Dinares,
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increasing their chances for stopping in Qayrawan. Denia was not the principal port
for departures from al-Andalus, since about 50% of those went through Almeria, as
opposed to 17% for Denia. 56 Nevertheless, about a quarter of the 'ulama' having
stayed in Denia travelled to the Orient. 57 This traffic and transit through Denia
functioned in both directions, and scholars from lfrTqiya often (re)entered al-Andalus
through Denia. For example, Abu al-Fac;ll, the caliphal ambassador who brought
letters of 'Abbasid investiture to al-Mu'izz b. BadTs in Qayrawan, continued on to al
Andalus, entering through Denia's port, though he did not stay there. 58 Denia's
scholars also communicated with their lfrTqiyan colleagues, without necessarily
travelling there, since Abu al-' Abbas b. RashTq, the jurist and governor of the
Balearics, exchanged letters with 'ulama' in Qayrawan.
Denia's rulers maintained diplomatic relations in line with this traffic and the
importance of the lfrTqiyan ZTrid state in Mediterranean networks. Mujahid and 'AIT
were not the only rulers to co1Tespond with the ZTrids in Qayrawan, since 'Abd Allah
b. BuluqqTn al-ZTrT also mentions epistolary exchange with his cousin. 59 We should
note however, that relations between Denia and Qayrawan existed despite the
supposed rift between Saqaliba and Berbers, and especially despite the Sunni-Shia
religious divide that could have separated them. Al-Mu'izz b. BadTs did renounce
Fatimid sovereignty, and so Fatimid Isma'Tlism, for a time in the middle of the
56

See annex.
57 Over half of those mentioned in context with Mayurqa travelled east, a clear sign of Mayi.irqa's
place in the maritime networks.
58
Having learned of the ambassador's arrival, 'AII b. Mujahid hastened to have meat and four
chickens sent to welcome the traveler; Ibn Bassam, DhakhTra, 4:65.
59 'Abd Allah b. BuluqqTn, Tibyan, 63-4.
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century, but the I:Iilan invasions and mid-century troubles forced him to return to his
former allegiances.60 Even if exchange was possible despite this rift, as it was with
the Christians, differences could pose problems for diplomatic and political relations.
lbn Bassam preserves two pieces of correspondence between 'An b. Mujahid and al
Mu 'izz b. BadTs, but beyond their simple existence, the letters do not offer specific
indications on the nature of relations between the two capitals.61 Nevertheless, 'An
and al-Mu'izz knew each other personally, since the future ruler of Denia had spent
time in the lfrTqiyan court.
Although the Barn} I:Iammad had aided in 'An's release from Pisan captivity,
the future ruler was sent to Qayrawan to await transport on to Denia around
423/1031-2. Mujahid sent the qar;ff of Denia, Al:imad b. al-I:Iasan b. 'Uthman al
GhasanT b. AbT Ri'al to the ZTrid court to bring his son home.62 Amicable relations
must have existed between the two courts, but their sectarian differences did pose
problems. In fact, lbn al-Abba.r's description of 'An and lbn AbT Ri'al's stay in
Qayrawan brings to light how the divide could make relations difficult. First of all,
though the religious scholar did not heed his orders, Mujahid forbade his qar;ff from
discussing with the 'ulama' in Qayrawan. Given the frequent mention of AndalusT
scholars that studied in Qayrawan, and the respect lbn AbT Ri'al shows for the ZTrid
capital as a religious center, it would seem that Mujahid's orders came more from the
60 1-1.R . Idris, La Berberie orientate, I: 181, 205-7; M. TalbT, article "al-Mu'izz b. BadTs Abu TamTm
Sharafal-Dawla," E.1.2, 7:481a.
61
lbn Bassam, Dhakhira, 3: I 84, 271-2.
62
lbn al-Abbar, Takmfla (Fes) (I989), no. 121; 1-1.R. Idris, "Deux maitres de l'ecole juridique
kairouanaise sous Jes ZTrTdes (Xi e siecle) : Abu Bakr b. 'Abd al-Rahman et Abu 'lmran al-FasT,"
Anna/es de l'lnstitut d'Etudes Orienta/es de la Faculte des Lettres d'A!ger (I 955): 58-9.
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qar;lf's presence there as an official representative of the Denia court. He represented
the dawla of Denia, which derived part of its legitimacy from its defense of
Malikiyya Sunnism.
Al-Mu'izz offered his guests gifts of money and two colts, but Ibn AbI Ri'al
refused the presents. Ibn al-Abbar writes that he refused for scrupulous reasons,
tawarr 'a, but offering presents to guests of honor was a common practice, and we
should wonder whether the Zirid ruler's sectarian loyalties were not a factor in the

qar;lf's refusal. If such was the case, diplomatic interaction between Zirid Ifriqiya and
Denia must have involved complications that the sources do not clearly indicate. The
possible tension in this situation comes through in al-Mu'izz's diplomatic tact: 'AlI
and Ibn AbI Ri'al were present in Qayrawan for Eid al-Adha, and al-Mu'izz invited
his guests to participate in the festival at his side. However, he ordered that the

khufba not be pronounced in the name of the Fatimids, out of respect for his guests.63
His decision shows there was a real political and sectarian divide between the taifa
and Ifriqiyan rulers, but one that could be bridged. Al-Mu'izz was probably moving
towards distancing himself from Cairo at this time, but his deference to Denia's future
ruler speaks to important relations between their polities.
There is no reason to believe that the sectarian rift engendered problems for
commercial exchange between al-Andalus and Ifriqiya, nor even with Fatimid Egypt.
Al-MuqaddasI may have remarked that a Shiite risked his life in fourth/tenth-century

63
According to lbn 'ldhar1, the people of Qayrawan also objected to the pronunciation of the khu/ba
in the name of the Fatimids, refusing even to frequent the mosque until al-Mu'izz ceased invoking the
'Ubayd1 name in 440/1048: lbn 'ldhar1, Bayiin, I :277.
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al-Andalus, but the Fatimids could not afford a similar policy, given the fact that the
majority of their subjects were in fact hostile to the Isma'IlT creed. 64 Goitein writes
that pirates occasionally made use of the schism to attack ships coming from the
Muslim West, notably the emir of Barga, Jabbara b. Mukhtar, and ships from Denia
may very well have practiced similar activities. This was probably not the norm
though, and Goitein also remarks that the fifth/eleventh-century Mediterranean was a
"free-trade community," in which goods and men travelled without restrictions. 65
The volume of trade with lfriqiya probably diminished over the course of' AlI
b. Mujahid's reign. The Zirid kingdom had been in decline since the beginning of the
century, a decline hastened by the I:IilalI invasions and other mid-century troubles. 66
Geniza letters, and notably those from the great merchant house of lbn 'Awkal,
present an lfriqiya that was clearly on the decline following periods of political
trouble and agricultural failures. 67 Because of this, and further exacerbating the
decline, a growing part of Mediterranean commerce turned towards the markets of the
eastern Mediterranean, and more and more ships left for Alexandria, without stopping
even in al-Mahdiya.

F. Daftary, A Short History of the Ismailis (Princeton, 1998), 65.
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Mi�r, modem Egypt and Libya, was also an essential stopover for AndalusT scholars
traveling east, either on pilgrimage or for additional training. As with Qayrawan,
despite the ruling regime's sectarian stance, the 'ulama' of Alexandria and Fustat
remained respected sources of religious and juridical learning. Mujahid even sought
to attract to his court an 'atim, Abu Mul;lammad 'Abd al-Wal;ll;lab b. Na�r, who had
sought refuge in Egypt.68 Other scholars did travel west to al-Andalus, but most
visitors came as merchants. 69 Scholarly exchange between East and West seems
though to have declined over the century, despite Alexandria's growing importance
for AndalusT commerce. 70

The menace of Christian fleets or pirates on the

Mediterranean increased the risks of travelling across the Mediterranean, to the point
that certain jurists counseled against it and pointed out that jihad against the Christian
North was a meritorious replacement for the hajj. 71 This does not seem to have had
any effect on commercial voyages, and 'AlT b. Mujahid personally worked to favor
exchange with Fatimid Egypt.
There are no clear indications of maritime commercial activity under Mujahid.
The first mention in the Cairo Geniza of a ship from Denia, the markab Mujahid,

M.J. Rubiera Mata, La taifa de Denia, 125-6.
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dates from 436, the year of Mujahid's death. 72
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This may have been in reference to the

first of Denia's rulers, since later documents sometimes specify markab Jbn Mujahid.
The political shift from Mujahid to 'AlT is all the more difficult to gauge, since it
coincides with the movement from west to east of the more important commercial
Jewish families, our principal source for Mediterranean trade for this period. The
very nature of this source, the Cairo Geniza, means that the majority of the documents
are related in one way or another to Egypt, and activities in the Muslim West simply
do not appear that often. We are left then with two possibilities: either Denia's
commercial activity under Mujahid, then 'AlT, followed the movement east, where it
became better documented, or investment in Mediterranean commerce only began at
that time.
Ibn Mujahid's boat is mentioned three times after 1050 in Geniza documents,
and on at least two occasions the boat sailed directly to Alexandria without a
stopover. 73 A fourth letter mentions a boat from Denia in Alexandria, and also
specifies that it had not stopped in al-Mahdiya. 74 Like other Mediterranean rulers
then, 'AlT owned at least one commercial vessel that sailed the maritime routes,
linking Denia's markets with those father east. Given the haphazard preservation of

72 S.D. Goitein, Letters of Medieval Jewish Traders, 283; S.D. Goitein, Mediterranean Society,
I :227; Geniza Bodi MS Heb E 98 64-5.
73 S.D. Goitein, Mediterranean Society, I :213; O.R. Constable, Trade and Traders, 123; Geniza TS 8
J 20, f. 2 and ENA 2805, f. 26. In this last document, 'AlT's ship must have been en route for
Alexandria, since it is described as being at Cap Harzeit, Ra's al-'Awsaj, the Roman port of
Paraetonium on the Egyptian coast: al-Bakr1, 85-6/173; W.H. Smyth, The Mediterranean, a Memoir
Physical, Historical and Nautical (London, 1854), 86.
74 S.D. Goitein, Mediterranean Society, I :318; Geniza TS IO J 16, f. 17. This letter is also interesting
in mentioning the arrival of ships from Genoa and "other lands of the Rum."
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documents through the Geniza, the relative frequent mention of his ship seems to
indicate that such travels were not exceptional, that they were even regular, and
documents from the sixth/twelfth century show that traffic continued along those
routes.
'AlT's involvement in Mediterranean relations was not purely commercial, and
while his father is especially known for invading Sardinia, 'AlI's moment of glory
came from an exchange with the Fatimid caliph al-Mustan�ir bi-Llah.

Around

447/1055-6, while a famine was decimating Mi�r, 'AlT sent a ship loaded with food
(ta 'iim) to the Fatimid ruler.75 The ship returned to Denia filled with precious stones,
gold and other treasures. Ibn al-Zubayr writes that on two subsequent occasions, 'AlT
sent presents to al-Mustan�ir: in 452/1060-1, he sent pearls and silks woven with gold
thread, while in 462/1070, he opted for furniture, silks, slaves, and thirty coral
branches of a quality never seen in the Fatimid court.76

'AlT commissioned his

secretary Ibn Arqam to write letters for the caliph and his vizier to accompany the
452/1060-1 shipment, instigating an epistolary exchange that was in his own interest

75
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with the Isma'IlT caliph, despite their sectarian differences.77
Diplomatic relations with the Fatimid caliph, though delicate, would have
offered legitimizing prestige for 'AlT. The principal AndalusI historians of the time
noted this correspondence, indicating that his contemporaries were equally well
aware of it.

The Egyptian famine gave 'AII the chance to act as the caliph's

benefactor, and the exchange of gifts that followed speak to mutual recognition
between two political figures.

'AII could not place himself under al-Mustan�ir's

Isma'IlT rule - although he does address him as am'ir al-mu 'min'in - and he could not
expect an investiture from the Fatimid court. He did however gain honor among his
peers, perhaps flaunting the recognition offered him by the most powerful Muslim
ruler in the Mediterranean.
More importantly, and more in line with 'AlI's reputation, this relation
certainly traced its ongms to his economic interests.

Archeological research in

Alexandria has produced fifth/eleventh-century caliphal-style ceramics from al
Andalus, and Denia was one of the major producers of such wares.78 These AndalusI
ceramics could have transited through an Ifriqiyan emporium, but ships could have
also carried them directly from al-Andalus. Slaves were probably one of the major
commodities sold out of Denia and transported from its markets towards the East, but
Mediterranean commerce was known for its diversity and merchants would have
Ibn Bassam, DhakhTra, 3:295-7.
W.B. Kubiak, "Overseas pottery trade of medieval Alexandria as shown by recent archaeological
discoveries," Folia Orientalia IO (1968): IO; J.A. Gisbert Santonja, Ceramica califal de Denia
(Alicante, 2000).
77
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filled their holds with other goods as well. The markab Mujiihid was loaded with a
bale of flax for the price of 15 5/24 dinars, and the ship must have carried merchandise
on the other occasions it is mentioned.79 Return journeys did not bring only flax, and
could include luxury or more sophisticated items. At the beginning of the twentieth
century, municipal workers in Denia turned up a ceramic jar filled with bronze
objects. The jar was probably buried around the time of the Christian conquest of the
town, and so the objects themselves date from the fifth/eleventh to the
seventh/thirteenth century.so Azuar Ruiz has shown that some of these objects are
stylistically analogous to Fatimid pieces from the fifth/eleventh century.

A

metallurgical study on a dozen of the pieces - in comparison with objects from
Tiberias in Israel, and the Ser9e Liman shipwreck off the Turkish coast - clearly
designates Syro-Palestinian production, using metals imported from Iran.s1 The rarity
of such objects in the Iberian Peninsula may indicate that these were luxury items
included with the treasures sent by al-Mustan$ir, but it would seem that they were
more likely tied to economic exchange.s2 Denia's ships increasingly followed the
routes to Alexandria, and amicable relations with the Fatimid court could only have
79 S.D. Goitein, Letters of Medieval Jewish Traders, 283; S.D. Goitein, Mediterranean Society,
I:227; Geniza Bodi MS Heb E 98 64-5.
80 R. Azuar Ruiz, Denia islamica, 51-5.
81
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"Estudio arqueologico de! poblamiento islamico de la montafia alicantina. El a'mal de Denia," 2 vols.
(Doctoral diss., Universitat Alicante, 1986-7), 134-249; M.J. Ponting, "From Damascus to Denia:
scientific analysis of three groups of Fatimide period metalwork," Historical Metallurgy, 37-2 (2003):
92-3, 98, 99. Ponting specifies that certain of the pieces supposed by Azuar Ruiz to be of AndalusT
origin were more likely produced in the Orient, in the same workshops as those from Tiberias.
82
J. Zozaya suggested a link between the importation of these goods and the exportation of wood
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helped. It is even possible that 'Alf was seeking assurances against naval attacks on
his ships, possibly by pirates such as the emir Jabbara.

Such aggression is not

mentioned in the letter from 'AlT to the caliph, but during his communications with
al-Mustan!;,ir the question may have been raised.
'Alf b. Mujahid well understood the dynamic patterns of trade and acted in
consequence. The economic weight of the Muslim Mediterranean rested clearly in its
eastern basin, and 'AlT sought to maintain his polity's place in the Mediterranean
commercial networks. Most likely informed of the Egyptian famine by his own
agents, 'Alf knew how to tum the situation to his advantage.

CHAPTER VII

DENIA AND THE ANDALUSI NETWORKS
Denia's policies fell within the larger program of affirming the taifa's place as a
conduit between al-Andalus and the Mediterranean. Mujahid and 'AlT adapted their
actions within that framework according to specific networks and political needs.
Relations with Pisa answered to Mediterranean dynamics, while those with Barcelona
required a skillful navigation of AndalusI geopolitics.

Relations with Muslim

Mediterranean ports likewise followed lines traced by economic and diplomatic
interests. The Berber ethnicity of the Banu I:Iammad or ZirI does not seem to have
affected maritime exchange any more than the ShI'a adherence of the Fatimid and
Ifriqiyan elites. The Mediterranean waters reduced ties to essential interests; though
complex, they left little room for confrontational posturing. AndalusI relations, on
the other hand, were quite different. 'AlT played freely with Mediterranean political
divisions, even addressing the ShI'a Fatimid caliph as amzr al-mii 'minzn, but in al
Andalus more stringent conditions framed his politics. Denia's rulers had to balance
regional and sometimes peninsular struggles between states and factions, while
protecting the reticular base of their own power. Their need to ensure the supply of
marketable goods to their ports as well as the redistribution of imports influenced
relations with AndalusI peers as much as concerns about extending or defending their
physical territory. This complex set of interests dictated Denia's AndalusI politics.
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Mujahid and 'AlT worked to establish, maintain and exploit their taifa's place on the
Mediterranean coast, constructing alliances and managing conflicts in consequence.

THE COASTAL TA!FAS

Events of the AndalusT fitna and the motivations of those involved are rarely
straightforward. Mujahid may have broken with his fellow 'Amirid clients, even
betrayed his master, but he did not intend to establish an independent state when he
left Cordova in 400/1010. He did not even seek exclusive autonomy from the other
centers of AndalusT powers. Mujahid split from the core 'Amirids, but Viguera
Molins is correct in noting that he participated in the communal nature of power
under the early 'Amirid taifas, though perhaps not as much as some historians would
believe. 1

Meouak has written that Mujahid shared power in Denia with Zuhayr,

citing the eighteenth-century Tunisian compiler Mal)mud Maqdish: wa Zuhayr wa
Mujiihid ma/aka madinat Diiniya. 2 MaqdTsh, however, is the only author to mention

this, and his considerable chronological distance from the events puts doubts on his
accuracy. Zuhayr, in fact, allied himself with Khayran from the beginning of the
fitna, making it illogical to follow MaqdTsh's claims. Nevertheless, Denia did not

emerge as an autonomous power until Mujahid declared the caliphate of al-Mu'aytT in
405/1014, placing himself in clear opposition to the I:Iammudid Cordovan regime,
and possibly as a countermeasure to Khayran's expansionist machinations in
1 M. J. Viguera Molins, "Historia politica," in Los Reinos de taifas. Al-Anda/us en el sig/o XI,
Historia de Espana Menendez Pidal, t. VIII-I, ed. M. J. Viguera Molins (Madrid, I 994), 59.
2 M. Meouak, Saqiiliba, 20 I; M. Maqdish, Nuzhat a/-an?iir ft 'ajii 'ib al-tawiir"ikh wa a/-Akhbiir, 2
vols., eds. 'A. ZuwarI and M. Ma}:ifiidh (Beirut, 1988), I :429.

Almeria.3 Moreover, before and after this date, Mujahid's influence extended into a
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large part of the Sharq al-Anda/us. His itinerant court went through Tortosa and
Valencia before settling in Denia, and he must have exercised his weight as fata kabir
among the 'Amirid refugees throughout the region.
Mujahid's influence comes through in regional recognition of his caliph, al
Mu'aytI, since Ibn Bashkuwal writes that the khutba was pronounced in his name
from minbars throughout the east.4 Khayran's disappointment in 'AlI b. I:-Iammud led
him to recognize al-Mu'aytI for a time around 407/106-7.5 The Denia caliphate thus
did not divide the Sharq al-Anda/us 'A.mirids, though we should not exaggerate its
unifying potential. Mujahid did little more than send out letters carrying his and his
caliph's new laqabs, and does not seem to have made any real effort to extend the
Denia caliphate over al-Andalus, not even to those territories under Siqlabz control.
Khayran's numismatic recognition of al-Mu'aytI may have even been tied to the
caliph's rebellion against Mujahid during the Sardinia invasion. The Saqaliba elite
were not necessarily submitting themselves to Mujahid's f:iijii,ba in recognizing his
caliph, rather they were seeking to legitimize their power against I:-Iammudid claims.6
Nevertheless, Mujahid's ability to promote his caliphate reflects directly on his place
3 Mujahid seems to have maintained semi-autonomous power before this, since lbn 'ldharT writes that
the khufba was pronounced for no one prior to this: "J:>..'i JC::Y 'J u\S _.,"; lbn 'ldharT, Bayan, 3: 116.
Given the uncertain nature of his own legitimacy and the AndalusT political situation, Mujahid must
have been reticent to insert his own name into the weekly prayer. Later, he would not hesitate to use
this tool to assert his position.
4 "��\ ..>!�\ � .J c,..,b. _., ,u,J.l.i'il J� ;._j)l..:Jt., .J t,>! _.,", lbn Bashkiiwal (1989), 413, no. 598.
5 Khayran issued a dirham in al-Mu'aytI's name in that year: A. Prieto y Vives, Los Reyes de taifas,
182, no. 140; G. Miles, Coins of the Spanish MuHik al-Tawa'if, 44, no. 160; A. Ariza Armada, "Las
cecas de taifas bajo dominio eslavo," 149-150.
6 This same form of recognition appears later around Hisham ll's reappearance in Seville, as a
number of taifas took advantage of the situation to legitimize their rule and implement fiscal policies
through monetary issues in Hisham's name.
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in the hierarchy of'Amirid clients.
Mujahid's eminence among the Saqaliba led his peers to solicit his help
outside of Denia on numerous occasions. As dynasties and taifas failed or converged
over the course of the century, the communitarian nature of Siqlabf power dissipated.
In the early years of the fitna, however, ambiguous sovereignty and the residual
influence of the 'Amirid hierarchy allowed the regime's former officers to exercise
considerable influence over territories controlled by their lesser peers.

Khayran

extended his power into Murcia through shared power with Zuhayr, and for a time
supported Mul)ammad b. al-Mu?:affar 'Abd al-Malik b. Mul)ammad b. AbI'Amir al
Man$lir in that same region.7 The 'Amirid 'abfd in Valencia and Jativa played off
conflicts between Mujahid and Khayran, alternating between the patronages of both.
Mu?:affar and Mubarak, the fityan who took control of Valencia after Mujahid's
departure sometime after 401/1010-1 and themselves an example of shared power,
enjoyed the support of Khayran.8 When thefata Labib, emir ofTortosa, was called in
after Mubarak's death in 408/1018-9, he invited Mujahid to share sovereignty not
only in Valencia, but also in Tortosa, and the khutba was pronounced in both their
names in those two taifas. 9 The two Saqaliba argued and LabTo left for Tortosa in
410/1019-20, but the 'Amirid 'abid invested Mujahid as their leader and continued to

7 lbn al-KhatTb, Kitab a 'ma/ al-a 'lam, 223-4, 248.
8 Khayran's involvement in Valencia is indicated by a dirham issued there in his name in 404/1013-4;

A. Canto, T. b. l:I lbrahTm, "Suplemento," 132, no. 26; lbn Bassan1, Dhakhrra, 3:15.
9 Akhbar duwwal muliik al-fawa 'if, 302; lbn Bassam, Dhakhfra, 3: I 9-20; lbn 'ldharT, Bayon, 3:163-4.

The sources do not specify if this authority was placed under a caliphal figure. Khayran and his
partisans invoked the l:lammudid caliphate - Mubarak and Mu�affar minted in 'AIT b. l:lammud's
name in 407, and al-Qasim al-Ma'mum invested Zuhayr and Khayran in their territories - but there is
no mention of Mujahid claiming similar recognition.
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pronounce the khutba in his name in Valencia until the arrival of 'Abd al-'Aziz b.
'Abd al-Rabman Sanchuelo in 411/1021-2.
The advantages for Mujahid in this shared sovereignty are not immediately
clear. He does not seem to have actively sought or maintained rule over Valencia,
and allowed 'Amirid mawiilf to oust him from there on two occasions. Denia's ruler
may not have had the means to counter the 'Amirid 'abzd in Valencia, but over the
course of the century the taifa of Denia tended to expand towards the south and west
and Mujahid did not push his northern borders farther than Bairen and the Serpis
nver.

Rather than territorial, Mujahid's interests to the north seem more fiscal.

Having the khutba pronounced in his name inferred claims to legitimacy perhaps in
conjunction with taxation. Mu?affar and Mubarak are more famous for their fiscal
abuse of local populations, but Mujahid must not have been indifferent to the 120,000
dinars the two fltyan raised monthly during their reign in Valencia and Jativa.10
Communitarian power was thus a way to share taxes legitimized by creating or
recognizing various caliphs, monetary production, and ceremonies such as the weekly
khutba. 11

Mujahid centered his attention on consolidating his power in the Sharq a/
Anda/us after the failed Sardinia invasion.

Despite his maritime defeat, Mujahid

remained, with Khayran, one of the principal regional actors.

Mujahid used his

influence among the 'Amirid mawiilf to advance his and his polity's interests beyond
10 Ibn Bassarn, DhakhTra, 3: 16; lbn 'ldharT, Bayan, 3: 160.
11 lbn l:layyan insists on the opulence of the Saqaliba taifas funded by abusive taxes, citing Mubarak
and Mu?affar's court; Ibn Bassarn, DhakhTra, 3: 16-9; A.-L. Prernare, P. Guichard, "Croissance urbaine
et societe mrale a Valence au debut de l'epoque des royaurnes de taifas (Xie siecle de J.-C.).
Traduction et comrnentaire d'un texte d'lbn Hayyan," R.O.M.M., 31 (1981): 15-30,passim.
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its borders.

During the second phase of this reign, Mujahid built alliances with

weaker but strategically important taifas such as Tortosa, while facing off Valencia
and Almeria.

This system of evolving alliances and confrontations developed

according to the taifa's maritime orientation and Iberian geopolitics, both of which
were heavily influenced by the Mediterranean networks.

Tortosa
Tortosa's dar al-�ina 'a, port and natural resources drew envrous attention from
neighboring states. Bordering the Catalan territories to the north, the taifa became a
tributary client of Barcelona, while the route that linked Zaragoza to the sea following
the Ebro valley passed through its territory.

Tortosa was an important piece in

regional geopolitical strategies, and became an essential element in Barcelona and
Denia's efforts to block Zaragoza's expansion towards the sea. The successive rulers
of Tortosa thus entered into protective alliances, and specifically favored relations
with the taifa of Denia.
Mujahid exercised power in Tortosa before settling in Denia, and probably
before the events of 399/1009-10. Ibn MaqdTsh remarks that the slaves placed by al
Man�ur to administrate the Sharq al-Anda/us took power there, while Ibn 'IdharI
writes that al-Man�ur himself placed Mujahid in the region. 12 Mujahid left Cordova
in 400/1010- after the death of Mul)ammad al-MahdI, for whom he had betrayed his
former patron 'Abd al-Ral)man Sanchuelo -, returning to lands under his control in
".i)l,JI t4'1.J '?�\ y'u:. 0! .J�\ 4JL... l_,;\S o.ic. :i_,J\i...JI L.JA t\j J," M. MaqdTsh, Nuzhat al-an+ar, I :429;
lbn 'ldharT, Bayc'in, 3: 155-6.
12
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the Sharq al-Anda/us. According to Ibn Khaldiln and al-Qalqashandi, Mujahid took
control of Tortosa at the beginning of the.fitna, before continuing on to Denia, though
no explanation is provided as to why Mujahid chose to tum his back on the caliphal
arsenal and fleet in Tortosa.13 LabTb, the first ruler of Tortosa, enjoyed Denia's
support, so it is not likely that he ousted Mujahid. lbn KhatTb does not include LabTb
among 'Abd al-Malik's.fityiin al-akbiir, but he was a 'Amirid Siqliibz client. Sources
do not document his arrival in Tortosa, and rarely mention him outside his relations
with Denia and Valencia.
Tortosa's initial weakness may have resulted from LabTb's lesser status under
the erstwhile regime, as well as immigration patterns at the beginning of the fitna.
Mujahid, on the other hand, as one of the principal 'Amirid officers, had a large
support base that was essential in establishing his power in Denia. Mubarak and
Mu{':affar were not as influential as Mujahid, but they did benefit from the waves of
'Amirid clients who immigrated to Valencia. 14 Those clients, many of whom had
military experience, helped the Saqiiliba pair impose their rule on the local
population, while also fending off aggression from neighboring taifas. LabTb thus had
fewer assets than his peers, which may explain the dependency of his regime. LabTb
may even have had client ties with Mujahid, who left Tortosa without seemingly
ruling out a regular presence there. Mujahid could thus dedicate his attention to
13 lbn Khaldiin, Kitab al- 'ibar, 4:355; al-QalqashandT, 256.
14 lbn al-KhatTo includes Mu?affar in his list of 'Abd al-Malik's firyan, but he did not rank with
Mujahid, Khayran, or Wa<;lil). In addition, according to lbn J:layyan, both Valencian rnlers were former
clients of Mufarrij al-'AmirT, the administrator responsible for MadTnat al-Zahra', who was in tum a
client of the 'Amirid J:,ojib. lbn J:layyan also writes that, although Mu?affar had rndimentary writing
and equestrian skills, indicating a privileged place among the Saqoliba group, Mubarak was the real
leader in Valencia; lbn Bassam, DhakhTra, 3:16, 18.
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building his maritime power in Denia and the Balearics, while knowing he could rely
on Tortosa and its resources.
Mujahid's conscious involvement in this taifa implies two series of factors.
Firstly, his Mediterranean ambitions required Tortosa's maritime resources. Its place
in the maritime networks, as well as its exceptional timber supplies made Tortosa's
port and naval shipyards vital centers of interest for Mujahid. Tortosa's complicity
was thus necessary for any commercial or pirate activities. This is directly implied by
the fact that the raids on the Catalan coast that attracted Roger of Tosney's Norman
adventurers coincided with Mujahid's co-regency over Tortosa.15 The cooperative
relations between the two ports appear again after the raid on the monastery of Lerins
in 1046.16 Since the captive monks appeared in Tortosa and Denia's markets, ships
from both ports likely participated in the attack and split the booty, indicating
moreover a shared economy between the two ports.
Tortosa also served as a piece in Denia's efforts to restrict Zaragozan
expansion towards the sea. This expansion was a constant dilemma for Denia, and
Zaragoza exerted pressure in that direction throughout the century.

Denia thus

worked in conjunction with Barcelona to prop up Tortosa to maintain their own
spheres of influence along the coast and contain the aggressive Banu TujTb and Hud.
Mundhir b. Yal;ya al-TujTbT first tried to take Tortosa shortly before 408 or 409/10178. lbn al-Khatib credits Mubarak of Valencia with coming to LabTb's aid, bringing

15
16

Ademari Cabannensis chronicon, 174; L. Musset, "Aux origins d'une classe dirigeante," 52-3.
Vita s. Ysarno, c. 5, 747-9.

5000 horsemen (foris) to help fend off the TujTbT.

17
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Mujahid does not appear in this

story, but his problems with Khayran during the same period may have impeded his
ability to intervene. Nevertheless, the 5000 faris mentioned by al-Khatib, even if
exaggerated, does speak to the serious menace that Zaragoza posed for the taifa of
Tortosa.
The Valencians chose LabTb to replace Mubarak after his death, giving the
Siqlabz control over the two cities. This most likely included Jativa, since that city
had also been under Mubarak's control, and its 'Amirid elite often acted in concert
with those of Valencia. 18 Ruling the two taifas seems to have been beyond LabTb's
abilities, since he invited Mujahid to share sovereignty over both. 19 This invitation
seems to indicate an effective submission on LabTb's part, since the khufba was
conjointly pronounced in their names in Tortosa and Valencia, while Mujahid
remained sole ruler in Denia. It was LabTb who needed to share his power. LabTb's
weak hold on power was threatened, in fact, on two fronts. He seems first of all to
have imposed taxes that were even more onerous than those criticized under Mubarak
and Mu{'.affar, provoking a rebellion in Tortosa.20 Unable to remain in power alone,
LabTb sought aid from the "tyrant" Ramon, and was accused of becoming one of the

17
Mundh1r's nephew, Mu}:iarib b. 'Isa al-TujThT died during the attack; lbn al-Khatib, Kitiib a'miil al
a'liim, 259.
18
lbn Bassam, Dhakhfra, 3: 19-20; lbn 'ldhan, Bayon, 3: 163. For Mubarak's control over Jativa, see
lbn al-KhatTo, Kitiib a 'ma! al-a 'lam, 259.
19
Akhbiir duwwal muhik al-/awii 'if, 302.
20 Ibn Bassam writes that he introduced new things for which he was detested: •fo.. \ji.i.,,.\ � W.,l ..:.,.i.:..l.i
4-,; Dhakhrra, 3:19.
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Barcelonan count's agents.

21

Catalan mercenary aid was common among the

Saqiiliba taifas, but LabTb's use of Christian forces against his own subjects provoked
them into requesting aid from lbn Hud, governor of Lerida, in their efforts to expulse
their ill-chosen ruler. Mujahid's role in the narrative is not clear at this point. LabTb
ruled both Tortosa and Valencia, but lbn ijayyan switches indeterminably between
the two cities, and mentions only Tortosa as the specific place for this rebellion. He
also writes that Mujahid was angered by lbn Hud because of the affront to his power
in Tortosa. The anonymous author of the Akhbiir duwwal muluk al-fawii 'if does not
specify when exactly Labib invited Mujahid to share his rule. He also indicates that
conflict between LabTb and Mujahid pushed the former to retire to Tortosa, leaving
Mujahid with exclusive rule over Valencia.22 lbn ijayyan, on the other hand, writes
that "the horizon darkened between [Ibn Hud] and Mujahid" because of what had
transpired in Tortosa, and the war that followed devastated the region. We have to
wonder then if Mujahid was pushed from power in Tortosa by LabTb or lbn Hud.23
Even if he was not co-regent with LabTb at this time, Mujahid consciously implicated
himself in the affairs of Valencia and Tortosa.
These events indicate the principal characteristics of the interests surrounding
Tortosa. Mujahid became directly involved at Labib's request, but this also seems to
Ibn Bassam, DhakhTra, 3: I 9-20. Ibn l:layyan gives only "Raimundo" for the count. Since the
events happened sometime around the succession between Ramon Borrell and Beranger Ramon in
IO 18, it is not possible to determine which count was involved.
22
Akhbiir duwwa/ muHik al-/awii 'if, 302.
23 Rubiera Mata and Guichard write that Mujahid backed out of this war suddenly without any
,
apparent reason. However, neither lbn Bassam nor lbn 'IdharT describe this, and we have found no
mention of it elsewhere. lbn l:layyan's description of the destruction caused by the conflict would
seem to indicate a considerable level of dedication on Mujahid's part. M.J. Rubiera Mata, La taifa de
Denia, 78; P. Guichard and B. Soravia, Les royaumes des taifas, 46.
21
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have been the formalization of an at least latent relationship between the two. As
noted above, Mujahid did not share power in his own base territories of Denia and the
Balearics.

Did LabTh call in Mujahid to discourage Hudid intervention?

Was

conjointly pronouncing the khufba in Mujahid and LabTh's names calculated to shore
up Tortosa's position vis-a-vis threats from Zaragoza and Lerida? The Catalans
likewise understood the need to intervene in favor of their Siqliibz ally against Ibn
Hud. Relations between Barcelona and Zaragoza were amicable at this point, and
Mundhir b. Abmad al-TujThT had brokered the marriage between the daughter of
Sancho Garcia of Castile and the son of Ramon Borrell. It was moreover probably
through his intervention that the Catalans sent support for al-Murtac;la's caliphal
campaign. Nevertheless, expansion by Zaragoza or Lerida towards the sea would
have worried the Barcelonan court, which held its own aspirations for these territories
to the south.
LabTo's rule seems to have continued in Tortosa, despite Ibn Hud's
intervention, until 427/1035-6, when another Siqliibz, Muqatil, succeeded him.
Sources do not provide many details on relations between Denia and Tortosa at this
time, but the two ports remained linked, as shown by the shared participation in the
Lerins raid. 'AIT b. Mujahid welcomed Muqatil's son at his court for a time, though
he took for himself a horse the father had sent for his son.24 Despite these ties, Ibn
Hud seems to have gained influence over Tortosa at this time, if not previously under
LabTo.

24

For the year 434/1043-4, Ibn 'IdharT writes that there were three taifa

Ibn Bassam, DhakhTra, 3:273-4.
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coalitions, two of which recognized the caliph Hisham II - one around Sulayman b.
Hud ofZaragoza, and the other around 'Abbad al-Mu'tac;lid of Seville - and the third
under the Berber caliphate of 'Idris b. Yal_lya b. 'AlI b. I:Iammud of Malaga.25
Mujahid's allegiances were with the 'Abbadid faction, while Muqatil ofTortosa sided
with the Banu Hud of Zaragoza. In addition, when Jativa 'Amirids assassinated
Muqatil for 'Abd al-'Aziz of Valencia in 445/1053-4, Mundhir b. Al_lmad b.
Sulayman b. Hud heatedly complained to the Valencian ruler.26 Muqatil was replaced
by Ya'la, whose reign lasted only a few years before he was in tum replaced by the
Siqliibt, Nabil. 27 Prieto y Vives believed this last ruler ofindependent Tortosa to have
been placed there by Zaragoza.28 In fact, the name NabTI appears on a dirham issued
by Mundhir b. Yal_lya al-TujibI in 428/1036-7, while NabTl's coins in Tortosa carried
the title khalifa, or officer, perhaps indicating subservience to a more powerful court.
Even ifsuch was the case, it did not suffice for Al_lmad b. Sulayman b. Hud, who took
the taifa in 453/1061-2 and confided it to his son, Mundhir, who would later add
Denia to his territories in 468/1075-6.
Zaragoza 's success in gaining access to the seaboard, and especially its
annexation of Tortosa, greatly worried Barcelona and Denia.

The parias that

Barcelona extorted from Tortosa and Lerida were also payments for protection from
Zaragoza.29 While the Hudid taifa was working its way towards the sea and Tortosa,
25
lbn 'IdharT, Bayiin, 3:219.
26 lbn Bassam, Dhakhira, 3: 172. We should note that Mundhir himself took over Tortosa for his
father after the taifa's annexation by Zaragoza in 452/1060-1.
27
A. Prieto y Vives, Los reyes, I 90-191; A. Vives y Escudero, Monedas, 210-212.
28
A. Prieto y Vives, Los reyes, 39.
29 P. Bonnassie, La Catalogne, 663-4.
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Denia and Barcelona seem to have strengthened their ties: the 450/1058 treaty should
definitely be read in this context. 'AlI b. Mujahid was militarily too weak to resist the
Bam1 Hud, and so turned to Barcelona for support. The chronology is imprecise, but
Ibn 'IdharI informs us that al-Muqtadir b. Hud had to face Christian soldiers after
taking Tortosa.30
The taifa of Tortosa thus does not seem to have been able to survive by its
own devices, despite the advantages provided by its port, timber supply and place
along the major road and maritime networks. These were in fact partly the reason the
taifa's rulers had to incessantly rely on allies for their survival.

A particular

relationship due to their former 'Amirid patron seems to have linked Mujahid and
LabTo, and possibly Muqatil, but Denia's interests in the taifa came from its
geopolitical importance. Denia and Tortosa were likewise tied by maritime networks,
and their inland territories were in some way intermixed.31 Zaragoza's expansion into
this zone seriously compromised Denia's chances for survival.

Valencia
Valencia occupied a central place in the coastal road networks, able to filter in part
Denia's access to the Via Augusta, as well as the supply of wood that passed from
Cuenca through Alcira and Cullera, but Mujahid and 'AlI do not seem to have
expressed much interest in the kura of Valencia and its taifa. Mujahid's direct
30 fbn 'IdharI Bayiin, 3:224.
,
31 Ibn Bassam writes that al-Muqtadir wanted to join some of Denia's fortifications to Tortosa. While
the two taifas did not share a contiguous border, their territorial networks must have come together at
some point; Dhakhfra, 4: 184.
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intervention in this region was limited to the earliest years of the fitna, and was more
the result of'Amirid administrative structures and Saqiiliba immigration that any real
interest in the area. In addition, perhaps to dissuade Mujahid from developing plans,
the taifa of Valencia, under Mubarak and Mu?affar and'Abd al-'AzTz al-Man$ur, was
placed under more powerful patronage, including Khayran and the Berber
I:Iammudids.
Mujahid's reasons for leaving Valencia are not clear, but it is possible that his
position there was destabilized by the massive influx of 'Amirid clients, many of
whom may have opposed him given his betrayal of 'Abd al-Ral)man Sanchuelo. 32 As
in Tortosa, sources do not indicate that Mujahid actively resisted his expulsion from
Valencia, and he only returned there at LabTb's invitation, after the death of Mubarak,
sometime around 408-9/1017-8. In the mean time, Mujahid had begun work on his
own taifa based on the Mediterranean, preparing even his invasion of Sardinia, and
Valencia's place in that scheme would only have been as a conduit for lumber. After
his failed invasion of Sardinia, Mujahid would have lacked the immediate resources
to reestablish his hold over the kura of Valencia, especially since the Saqiiliba in
Valencia and Jativa seem to have supported Khayran, Mujahid's chief rival. 33
Denia's ruler did not interfere in Mubarak's affairs, though he did harbor 'Abd al
'AzTz b. Aflal) when he was chased from Jativa by the Valencian ruler. 34
32

Khayran, for example, resided in Jativa, before returning to Cordova in 400 to overturn the regime
of MuJ:iammad b. 'Abd al-Jubbar al-Mahdi; lbn 'Idhari, Bayiin, 3:96.
33
Cf. the dirham struck in Khayran's name in Valencia in 404/1013; A. Canto Garcia, T. b. 1:L
Ibrahim, "Supplemento," I 32, no. 26.
34 Jbn al-Khatib, Kitiib a 'miil al-a 'lam, 259. This may in fact be the lbn Aflab to whom lbn Darraj
dedicated a poem in Denia, and who subsequently died alongside his father, Aflab, in Almeria in 405.
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The people of Valencia called on LabTb to replace Mubarak after his death,
though this was most certainly the 'Amirid 'abfd, and not the Valencians in general,
who confided their city into LabTb's hands. The 'abzd in fact, appear often in this role
throughout the fitna. When the alliance between LabTb and Mujahid in Valencia
broke down, Mujahid remained ruler there through the support of the 'Amirid 'abfd,
receiving the bay'a from them in 410/419-20. 35 For nearly two years the khutba was
pronounced there in Mujahid's name in Valencia, where he was the "leader of the
'Amirid 'abfd," before, that is, they rebelled and chose to replace Mujahid with 'Abd
al-'AzTz b. 'Abd al-Ral)man, grandson of al-Man�ur, 411/1021-2.
During this time, Mujahid maintained a policy of aggressive expansion to the
south, a sign that his Sardinian failure had not diminished his ambitions. In control of
Denia and the kura of Valencia and Jativa, Mujahid sought to expand his influence of
the territories south of the Jibal Balansiya, following the routes that linked the urban
centers of the Sharq al-Anda/us. He thus invaded territories in northern Tudm"ir under
Khayran's control, taking over Murcia and Orihuela and inflicting a major naval
defeat on Khayran's fleet in Almeria. 36 Mujahid's temporary mastery of the Sharq
al-Anda/us ended quickly though, since he was chased from Valencia and pushed
back from Tudm"ir, forced back to his core territories around Denia, the Balearics and
If such is the case, Wasserstein's argument that Mujahid could not have entered Denia before 405
needs to be reconsidered: D. Wasserstein, The Caliphate in the West, 121-4.
35
Akhbar duwwal mu/ilk al-fawo 'if, 302.
36
Khayran was forced to seek help from MuJ:iammad b. 'Abd al-Malik, another of al-Man�ur's
grandsons, offering to cede to him any territories he could take back from Mujahid: lbn al-KhatTh, 2234. Mujahid sent the poet Sa'id al-BaghdadT a sack of dinars and a letters announcing his naval victory:
lbn Bassam, Dhakhfra, 4:12-3. lbn I:Iazm relates a story in which a friend who came to visit him in
Jativa was unable to return to his love in Almeria because Mujahid had blocked all naval and terrestrial
access to the city; Tawq al-hamama, 149-50.
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the Mediterranean sea lanes.
Mujahid does not seem to have attempted to preserve his rule in Valencia,
though the sources are certainly not clear on the circumstances surrounding his
departure. The Akhbiir duwwal muluk al-fawii 'if describes a rebellion by the 'ab'id,
while Ibn I::Iayyan seems to indicate a more voluntary exit: "When Mujahid left the
'Amirid clients, they entrusted the matter to their leaders who advised them to
recogmze one of their [ ...] and they agreed on the son of their patron, 'Abd al
'AzTz."37 This retreat may have coincided with the conflict with Khayran and his
temporary ally, Mubammad b. 'Abd al-Malik b. al-Man�ur, forcing Mujahid to
concentrate his resources on his acquisitions in the Vinalop6 and Segura valleys.
Whatever the reason, Mujahid did not dispute 'Abd al-'AzTz's investiture, though,
like his fellow 'Amirids, he did not submit to his fonner patron's grandson.
'Abd al-'AzTz became ruler of Valencia in 411/1021, but the sources do not
describe conflicts between the taifa and Denia during the initial years of his reign. In
fact, Valencia does not seem to have interested Mujahid. Plus, 'Abd al-'AzTz's ability
to block Denia's access to the major road networks may have been a considerable
deterrent to any plans to discomfort his rule (Valencia, on the other hand, required the
access to Mediterranean markets that Denia's port provided). 'Abd al-'AzTz may also
have built a considerable network of alliances to protect himself.

Since fleeing

37 "•#�I-.)<:. tli f,," Akhbiir duwwal muhik al-fawii'if, 302; " ..lA>l,... '-:-'u.:i � uJ:ly,WI ._.11_,..JI ul.S
j/j.JI ::,.,c- f"'>'i_,,. 0!1 c)c lfa:ili -J ufa..:/ �i u-- -»-'i �\.:i:i) <) IJ.JJLl:i J � � .)) f"'>y,I IJ.li....l .li f"'>� f"'>..»fi,"
Ibn al-KhatTb, 224-5; lbn 'ldhar1, Bayiin, 3:164; lbn Bassam, Dhakhfra, 3:186. Given 'Abd al-'Az1z's
age at the time, between fourteen and fifteen years old, it is most likely that the 'abTd were simply
looking for a legitimizing figure for their own power; P. Guichard and B. Saravia, Les royaumes des
taifas, 44.
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Cordova, this son of 'Abd al-Ra}:iman Sanchuelo had been harbored by the TujTbT
court in Zaragoza, and Mundhir b. Yal:iya al-TujTbT may have seen this investiture as
means to expand his influence in the area - after resolving himself to losing this
precious pawn in the games of legitimacy. 38 'Abd al-'AzTz wrote to the I:Iammudid
caliph al-Qasim and had the khufba pronounced in his name, receiving in tum the
laqab al-Mii'tamin.

The caliph also sent four kuttab to aid the new ruler in

administrating his state. With this support, and that of the 'Amirid 'abzd who had
brought him to power, in addition to the weight of his prestigious heritage, 'Abd al'AzTz must have inspired a minimum of respect among his neighbors. Denia and
Valencia seem to have gone without open conflict until 'Abd al-'Aziz's acquisition of
TudmTr and Almeria in 429/1038, causing war to break out with Mujahid.
This conflict, as we shall see below, allowed Mujahid to enlarge his taifa,
recover northern Tudmir, and expand his power along the inland road networks as far
as Jaen.

'Abd al-'Aziz had inherited these territories after the death of Zuhayr,

former client of his father. 39 He likewise inherited Zuhayr's conflict the Berber Banii
ZirI in Granada. The conflict seems the result of hubris or vanity on Zuhayr's part,
but 'Abd al-'Aziz's decision to continue has no clear explanation, especially since
'Abd Allah b. BuluqqTn claims the Valencian ruler had benefitted from exceptional

38 Guichard notes, however, that Mundhir b. Yabya's intentions are not clear. According to lbn
tiayyan, 'Abd al-'Az1z left Zaragoza secretly, indicating that the TujTuid had other intentions for this
protege. Ibn al-Kha\Th, on the other hand, mentions no complications; lbn 'ldhar1, Bayan, 3:164; lbn
Bassam, Dhakhzra, 3:186; lbn al-Kha\Th, Kitab a 'ma! al-a 'lam, 225; P. Guichard and B. Saravia, Les
royaumes des taifas, 32.
39 lbn 'ldhan, Bayan, 3:167; lbn al-Kha\Th, 219. lbn Bassam specifies that the territories fell to 'Abd
al-'Aziz because Zuhayr had been among the slaves (ti/ad) of the house of this grandfather; Dhakh"ira,
I :557.

support from his grandfather, Badis b. I:Iabbus, in Granada.

40

Nevertheless, a
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contingent of Catalan mercenaries was enrolled, and Mujahid allowed himself to be
convinced to come out against the Berbers. 'Abd al-'Aziz most likely proposed to
share territories conquered, and Mujahid's interest in the region is indicated by his
subsequent control over Segura and Baeza. Mujahid did not follow through though,
backing down at the last minute, provoking 'Abd al-'Aziz to call him a coward, an
insult that must have facilitated the war that Mujahid brought against the territories
under his control.41
The ruler of Valencia lost Almeria and most of his Tudmir territories in the
conflict that followed.42 No exact information appears in sources to indicate where
Mujahid and 'Abd al-'Aziz's forces met. However, Mujahid's attack did provoke a
general dissention among the governors who formally served Valencia, forcing 'Abd
al-'Aziz to send for help from his mother's Castilian connections.43 He was able to
save Jativa, but lost almost all other territories inherited from Zuhayr; the bu�iin of
Tudmir as far as Jaen transferred their loyalty to Mujahid, while the governor of
40 lbn 'ldhar1, Bayan, 3:169; 'Abd Allah b. Buluqqtn, Tibyan, 77.
41 'Abd Allah b. Buluqq1n attributes this change of mind to Mujahid's reticence to face the Berbers,
whose warrior prowess he had known while serving the 'Amirids: Tibyan, 77.
42 Mujahid's conflict was not solely with Valencia. lbn Khaldun mentions a war between Mujahid
and Mubammad b. 'Abd Allah b. Qasim, the ruler of the taifa of Alpuente, though he does not provide
any details. Moreover, al-Mu'ta<;lid b. 'Abbad of Seville wrote a letter to Mujahid, lbn Mundhir of
Zaragoza, 'Abd al-'Az1z of Valenia and Abmad 'A<;lud al-Dawla of Alpuente, reproaching them for
using Christian mercenaries in their fights among each other. Mujahid's fight with Alpuente may have
grown from the war with Valencia, as a result of an alliance between the two. Mujahid may also have
been tempted by Alpuente's location along routes connected Valencia, Zaragoza and Toledo; Kitab al
'ibar, 4:354; lbn Bassam, Dhakhlra, I :480. Samelli Cerqua ties lbn 'Abbad's letter to conflict with
the Berber's, but the text is not specific, and Mujahid seems, in fact, to have avoided conflict with the
Berbers; "La vita intelletuale," 616-7.
43 Akhbar duwwal muhik al-tawa 'if, 302; lbn al-KhatTo, 224. Sources do not specify that Mujahid
enrolled mercenaries of his own, but Ibn Abbad's letter may indicate this. In addition, Denia's
renewed monetary production from 430/1038-9, may have been in part to pay for Catalan services.
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Almeria, Ma'an b. Sumadil) declared his own independence. Hostilities continued,
and reached a point where Sulayman b. Hud felt it necessary to intervene and broker a
peace, lest the war weaken al-Andalus as a whole against Christian threats. 44 To help
ensure the peace, a triple alliance was built and consecrated through three marriages:
'AII b. Mujahid married a daughter of Sulayman b. Hud, while his sister was given in
marriage to 'Abd al-'AzTz.45 Valencia was thus severely weakened by this conflict
with Denia, and became dependant on the emerging inland powers, drawn towards
both the Dhu 'I-Nun of Toledo and the Banu Hud of Zaragoza, while payingparias to
Castile. 'Abd al-'AzTz was able to maintain a relative balance within the major
coalitions of the mid century: an alliance with Toledo was cemented through a
marriage between his son, 'Abd al-Malik, and the daughter of al-Ma'mun Yai)ya b.
Dhu 'l-Nun; Ibn 'IdharT lists Valencia as part of Zaragoza's faction in the list of taifas
recognizing Hisham II's caliphate. Despite these precautions, and as was the case
with 'AII b. Mujahid and the Banu Hud, the marriage alliance with Toledo did not
prevent the Banu Dhu 1-Nun from forcing their way into Valencia. In fact, the end of
'Amirid rule in Valencia is comparable to Denia's fall to Zaragoza, with the taifa's
annexation by a more powerful inland state searching for access to the sea.46
Relations between Denia and Valencia did calm, though, before their
respective ends. Mujahid had acquired the territories he was interested in and which
gave him regular access to the inland road networks, and he thus accepted the peace

44

lbn Bassam, DhakhTra, 3:314.
M.J. Rubiera Mata, la taifa de Denia, 87.
46 See Guichard's summary of these events in his Les musulmans de Valence, I :62-5.
45
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proposed by Sulayman b. Hud. The diverging alliances maintained by Denia and
Valencia probably indicates a mutual mistrust or apprehension, but sources do not
describe further violence between them, and Mujahid and 'Abd al-'Aziz exchanged
reconciliatory letters.

Later, when I:Iasan b. Mujahid tried to upset the dynastic

succession in Denia by assassinating his brother, 'AlI wrote to his brother-in-law to
the north to inform him of the treachery.47

'Abd al-'Aziz allowed his wife to

accommodate her banished brother, but he honored his pact and refused to help in
I:Iasan's plans. 48 Diplomatic correspondence between the two courts, now without
the insults that had colored Mujahid and 'Abd al-'Aziz's exchanges, indicates
stability in their relations. 49

'AlI b. Mujahid did not share his father's martial

ambitions, and inherited a taifa with sufficient territories to pursue his mercantile and
maritime interests.

Tudmir and Almeria
Denia expanded towards the south and west, occupying principal strategic points in
an effort to control or at least ensure access to the maritime and road networks that
linked the peninsular interior and the Mediterranean. Mujahid and 'AlI could extract

47 lbn Bassam, DhakhTra, 3: 130-1.
48 lbn 'ldharT, Bayan, 3: 158.
49 On the libelous messages exchanged between Mujahid and 'Abd al-'AzTz, see M.J. Rubiera Mata,
La taifa de Denia, 87; C. Samelli Cerqua, "La vita intelletuale," 611; C. Samelli Cerqua, Mujahid al
'Amir"i, 218. Perhaps the most well-known of these insults is 'Abd al-'AzTz's reminder to Mujahid of
the difference between their family backgrounds: ")y:,.'.71 � �I � / )y � 4-,JI_,.. �," lbn
Bassam, DhakhTra, 3: 172; Jbn Sa'Td, Al-Mughr"ib fl f:iula al-maghrib, ed. S. l)ayf (Cairo, 1953), 1 :332.
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considerable revenue from tolls, while also safeguarding supply routes towards their
ports, where they would also receive duties from markets and customs houses.
Stronger states to the north, namely Zaragoza and Barcelona, made expansion in that
direction impracticable. Denia exerted constant pressure on northern Tudmir and
benefited from 'Abd al-' AzTz's inability to hold together such vast territories. Before
Mujahid's success however, his efforts in TudmTr were more often part of his larger
conflicts with Khayran.
Mujahid and Khayran were the two most important of the 'Amirid $aqiiliba,
and Ibn al-KhatTb specifically underlines their exploits and renown.so Like Mujahid,
Khayran had been one of 'Abd al-Malik's principal officers and participated directly
in the events at the beginning of the fitna, the difference being that Khayran remained
loyal to the 'Amirid regime. Levi-Proven9al wrote that Khayran was addled and
unscrupulous, and served only his own ambitions.st Nevertheless, even if Khayran
did change camps often, his actions during the fitna seem tied to a real loyalty
towards his former patrons and the Umayyad house, more so than simple self
promotion and vainglory.s2

In fact, it was only his success and personal power

among the members of the $aqiiliba community that distinguished him from his
peers. Moreover, those same peers followed him in almost all his decisions. While
Mujahid was accused of betraying his patron and turning his back on his fellow
'Amirid clients, Khayran became their leader, especially after the death of Wa<;lil).

50

lbn al-KhatTb, Kitab a 'ma/ al-a '/am, 121.
E. Levi-Provenr;:al, HEM, 3:329
52
P. Scales, The Fall, 96.
51

According to al-Maqqar1, Khayran governed Almeria under al-Man�ur.53
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Though this is in contradiction with other authors, Khayran most likely occupied
some influential position in the region prior to thefitna. 54 Khayran was probably part
of the palatine administration purged by al-Mahdi, and became one of the leaders of
the Saqiiliba who fled Cordova for the Sharq al-Anda/us. He worked from Jativa to
restore a pro-' Amirid regime in Cordova, while also working to secure Siqliibz power
in the East.
The arrival of Sulayman al-Musta'fa bi-Llah and his Berber supporters m
Cordova in 403/1013 forced a change on Khayran and his fellow Saqiiliba. Khayran
had left Jativa to support the regime of Wac;iil) under Hisham II. Though the caliph's
death did not cause the Slavs to abandon the regime, indeed it would seem that they
were its principal supports, the fall of this last 'Amirid Cordovan regime pushed its
clients to concentrate on reinforcing their power base in the Sharq al-Anda/us, and a
personal place in whatever order replace the old. Khayran thus set to constructing a
polity to the southeast.

He first established a hold over Orihuela in 403/1013,

expulsing the Berbers settled there.55 From Orihuela, he took Murcia and Tudmfr,
using the region to next expand into Almeria in 405/1014-5. This last city had been
under another Slav, Aflal), who had taken power there with the governor 'Abd al
Ral)man b. Rawish in 402/10 I 1-2, before eliminating his partner shortly before his

53

Al-MaqqarT, History, 257.
54 lbn al-KhatTb, al-'UdhrT and the author of the Primera cr6nica write that at the beginning of the
fitna, Almeria was governed by 'Abd al-Ral:iman b. Rawish and Afla):i, and that Khayran came to
power there later; lbn al-KhatTb, Kitiib a 'miil al-a 'lam, 242-3; al-'UdhrT, 82; Primera cr6nica, 461.
55
Al-'UdhrT, I 6.

own demise.
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Almeria and Tudm'ir offered Khayran a solid base, not only to ensure

his place at the head of the elite Saqctliba, but also to develop his own role in the
struggles surrounding the caliphate.

He supported first 'AlT b. I:Iammud against

Sulayman, before launching his own brief efforts at caliph creation with the candidate
al-Murta9a. While aimed at Cordova, much of Khayran effort was calculated to
strengthen his position vis-a-vis Mujahid.
Historians have tended to see in this period the beginning of Mujahid and
Khayran's rivalry.

Rubiera Mata considers not only that Khayran's success in

Almeria pushed Mujahid to declare the caliphate in Denia, but also that al-Mu'aytT's
new caliphal claims pushed Khayran to align with the I:Iammudids to protect his own
legitimacy. 57 Indeed, while both had served under the same patron, the fragmentation
of the fitna severed those connections. The influx of Amirid clients into the Sharq a/
Anda/us that began with Sulayman al-Musta'In bi-Llah's second reign compromised

Mujahid's plans in the region.

The Dhikr biliid al-Anda/us ascribes to Mujahid

control not only over Tortosa, Valencia and Denia, but also Tudmir, Lorca, Baeza and
J6dar as early as dMi al-bi;Jja 400/July-August 1010.58 This date corresponds with the
death of Mu]:iammad al-Mahdi, and corroborates Ibn Khaldun's affirmation that
Mujahid arrived in the region at this time. 59

The author of the Dhikr may be

amalgamating the territories under Mujahid's control over the course of his reign, and
especially those towards the end of his life, but the text is generally reliable, both in
56 Al-'UdhrT, 82.
57

M.J. Rubiera Mata, La taifa de Denia, 62; P. Guichard, B. Saravia, Les royaumes des taifas, 21-2.
58 Dhikr biliid al-Anda/us, I :217/2:229.
59
lbn 'ldharT, Bayiin, 3: I 00; lbn Khaldiin, Kitiib al- 'ibar, 4:354.

its chronology and general facts presented.
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Mujahid may then have exercised

considerable power over most of the Sharq al-Anda/us - but in whose name? - until
the 'Amirid clients led by Khayran displaced him. Khayran may have participated in
Mujahid's expulsion from Valencia by Mubarak and Mu?affar, as a dirham struck in
that city in his name in 404/1013-4 would seem to indi�ate.60 Al-'UdhrI writes that
he chased the Berbers from Orihuela and Tudmir to make a place for himself there,
though he does not mention conflict with Mujahid this early. The anarchy of this
period, along with the complete lack of clear legitimacy, makes it difficult to know
who held which territories beyond simple claims, but Khayran's subsequent regional
position points to authority from an early date.
Khayran's expansion likewise endangered Mujahid's maritime ambitions.
Through Almeria, with its dar al-:jina 'a and caliphal fleet, Khayran could easily
dominate the maritime resources of the Sharq al-Anda/us. Though he did not exploit
them with as much conviction as Mujahid, Khayran must certainly have been aware
of the strong legitimizing power of these symbols of the erstwhile caliphal regime. 61
In addition, the death of Muqatil in 403/1012-3 possibly brought the Balearics into
play. Control over the islands, along with Tortosa or Almeria, could have decided the
mastery of the Western Mediterranean.62 These events were likely among the factors
that pushed Mujahid towards his Mediterranean strategy.

With little recourse to

continental power, Mujahid turned to the maritime lanes and the naval and corsair
60 A. Canto, T. b. 1:L lbrahTm, "Supplemento," 132, no. 26.
Ch. Picard, La mer, 40-1.
62
According to lbn Khaldiin, Muqatil governed the Balearics under al-Man$iir and 'Abd al-Malik,
and died in 403/1012-3: lbn Khaldiin, Kitiib al- 'ibar, 4:353.
61
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policies he had carried out under the 'Amirid regime.
The enmity between Mujahid and Khayran should, however, be nuanced
somewhat.

Though Khayran's expansionism does seem to have pushed Mujahid

towards declaring the caliphate of al-Mu'ayt'f in 405/1015, Khayran's subsequent
alliance with the Barn} I:Iammild quickly fell apart, leaving him without legitimizing
recognition of his authority. This is probably the reason behind a 406/1015-6 dirham
struck in Almeria in the name of 'Abd Allah [al-Mu'aytI]. Khayran's name does not
appear on the piece, but the place name definitely implies his participation.63 Ibn
Bashkilwal does in fact write that al-Mu'aytI received the bay'a as caliph in the Sharq
al-Anda/us and the khutba was pronounced in his name throughout the East. 64
Khayran was not submitting to Mujahid, but using 'Abd Allah al-Mu'ayt"f's name did
imply recognition of the source of his legitimacy.
This was, nevertheless, only a brief respite in the conflict between Denia and
Almeria, and Khayran may even have contributed directly to al-Mu'ayt"f's rebellion
against Mujahid. 65 Mujahid returned from the failed Sardinia expedition only shortly
before the caliphal campaign of al-Murta<;la, the 'Amirid-sponsored candidate, and he

63 A. Prieto y Vives, Los Reyes de taifas, 182, no. 140; G. Miles, Coins of the Spanish Muhik al
Tawa 'if, 44, no. 160; A. Ariza Armada, "Las cecas de taifas bajo dominio eslavo," 149-50. There are
some identification problems for this dirham, and the date is not clear: A. Prieto y Vives does not
hazard a guess at the date, A. Vives y Escudero gives 4_3, and G. Miles and A. Ariza Armada indicate
406. However, though this date does correspond with the caliphate of 'Abd Allah al-Mu'ayF, it
precedes the ascension of 'Ali b. l;lammiid in mubarram 407, to which Khayran directly contributed;
lbn Khatib, Kitab a 'ma! al-a 'lam, 142, 152; Ibn Bassam, Dhakhfra, I :86.
64 Ibn Bashkiiwal (1989), 4 I 3, no. 598.
65 The simultaneity of the Aliita emission without Mujahid's name, and Khayran's piece mentioning
al-Mu'ayti may point in this direction.

does not seem to have participated in the venture.

66
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This abstention agrees with lbn

Bassam's claims that Mujahid split from the 'Amirids, which is not surprising given
Khayran's role at the head of this movement. Mujahid and Khayran came together a
few years later, in 417/1026, to expulse the Cordovan representative of Yal)ya b. 'AlI
b. I:Iammud at the request of the city's inhabitants.67

Their mutual disdain and

mistrust caused a falling out within a few months, and Khayran returned home.
Mujahid left the capital himself a short time later. The ambition of both men, and
their rivalry, would have made it impossible for them to work together on a long-term
basis, and their stay in the former caliphal capital probably convinced them of the
futility, and even absurdity, of any effort to restore the caliphate there. Cordova was,
moreover, too far removed from the maritime and Mediterranean networks that were
the base of Mujahid's power, and the former capital could only have had peripheral
status in his territories.
Mujahid's failure m Sardinia forced him to rethink his Mediterranean and
general strategy, bringing his attention back to the Sharq al-Anda/us. The invitation
to share power with Labib in Valencia and Tortosa offered him the opportunity to
rebuild his presence on the continent through the port of Denia, but Mujahid's
priorities lay to the south. His efforts over the next few years, and until the end of his
reign, focused on expanding into Tudmir, Khayran's sphere of influence. Sources do
not provide precise dates for the conflicts between Mujahid and Khayran, but at least
lbn al-KhatTh does not include him in the list of those 'Amirids who took the field against Granada,
and only lbn Khaldiin mentions him among the partisans of al-Murtac;la. Mujahid may have sworn the
bay 'a to stabilize his legitimacy in the aftem1ath of this own failed caliphate, without contributing
concretely to the actual campaign.
67
lbn 'ldharT, Bayiin, 3:143; lbn al-Kha\Th, Kitiib a'miil al-a'liim, 159.
66
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part of the hostilities occurred before 414/1023. Mujahid succeeded in occupying
Orihuela and Murcia, thus taking control of major portions of the network of
communications for the region. Though he had lost much of his fleet in Sardinia,
Mujahid was able to rebuild to the point of dominating the former center for caliphal
naval production.

Ibn I:Iazm writes that he blockaded the port, while Sa'id al

BaghdadI wrote a poem to commemorate a major naval victory over Khayran.68 The
ruler of Almeria had to call on Mul)ammad b. al-Muiaffar 'Abd al-Malik b.
Mul)ammad al-Man�ur, who had used his mother's inheritance to finance an army
and set himself up in Jaen.69 Though he had been passed over by the 'Amirid 'abfd of
Jativa and Valencia in favor of his cousin, 'Abd al-'Aziz, Mul)ammad's resources
were enough to oust Mujahid from Orihuela and Murcia. Differences, however, arose
between Khayran and his ally, and Mul)ammad turned to his former adversary,
Mujahid, for refuge.70 Khayran entrusted his fellow fata Zuhayr with governing
Tudmir, keeping Almeria for himself. With perhaps the support of the Banu $inhaja
of Granada, with whom Zuhayr was allied, the two fityan were able to block
Mujahid's peninsular ambitions, reinforcing the taifa's Mediterranean orientation.
Khayran died in 419/ l 028, and Zuhayr came into control of the territories
stretching from Almeria to Cordova, from Jativa to Baeza to the borders of Toledo.71
68 Ibn Bassam, DhakhTra, 4:12-3; lbn l:lazm, Tawq al-(lamama, 149-50.
69 lbn al-KhatTb, Kitab a 'ma! al-a 'lam, 223.

This tum of events is somewhat difficult to understand. Why would Mujahid protect the author of
his defeat in Tudm1r? Mu):iammad also sought refuge from his sister in Jativa: lbn Bassam, DhakhTra,
1:12-3. M.J. Rubiera Mata has tried to reconstruct Mu):iammad b. al-Mu�affar's life; "El principe
hastiado, Muhammad ibn 'Abdalmalik ibn Abu 'Amir, efimero soberano de Orihuela y Murcia," Sharq
al-Anda/us, 4 (1987): 73-82.
71
lbn al-KhatTh, Kitab a'ma/ a/-a'/am, 248; lbn 'ldhar1, Bayan, 3:168-9; al-'Udhr1, 83.
70
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Zuhayr's possessions, even without Jativa, which he ceded to 'Abd al-'AzTz alMan�ur, would have allowed him considerable power over Denia's access to
peninsular markets. Mujahid thus did not enter into direct conflict with his powerful
neighbor, though he did not renounce his overall strategy of building Denia's
influence in the region's communications networks. Instead of open confrontation,
Mujahid insinuated himself into a conflict between two factions of the Murcia elite the Banu Tahir and Barn} Khattab - over control of that city.72 Mujahid supported
Abu 'Amir b. Khattab against Abu Bakr Al)mad b. Tahir, hoping to gain his loyalty
and shift the city back to his domain.73 Denia was not, however, in a position to force
the situation, and Mujahid accepted to liberate Ibn Tahir in exchange for a large
ransom. This effectively conceded control over Murcia to Zuhayr, who proceeded to
imprison Ibn Khattab in Almeria and name the Banu Tahir to run the city. This
family would continue to control Murcia until the end of the taifa period, and
Mujahid would have to await Zuhayr's death in 429/1038 to bring TudmTr into his
sphere of influence on a stable basis.
This incident illustrates one of the basic aspects of taifa power. The muliik al
tawii '![ depended on the adherence of local elites to impose their regimes in the towns

and fortifications of their principalities; Zuhayr needed the participation of the local
Banii Tahir to implement his rule in Murcia. The governors and representatives of
the local elites swore the bay 'a to their respective rulers, thus communicating their
72 lbn al-Abbar, Kitiib al-bulla al-siyarii ', 2: 116-7.
73 Mujahid was probably in contact with the Banii Kha(tab since the time of the 'A.mirid regime. Al
Man�iir had named Abu al-A.�bagh Musa b. Al:imad b. 'Abd al-Ral:iman b. Marwan b. Kha(tab
governor of the towns of Valencia, Ondara, Tortosa and the Balearics in 374/985; al-'UdhrT, 15-6; lbn
al-Abbar, Kitiib al-bulla al-siyarii ·, 2:311-3.
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consent to a specific dawla, and especially their recognition of its fiscal structures and
representatives.

Control over a territory could thus switch without military

confrontation, signified by the simple changing of names during the weekly khu/ba.
Mujahid was finally able to extend his power beyond the Jibal Balansiya thanks to
defections by 'Abd al-'Aziz's governors. The importance of the local elites explains
in part efforts taken to maintain and argue legitimacy. Even though most of these
elites did not wish to rule themselves, they could choose, to a certain point, to whom
they would swear the bay 'a.74
Zuhayr died during an ill-advised attack on Granada in 429/1038, and the
people of Almeria invited 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Man�ur of Valencia to govern their city.75
Zuhayr had originally forged an alliance with the Banu Sinhaja of Granada, a possible
sign of Mujahid's tlu·eat to the north, and a definite sign of the little importance
placed on factional ethnic divisions in the years following the fitna. For reasons that
are not clear, but that certainly involved a fair amount of self-grandeur, Zuhayr
aligned himself with Mu}:iammad b. 'Abd Allah b. Birzal, ruler of Cannona and
enemy of Bad1s b. I:Iabbus, provoking open dispute with his former ally. 76
Even less clear is 'Abd al-'Az1z al-Man�ur's decision to continue this conflict
with the Berbers of Granada, especially since he does not seem to have had the
means.

Mujahid consented to participate in the expedition against the Sinhaja,

probably in exchange for the promised division of territories conquered. The possible
74 P. Guichard, B. Soravia, Les royaumes de taifas, 86, 141-7.
75 lbn al-KhatTb, Kitiib a'mii/ al-a'/iim, 249; lbn 'IdharT, Bayiin, 3:167. Since Zuhayr, as a eunuch,
had no descendants, 'Abd al-'AzTz inherited the possessions of his family's client.
76 lbn 'IdharT, Bayiin, 3: 169.
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gains did not suffice though, and Mujahid's apprehensions about fighting the Berber
warriors he knew too well from his service under the 'Amirid regime caused him to
renege at the last minute on his commitments. 'Abd al-'Aziz insulted the ruler of
Denia, but was obliged to tum back home without his support.
Mujahid's brief time in the field with 'Abd al-'Aziz gave him privileged
information on the Valencian ruler's military capacities. 'Abd al-'Aziz's hold over
Tudmir and Almeria was not solid, and in 433/1042, Mujahid took advantage of this
weakness to expand his territories. The ruler of Valencia entrusted rule of Almeria to
his brother-in-law Ma'an b. $umadil;, who promptly declared his independence. The
subsequent clash between Mujahid and 'Abd al-' Aziz escalated quickly, and al
Man$tir was forced to call for help from his mother's Castilian relatives - because the
Catalans sided with Mujahid? - but his losses resulted as much from defections as
from military battles. Mujahid thus brought under his control strategic points from
Lorca, Murcia, Orihuela and Eiche to as far as Baeza and J6dar, taking in fact the
entire kura of Tudmir, its road networks and coastal infrastructures - namely
Alicante.77 'Abd al-'Aziz was able to save Jativa, but the political map of the Sharq
al-Anda/us had radically changed by the end of the conflict, and Denia's territory

encompassed the majority of the crossroads and passage points that tied al-Andalus to
the Mediterranean.
The geographer al-'UdhrI (d. 478/1085-6) writes that these territories passed
to 'AII b. Mujahid on his father's death, and stayed in his power until they were
77 Akhbar duwwal muliik al-/awa 'if, 302; lbn 'ldharT, Bayon, 3: 174; lbn al-KhatTb, Kitab a 'ma/ al
a 'lam, 225; al-'UdhrT, 16.

annexed by al-Muqtadir of Zaragoza in 468/1076-7. 78
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Other authors, however, and

notably Ibn al-Abbar, indicate that the Banu Tahir submitted to 'Abd al-'AzTz and his
son, 'Abd al-Malik, to whom they sent their surplus taxes. 79 Ibn 'IdharT, on the other
hand claims that the Banu Tahir took advantage of 'Abd al-Malik's weakness to
become independent. 80

In a well-known story, Mujahid sent the lexicographer

Tamam b. Ghalab b. 'Umr al-LughawT one thousand dinars to dedicate his book to
him, "at the time of his conquest of Murcia," indicating perhaps that his hold over
that city was only temporary. 81 The situation is thus unclear, and Murcia's place
between Denia and Valencia remains ambiguous. What is clear, however, is that
outside the capital cities, political authority was expressed through tax collections.
The governor of Murcia, Abu Bakr Abmad b. Tahir in this case, collected taxes, from
which he paid the administration and army, then sending any surplus to the ruler who
had confirmed his governorship. 82 Authority over cities and busiin defined taifal
territory, and during times of peace that authority was translated through tax
payments. Through Mujahid's campaigns, Denia had won over those who controlled
the more important busiin on the roads between Toledo and Seville and the
Mediterranean coast. This not only helped ensure the flow of goods between the
taifas ports and the interior markets, but also offered increased revenues from taxes
78 Al-' UdhrT, 16.

79
P. Guichard, B. Saravia, Les royaumes des taifas, 92; lbn al-Abba.r, Kitab al-J:,ulla al-siyara ',
2:117.
80
lbn 'IdharT, Bayan, 3:239-40.
81 Ibn Bashkuwal (1989), 200, no. 287; al-l)abbT (1989), 309, no. 602; al-l:[umaydT (1989), 283, no.
343; Ibn Sa'Td, Al-Mughrib Ji f:,u/a al-maghrib, 1:166. The episode was used by al-ShaqundT in his
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and tolls collected along those roads.
Murcia vacillated in its allegiance, but the rest of northern TudmTr at least
continued under' AlI b. Mujahid's authority. Baeza passed to Granada, but Segura, in
the same region, remained in the hands of the Denia 'Amirids until the end of the
dynasty, and the taifa now stretched from the coast to the borders of Cordova and
Toledo.83 Nevertheless, despite this seemingly strong position, Iqbal al-Dawla did
not translate it into military power, and did not exploit his advantages over his
neighbors. Denia's foreign policy under its second ruler worked through diplomacy,
correspondence and alliances. These relations concentrated more on mutual benefit,
and eventually did little to protect the taifa, and its neighbors, from the emerging
powerful states of the interior. The entire region, in fact, would soon fall to the
expanding authority of Zaragoza, Toledo and Seville.

THE TAIFAS OF THE INTERIOR

Toledo
Toledo and its region supplied much of Denia's commercial activity, but
paradoxically, little diplomatic exchange occurred between the two taifas. Ceramics
from Toledo found in the region of Denia, as well as distribution of those same
ceramic types in North Africa indicate Denia as the principal transfer point between

83 'Abd Allah b. Buluqqin, Tibyiin, 92, I 06; lbn al-Abbar, Kitiib al-bulla al-siyarii ', 2: 149-50.
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The jurist Abu al-Walfd al-Bajl
the peninsular interior and the Mediterranean.
pronounced a fatwa concerning a cobbler from Denia who had died leaving valuable
skins in the region of Toledo. 85 There is, however, no trace of communications
between the two courts, and this despite the fact that Mujahid, 'Alf and Yal)ya b. Dhu
'1-Nun al-Ma'mun shared the same apprehensions concerning the expansionist Banu
Hud. The closest indication of any kind of cooperation is their belonging both to the
coalition built around the Banu 'Abbad of Seville. 86 Ibn 'IdharI describes a division
between the AndalusI and Berber rulers, split in their loyalty between the caliphates
of the false Hisham II and Idris b. Yal)ya b. 'Alf b. I:Iammud. He also specifies that
the Andalusis themselves were divided between the allies of Zaragoza and Seville,
with both Denia and Toledo siding with Seville. The alliance did not last though,
notably because of competition between Toledo and Seville over annexing Cordova.
Relations between Denia and Toledo were probably limited in part because of
close ties between Toledo and Valencia. Like the Banu 'Abbad or Banu Hud, the
Dhu '1-Nunids sought to improve their access to the Mediterranean, and worked to
extend their influence through the 'Amirids of Valencia. 'Abd al-Malik b. 'Abd al
'Aziz married the daughter of al-Ma'mun of Toledo, who subsequently took the
opportunity to interfere in his son-in-law's affairs, even replacing him with his own
84 For archeological remains, see: R. Azuar Ruiz, Denia islamica, 56, 246, 326, 415-6; R. Azuar
Ruiz, "AI-Andalus y el comercio meditemineo def siglo XI, seg(m la dispersion y distribuci6n de las
producciones ceramicas," La Peninsula iberica y el Mediterraneo entre las siglos XI y XII, Codex
Aquilarensis, 13.1 ( I 998), 57-8. Despite the lack of direct access to the sea, members of Toledo's
Jewish community participated in Mediterranean commerce. When a man in Jerusalem wanted to
contact his family in Badajoz, he sent a message through Fustat and "the people of Toledo": S.D.
Goitein, A Mediterranean Society, I :69; Geniza TS 13 J 23, f. 22.
85
V. Lagardere, 1-Iistoire et societe en Occident musulman, 174.
86
Ibn 'ldharT, Bayiin, 3:219.
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Toledo's involvement in Valencia, and al-Ma'miin's direct efforts to control

the 'Amirid court there, may have discouraged active dialogue with Denia. Tensions
between the Dhii 'l-Niinids and the 'Abbadids of Seville, Denia's principal inland
ally, likely also hampered relations between them.

Seville
Denia's rulers maintained close relations with Seville, based in large part on
economic factors and the commercial artery that linked the Betic region and the
Sharq al-Anda/us. Shared apprehension concerning the Banu Hiid of Zaragoza also
brought them together. Anti-I:Iammiidid sentiments may also have contributed, but
Denia does not seem to have actively worked against the Berbers. Overlapping
possess10ns between Denia and Granada in the Sierra de la Segura, as well as
concerns about interference with traffic towards the coast, may have influenced 'An
to keep his father's policies and avoid conflict with the Sinl)aja of Granada. Denia
was, nevertheless, part of the coalition around Seville and the false Hisham II that Ibn
'IdharT considered anti-Berber.
Rubiera Mata insists on the importance of maintaining access to the eastern
coast, avoiding the hostile Berbers of Granada, as a major factor in Seville's relations
with Denia. Nevertheless, Seville did have its own port and diir al-$inii 'a, which al
RazT described as "one of the finest ports in Spain where large ships can dock."88
Boats carried olive oil towards the Orient from its port - though IdrTsT does specify
87
88

Jbn 'IdharT, Bayan, 3:165-6.
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transport by sea and land - and many fragments of ceramic cuerda seca from Seville
have been found along the North-African coast, from Ceuta to Fez and Marrakesh,
and eastwards as far as the Qal'a I:Iammad. 89 A sixth/twelfth-century Geniza letter
states that the trip by sea from Tripoli in modern Libya to Seville could be made in
eight days, while a boat whose owner was from Seville appears on more than one
occasion in letters from the fifth/eleventh century. 90 Seville's commercial contacts
with the Mediterranean did not necessarily pass through the Sharq al-Anda/us ports,
but Constable does note that rough conditions caused some merchants to disembark
before the Straits of Gibraltar and finish their journey by land.91 There is no question
about 'Abbadid desires to gain direct access to the Mediterranean, as their efforts to
annex Murcia would later confirm, but relations with Denia should also be placed in
the larger geopolitical context that included the need to contain Toledo and Zaragoza.
Mujahid was one of the first taifa rulers - along with 'Abd al-'AzTz al
Man�ur, Muqatil of Tortosa and Ibn Jahwar of Cordova - to recognize the caliphate
of Hisham II in Seville in 426/1035, and Ibn 'IdharT places him alongside al-Mu'ta9id
in 435/1043-4, in his lists of the three divisions among the muluk al-fawii 'if. 92
Though he had married his son with the daughter of Sulayman b. Hud, Mujahid
sought to balance his position among the inland taifas, likely knowing that his newly

89
Al-RazT, 93; ldrTsT, Opus geographicum, 541; al-l:limyarT, 19/25; R. Azuar Ruiz, "Al-Andalus y el
comercio meditemineo," 56-7, citing M. Casamar, F. Valdes, "Origen y desarrollo de la tecnica de
cuerda seca en la Peninsula lberica y en el Norte de Africa durante el siglo XI," al-Qantara, 5.1-2
( I 984): 383-404.
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S.D. Goitein, A Mediterranean Society, I :318, 331, 338; Geniza ENA 1822 A, f. 9; TS 8 J 27, f. 2;
ULC Or 1080 J 167.
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acquired territories would attract jealous attention. Diplomatic exchange between
Denia and Seville was quite active, with regular personal correspondence between the
two courts. Al-Mu'ta<;lid had a harem of seventy "well-born" wives, but his favorite
was the daughter of Mujahid and sister of 'AlT. 93 This marriage consolidated relations
between the two taifas sometime around 433/1041-2. 94

Regular letters between

Mujahid and al-Mu'ta<;lid speak to their shared interested in language and poetry, and
Mujahid delighted his son-in-law with an exceptionally intelligent and educated
slave, who took her new master's name as her own, al-'Abbadiyya. 95 These close
relations may explain in part al-Mu'ta<;lid's personal involvement in the dynastic
matters after Mujahid's death.
The transfer of power from Mujahid to his sons seems to have been a hesitant
and unwieldy process. Mujahid had two sons in line for the succession: the oldest,
'AlT, and his brother, I:Iasan. 'AlT had remained prisoner in Christian lands for sixteen
years after the failed Sardinia invasion, but after his return in 423/1031-2, his father
reinstated him as heir alongside his younger brother. 96 A series of dirhams and dinars
struck in Denia mentioning only I:Iasan, in 430/1038-9 and 432/1040-1, both Mujahid
and I:Iasan in 432/1040/1, then Mujahid and his two sons in 435/1043-4 and
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436/1044-5, indicates to some extent Mujahid's intentions.
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Some have

hypothesized that the earliest emissions by I:Iasan point to a rebellion, or contested
rule, but the dirham struck the same year carrying also Mujahid's laqab, al
Muwaffaq, goes against this, while written sources carry no mention of such
tensions.98 I:Iasan seems to have been the heir during 'AlT's absence, but was then
associated with his brother, losing primacy in the succession.

'Alf then took

Mujahid's place upon his death in 436/1044, proposing that I:Iasan succeed him in
tum. I:Iasan's deception presented an opportunity for al-Mu'ta9id to intervene in
Denia's affairs, and thus gain influence over the corridor that Mujahid had recently
achieved between his port and the Betic region. In response to I:Iasan's request for
aide, the ruler of Seville sent a slave (ghuliim) from his army to carry out 'Ali's
assassination. 99 I:Iasan's plan failed, and he had to flee Denia and seek protection
from his brothers-in-law in Seville and Valencia. 'An had sent envoys to infom1 his
fellow muluk al-tawii 'if, not only of his brother's treason, but also of al-Mu'ta9id's
role in it. 100 The 'Abbadid ruler must have understood that continuing to support
I:Iasan was not in his best interests, that it could trouble his access to the east, and so
97
See annex.
98 Prieto y Vives took J:lasan's emissions as a sign that he had ruled during his father's lifetime, while
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This last hypothesis was rejected by Ariza and Retamero: A. Prieto y Vives, Reyes, I 22; R. Chabas
Llorens, "Mochehid, hijo de Yusuf, y Ali, hijo de Mochehid," in Homenajes a D. Francisco Codera,
(Zaragoza, 1904), 411-34; M. Barcelo, "Assaig d'un corpus numismatic de la taifa 'amirida de Daniya
Mayurqa (436-468)," in Actas def IV coloquio hispano-tunecino (Palma de Mal/area, 1979) (Madrid,
I 983), 43-58; M.J. Rubiera Mata, La taifa de Denia, 94-5; A. Ariza Armada, "Las cecas de taifas bajo
dominio eslavo," 152-3; F. Retamero, "La formalizaci6n del poder," 437-8.
99
Ibn Bassam, DhakhTra, 3:130-1; lbn al-KhaFb, Kitab a'mal al-a'lam, 254; lbn 'ldhar1, Bayan,
3:157.
100
lbn Bassam provides the letter written to 'Abd al-'Az1z al-Man�ur in which 'Al1 describes, in
detail, the attempt and its aftermath: Dhakkira, 3:130-1.

319
refused his former accomplice asylum. 'Abd al-'Aziz allowed him to enter Valencia,
but offered nothing for his cause, and I:Iasan ended his days in silence.
Sources do not provide details on subsequent relations between Denia and
Seville, but it was in their mutual interest to maintain at least constructive diplomacy.
When he executed his son with his own hands, al-Mu'tac;lid included 'AlI in the list of
rulers he wrote to explain his actions. Their relations may even have gone beyond
superficial reconciliation, since Ibn Bassam describes a present offered by al
Mu'tamid, son and successor of al-Mu'tac;lid, to "his primary wife, Bint Ibn
Mujahid". I01 There is no specific mention of such a marriage, and Ibn Bassam may
be confusing the wife with Mujahid's daughter, and so al-Mu'tac;lid's wife. If such
was the case, the gift shows at least the privileged place held by Ibn Mujahid's sister
in the 'Abbadid court. 'AlI must in any case have considered 'Abbadid Seville an
ally, since he sent his minister, Mul)ammad b. Muslim, there to ask for help against
lbn Hud. Seville's help, if sent, did not arrive in time, but this was not because of a
lack of interest in the region.

Indeed, after Zaragoza's annexation of Denia, al

Mu'tamid extended his own power eastwards, sending his minster, Ibn 'Ammar, then
his own son, to take possession of Lorca, then Murcia. 102 These actions followed
quickly on the 'Abbadid conquest of Cordova, and Seville's strategy seems in part to
come from the desire to build a corridor that stretched to the sea between the hostile
Banu Sinhaja to the south, and Banu Hud to the north.
101
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Badajoz
Badajoz was one of the farther removed taifas from Denia's territory, but Mujahid
and 'AlT maintained close ties with the ruling Aftasid family.

There are no

archeological traces of trade between the two regions, and maritime access was
plentiful in this taifa that included Lisbon and especially Alcacer do Sal, the former
caliphal diir al-�inii 'a for the Atlantic. Nevertheless, these ports did not necessarily
have regular contact with the Mediterranean, and part of the taifa's products and
commerce may have transited through Denia. A Jewish merchant from Badajoz,
residing in Jerusalem, sought to contact his family back home by sending a message
to Toledo, where his father often did business. In such cases, Denia likely served as
the point of entry for communications continuing inland. 103
Antagonism between Badajoz and Seville did not hamper personal and
diplomatic relations between Denia's court and al-Mu:,?:affar b. al-Aftas, second ruler
of Badajoz. 104 Mujahid sent him a letter in which he expressed his friendship, despite
the distance that separated them. 105

103

'AlT wrote him on at least three occas10ns,

S.D. Goitein, Mediterranean Society, I :69; Geniza TS 13 J 23, f. 22.
According to lbn 'Idhar1, al-Mu?:affar had to face not only Ferdinand l of Castile, but also Ibn
'Abbad of Seville and lbn Dhu '1-Nfm of Toledo; Bayiin, 3:236; P. Guichard, B. Saravia, Les royaumes
de taifas, 66.
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served as an 'Amirid officer, and the age difference between him and Mujahid - lbn al-Aftas
succeeded his father in 437/1045 and rnled until 460/1068 - does not seem to support the idea of a
friendship built before the fitna. If Mujahid did know a rnler of Badajoz before, it was probably Sabur,
the SiqliibTwho rnled at the beginning ofthefitna. In addition, according to al-Maqqar1, Sabur was the
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notably when he succeeded his father, and a few years later to send his condolences
on the death of his father, 'Abd Allah b. al-Aftas, in 435/1043-4. 106

Relations

between these relatively distant taifas stems first from the particular interest Mujahid
and Muzaffar both held for language and literature, providing material and occasions
for epistolary exchange. Their correspondence began even before al-Muzaffar had
come to power, a sign of its personal nature.
Badajoz could also offer a piece in Denia's efforts to maintain geopolitical
balance.

Ibn 'IdharT includes Ibn al-Aftas in the coalition centered around al

Mu'ta9id of Seville in 435/1043-4, together with Yal:iya b. Dhu 'I-Nun and the other
rulers of the south-west, separate from Sulayman b. Hud and the Berbers. 107
Significantly, most of the extent correspondence between Denia and Badajoz dates
from this period, one of intense diplomatic activity for Mujahid, set off by his
imminent death, his recent conquests, and a general reshuffling of taifa regimes.
Mujahid seems to have worked consciously in the last few years of his reign
to assure a stable succession after his death. He took precautions concerning the
Catalans, as discussed above, and he seems to have done the same with his peers.
The tacit support of the other muhik al-fawa 'if at a fragile time for this dynasty would
have been valuable, and their recognition of the succession essential. This is clear in
'AIT's first efforts to ensure his hold over power after his brother's failed plot: he
repeated the bay 'a ceremony with his governors, and he wrote to his fellow taifa
brother of LabTb, rnler of Tortosa, whose relationship with Mujahid is treated supra; Histo1y of the
Mohammedan Dynasties, 2:258.
106
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rulers.
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His ascens10n and rule would not have been possible without the

approbation of these two groups.
Mujahid's success in his conflict with 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Man�ur drew the taifa
towards the interior of the peninsula. Sulayman b. Hiid's intervention ended the war,
but Mujahid still had to consolidate his hold over these new territories that juxtaposed
new neighbors. The marriage alliance with the Banu Hud did not prevent Mujahid
from understanding Sulayman b. Hud's expansionism; frontal attacks on Toledo left
little question of Zaragoza's intentions for surrounding taifas. 109 In addition, even if
Mujahid does not seem to have pursued an anti-Berber policy, the acquisition of
Zuhayr's territories in the Sierra de la Segura placed the taifa in a delicate and
possibly vulnerable position vis-a-vis Granada, as the subsequent loss of Baeza
shows. The marriage between Mu'tac;!Id b. al-'Abbad and Mujahid's daughter was
certainly orchestrated with these problems in mind, consolidating a relationship that
existed at least as early as 435/1043-4, when Mujahid was among the first to
recognize Seville's puppet caliph, the false Hisham II. The same dynamic explains
Denia's place in the 435/1043-4 coalition described by 'Ibn 'IdharI. Though the
sources do not provide information on specific actions by this group, Mujahid needed
to situate his power within a structure that was larger than his own taifa. Badajoz was
not among Denia's principal allies, especially since it was often involved in armed
conflict with Seville and Toledo, but a diplomatic relationship with the Aftasids in
this context could enlist the support of a powerful court, without that support
108
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necessarily entailing military action. Even at its greatest extent, Denia's territories
did not reach as far as Badajoz, but its territorial expansion towards the Betic region
involved the taifa in regional geopolitics. If Mujahid and 'Al'i wanted to profit from
the economic ties offered by the roads now under their influence, they had also had to
maintain a diplomatic presence in the area.
Finally, the intensification of diplomatic activity during the 430s/1040s was
also the result of a number of dynastic transitions.

Seville, Toledo, Badajoz,

Zaragoza and Denia, as well as other dynasties, went through major changes at this
time, indicative of a generational transition. Relations thus had to be established and
defined between the new members of the peninsular ruling elite.

ZARAGOZA AND THE DRAW OF THE SEA

Zaragoza, like Seville and Toledo, used its power base at the center of the Peninsula
to extend towards the coast, imposing its rule and annexing neighboring states. The
expansion of these three polities exploited regional opportunities, while building on
the need to establish a presence in the Sharq al-Anda/us. Though powerful within
their continental territories, these taifas remained dependant on the Mediterranean
port-cities for a large part of their economic survival.

In addition, the riches

generated by Mediterranean commerce could only attract the attention of the Hiidid,
Dhii 'l-Niinid and 'Abbadid regimes, influencing their foreign policies and the
general character of their expansionism.
The taifas of Denia and Zaragoza, more specifically the 'Amirid and Hiidid
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dynasties, shared shifting and unstable relations throughout the century. Even before
Sulayman b. Hud came to power in Zaragoza in 431/1039-40, he had forced his way
into Mujahid's sphere of influence, participating in the rebellion against LabTb in
Tortosa and Valencia. This intrusion led to an intense war between Mujahid and Ibn
Hud, though the eventual outcome, or even if there was one, is not very clear.
Tortosa's weakness meant the taifa had to rely on a more powerful state, possibly
playing Zaragoza, Denia, and Barcelona off each other. Bonnassie has postulated the
idea of a protectorate by Barcelona and Denia over Tortosa, motivated by the need to
limit Zaragoza's efforts to expand towards the sea. 110

Despite this, Zaragoza's

involvement in the region continued, and at least part of the relations between Denia
and Barcelona stemmed from the need to protect their interests against a common
threat.
Mujahid and Sulayman nevertheless recognized the need to maintain a
modicum of peace between Muslims, as well as their mutual economic interest in the
traffic that flowed between the Sharq al-Anda/us and the Hudid territories. Ibn Hud
was especially active in this, when not trying to make gains through less pacific
means.

Ibn Hud intervened in the conflict between Mujahid and 'Abd al-'Aziz,

specifically citing the need for unity against the Christians. 111

The subsequent

marriage alliance between the two powers did little to change their relations, which
never went beyond mutual apprehension. There is no record of diplomatic exchange
110
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between the two courts, and archeology provides no conclusive evidence concerning
eventual economic exchange.

Zaragoza may have depended less on Denia,

circulating goods through Tortosa's port. Nevertheless, some exchange did occur,
since biographical dictionaries provide notices for nine different 'ulama' who moved
between the two towns. 112

Sources do not mention any further open conflicts

between the two taifas before the fall of Denia in 468/1076, but the peace merely
covered tensions that built up to the taifa's annexation.
Mujahid did not intervene directly in the conflict between al-Musta'Tn and
Yal)ya b. Dhu 'I-Nun of Toledo. Nevertheless, Denia's alignment with Seville at this
time, as indicated by Ibn 'Idhar1, may indicate Mujahid's apprehensions concerning
Zaragoza's expansion into the Guadalajara region.113

Ibn 'Idhar1 clearly states

opposition to the Berbers, but does not explain the division among the Andalus1s.
One of the principal reasons though, must have been the armed conflict between
Zaragoza and Toledo and that ended only with the death of Sulayman b. Rud in
438/1047.

Ya]:iya b. Dhu 'l-Nun was forced to recognize Seville's false caliph,

Hisham II, in exchange for a promise of military aid against Zaragoza.114 Mujahid's
adherence to this group came perhaps more from economic interests, but he may also
have wanted to mark some distance from Zaragoza. Al-Musta'111 had rapidly adopted
an aggressive foreign policy of enlarging his taifa at the expense of his neighbors.
The annexation of Guadalajara is one example of this policy, but Hudid interference
112
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in the Sharq al-Anda/us indicates their intensions in the region. Ibn Hud's peace
brokering between Mujahid and 'Abd al-' Aziz was supposedly motivated by Islamic
unity, but his own annexation of Guadalajara, and use of Castilian mercenaries
against Toledo, shows this was not necessarily his primary concern. 'Abd al-'Aziz's
adherence to al-Musta'In's coalition a few years later indicates growing Hudid
influence in the region, and may have been intended to discourage any eventual
territorial ambitions on Mujahid's part. Zaragoza was involved in heavy conflict with
Toledo, and so could not expend substantial effort in expanding eastwards, but it
could deter similar efforts by Denia.
Mujahid proceeded Sulayman b. Hud in death by only a couple of years, and
while al-Muwaffaq was replaced by the complacent 'AlI Iqbal al-Dawla, the
successor in Zaragoza, Al)mad b. Sulayman b. Hud al-Muqtadir was one of the
second generation rulers - along with al-Mu'tac;lid of Seville and al-Ma'mun of
Toledo - who would remake the taifa map. Sulayman b. Hud had divided his lands
among his sons, and while AJ:imad received Zaragoza, he had to spend several years
rebuilding and consolidating his father's former territories.

He eliminated his

brothers in Calatayud, Huesca and Tudela as early as 442/1051, but had to wait until
459/1066-7 to finally take Lerida from his brother, Yusuf al-Muzaffar, who was
paying parias to Ramon Beranger I in exchange for his support. 115 In the meantime,
al-Muqtadir did not neglect efforts to increase access to the Mediterranean.

In

452/1060-1, al-Muqtadir annexed the taifa of Tortosa, overturning the SiqlabfNabil,
115

P. Bonnassie, La Catalogne, 354-5, 663-4; P. Guichard, B. Soravia, Les royaumes des taifas, 68;
lbn Khaldun, 4: 158.
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placing his own son, Mundhir 'Imad al-Dawla, at the head of the satellite state.

116

Some historians have taken lbn I:Iayyan's narrative of the rebellion against LabTb, in
which the inhabitants called on lbn Hiid, as an explanation of this transfer of
power. 117 This interpretation, though, does not fit with the text's chronological order:
lbn I:Iayyan includes the episode with the events following the death of Mubarak in
Valencia, preceding the ascension of 'Abd al-'Aziz; the Dhakhira passage names
LabTb, and not NabII; lbn Hud's intervention in Tortosa provoked a war with
Mujahid, and not Ibn Mujahid.118 Considering especially his reaction to the invasion
of his own lands a decade later, and his need to ask for help from his peers, it would
be hard to imagine 'An b. Mujahid participating in the war with lbn Hiid that lbn
I:Iayyan describes.
Sources do not provide precise information concerning the build up to this
invasion, but the rapprochement between Denia and Barcelona a few years earlier
indicated by the treaty of 450/1058, points to a general ill-feeling concerning
Zaragoza's maneuverings. Prieto y Vives hypothesized that Nabn might have been
an agent for the Banii Hud, which, if true, would further explain Denia and

116
lbn Khaldun, Kitab al-'ibar, 4:353; lbn 'IdharT, Bayan, 3:224; lbn al-Kha\Tb, Kitab a'mal al
a'lam, 198.
117
lbn Bassam, DhakhTra, 3:19-20. Cf. P. Guichard, 8. Sorvia, Les royaumes de taifas, 69. A. Prieto
y Vives comes to the same conclusion using a similar passage from lbn al-Kha\Tb's Takmila that also
carries LabTb's name: Los reyes de taifas, 37-8, no. 2.
118
The confusion between LabTb and NabTI is common in secondary sources, especially since
monetary emissions by the latter are unclear: A. Prieto y Vives reads "NabTI", A. Vives y Escudero
transcribes "LabTI", and F. Codera y Zaidin hesitates, then changes his mind; A. Prieto y Vives, Reyes,
191, ns. 195-7; A. Vives y Escudero, Monedas, 211-2, ns. 1293-5; F. Codera y Zaidin, Tratado de
numismatica arabigo-espanola (Madrid, 1879), 183, 186; "Monedas arabes de Tortosa," Revista de
ciencias hist6ricas (Gerona, 1881): 13-4, ns. 14-5.
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Barcelona's worries.

119

Though Denia did not have the resources to oppose

Zaragoza's annexation of Tortosa, al-Muqtadir had to face Catalan troops during his
conquest of the taifa. Tortosa was a tributary state of Barcelona, paying regular
parias, and Ramon Beranger could hardly have appreciated this encroachment into
his sphere of influence. The attack on Barbastro two years later may even have been
motivated in part as a reprisal for al-Muqtadir's taking of Tortosa. 120
Though the "crusade" character of Barbastro can certainly be questioned, it
did serve to galvanize the attention of the Peninsula's Muslims on al-Muqtadir. The
ruler of Zaragoza deftly turned the situation to his own advantage, building an image
of himself as a protector of Islam. He had missives sent to his fellow muHik al
tawa 'if, exhorting them to contribute to efforts to retake the city in the name of
Islam. 121 'AIT b. Mujahid's principal contribution was a letter written by his principal
katib, Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, in which the inhabitants of Barbastro called their Muslim
brothers to jihad to protect the borders of Islam against the infidels. 122

Many

mujahiddfin answered the call to augment al-Muqtadir's forces, including 500
horsemen sent from Seville, and Barbastro was brought back under Hudid rule the
next year, in 457/l 065. At a time when many taifas were reduced to paying parias,
following not long after the loss of Coimbra and the battle of Patema, al-Muqtadir's

A. Prieto y Vives,Los reyes de taifas, 39.
Ph. Senac, "Un chiiteau en Espagne. Notes sur la prise de Barbastro (1064)," in Liber Largitorius.
Etudes d'histoire medievale offertes a Pierre Taubert par ses eleves, eds. D. Barthelemy, J.-M. Martin,
(Geneva,2003), 554.
121
Ph. Senac,"Un chiiteau en Espagne," 558; Jbn Bassam,DhakhTra, 2:67,3:132-7.
122
M.J. Rubiera Mata, La taifa de Denia, 131; Jbn Bassam, DhakhTra, 3:132-7. This interpretation
may seem strange, but Jbn 'Abd al-Barr does not seem to have worked for the Hudid court, and he did
write letters for' Alt b. Mujahid during the same period; lbn Bassam, DhakhTra, 3:98-9, I 00-2.
119
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victory against the Christians considerably consolidated his power: it was in fact after
Barbastro that A}:imad b. Sulayman b. Hud adopted the laqab al-Muqtadir. Ibn
'IdharI highlights the renown that he gained, while Ibn Bassam writes that there was
not a single king (malik) who did not desire to enter into relations with him. 123 Thus
strengthened, al-Muqtadir was able to push his brother, Yusuf, from power in Lerida,
and tum back to his march towards the sea.

THE FALL OF DENIA AND CONQUEST OF THE COAST

More than a decade separated Barbastro and al-Muqtadir's entry into Denia in
468/1076-7. Nevertheless, Ibn 'IdharI and Ibn al-KhatTh both immediately follow
their descriptions of Barbastro with the conquest of Denia. 124 There is certainly some
telescoping going on here because of the years separating these historians from the
events they describe, but al-Muqtadir's momentum coming off his great victory must
be taken into account in analyzing subsequent conquests. Ibn Bassam provides more
details concerning Denia's fall, but the passage in his Dhakhfra also communicates a
very rapid succession of events, of a short amount of time between Ibn Hud's initial
advances and Ibn Mujahid's capitulation; 'Abd Allah b. Buluqqin insists on an
element of surprise that allowed Ibn Hud to take the city with few difficulties. 125 The
invasion did, however, represent the culminating moment in a series of preparations,
and 'AlI b. Mujahid had been aware for quite some time of the approaching danger.
123
124
125

Jbn 'ldharT, Bayan, 3:228; lbn Bassam, DhakhTra, 4:184.
lbn 'ldharT, Bayan, 3:228; Ibn al-Kha\Tb, Kitab a'mal al-a'/am, 198.
lbn Bassam, DhakhTra, 4:184; 'Abd Allah b. BuluqqTn, Tibyan, 103.
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He had witnessed the ease with which al-Ma'mun of Toledo had pushed his son-inlaw, 'Abd al-Malik, from power in Valencia in 457/1065-6, and probably did not
have any illusions concerning his own brother-in-law's expansionist ambitions. Ibn
Bassam transmits a letter written by Mu}:iammad b. Muslim, ki'itib in Denia's court, to
Aghlab, governor of the Balearics, in which he describes a diplomatic tour of the
courts of Almeria, Granada, Cordova and Seville to solicit their aid against al
Muqtadir b. Hud. 126 Given the distances travelled, the time spent in each court, and
complications along the way, Mu}:iammad b. Muslim's tour must have taken several
months. No mention is made of any aide coming of this diplomatic mission, but it
shows that 'AlT had some warning of Ibn Hud's impending invasion, or at least the
fall of Denia was not the result of a simple conversation, as intimated by Ibn Bassam
or 'Abd Allah b. BuluqqTn.
Al-Muqtadir initially campaigned to annex certain fortresses to the territory of
his son, the emir of Tortosa. 127 Ibn Bassam does not specify which fortresses were
targeted, but, as discussed above, the episode does point to the non-linear nature of
taifa borders and their fragmentary territories. It is not clear whether al-Muqtadir was
after territories that Mujahid may have taken during his conflict with Mu}:iammad b.
'Abd Allah b. Qasim of Alpuente, or whether he was treading on Denia's core lands.
'AlT's reaction, in any case, seems to indicate that the fortresses in question were not
essential to the taifa's operations, since he ordered his governors to evacuate those

126
127

Ibn Bassam, Dhakhfra, 3:320; M.J. Rubiera Mata, La taifa de Denia, 143-4.
Ibn Bassam, Dhakhfra, 4: 184.

districts.
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Their lack of importance is also indicated by the fact that Granada's

earlier efforts to take the fortress of Baeza were met with fierce resistance, requiring
considerable investment to finally dislodge Denia's agent there. 129
'AlI's advisors beseeched him to change his mind, and he sent out letters to
countermand the previous order, now commanding his governors to prepare for
combat. This may be the moment when he sent Mubammad b. Muslim to ask for aide
from his potential allies. The rest of the story, reported by Ibn Bassam, and alluded to
by 'Abd Allah b. BuluqqTn, is anecdotic, but certainly indicates the generally
perceived weakness of Denia, as well as the reticular system of taifa fortifications.
Al-Muqtadir seems to have penetrated directly into Denia's core, without taking the
time to methodically reduce outlying fortifications.

This, the authors intimate,

because he did not intend to conquer the taifa itself. When Mu'izz al-Dawla, 'AlI's
son, met al-Muqtadir to capitulate, asking what would be done with them, the Hiidid
ruler did not understand what he meant, and one of his advisors had to explain to him
what had just happened. Al-Muqtadir quickly then accepted their surrender, received
the bay'a from Denia's inhabitants, and settled 'AlT in Zaragoza with an iqta' for his
needs until his death in 474/1081.130 'Abd Allah b. BuluqqTn wrote that territorial
conquest required the slow and fastidious reduction of the castles that constituted a
taifa's defensive network. Yet, despite its outlying fortifications, and networks of
bu�un, the entire taifa of Denia fell in a direct attack on its capital. 'AlT b. Mujahid
lbn Bassam uses the term bilad, indicating that the fortresses served to define a territory, but the
word choice may have been simply the result of the author's rhyming prose.
129
'Abd Allah b. BuluqqTn, Tibyan, 92.
130
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had in fact neglected military affairs, as both lbn Bassam and'Abd Allah b. Buluqqin
write, to the point that the heart of his defenses was hollow, and without exterior aide,
he could not resist al-Muqtadir's advances.
The events that follow illustrate the indirect nature of taifa authority. The
taifa's territory was defined by the governors or elite who had sworn the bay 'a to
Mujahid's, then'AlI's,'Amirid dawla. Al-Muqtadir had to receive this oath after his
conquest of Denia to assert his power. This was also the opportunity to confirm those
governors in their posts, as was the case with lbn Tahir in Murcia. 131 It was likewise
an opportunity for /:zu$Ltn to break away from central authority. One of 'AlI's sons,
Mujahid Siraj al-Dawla, whom his father had appointed 'amil of Segura, declared
himself independent, and with Catalan help, was able to retake some districts before
al-Muqtadir had him poisoned in 469/1076-7.132

Siraj al-Dawla's successors in

Segura, Ibrahim and 'Abd al-Jubar, were family clients, whose father had been
captured during the Sardinia invasion.

The two brothers were able to play off

rivalries between Zaragoza and Seville, eventually negotiating their surrender to the
'Abbadids.133 Segura's independence and later capitulation to Seville demonstrate
the possibility, within logical limits, for the 'ummal and other governors to choose to
whom they would swear oaths and submit territories under their control.
1
13
132
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Al-'Udhr1, 16.
Jbn al-Abbar, Kitab al-1:,ulla al-siyara ', 2:149; lbn Khaldiin, Kitab al- 'ibar, 4:354. Mujahid b.
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his Catalan mercenaries: A. Canto Garcia, T. b. 1::L Ibrahim, "Supplemento", 157, no. 91. Note that
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conquest of the capital had tumbled the taifa and its dawla, but local authorities did
not have to follow the capital's lead.
The Balearics likewise split from the former taifa of Denia under the lead of
its governor, 'Abd Allah b. Aghlab al-Murtac;la. 134 The Almoravids conquered most
of the taifas before the end of the century - Zaragoza, though, fell in 503/1110 - the
Balearics were the last taifa, entering Almoravid authority only after the Pisan and
Barcelonan attack in 508/1115. 'Abd Allah al-Murtac;la did not issue coins in his own
name while his former patron was still alive, his first dirhams appearing in 480/10878, avoiding thus official claims of sovereignty before that date. 135 The ambiguity of
this situation is perhaps the reason why he is not clearly designated in the sources,
often amalgamated with his successor, Mubashir b. Sulayman Na�ir al-Dawla, also a
Denia 'Amirid client, who was more assiduous in building and exercising his
authority. 136 The diminished number of 'ulamcr' passing through the Balearic port
points to changes in maritime traffic, with more direct routes to the East emerging. 137
This change did not, however, interrupt the port's intense naval and pirate activity,
and the poet Abu Bakr b. Mul)ammad b. 'Isa b. al-Labbana knew how to flatter the
basis of his patron's power in praising the size and warrior-like aspect of the fleet

134
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According to Ibn Khaldun, Mubashir incessantly sent

out maritime raids, an activity that eventually provoked the combined Barcelonan and
Pisan attack on the Islands. 139 Majorcan ships preyed on maritime lanes, while also
descending on the Catalan, French and Italian coasts. 140 The author of the Liber
maiolichinus mentions church spoliations, pillaging and burning of villages and
castles in the name of the Prophet, and trafficking in human booty - the Pisans
supposedly liberated 30,000 Christian slaves during their invasion - leading up to the
Pisan-Catalan response in 508/1115. 141 The political split from Denia does not seem
to have marginalized Majorca from continental circuits. The Banu Hud, perhaps too
busy consolidating their coastal possessions, did not seek to reintegrate the Balearics
into the taifa of Denia, now under the authority of Mundhir, son of al-Muqtadir and
emir of Tortosa, and exchange continued within the former taifa's maritime space.
Mubashir, it seems, had easy contact with members of the Banu Maymun, a family
that occupied important positions on the continent, in Denia, Alcira, and Onteniente,
and who would become the sixth/twelfth-century equivalent of the Banu Rumal)is
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under the Almoravids.
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142

Denia's political body was broken, its continental territories shared between
Seville and Zaragoza in the short interim before Almoravid invasion, while the
Balearics would prolong certain aspects of the 'Amirid dawla into the sixth/twelfth
century.

Al-Muqtadir associated Denia and Tortosa under his son, Mundhir; in

Murcia he confirmed the wilayat of Ibn Tahir.

He also bought Alfonso VI's

complacence in preparation for expansion into Valencia, though in the end he
accepted the submission of the governor, Abu Bakr Mul)ammad b. 'Abd al-'Aziz,
without annexation. 143 Mundhir b. al-Muqtadir maintained the maritime importance
of his new lands, becoming himself involved in Mediterranean commerce. 144 Ships
from Denia were still arriving in the port of Alexandria in the middle of the
century. 145

Nevertheless, rivalries between Zaragoza and Seville, along with

'Abba.did conquests of Cordova, Segura and Murcia, must have disrupted continental
traffic and economic networks. The conquest of Toledo by Alfonso VI created a
sudden influx of refugees to Denia, but it also ruptured trade patterns, especially since
the intensification of conflicts between Christians and Muslims, following the arrival
of the Almoravids, continued to trouble commerce with the forn1er taifa capital. 146
Denia's brilliance had been the effect of specific policies. Within a larger ensemble,
142
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without the specific dynamic that had created and maintained the taifa and made it a
conduit between the Peninsula and the Mediterranean, the great port began to fade.

CHAPTER VIII

PHYSICAL TRANSFORMATIONS
This study began by describing the geographic, human and historic space of Denia
and the Sharq al-Anda/us before the rise ofthe taifas (or fall ofthe caliphate), and we
have investigated how Denia grew from these antecedents. In the same logic, this
final chapter will examine how those elements changed over the course of the
fifth/eleventh century, and to what extent the taifa and its Mediterranean policies had
any influence over those changes. The taifa of Denia emerged as a continuation of
forces already in place under the Cordovan caliphate, accentuated under the 'Amirid
regime, and brought to fruition by Mujahid and 'AIT. Mujahid established his polity
on caliphal foundations, and the maritime and Mediterranean orientation of his
policies reflects a vision in development since the reign of' Abd al-Ral)man III of the
possibilities offered by the AndalusT littoral. The taifa 's rise and its implication in the
Mediterranean networks was the result of Mujahid's conscious decisions, but these
were part of a continuation from the caliphal period, not a rupture. This final chapter
will thus reprise the taifa's evolution as an extension of caliphal precedents, tracing
how the polity exerted its own influence over an ensemble offactors.
This evolution is visible not only in events, in political choices, but also in
regional structures, settlement patterns and networks of fortifications and roads.
Regional settlement had already begun a period of important change at the end of the
337
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fourth/tenth century under pressure from Cordova and Islamicizing and urbanizing
forces. Urbanization and rural restructuring would continue during the taifa period,
though now under the influence of heightened participation in the Mediterranean and
localized adaptations of 'Amirid financial policies.

Though piracy and booty

financed the taifa court, changes in the balance of Mediterranean power forced
Denia's rulers to adopt more conventional fiscal solutions based on territory and
settlements. The fiscal administration, implemented most often through the binomial
/:zi$nlqarya, had an essential effect on settlement patterns, especially since Denia's
rulers pursued colonizing policies meant to better exploit the terrestrial resources of
their taifa.1

At the same time, the development of Denia's port, the coast and

possibilities offered by secondary ports invigorated road networks, extending roads
from the coast and reinforcing ties between these ports, their hinterlands and
territories further inland.

POLITICAL STRUCTURES, URBANIZATION, AND lSLAMICIZATION

The taifa of Denia and its population, along with the rest of al-Andalus, underwent
profound changes over the course of the century. Regional Islamicization had a
profound effect on settlement during the caliphal period, and continued to do so
during the taifa period. Fiscal practices under the former caliphate and Man�urid
regime contributed to, and adapted to these changes. In fact, along with the effects of
urbanization on rural districts, many of the changes considered emblematic of the
1

See below.
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taifa period had begun before the caliphate's fall. By the tum of the century, rural
populations were abandoning isolated elevated sites, grouping in urban centers, while
also establishing new settlements in heretofore neglected zones.

Innovative

agricultural techniques also added to political and fiscal factors in shaping population
patterns, leading to two successive, and sometimes simultaneous, movements, with
the abandonment of former villages and lands followed by, or concomitant with, the
creation of new settlements.
Population density in the Jibiil Balansiya was low before the fifth/eleventh
century because of the region's mountainous terrain and the poor extension of
regional road networks. The population was concentrated in the south along the
Segura and Vinalop6 valleys, while to the north people had collected around Ondara
and the coastal plain, as well as in the few valleys that pierced the mountains, around
Bocairent, Cocentaina and the Seta and Gallinera valleys. Caliphal implication in this
area evolved over the fourth/tenth century, imposing administrative and fiscal
structures, while promoting the occupation of new sectors.

However, extending

cultivation to new areas was not a simple expression of state policies, and the
government also had to react to popular efforts to appropriate virgin lands beyond its
influence.
The principal sites in the Lower Segura were closely tied to cultivating the
alluvial plain and ample possibilities for irrigation. The ribat of Guardamar existed in
relation with these settlements, serving as a conduit to the Mediterranean as well as a
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regional pole for Islamicization, along with Orihuela and Murcia.2 In the lower and
middle Vinalop6, the urbanizing effects of Eiche become visible from the fourth/tenth
century in sites around Alicante, Novelda, Petrer, Sax and Villena, while the
Vinalop6 corridor that linked Murcia and Valencia explains in part regional
fortifications and their associated villages.3 In the Jibal Balansiya, Umayyad power
was reinforced after the conquests of 316/928-9 through fortified sites at Almiserat,
Cocoll, Sant Antoni de Oliva and Cocentaina; besides these, settlement remained
sparse in the region until the end of the century.4 Ondara acted as an administrative

2 See: S. Gutierrez, P. Moret, P. Rouillard, P. Sillieres, "Le peuplement du Bas Segura de la
Protohistoire au Moyen Age (prospection I 989-1990)," Lucentum, 17-18 (1998-9): 25-75; R. Azuar
Ruiz, S. Gutierrez Lloret, "Formaci6n y transformaci6n de un espacio agricola islamico en el sur del
Pais Valenciano: el Bajo Segura (siglos IX-XIII)," Castrum 5, 201-11; El ribat calipha/. Excavaciones
y estudios (1984-1992), ed. R. Azuar Ruiz et a/ii (Madrid, 2004).
3 Azuar Ruiz has refuted Rubiera Mata's "fantastical" idea of a network of fortifications resembling a
Byzantine limes, but did note the military role of these fortifications, especially in helping consolidate
Umayyad power and controlling roads. He subsequently retracted this state-based vision, adopting a
more "general" dynamic in line with the bi�n-refuge definition expounded by Bazzana, Cressier and
Guichard in their Chateau ruraux d'al-Andalus. For the Yinalop6, see in particular the following
articles by R. Azuar Ruiz: "Panorama de la arqueologia medieval de los valles alto y medio de!
Yinalop6 (Alicante," Lucentum, 2 (I 983): 349-383; "Formaci6n y consolidaci6n de los territories
castrales en epoca islamica. Les l:iu�fm del Vinalop6," in Fortificaciones y castillos de Alicante.
Valles de! Vinalopo (Petrel, 1991), ed. C. Navarro Poveda (Petrer, 1994), 67-102; "Fortificaciones de
taifas en el Sarq al-Anda/us," in Castillos y territorio en al-Anda/us, ed. A. Malpica (Granada, 1998),
116-40. Despite Azuar Ruiz's change in opinion, the importance of this route linking Murcia and
Valencia, followed by both 'Abd al-Ral:iman III and al-Man�ur during their military campaigns, cannot
be ignored when analyzing fourth/tenth-century fortifications in the Vinalop6 valleys. Cordovan
power had imposed itself in the region through military conquest, and the state must have required a
subsequent physical presence there.
4 Almiserat, Cocall and Sant Antoni are closely tied to the imposition of Umayyad power after
rebellions by the Banu al-Shaykh and Banu lbn AbI Jawshan. The isolation of Almiserat and Cocoll
would have hindered any relation with local populations, indicating these sites were chosen for their
strategic capacity: lbn I:fayyan, Muqtabis, 5:237-8; A. Bazzana, "Un fortin omeyyade dans le Shark al
Andalus," Archeologie islamique, I (1990): 87-108; J. Torr6 I Abad, "Fortificaciones en Yibal
Balansiya. Una propuesta de secuencia," in Castillos y territorio en al-Anda/us (Granada, 1998), 394,
398, 400; J. L. Simon Garcia, "Alquerias fortificadas del Vinalop6," in De la medina a la vila: Actas
11 Jorandas de Arqueologia Medieval, ed. F.J. Jover Maestre and C. Navarro Poveda (Alicante-Petrer,
2004), 109; R. Azuar Ruiz, Denia islamica, 109-12; A. Bazzana, Maisons d'al-Anda/us, 1:413, 438; J.
Torr6 i Abad, P. Ferrer Marset, "Asentamientos altomedievales en el Pie Negre (Cocetaina, Alicante).
Aportaci6n al estudio del transito a la epoca islamica en el ambito montafioso de las comarcas
meridionales de! pais valenciano," in Actas de! 1 Congreso de Arqueologia Medieval Espanola, 3

341
center along the coast, exploiting Denia's anchorage, and the Pefion de Ifac may have
been the site of a fortification, but coastal populations were likewise sparse. 5
Governmental initiative is palpable in the fourth/tenth-century fortified sites,
tied to the region's recent conquest and the imposition of caliphal power on rebellious
local clans.

In parallel, another population or settlement shift was tied to the

Islamicization of rural areas and the imposition of the caliphal fiscal system. Over
the course of the fourth/tenth century, with an acceleration at the beginning of the
taifa period, new establishments appear associating state power and village

.
-6
co11ectlves,
su/tan and qura.

Fortified sites dating from the first half of the

(Zaragoza, 1986), 129-146. Guichard's theories on Berber settlement are neither archeologically nor
documentarily measureable, and so do not enter into this discussion.
55
Al-'UdhrT, 15-6; al-RazT, 71. Bazzana dates the castle of Ifac from the caliphal period, identifying
it with the Tq!Tm of al-' Askar, but Pavon Maldonado and Torro i Abad prefer to date the site from the
thirteenth century: C. Aranegui, A. Bazzana, "Vestiges de stmctures defensives d'epoque romaine
tardive et d'epoque musulmane au Pefion d'Ifac (Calpe, Province d'Alicante)," MC V., 16 (1980):
421-36; B. Pavon Maldonado, "Calpe y al-Askar (Alicante). Sobre el habitat medieval de! Pefion de
Jfach y al-Askar o Madinat al-Askar," Sharq al-Anda/us, 14-15 (1997-8): 81-106; J. Torro i Abad,
"Fortificaciones en Yibal Balansiya," 399. Recent work on the Castellar de Morera, near Eiche,
strongly points to it being the site of al-'Askar: P. Guichard, "Le Castellar de Morera d'Elche est-ii la
Madina d'al-'Askar des textes arabes," MARQ. Arqueologia y museos, 2 (2007): 99-105;
[http://www.blogdelmarqexcavaciones.com/index.php/category/excavaciones/castellar-de-la-morera/],
consulted 12/03/2010. The site of Tossals de Bullento, near Pego, held a primitive fortification that
may have served as storage for maritime expeditions: R. Azuar Ruiz, Denia islamica, 71-2; J. Torro i
Abad, "Fortificaciones en Yibal Balasiya," 396-7. Slightly north, at the site "Los Arrozales",
constmction work unearthed caliphal ceramics and "old drainage systems": A. Bazzana, Maison d'al
Andalus, 1:402.
6
It is extremely difficult to establish a precise chronology for this restmcturation of mral settlements.
Without coins or dated markers, such as funeral steles, and besides vague and often debatable
indications provided by constmction methods and materials, archeologists use ceramic markers to date
sites. Certain ceramic types, such as flares de Iota entre metopas, seem solidly associated with the
caliphal period, or at least do not go past the beginning of the taifa period, but those in verde y
manganeso are not as clear. This glazed process originated in the Peninsula in the workshops of
MadTnat al-Zahra', and even after regional diffusion, indicates a certain level of affluence and
urbanization. Major diffusion began towards the end of the caliphal and Man�iirid periods, and the
fragmentation of Cordovan elites towards the taifa capitals brought this ceramic technique. Thus,
during the period bridging the caliphate and the taifas, workshops in Denia, Murcia, Valencia and
elsewhere were producing "caliphal" ceramics in verde y manganeso, imitating MadTnat al-Zahra's
more sober motifs while introducing the more luxurious patterns associated with the taifas. These
ceramics can thus indicate a fairly wide chronology, from the second half of the fourth/tenth century to
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fourth/tenth century were generally abandoned in conjunction with these new
settlement patterns. An administrative framework that translated juridical, fiscal and
military aspects of the caliphate came to bear on the Sharq al-Anda/us lands. This
process was not unique and appears a few decades earlier in other AndalusT regions.
The system was essentially comprised of an association between rural collectivities,

qura, and an administrative fortified site, the f:zi�n, the whole forming an
administrative district, the juz '. 7

Through this system, the state received taxes,

collected by its representatives and collectively paid by the qura, ensured the regular
observance of legal codes and maintained a military presence. Cressier describes a
dense network of sites in south-west al-Andalus towards the end of the fourth/tenth
century, a system of "rigidly structured territorial divisions, with a castle in the center
[of each]." 8 The development of this system of f:zu$fin coincided with a colonization
the end of the taifa period: only the absence of ceramics in cuerda seca, a technique more solidly
associated with the fifth/eleventh century, can eventually justify dating that does not go past the first
half of the taifa period. The majority of the sites associated then with this restructuration can only be
vaguely dated, offering verde y manganeso ceramics, but without other chronological indicators. Our
analysis is thus dependent on the work of archeologists working in the area, negotiating between
sometimes conflicting interpretations. Nevertheless, it is possible to establish patterns of change over
time that are part of a larger continuity and due to more than one factor. For ceramics indicators, see
for example the chart by A. Bazzana, Maisons, I :56. J.A. Gisbert Santonja noted that the ceramic kiln
in Denia produced during the same period verde y manganeso ceramics in both caliphal and taifa
styles; "Ceramica caliphal de Denia," in Ceramica califal de Denia (Alicante, 2000), 26.
7 A. Bazzana, P. Cressier, and P. Guichard, Chateaux niraux d'al-Andalus, 132.
8 P. Cressier, "Agua, fortificaciones y poblamiento : El aporte de la arqueologia a los estudios sobre
el Sureste peninsular," in Aragon en la Edad Media, 9 (Zaragoza, 1991), 409. In a later publication,
Cressier situates this threshold at the beginning of the fifth/tenth century, demonstrating the ambiguous
chronology of which he writes, "this profound restructuration of the Andalusian mountains dates from
the tenth century, though we cannot be sure if it should be attributed to the caliphal or beginning of the
taifal period:" P. Cressier, "Remarques sur la fonction du chateau islamique dans l'actuelle province
d' Almeria, a partir des textes et de l'archeologie," in « L 'Jncastellamento ». Actes des rencontres de
Gerone (26-27 novembre 1992) et de Rome (5-7 mai 1994), ed. M. Barcelo and P. Taubert (Rome,
1998), 247; P. Cressier, "Chateaux et terroirs irrigues dans la province d'Almeria (X0-XVe siecles)," in
Castrum 5, 452. Senac has noted a reorganization of settlements in the Upper March that speaks to
processes of Islamicization. However, he specifies that the modeled observed in the Sharq al-Anda/us
does not apply well there, underlining the influence of local elites and dissimilar choices for site
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of agricultural lands by rural collectivities, possibly stimulated and planned by
elements tied to the central power.9 Without denying the idea that these qura were in
many cases collectively owned by their own free peasants, urban and governmental
power began to extend over the countryside in the second half of the fourth/tenth
century, with even limited appropriation of lands by private individuals in some
areas.10
In the Jibal Balansiya, Cocentaina's castle remained its district's /:li$n, but all
the other sites in that juz' were abandoned; new /:lu$iin and qura emerged according to
new settlement patterns.11 Lands colonized at the end of the caliphal period can be
noted in sites at Castellar d' Alcoy, Tossal del Moro, and in the Laguart and Gallinera
valleys. All of these sites arose towards the end of the fourth/tenth century, and
continued on into the next. A funerary stele from Alcoy is dated from 374/984, and
the presence of ceramics in verde y manganeso, as well as cuerda seca, confirms

placement: Ph. Senac, "Stratigraphie du peuplement musulman au nord de l'Ebre (VIII0-Xl 0 siecle),"
in De la Tarraconaise a la Marche Superieure d'al-Andalus (JV"-Xf' siecle): !es habitats ruraux, ed.
Ph. Senac (Toulouse, 2006), 66-8; Ph. Senac, "Evoluci6n de! poblamiento musulman al norte de! Ebro
(siglos VIII-XI)," in Arqueologia medieval. Reflexions des de la practica. I Curs Internacional
d'Arqueologia Medieval, ed. F. Sabate and J. Brufal (Lerida, 2007), 148-50; Ph. Senac, "Paysans et
habitats ruraux de la Marche Superieure d'al-Andalus: les donnees des textes et de l'archeologie," in
Movimientos migratorios, asentamientos y expansion (siglos VII-XI) (Pamplona, 2008), 99-100.
9 P. Cressier, "Chateaux et terroirs," 452; P. Cressier, "Remarques sur la function du chateau
islamique," 245.
10 Ph. Senac, "Le chateau dans al-Andalus: bilan et perspectives de la recherche frans;aise," MC. V.,
29-1 (1993): 176; Ph. Senac, "Stratigraphie du peuplement musulman," 70; Ph. Senac, "Evoluci6n <lei
poblamiento musulman,"152. Private possession of lands, as almunias and ral:zals remained the
exception during this period, except perhaps in the Upper Marches. The private interests of the elites
extended into rural areas more commonly through the iqfa' system, or fiscal concessions from state
domains: Ch. Picard, "Quelques remarques sur la propriete du sol dans le Gharb al-Andalus pendant la
periode musulmane," Revue des eludes islamiques, 60 (1992): 510-11; P. Guichard, Musulmans de
Valence, 379-83.
11 R. Azuar Ruiz, "Fortificaciones de taifas en el Sarq al-Andalus," 119-22.

continuity from the caliphal to the taifal period.
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The qarya of Tossal del Moro, also

with ceramics in verde y manganeso, sat at the junction of the Seta and Serpis valleys,
as well as the only routes between inland regions and the Guadalest valley and
Marina Baja littoral. 13 Guichard has identified the site, situated in the Pla de Petrocha
zone near Benilloba, with the qarya of Butrush/Bitrusha, cited by Yaqiit and Ibn al
Abbar as the home of two jurists in Denia in the fifth/eleventh and sixth/twelfth
centuries; the quantity and quality of ceramics discovered at the site seems to
coincide with an important qarya with urbanizing structures susceptible of hosting a
family of jurists. 14 Over the course of the century, the fortification of Pefiaguila was
built overlooking this crossroads, serving as an administrative center and
representative of state interests. 15 In the Serpis valley farther north, a funeral stele
from 388-404/998-1014 and discovered in Alcocer de Planes indicates a settlement
there, possible associated with the l:zi�n of Cocentaina. 16

The caliphal fort at

Almiserat bears witness to the strategic importance of the Gallinera valley following

12 C. Barcelo, La Escritura arabe en el pais valenciano. Jnscripciones monumentales (Valencia,
1998), I:133, no. 6; R. Azuar Ruiz, Denia islamica, 134-6.
13 R. Azuar Ruiz, Denia islamica, 93.
14 Yaqut, I :443; lbn al-Abbar, Kitab al-takmila (HusaynT), n. 635. Following Guichard's theory, this
site may also be associated with the juz' of Banu Ghafil, mentioned by al-'UdhrT (p. 20) and the Sierra
de Benalcatil, mentioned by al-RazT (p. 70). In a 1976 article, Guichard noted family ties between
jurists in Jativa and Denia who carried the same clan name of lbn Ghattal, while two jurists in Denia
originally from Butrush/Bitrusha carried the names lbn 'Attal and lbn Ghattal; P. Guichard, "Un
toponyme historique de l'ancienne kura de Tudmfr: Benicadell," Murgetana, 45 (1976): 44-5.
15 J. Torr6 i Abad, "Fortificaciones en Yibal Balansiya," 402; R. Azuar Ruiz, Denia islamica, 98-9.
Two funeral steles from Pefiaguila date from 452/1060-1 and 469/1077-8; C. Barcelo, La Escritura
arabe en el pais valenciano, I: 158-9, 173-4, ns. 19, 30.
16 C. Barcelo, La Escritura arabe en el pais valenciano, I: 139-40, no. 9; R. Azuar Ruiz, Denia
islamica, 137.
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the conquests of the fourth/tenth century.

17

A funerary stele discovered at Alpatr6, at

the other end of the valley and dated from 331/942-3, indicates the beginnings of
settlement during the same period. 18 A new phase of colonization, including the

qarya of Benirrama, coincided with the abandonment of Almiserat and construction
of Gallinera castle at the tum of the century. 19 In the Laguart valley, the site of
Atzavares resembles Gallinera castle, and seems to share the same chronology.20 The
two /:zu.$iin coincided with districts, juz' al-Ghalinar and iqlfm Laqwar, named by al
'UdhrT. 21 This entire region of the Jibal Balansiya, from Cocentaina, through the
Serpis, Seta, Planes, Gallinera, Ebo, Laguart and Guadalest valleys until the coast,
was colonized over the course of the taifa period, and castle sites multiplied to
integrate new settlements into a governmental framework.22

A. Bazzana, "Un fortin omeyyade dans le Shark Al-Andalus," 87-108; J. Torr6 i Abad,
"Fortificaciones en Yibal Balansiya. Una propuesta de secuencia," in Castillos y territorio en a/
Anda/us (Granada,1998),394,398,400.
18
C. Barcel6,La Escritura arabe en el pais valenciano, I: I26-7,n. 2. The early date may,however,
also point to a settlement from an earlier period.
19 R. Azuar Ruiz does not date the castle before the thirteenth century, while A. Bazzana proposes
caliphal origins: R. Azuar Ruiz, Denia islamica, 77; A. Bazzana, Maisons, 1:4 I 9. A stele from
Benirrama dates from 456-64/1063-71; C. Barcel6,La Escritura arabe en el pais valenciano, I:170-1,
no. 27. Alcala castle, at the western end of the valley,dates probably from the fifth/eleventh cenh1ry;
J. Torr6 i Abad,"Fortificaciones en Yibal Balansiya," 404; A. Bazzana,Maisons, I :397.
20
A. Bazzana,Maisons, I:403.
21 Al-'UdhrT, 11, 20. At one time, R. Azuar Ruiz proposed Cocentaina as the bi!fn for the district of
Ghalinar; Denia islamica, I 07.
22
Among the fortified sites dating from the fifth/eleventh century: Pia de la Casa et Penya Alta,
Gaianes, Castells, Guadalest, Confrides, Margarida, Pop, Tarbena, et Segaria; J. Torr6 i Abad, P.
Ferrer Marset, "Asentamientos altomedievales en el Pie Negre," 141; J. Segura Marti,J. Torr6 i Abad,
Torres i Castells de l'Alcoia-Comtat (Alcoy, 1985), no. 3; J. Torr6 i Abad, "Fortificaciones en Yibal
Balansiya," 402; A. Bazzana,Maisons, 410,424,433,441,444; R. Azuar Ruiz,Denia islamica, 82; J.
Segura Marti, J. Torr6 i Abad, Ir' Jornades d'Historia Alcoiana « l'Epoca Medieval». Cataleg
Caste/lologic de !'Area de Treball de! Museu Arqueologic Municipal d'Alcoi (Alcoy,1984); E. Cortell
Perez, J. Torr6 Abad, "Dos yacimientos medieva\es en Serrella," Revista de! lnstituto de £studios
Alicantinos, 38-2 (1983): 101-117; A. Bazzana, P. Cressier, P. Guichard, Chateaux ruraux d'al
Andalus, 101; A. Bazzana, P. Guichard, "Structures du peuplement et organisation de l'espace," in
Histoire et archeologie de I 'habitat medieval, ed. A. Bazzana and J.-M. Poisson (Lyon, 1986),99; R.
Azuar Ruiz,"Fortificaciones de taifas en el Sarq al-Andalus," 127.
17
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Littoral settlements likewise appeared during the taifa period, from the Marina
Baja continuing to Denia. A qarya near Villajoyosa has produced ceramics in verde y
manganeso and a mosque. 23

Yaqiit wrote that the qarya of Altea father north

produced a scholar in the fifth/eleventh century, and IdrisI cites the Jabal Kalb on the
coastal sailing route between Denia and Alicante. 24 The Gorgos valley plain, as well
as the area around Javea's harbor, were densely populated, with settlements scattered
throughout the zone from the end of the caliphal period.25
In the southern parts of the taifa, in the heart of the kura de Tudmir, the
extension of urban influence is notable especially in the Lower Segura, where the
creation of an irrigation system in the Orihuela huerta led to the abandonment of
several sites from the fourth/tenth century. 26 Sonia Gutierrez Lloret has shown that
archeological signs of Islamicization and urbanization, culminating under the late

23
Near Villajoyosa, in the Tapida valley, J.R. Garcia Gandia directed a dig at the Foietes de Dalt site,
which dates from the fourth/tenth century. During the taifa period, the population grew and
established a new qarya at Tossal de I' Almissera. Among the ceramics unearthed at this site was a
"North African" ataifor and another piece in verde y manganese decorated with the term "al-mulk";
J.R. Garcia Gandia, S. Llorens Campello, G. Perez Boti, "L'Almissera: territorio castral y espacio rural
en epoca islamica," De la medina a la vi/a: Actas II Jornadas de Arqueologia Medieval, ed. F.J. Jover
Maestre and C. Navarro Poveda (Alicante-Petrer, 2004), 83-105.
24
Yaqiit, 1:349-50; IdrTsT, Caminos, 70/96.
25
Numerous sites in the Gorgos valley have produced ceramics in verde y manganeso, and a funeral
inscription from Javea dates from 380-404/990-1014: C. Barcelo, La Escritura arabe en el pais
va!enciano, 137-8, no. 8; R. Azuar Ruiz, Denia islamica, 66; J. Bolufer Marques, "Aproximaci6n al
poblamiento islamico de los terminos municipales de Xabia y Benitatxell (Marina Alta, Alicante)," in
II Congreso de Arqueologia Medieval Espanola, (Madrid, 1987), 2:477-90; J. Bolufer Marques, "Les
necropolis andalusines de Xabia," Aguaits, 21 (2004): 137-142. We would like to thank J. Bolufer
Marques, director of the Javea archeological museum, for a helpful discussion and providing us with
unpublished information on many sites throughout the Pexet valley that have produced taifal-style
ceramics, including: Capsades, Rodat, Cansalades, Poet, Pous de l'Abiar and la Lluca.
26
S. Gutierrez Lloret, P. Moret, P. Rouillard, P. Sillieres, "Le peuplement du Bas Segura," 67-72; R.
Azuar Ruiz, S. Gutierrez Lloret, "Fonnaci6n y transformaci6n de un espacio agricola islamico en el sur
de! Pais Valenciano: el Bajo Segura (siglos IX-XIII)," in Castrum 5, 201-211.
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caliphate, are visible for the beginning of the fifth/eleventh century.2 None of the
sites in the lower Segura valley show signs of post-caliphal occupation, and for the
Vinalop6, only Castillo de Salvatierra near Villena consolidated as a /:,i$n in the taifa
period. 28 The Castillo de la Murta, near Agost, while in relation with a meager
settlement, seems to have existed more for surveillance of the Vinalop6 and Alicante
plain. 29 Although settlement remained sparse in the Upper Vinalop6, Castalia and
Salvatierra emerged as /:,u$iin, and a series of qurii began to reclaim lands abandoned
for centuries. 30
This overview of settlements in the caliphal and taifal periods has to be
understood in the context of a larger, peninsular evolution. Rural settlements were
incorporated into governmental and fiscal systems, while new agricultural and
irrigational practices also shaped new patterns. Fortified sites from the early caliphal
period correspond more with state or strategic needs, tied to the consolidation of
Umayyad power in recently conquered areas. Urban influence over rural areas began
to spread from the mid-fourth/tenth century, leading to the abandonment of rural sites
and the integration of rural populations, as seen around Orihuela and its developing
huerta. In the taifa of Denia, urban growth accompanied this movement, as with
Eiche, Alicante and Denia, in conjunction with the colonization of new lands through
27

S. Gutierrez Lloret, Cora de Tudm,r, 310.
R. Azuar Ruiz, "Fom1acion y consolidacion," 91-2; R. Azuar Ruiz, "Fortificaciones de taifas en el
Sarq al-Andalus," 118-9. Azuar Ruiz includes Cabezo Soler among the sites that outlast this change,
but Gutierrez Lloret writes clearly the contrary: "en el Cabezo Soler faltan precisamente las
producciones que sugieran la perduracion de! asentamiento entre el siglo XI y la conquista cristiana del
XIII;" S. Gutierrez Lloret, P. Moret, P. Rouillard, P. Sillieres, "Le peuplement du Bas Segura," 65.
29
E. Lopez Segui, Arqueologia en Agost (Alicante) (Alicante, 1996), 64-70, 134-6; R. Azuar Ruiz,
"Formacion y consolidacion," 81.
30
R. Azuar Ruiz, Denia islamica, 165; J. L. Simon Garcia, "Alquerias fortificadas de! Vinalopo,"
122, 125.
28
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new qurii and f:zu.run. Recent historiography and archeological work confirms this
phenomenon of abandonment and regrouping in the taifal period.

EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL POLICIES

Analyses of taifal period settlement refer to several associated factors: urbanization
and Islamicization, new agricultural techniques and state intervention most often
through fiscal action. Denia's Mediterranean policies also contributed, but within the
gradual movement that began in the caliphal period. Innovations in irrigation and the
association of secano and regadio lands often influenced choices for new sites, but
did not determine the overall dynamic.31 An examination of fiscal policies, under the
caliphal then taifa courts, can help shed further light on the subject.
Studies on settlement patterns in this region have benefited, and perhaps
suffered in part, from a text by lbn I:Iayyan that describes fiscal abuses by the 'Amirid
rulers of Valencia, Mubarak and Mu?affar.32 lbn I:Iayyan writes that these abuses
pushed peasants to flee for the cities and abandon their lands, which urban elites
31 Works by Cressier, Barcelo and Bazzana have shown that new qurii were established according to
irrigation possibilities, while buFtn were placed with the control of hydraulic systems in mind; P.
Cressier, "Agua, fortificaciones y poblamiento," passim; A. Bazzana, "Territoire castral et reseaux
irrigues : l'exemple du hisn de Ghaliniir (Alicante)," M.C.V., 29-1 (1993): 155-170; M. Barcelo, "Los
buJitn, los castra y los fantasmas que aim los habitan," in Castillos y territorio en al-Anda/us, ed. A.
Malpica (Granada, 1998), 1-41. Bolens' dissertation on AndalusT agronomy, along with Watson's work
on the "Arab agricultural revolution" have shown the profound effects of new agricultural techniques
and products on AndalusT settlement and demographics: L. Bolens, "La Revolution agricole andalouse
du Xi e siecle," Studia islamica, 47 (1978): 121-42; L. Bolens, Agronomes andalous du Mayen-Age
(Geneva, 1981 ); A. Watson, "The Arab Agricultural Revolution and its Diffusion, 700-1100," The
Journal ofEconomic History, 34-1, The Tasks ofEconomic History, 8-35.
32 The text is reproduced by lbn Bassam (Dhakhrra, 3:15-20) and lbn 'ldharT (Bayiin, 3:158-63).
Premare and Guichard provide a French translation of the Dhakh"ira passage with their analysis:
"Croissance urbaine et societe mrale a Valence au debut de l'epoque des royaumes de taifas (XI° siecle
de J.-C.). Traduction et commentaire d'un texte d'Jbn Hayyiin," R.O.M.M., 31.1 (1981): 15-30.
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subsequently took over, taking on the former owners as hired workers. Guichard and
Premare published a translation and habile analysis of the passage to underline the
effects of these practices on AndalusI society, and the article has since held broad
influence over regional historians and archeologists.

The authors point out the

introduction of private domains (<;liya' mustakhla$a) into a system that had heretofore
known mostly collective village properties, though they also note "there was no
profound transformation of the rural landscape, only a modification in the social and
legal condition of peasants."33 Guichard insists moreover that raf:zals and other forms
of private agricultural property remained an exception in the Sharq al-Andalus. 34
Nevertheless, regional settlement changes are often presented in conjunction with the
fiscal practices of the 'Amirid clients.
Azuar Ruiz specifies that the abandonment of rural sites should not be tied to
the disarticulation of the Umayyad state, since such events usually provoke flight
from the city to the country, the opposite, in fact, of what is observed here. Azuar
Ruiz uses Guichard's work, lbn I:Iayyan's text, and another by lbn I:Iazm on the
abuses of the muluk al-fawa 'if to write that "the abandonment of sites by peasants at
the beginning of the fifth/eleventh century may be the result of high and excessive
taxation applied by the first taifas."35 The archeologist Navarro Poveda applies this
interpretation to Novelda in the Vinalop6.36 Gutierrez Lloret, however, in her longA.-L. Premare, P. Guichard, "Croissance urbaine," 26; P. Guichard, Musulmans de Valence, 252.
P. Guichard, Musulmans de Valence, 379-83.
35
R. Azuar Ruiz, "Del Hisn a al Madina," 38; R. Azuar Ruiz, "Fortificaciones de taifas en el Sarq al
Andalus," 93.
36
C. Navarro Poveda, "El valle de Novelda (Alicante) en epoca islamica," in Urbanismo medieval
de! pafs valenciano, ed. R. Azuar, S. Gutierrez, and F. Valdes (Madrid, 1993), 144.
33

34
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term analysis sees the culmination of urbanization begun under the caliphate in the
appropriation of lands by cities representative of fragmented taifal power. 37 This last
analysis seems more in line with patterns of abandonment and colonization observed
in the Sharq al-Anda/us in the fourth/tenth-fifth/eleventh centuries, and taifal
practices seem more a continuation than a rupture of caliphal policies.
Ibn I:Iayyan's description of fiscal abuse should in fact be placed in relation
with al-TurµishI's near contemporary description of changes introduced under the
'Amirid regime.

He explains that Ibn AbT 'Amir established monthly monetary

payments to the army, paying for them with a tribute on the land, impoverishing the
people and devastating their farms.

Rural populations fled, leading to lower

agricultural yields and so lower tributes raised by the state, weakening the army and
allowing the Christians to take over Muslim territories, until the Almoravids
reestablished iqfa' concessions as in the past. 38 'Abd Allah b. BuluqqTn describes in
similar terms reforms introduced under al-Man�ur, explaining that he freed AndalusTs
from their military responsibilities in exchange for financial contributions through
land-based tribute. 39
Both texts clearly show the 'Amirid regime paying for a professional army
through property taxes. They both also show the am1y directly collecting their pay.
37

S. Gutierrez Lloret, "Ciudades y conquista. El fin de las ciudades visigodas y la genesis de las
mudun islamicas <lei sureste de al-Andalus," in Genese de la ville islamique en al-Anda/us et au
Maghreb occidental, ed. P. Cressier and M. Garcia-Arena( (Madrid, 1998), 157.

38
"to-1ly,i \�I_, yl,:._)I i.foli 4">.1-1"-:i ;;4 u:,.}11 u-k 1'.ii-' �I u-k Jly,YI � o->4L.:... .i.:..;,.ll ylbc J_>!
J� u-k _,.wl (JJ!J J\.;.;,.YI �.., ul.bl..JI c)! �_>..l\ wy\+;JI will O_JL......li � I� yl,:._)\ W!.)� ·��I_,
l...S -:.,1,:.\..1,S;II l_,J_>! u_,..:;...ll \+ihJ ul u-1! _)� � _,.wl Y'IJ � � �\ Y'I J...>.i i-J_, � �\ hi� �I
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"Structures etatiques et communautes rurales : !es impositions legales et illegales en al-Andalus et au
Maghreb (Xle-XVe)," Studia islamica, 80 (I 994): 60.
39 tl.1.!';11 � c.,.,�: 'Abd Allah b. BuluqqTn, Tibyan, 58.
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Al-TurtushI claims these new fiscal practices, and their abuse by the army, forced
peasants to flee their lands, a process analogue to the situation Ibn ijayyan describes
for taifal Valencia.

'Abd Allah b. Buluqqin specifies that the muliik al-tawa'if

followed this precedent and continued these policies, and is seconded by al-TurturshI
who links the 'Amirid reforms to taifal decadence before the arrival of the
Almoravids. In his analysis of territorial concessions in al-Andalus, Chalmeta ties
these texts to Ibn ijazm's description of fiscal abuse under the taifa rulers with the
resulting impoverishment of the rural AndalusI population.40 An increase in caliphal
property taxes thus effected rural settlement. Ibn ijayyan's description of rural flight
during the taifa period is matched by al-TurtushI's own text on Umayyad and 'Amirid
fiscal policies. These policies were continued, and probably extended under the taifa
rulers, but have their roots in al-Man�iir's reforms.
Fiscal policies under al-Man�iir and then the muliik al-tawa'ifthus influenced
rural settlement between the fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh centuries. These practices
seem to have contributed to the extension of urban influence over rural zones, at
times through the transfer of these lands to the hand of urban elites. Senac and Picard
have noted a process of privatization of lands in the Upper March and surrounding
Seville beginning in the fourth/tenth century.41 Senac uses the texts by Ibn ijayyan
and al-TurtushI to explain the massive and precipitous emergence of almunias and
rabals north of the Ebro as documented by post-Reconquista documents. Likewise,
40
P. Chalmeta, "Concesiones territoriales en al-Andalus (hasta la llegada de los Almoravides),"
Cuadernos de Historia, 6 (1975): 66-72.
41
Ph. Senac, "Stratigraphie du peuplement musulman," 68-70; Ch. Picard, "Quelques remarques sur
la propriete du sol," 510-11.
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Guichard uses Reconquista documents from the seventh/thirteenth century to note
private suburban properties, rabals, around Valencia.42

However, though these

repartimientos may indicate properties that date from the fifth/eleventh century, they
require more precaution than documents from the Upper March more or less
contemporaneous with the end of the taifas.
lbn I:Jayyan describes the plundering of peasant lands by Mubarak and
Muiaffar as a personal act, and recognizes neither the legality nor the legitimacy of
their power. Nevertheless, the fityii,n were the de facto representatives, possessors
even, of the sultan. The appropriation of lands abandoned by owners in debt to the
sultan was certainly not without precedent.

The jurist al-WansharishT notes

specifically for the region of Valencia in the fourth/tenth century the confiscation of
lands by the sultan who then conferred them to someone who would pay the property
taxes instead of the original owner.43 This case certainly resembles lbn I:Iayyan's
description, though Mubarak and Muiaffar seem to have subjected successive
landowners to this treatment.

Should we assume that the abandonment of lands

resulted in their incorporation into state properties, worked for the benefit of the bayt
al-ma!, distributed as concessions or sold? Al-WansharTsT also transmits a fatwa
justifying the sale of lands belonging to the public fisc, bayt al-ma/ al-muslimzn, by
the Bani} 'Amir, Banu Sumadi]:i and Banu 'Abbad, perhaps akin to the Valencian
situation where abandoned lands were redistributed among members of the taifal

42

P. Guichard, Musulmans de Valence, 379-383.
Al-WansharTsT, Mi 'yar, 6: 179, 8:330; V. Lagardere, Histoire et societe, 171, 348. The use of the
termjawara, oppress, may indicate the possible illegality of the agent's actions.
43

elite.

44
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Denia is not specifically mentioned in these examples, but Ibn I:Iayyan, Ibn

I:Iazm, 'Abd Allah b. BuluqqTn and al-Turtfish'f attribute these practices to the muliik
al-tawa 'if as a whole. We can thus prudently trace to this period at least some of the
raf:,als mentioned in the repartimientos for Denia. 45
Nevertheless, the appropriation of abandoned lands was not the most
important change in settlement patterns.

The majority of caliphal sites were

abandoned and were not reoccupied before the end of the taifa period. Rural flight
coincided with singular urban growth, as well as the colonization of new lands.
Regional urbanization in response to caliphal expansion appears as early as the
second half of the fourth/tenth century, though the process culminated under the
taifas. The cities of Orihuela, Eiche, Alicante, Denia, Valencia and Mad'fnat Mayurqa
were subjected to considerable demographic pressure, manifest in a wave of
construction and reordering of urban structures. 46 This urban development sprang at

44

Al-WansharTsT, Mi 'yar, 6:97-8; V. Lagardere, Histoire et societe, 184.
Repartimientos de los reinos de Mallorca, Valencia y Cerdena, ed. Prospero de Bofamll y
Mascaro (Barcelona, 1856), 346-7, 367, 40 I, 460. Properties are mentioned near Deni a, Pefiaguila,
Ontinyent, and Albaida between Denia and Jativa.
46 E. Diz Ardid, "Espacios urbanos en la Orihuela medieval," in Urbanismo medieval de! pais
valenciano, ed. R. Azuar Ruiz, S. Gutierrez and F. Valdes (Madrid, 1993), 163, 170; P. Rosser, I.
Quiles, N. Rossello, "La ciudad de Alicante y la arqueologia del poblamiento en epoca medieval
islamica," in JV Congreso de Arqueologia Medieval Espanola : Sociedades en transicion, Alicante, 49 octubre 1993, II, Comunicaciones (Alicante, 1993), 117-9; R. Azuar Ruiz, J .L. Menendez Pueyo, "El
alfar islamico de Eiche (Alicante) (siglos Xl-Xlll)," in ll Congreso de arqueologia peninsular.
Zamora, del 24 al 27 de septiembre de 1996 (Alcala, 1999), 4:679-690; E. Lopez Segui, I. Gomez
Martinez, A. Pastor Mira, F. Tendero Fernandez, P. Torregrosa Gimenez, "Eiche medieval : la
evolucion de su sistema defensive," in De la medina a la vi/a: Actas JI Jorandas de Arqueologia
Medieval, ed. F.J. Jover Maestre, C. Navarro Poveda (Alicante-Petrer, 2004), 33-58; P. Costa Cholbi,
J. Bolufer i Marques, M.A. Garcia Bebia, "L'urbanisme de! Raval de Daniya - El Forti - Denia," in JV
Congreso de Arqueologia Medieval Espanola. Sociedades en transicion (Alicante, 1994), 2:269-275;
"Daniya - Denia -. Remembranr;:a d'une ciutat andalusf," in JV Congreso de Arqueologia Medieval
Espanola. Sociedades en transicion (Alicante, 1994), 2:251-260; J. Pascual Pacheco, R. Soriano
Sanchez, "La evolucion urbana de Valencia desde epoca visigoda hasta epoca taifa (siglos V-Xl)," in
JV Congreso de Arqueologia Medieval Espanola : Sociedades en transicion, Alicante, 4-9 octubre
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least partly from the rural exodus tied to fiscal oppression.
Lucie Bolens has argued that taifal decentralization was a positive force in the
development of al-Andalus.

She maintains that the personalization of private

property rationalized production and taxes, contributing to a "policy of growth in
agricultural production."47 She likewise notes that the colonization of new lands
intensified beginning in the fifth/eleventh century, and that the choice of new fields
was a theme often treated in agricultural treatises from the time.48 It seems in fact
that we can analyze taifa settlement patterns through this idea of localized power,
fiscal administration and agriculture, and the "psychological motive for growth."
Reduced to a regional existence, and so limited economic resources, the taifa rulers
sought to better exploit the lands under their authority, expanding lands susceptive of
providing fiscal income. The redistribution of lands described by Ibn I:Iayyan points
to efforts to preserve state income, while 'Abd Allah b. Buluqqin and al-TurtfishI
indicate a process that would have led to the extension of cultivated lands.49 The taifa
state thus intervened directly in the repopulation of rural zones, encouraging the
colonization of new lands through its own agents and inciting the elite to do the same
through territorial concessions. This interpretation implies impetus from the top, and
although the possibility for popular initiatives did exist, they would have been in
I 993, II, Comunicaciones (Alicante, 1993), 67-76; G. Pons Homar, M.M. Riera Frau, "El pou 5 del
carrer Troncoso (Ciutat de Mallorca). Un nou jaciment del segle XI," in Les Illes orientals d'al
Andalus i !es seves relaciones amb Sharq al-Anda/us, Magrib i Europa cristiana (ss. VIII-XIII), ed. G.
Rosse 116-Bordoy (Palma de Majorca, 1987), 191-204.
47
L. Bolens, "La revolution agricole andalouse du Xie siecle," 122; L. Bolens, Agronomes andalous,
II.
48
L. Bolens, Agronomes andalous, 10.
49
For Granada, at least, fiscal or landed concessions (inziiliit) seem to have been the primary means
for maintaining the taifa's military forces: 'Abd Allah b. BuluqqTn, Tibyiin, 145-7/138-40 and passim;
P. Guichard, Musulmans de Valence, 368.

reaction to influence exercised by the state. The margins for independent action by
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rural populations was limited, and even when lands were colonized independently,
the state would have made its presence known sooner or later, through its fiscal
agents and administration structure by the qaryalbi$n complex.
Ceramics with verde y manganeso and cuerda
seca decoration, luxury and caliphal ceramics,
can serve as indicators of urban intervention in
rural production, of the role of elites in relations
between qura and the sultan.

For example,

investigations at Tossal de l 'Almissera, near
Villajoyosa, a site created ex nova in the fifth/eleventh century, have produced verde
y manganeso ceramics, including an ataifor bearing the term "al-mulk". 50 According
to Barcelo, in caliphal al-Andalus, ceramic instances of al-mulk were "a strict and
rigorous expression of Umayyad legitimacy."51

The diffusion of this technique

followed the exodus of Cordovan elites to the taifa capitals, and Denia was no
exception. Archeological work in Denia in 1990s revealed a pottery oven active
during the fifth/eleventh century that produced caliphal ceramics m verde y
manganeso. 52 The close association between authority and these decorations reflects
a similar relation between the capital and rural settlements, while the presence of
50

J. R. Garcia Gandia et a/ii, "L' Almissera: territorio castral y espacio rural en epoca islamica," The
piece is currently part of the archeological museum collection in Villajoyosa.
51 M. Barcelo, "Al-Mulk, el verde y el blanco. La vajilla califal omeya de Madinat al-Zahra'," in La
ceramica altomedieval en el sur de al-Anda/us. Primer Encuentro de Arqueologfa y Patrimonio, ed. A.
Malpica Cuello (Granada, 1993), 294; J. Escudero Aranda, "La ceramica decorada en 'verde y
manganeso' de Madinat al-Zahra," Cuadernos de Madrnat al-Zahra', 2 (I 988-90): 129-30, 144.
52
Ceramica califal de Denia (Alicante, 2000).
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luxury ceramics at such sites points to an elite exhibiting its social and political status.
Luxury ceramics at fortified sites can probably be associated with quwwiid,
troops and other representatives of the sultiin. 53 This was not the case for all sites,
and the consensus among historians and archeologists is that the majority of these
rural fortifications, albacars, were shelters for rural communities. 54 Nevertheless,
state intervention, or at least the possibility, through these structures was common.
Fortifications dependent on rural populations could later be the object of
governmental attention, with the construction of central towers or celoquias, while
troops occupied them only in time of need. 55 'Abd Allah b. Buluqqin thus ordered
the restoration of several sites (ma 'iiqil) during his conflict with Almeria, while 'Ali
b. Mujahid ordered governors to fortify their posts when threatened by al-Muqtadir b.
Hud. 56 Ibn Bassam uses the term 'ummal for these governors, a title related more to
fiscal administration than military duties, though they obviously were expected to
exercise such duties when ordered.

The term likewise indicates the presence of

governmental agents, not local representatives acting as intermediaries between the
qurii and the sultan. Finally, as Azuar Ruiz has noted, changes in settlement patterns,
the continuous establishment of new rural fortifications and the normalization of
53

Guichard has argued that the presence of luxury or "caliphal" ceramics does not in fact indicate the
presence of aristocratic groups: Musulmans de Valence, 218. General theories on the subject should
indeed be avoided, especially for village sites, but as physical emanations of the state, bu�iin offer a
more stable terrain for analysis. Fortified sites having produced verde y manganeso ceramics include:
Castillo de Cocentaina, Pia de la Casa, Pefiaguila, Salvatierra, Castalia, Casteliar d 'Alcoy, Pop,
Gaianes, Tarbena, Las Atzarvares: R. Azuar Ruiz, Denia islamica, 98, 111, 134-64, 165-7; E. Cortell
Perez, J. Torro Abad, "Dos yacimientos medievales en Serrella," Revista de! lnstituto de £studios
Alicantinos, 38-2 (1983): 107; Chateaux ruraux d'al-Andalus, IOI; J.M. Segura Marti, J. Torro Abad,
Torres i Castells de l 'Alcoia-Comtat (Alcoy, 1985); A. Bazzana, Maisons d'al-Andalus, 403.
54
See Chateaux ruraux d'al-Andalus, 114-9; P. Guichard, Musulmans de Valence, 215-7.
55
P. Guichard, Musulmans de Valence, 217-9; R. Azuar Ruiz, "Fortificaciones de taifas," 132-3.
56
'Abd Allah b. BuluqqTn, Tibyan, 112; lbn Bassam, DhakhTra, 4: 184.
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taifal monetary em1ss1ons should all be understood in relation with taifa fiscal
policies.57 To more efficiently exercise fiscal pressure on rural communities, the taifa
rulers, and 'Ali b. Mujahid specifically, established agents through rural and semi
urban fortifications to collect taxes via coins struck specifically for that purpose.

DEVELOPMENT AND THE SEA

Settlement patterns under the taifa regime answered not only to new agricultural
techniques and lands, but also to the attraction exerted by the coast and
communications axes. Settlement would logically follow valleys and paths, but the
ensemble of networks created over the course of the century points to singular
interaction between inland sites and production zones and growing ports and harbors.
A mutual stimulation existed between the interior and the coast, since ports
emerged in relation to the possibilities offered by the hinterland as a zone of
production and consumption.

Coastal development largely contributed to

demographic expansion along the roads that tied the ports to junctions in the Jibal

Balansiya. In the fourth/tenth century, al-RazT mentions only Denia as a regional
port, with Pechina to the south and Tortosa to the north, and speaks of Alicante only
as an agricultural district.58 The coast was neglected and settlements clung to areas
served by the viae Augusta and Hannibal.

The dynamics behind this settlement

changed over the course of the fifth/eleventh century, and the littoral began once
again to exert its influence. Al-BakrT notes six harbors between TudmTr and Denia 57 R. Azuar Ruiz, "Fortificaciones de taifas," 126-8.
58 AI-RazT, 70-1.
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Qab{il Tudmzr, Santa Pola, Alicante, Moraira and the Montg6 -, while archeological
work and other texts have identified El Campello, Villajoyosa, Benidorm, Altea,
Calpe and Javea.59 Denia's coast was thus accessible to ships, and communities grew
along the littoral as a result. Near Denia, the Gorgas valley, from Teulada to Javea,
emerged as a densely populated area, explained in part by the proximity of the capital,
but also by Javea's excellent natural harbor. 60 In the hinterland of Villajoyosa, the
qura grouped around Almissera were in easy contact with the major urban centers via
the coast as well as the route towards Butrush and Pefiaguila /:ziJn, a major
communications junction for the Jibal Balansiya. Altea served as the maritime outlet
for the iq!Tm al-jabal, cited by Yaqut, of which the rural fortifications of Confrides,
Guadalest, Tarbena, Pla de la Casa and Castell de Castells speak to the importance of
these secondary routes to the sea and underlining their fiscal and military
importance. 61

Secondary ports created opportunities for economic exchange with

other zones along the coast, as well as the greater Mediterranean. Archeological
signs from Denia's littoral attest to these communications: North-African ceramics in

59 Al-BakrT, 81-2/164-6. We were unable to identify Qab/U Tudmzr, especially since Cartagena,
Murcia's maritime outlet, appears just before. For El Campello, the site "La Isleta" has produced
archeological markers comparable to those from Castellet de la Murta d'Agost: E. Lopez Segui,
Arqueologia en Agost, 136. J. R. Garcia Gandia kindly showed us unpublished ceramics in verde y
manganeso from near Villajoyosa. A shipwreck of the coast of Altea adds to Yaqiit's mention of the
site as the origin of a late-fifth/eleventh-century jurist, while Benidorm has produced a Fatimid coin
hoard from the taifa period: Yaqiit, 1 :349-50; S. Martinez Lillo, "La arqueologia y el mar," 218, 220;
C. Domenech Belda, Dinares, dirhames y feluses, 195. ldrTsT cites lfac in the sixth/twelfth century as a
harbor between Denia and Alicante: Caminos, 70/96.
60 C. Barcelo, La Escritura arabe en el pais valenciano, 137-8, no. 8; R. Azuar Ruiz, Denia islamica,
66; J. Bolufer Marques, "Aproximaci6n al poblamiento islamico de los terminos municipales de Xabia
y Benitatxell (Marina Alta, Alicante)," in II Congreso de Arqueologia Medieval Espanola (Madrid,
1987), 2:477-90; J. Bolufer Marques, "Les necropolis andalusines de Xabia," Aguaits, 21 (2004): 137142.
61 Yaqiit, I :349-50; R. Azuar Ruiz, Denia islamica, 356.
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Javea, Villajoyosa and Almissera indicate ships conducting commerce while
following the coastal route to Denia, ships found near Altea transported ceramics
from the Balearics and North Africa, while a fifth/eleventh-century Fatimid com
hoard discovered in Benidorm points to similar relations. 62
Roads and routes emerged to link these qurii and bu$un with the secondary
ports, and then through coastal shipping with Denia, Alicante, Madinat Mayurqa and
the Mediterranean. Interior routes likewise tied them to regional urban centers. Al
'UdhrI and al-IdrisI describe routes that show a connection between littoral growth
and communications networks; the road from Tudmir to Valencia passed through
Onteniente, encouraging the emergence of staging villages, such as Aspe and Biar,
and facilitating ties between Denia and Alicante. Established roads linked Denia with
Valencia and Jativa, Bocairente served as a juncture for routes to Tudm'ir, Cordova
and Toleda, while Alicante attracted traffic from Orihuela, Elche and the Vinalop6
valley.63
Denia thus emerged as a macffna and regional capital, stimulated by maritime
and interior traffic and supported by the fiscal power of the state. The city's principal
urban structures were begun under the taifa and its rulers' political programs. The
city walls, the foundations of the qa$aba noted by al-'UdhrI and IdrisI, and Denia's
urban layout were already in place by the end of the taifa period.64 Inside the walls,
62 J. R. Garcia Gandia et a/ii, "L'Almissera: territorio castral y espacio rnral en epoca islamica," 92;
S. Martinez Lillo, "La arqueologia y el mar," 218, 220; C. Domenech Belda, Dinares, dirhames y
fetuses, 195; C. Domenech Belda, "La moneda fatimi y su relaci6n con al-Andalus," 341.
63
IdrTsT, Caminos, 64-6; IdrTsT, Opus geographicum, 5:556-7; al-'UdhrT, 10, 17, 20.
64
Al-'UdhrT, 19; IdrTsT, Opus geographicum, 5:557; al-l::limyarT, 76/95; J.A. Gisbert, "Ddniya y la
Vila de Denia. En tomo al urbanismo de una ciudad medieval," in Urbanismo medieval de! pais
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archeological investigations have found taifa period shops and workshops - including
the aforementioned pottery kiln - and urban growth led to the construction of a new
mosque by the end of the century.65 At least two cemeteries served the city, one near
the gate for Ondara, the other in the new urban zone known as El Forti, associated
with commercial and artisanal activities there. 66 Demographic growth stemmed in
part from the rural exodus, but this does not explain the rapid urbanization. The
construction of emblematic state structures, such as the qaJaba, city walls and dar al
Jina 'a could only come from the sultan, and depended on its economic resources.
Similar growth appears along the entire Sharq al-Anda/us littoral, which profited
from the decentralization of peninsular economic networks concomitant with the
renewal of Mediterranean markets. These urban constructions likewise speak to the
success of taifa fiscal administrations that drained rural surplus as much as maritime
profits.67 It would be simplistic to reduce taifa politics to their fiscal policies and
desire to assure their financial needs.

lfuJiin also served rural populations and

strategic military needs; monetary production played a central role in communicating
valenciano, ed. R. Azuar, S. Gutierrez, F. Valdes (Madrid, 1993), 69; J.A. Gisbert Santonja, V.
Burguera Sanmateu, J. Bolufer i Marques, La ceramica de Daniya, 32; R. Azuar Ruiz, Denia islamica,
33.
65
Results for these investigations have not yet been published, and were graciously communicated
by the municipal archeologist, J.A. Gisbert Santonja. lbn al-Abbar notes that Abu al-Walid al
Waqqashi (d. 489/1095) was buried near the old mosque; Tiikmila (BAH), 606, n. 1691; C. Barcelo
Torres, La Escritura arabe en el pais valenciano, 1:49; J.A. Gisbert Santonja, V. Burguera Sanmateu,
J. Bolufer i Marques, La ceramica de Daniya, passim.
66
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Aguaits, 21 (2004): 13-36; J.S. Castello Mari, "Maqbarat al-rabad: un cementeri al Raval de Daniya,"
Aguaits, 21 (2004): 69; S. Ruiz Server, B. Simone!, "Maqbarat al-fajjarim: el cementeri dels
terrissers," Aguaits, 21 (2004): 79, 81. The great Koranic reader, 'Uthman b. Sa'id b. 'Uthman al-Dani
was buried in the Ondara gate cemetery: Yaqui, Kitab al-Trshiid al-iirTb ilii ma 'rifat al-adTb
(Dictionary ofLearned Men of Yaqiit), ed. D.S. Margoliouth (London, 1923), 5:37.
67 lbn l:layyan directly associated urban construction in Valencia with the taxes of Mubarak and
Mu?:affar: lbn Bassam, DhakhTra, 3: 15-6.
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political legitimacy while responding to market needs; the construction and
maintenance of road and communications networks was the implied responsibility of
any ruler. Nevertheless, together, these different factors evoke fiscal policy. The
state exercised its influence on many levels on settlement patterns through its
policies, imposing taxes directly on peasant lands, conceding tax receipts to members
of the elite, increasing revenues through improved agricultural production, sometimes
even promoting expanded rural colonization. The dynamics of this process were
influenced in turn by the taifa's larger Mediterranean policies, stimulated by the
maritime communications in which the Mujahid and 'AIT directly participated.
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which flowed the riches of both the Mediterranean and al-Andalus. The taifa should
not be reduced to just one of its facets, and it did resemble on more than one level
other AndalusT kingdoms, but the sea gave Denia its specificity. The omnipresence of
the sea and coastal growth were present at its origin, determined its development and
inspired its fall.
Mujahid and 'AIT, each for his own reasons, sought the foundations of their
power in the Mediterranean. Mujahid's actions at the beginning of the fitna were a
continuation of the caliphal period, inspired by Umayyad and 'Amirid visions of the
potential offered by the Mediterranean, especially for maritime jihad. He used the
Sharq al-Anda/us ports to pursue the guerre de course in which he had likely
participated under the 'Amirid regime. As the central administration disintegrated
and peripheral territories drifted off, Mujahid placed himself in a position to take
advantage of Denia's place as an outpost for maritime conquest. He transformed the
instability caused by the Umayyad fall into the opportunity to establish a caliphate
centered on decidedly Mediterranean bases. He assimilated the sea to a territory over
which he could spread Islamic political control. Extrapolating from 'Amirid maritime
strategies and even political theory, Mujahid's new ambitions are remarkable in fact
for how much they outdistance and rethink policies of the erstwhile regime. Mujahid
was not claiming to continue or replace the Cordovan Umayyad caliphate (his
candidate did not even belong to that branch of the dynasty), but was creating a new
Islamic political space based on the Mediterranean Sea and the perpetual expanding
frontier of jihad and conquest.
Mujahid had been educated alongside the sons of al-Man�ur to serve in the
highest spheres of the caliphate. The ism given to the young protege indicates even
the path intended for him, one of more than palatine service. How much of his later
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actions were driven by this early education is difficult to say, but it does seem to have
informed his decisions and policies, placing his taifa apart from those of his peers
along the Sharq al-Anda/us. The rulers of Tortose, Valencia and Almeria reaped
profits from their coastal locations, and their ports expanded during this period, but
none followed the same path as Mujahid. The other fityan rulers, as ambitious as they
may have been, thought of their states in relation to the fallen regime, "AndalusI
centric" and peninsular. Mujahid, at least during the initial stages of the fitna, turned
from Cordova and established his state on the borders of the dar al-Islam.
Mujahid's failure in Sardinia and his decision to end his caliphate forced the
ruler to limit and redirect his ambitions, now expressed through piracy and territorial
conflicts inland.

Denia remained an outpost for maritime jihad, and its ships

continued their aggressive campaigns, but the port's role as a relay between the
Mediterranean and AndalusI markets became its primary focus. The taifa would
remain at the intersection of both spheres until its end, and its port, barely mentioned
before the fifth/eleventh century, became one of the principal transit points for goods
and people travelling between al-Andalus and the Muslim Mediterranean. Mujahid's
peninsular conquests certainly were motivated by territorial ambitions, but followed
also the flux of communications inland. The conquest of northern Tudmir can be
seen as the simple extension of taifa boundaries, but it also integrated new ports and
routes essential to the taifa's expanding control of peninsular and maritime networks.
The sea was increasing its draw on resources from the interior, and Mujahid worked
to ensure that his territories funneled that growing attraction.
This Mediterranean policy likewise dictated Mujahid's diplomatic relations,
leading him on a double program to safeguard his interests along trade routes while
anticipating the ambitions of this peers.

Diplomatic alliances filled these needs,
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bringing Denia closer to interior taifas, namely Seville, and working to isolate the
threat of the expansionist Banil Hild with their own Mediterranean plans. The sea
thus drew not only resources, but also envy, and Mujahid's diplomacy addressed
both.
Changes in Denia's Mediterranean politics appear already under Mujahid, as
the taifa relied less on booty from piracy and more on taxation and commerce.
Pirates continued to ply the waters from Denia's port, but the increasing power and
interventionism of Christian ports negatively affected the fiscal feasibility of booty as
a state resource.

Perhaps, as Guichard suggested for the Umayyad caliphate, a

normalized and stable regime, along with an "international stature" may have made
Denia's rulers ill at ease with pelagic robbery as a state activity. The reprisal of
monetary production towards the end of Mujahid's reign, though tied also to other
factors, does point to state finances derived from commerce and taxes. Nevertheless,
the sea still was dominant in this new political equation.
'AIT did not abandon his father's guerre de course, though he seems to have
confided its direction to others, namely the Balearic governors, concentrating his
personal attention on maritime commerce. Changes in the Mediterranean dynamic
meant an expanded field of action for Denia's interests. The western basin remained
the taifa's sphere of interest, but the eastern shift of markets towards Egypt
restructured maritime networks. Mentions of Ibn Mujahid and Denia in the Cairo
Geniza after the middle of the century attest to this change, as well as to 'Alf's efforts
to adapt to the evolving markets.
'AIT inherited his father's diplomatic constructions and conflicts, though he
showed himself to be a less habile statesman. He also had to deal with the threat of
Zaragoza's growing power, and in particular the Banil Hild's desire to obtain
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territories along the littoral.

'Alf took care to maintain relations with the Banii

'Abbad of Seville, conscious of commercial ties, but also of a shared mistrust for
Zaragoza. He likewise pursued parallel relations with Barcelona, following this same
logic of economic interests and geo-political strategy.

This diplomatic policy

ultimately failed, overly relying on allied support and mercenary forces, leading to the
taifa's fall, provoked in part by the taifa's economic success.
'Alf worked to improve relations beyond the Iberian Peninsula with his
Muslim peers across the Mediterranean. His correspondence with the lfriqiyan Zirids
and the Fatimid caliphal court coincided with the presence of ships from Denia in
those same zones, illustrating the association between politics and Mediterranean
commerce in Denia's court. Denia's networks do not come through fully in the Cairo
Geniza, and the taifa's relations with the Maghreb are almost totally absent.
Nevertheless, through this corpus of documents, it is clear that 'AlI and other
merchants from Denia traded regularly through circuits linking the taifa with lfriqiya
and Egypt. These relations worked not only through physical networks of ships,
routes and ports, but also through human ones, as shown by 'AlI's close association
with the trading house of Nahray b. Nissam. Denia fed this Mediterranean commerce
with products drawn from its hinterland and inland economic centers, serving largely
as a point of redistribution between the two systems. Mediterranean products must
also have travelled inland through Denia's port, though their nature and quantity is
not clear. The North-African ceramics and Fatimid coins found throughout the taifa,
as well as the bronze objects from Denia itself, speak to the presence of
Mediterranean goods in AndalusI markets, and their transfer through the taifa's ports.
The sea's influence on settlement patterns in the taifa stemmed from
economic development begun in the fourth/tenth century, the extension of caliphal
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power along the littoral and 'Amirid maritime policies, all of which were continued
under Mujahid and 'AlL Regional urbanization resulted from many factors, among
which were rural Islamicization and governmental fiscal policies, but exchange
between the Mediterranean and the Iberian Peninsula likewise left its mark. The
Sharq al-Anda/us ports experienced significant growth, and the material markers,
such as luxury ceramics and urban structures, indicate economic development in
conjunction with Mediterranean renewal. Besides long-distance trade, the growth of
secondary ports points to closer ties with heretofore isolated hinterlands through
coastal shipping. Rural population movements show not only flight from abusive
taxes, but also the possibilities offered by maritime participation. Rural settlement
responded not only to the need to regularize the tributary relation between the state
and villages, but also the development of road networks implicating interior markets,
rural areas and Mediterranean ports.
Denia 's rulers understood their taifa as a junction between the Mediterranean
•.
Denia was an integral part of the fragmented AndalusT
and the Iberian Peninsula.

dynamic while fully participating in the Mediterranean world. Acting as bridges
between the sea and mainland, ports like Denia made possible the almost organic
circulation so characteristic of the Mediterranean.
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Map 2. Land and Maritime Routes in the Sharq al-Andalus
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Map 3. Cities and sites associated with the taifa of Denia

Appendix B
'Ulama' having lived in, studied in, or travelled through the Sharq al-Anda/us

373

374
Sharq alAnda/us
Tortosa
Tahir b. Hazm
Wahab b. al-Khatl b. Pechina
Ruzayq
'Abd al-Rahman b. Tudmfr
al-Fac;ll b. Rashid alKanan1 al-'Ataq1,
Abu al-Matraf
Tudmfr
'Amfra b. 'Abd alRaJ:iman b. Marwan
al-'Utaq1
Sa'td b. Tamr b.
Almeria
Sulayman b. alI:Iasan al-Ghafaq1
MuJ:iammad b.
Tudmfr
'Amira al-'Utafi
Tahir b. Ha21n
Tortosa
'Abd al-RaJ:iman b. Tortosa
Mu'awiya
Name

Isma'tl b. al-Fac;ll b.
al-Fac;ll b. 'Amira al'Ataq1
Al-$abaJ:i b. 'Abd alWaJ:iman b. al-Fac;ll
al-Taq1
'Abd al-RaJ:iman b.
al-Fac;ll b. 'Amira b.
Washd al-'Ataqt
Fac;ll b. 'Amfra b.
Rashid b. 'Abd
Allah b. Sa 'td b.
Shari b. 'Abd Allah
b. Muslim b. Nufl b.
Rabi' b. Malik b.
Muslim al-Kinan1 al'Utaqt
Ibrahim b. Musa b.
Jamtl
Khalifb. Khalifb.
Hisham al-Asha'ar1
MuJ:iammad b.
Harun b. 'Abd Allah
b. 'Abd al-RaJ:iman
b. al-Fac;ll b. 'Umira
al-'Utaq1

Other
Andalus

Overseas
travel

Mishraq, Hajj

Mishraq

Dead Reference

95
220

I:Iumayd1, 517
.Qabbt, 1309

227

Farac,H, 778;
.Qabbt, 1037;
I:Iumaydt, 611

239

Farac;lt, 967;
.Qabbt, 1255

269

I:Iumayd1, 484;
.Qabbt, 823

276

Farac;lt, 1117

285
288

.Qabb1, 863
Farac;lt, 783;
.Qabbt, 1043;
I:Iumayd1, 615
Takmila (Fez),
464

Tudmfr

Hajj, Kairouan >293

Murcia

Kairouan,
Mi�r

294

Farac;lt, 605

Tudmfr

294

Farac;lt, 786

Tudmfr

297

Farac;lt, 1038;
I:Iumayd1, 758

Tudmfr

Mishraq, Mi�r 300

Tudmfr, Lorca
Tudmfr

Mi�r,
Kairouan

Farac;l1, 21

304

Farac;lt, 406

306

Farac;l1, 1169

375
Mas'ud b. 'Umar alUmawI, Abu alQasim
Mu'awia b. 'Ahas b.
Hisham al-JudhamI,
Abu al-Mughira
Al)mad b. Sa'Id b.
Misra, al-GhafiirI
Fac;il b. Salama b.
Kharir b. Munkhkhal
al-JuhnI, Abu
Salama
Mubammad b. AbI
Khalid b. Yazid alBaiianI
Mubammad b.
Ash'ath b. Yabya alUmawI
I)amam b. 'Abd
Allah b. Najaya,
Abu 'Abd Allah al'Amir,
Yasin b. Mubammad
b. 'Abd al-Rabim alAn�ar,
Musa b. 'Abd alSalam al-c;iabI
Al)mad b. Sa'Id b.
Misra al-GhafiirI
J::laf�u b. Mubammad
b. J::laf�u al-LurqI alTamimI
Qasim b. Isma'Il b.
Yunis b. Mu'awia b.
'Abd al-Jubar b.
'Abd Allah b.
Isma'Il b. Yunis b.
Jushim al-BajanI
Al)mad b.
Mubammad b.
Ma'rufb. Walid b.
I:Iaf� b. 'Ara.ma b.
Mashghula alJ::l_udhammI
Jabbafb. Yaman

Tudmir
Tudmir

Kairouan

Tortosa
Pechina

307

Farac;II, 1423;
I:IumaydI, 815

310

Farac;II, 1444;
I)abbI, 1343;
I:IumaydI, 797
Farac;II, 93

312
319

I)abbI, 1287;
I:IumaydI, 757

319

I)abbI, 323

320

Bashkuwal,
1079

Pechina

320

I:IumaydI, 515;
I)abbI, 861

Pechina

320

I)abbI, 1507

321

Farac;II, 1459

322

I:IumaydI, 247;
I)abbI, 411
I)abbI, 668

Cordova

Pechina
Almeria

Tudmir

Cordova

Elvira

Mishraq

Tortosa
Pechina

Cordova

325

Pechina

Sidona

325

Bashkuwal,
1013

Tmtosa

Cordova

327

Farac;II, 167

327

Farac;II, 320;
J::l_umaydI, 365;
I)abbI, 632

Valencia

Mishraq,
Mecca,
Medina

376
Tayib b. Mul)ammad
b. Hariin b. 'Abd alRal)man b. al-Fa<;il b.
'UmTra al-KananT,
al-'UtqT, Abii alQasim al-TudmTrT
'Abd al-Mii'min b.
YazTd al-An$iirT
Mul)ammad b.
I:Iasan b. Qasim b.
Da'Tm
'Ali b. al-I:Iasan alMarrT
I:Iasan b. 'Abd Allah
b. I:Iasan al-TamTmT
Al)mad b. Ral)Tq b.
Ibrahim b. Barth b.
Khalif b. Rashid alSumanT
I:Iafi$ b. Mul)ammad
b. I:Iaf$ al-TamTmT

TudmTr

328

Fara<;li, 625;
I:IumaydT, 519;
QabbT, 866

Mishraq

331

Fara<;iT, 875

Mishraq

332

Bashkiiwal,
1109

Pechina

334

QabbT, 1220

TudmTr,
Pechina
Mayiirqa

338

Fara<;iT, 342

Cordova

343

Takmila (Fez),
16

Cordova

345

Fara<;iT, 368

345

QabbT, 820

346

Fara<;iT, 971

348

Fara<;iT, 488

349
354

Fara<;iT, 1475
Fara<;iT, 1093

363

QabbT, 167

364

Fara<;iT, 1314;
QabbT, 199

368

Fara<;iT, 797

368

Fara<;iT, I 322

Tortosa

Cordova

Almeria

Lorca,
TudmTr,
Pechina
Pechina

Sa'Td b. Manazal b.
al-Shaqaq
'Ala' b. Mul)ammad TudmTr
Sa'Td b. Yal)ya alKhashab
Mu'atT b. Al)mad
Malik b. TawrII alThaqafi

Tortosa

Huesca,
Zaragoza
Kura Valencia Cordova
Lorca,
Pechina,
Orihuela
Mul)ammad b. 'Abd Pechina
Allah b. STd, Abii
'Abd Allah
Mul)ammad b. 'Abd Pechina,
al-Malik alValencia
KhawlanT
'Abd al-Ral)man b. Tortosa
Cordova
'Ali b. 'Abd alMalik b. 'A'dh
Mul)ammad b.
TudmTr,
IbrahTm b. Mul)ibb
Pechina
al-ZuharT

Kairouan,
Tunis, Mi$r,
Bone

377
Zakariya' b.
Mul)ammad
Qasim b. Khilafb.
Fatal) b. 'Abd Allah
b. Jubayr
Yal)ya b. Sharal)TI
Yilnis b. Umayya b.
Malik b. $alal) b.
Burd b. Ilyas b. Burd
al-Anl;,arI al-Zafat
Al)mad b.
Mul)ammad b.
Ma'riif
Ayilb b. 'Abd alMu'min b. Iztd alAnl;,art, Ibn Abt
Sa'td
Yal)ya b. Malik b.
'A'dh b. Ktsan b.
Ma'n b. 'Abd alRal)man b. l;,alah
Ja'far b. Juhafb.
Yaman
Sa'td b. Jazt
Mul)ammad b. Abt
al-J:Iusam Tahir b.
Mul)ammad b. Tahir
al-Qtst al-Zahid
'Umar b.
Mul)ammad b.
Ibrahim al-'AmTrt
Yilnis b. Abt 'Isa b.
'Afik
'Isa b. Abt al-'Ala'
Sa'ad b. Makaram
Qasim b.
Mul)ammad b.
Qasim b. Al;>ba'
Wa!Id b. 'Abd alMalik b. Mul)ammad
b. Marwan b. Khitab
al-'Utaqt
Yal)ya b. Al)mad b.
Jabr b. 'Ubayda

TudmTr,
Pechina,
Murcia
Tortosa
Valencia
Valencia

Cordova

Tortosa

Cordova

Tortosa

Cordova

Tortosa

Valencia

Cordova

Mishraq

371

Fara�II, 450

Mishraq

371

Fara�H, 1075

Mishraq

371
371

Fara<;lt, 1596
Fara<;lt, 1640

372

Qabbt, 346

374

Fara<;lt, 272

Mishraq,
Mecca

Mishraq, Hajj, 375
'Iraq,
Baghdad,
Bal;,ra, Mil;,r
376

Fara<;lt, 1597

Fara<;lt, 317

kilra Valencia Cordova
Tudmir,
Cordova
Murcia

Mishraq
Mishraq

378
378

Fara<;lt, 538
Fara<;lt, 1349;
Qabbt, 155

Pechina,
TudmTr

Mishraq

380

Bashkilwal,
851

Kura Valencia Cordova

Hajj

380

Fara<;lt, 1641

TudmTr
Valencia
TudmTr

Mishraq

381
381
388

Fara<;lt, 991
Qabbt, 787
Fara<;lt, 1077

393

Fara<;lt, 151 I

393

Bashkilwal,
1463

TudmTr

Pechina

Cordova

Cordova,
Guadala-jara
Toledo

378
'Abd al-Ral:iman b.
Mul:iammad b.
Al:imad b. 'Ubayd
Allah al-Ru'TnT
Mul:iammad b. 'Abd
Allah b. 'Isa b.
Mul:iammad b.
lbrahTm b. al-MarbT
Al:imad b. 'Umar b.
Ans al-'Udharu, Abu
al-'Abbas al-Mara
lsma'Tl b. STdih
'Abd Allah b. 'Abd
al-Ral:iman b. alMajl:iafal-Mu'afarT
Mul:iammad b.
Al:imad b. al-Khala�
al-BaiianI
Mul:iammad b. Sa'Id
Abu 'Amir alTakarnnT al-Katib
Yusufb. lbrahim al'AbdarT, Abu alI;Iaiai
'Abd al-Ral:iman b.
'Abd Allah b. 'Abd
al-Ral:iman b. alJal:il:iafal-Ma'afarT
'Abd Allah b. Yusuf
b. Na�r al-AzdT, lbn
al-Fara9T
Al:imad b.
Mul:iammad b. AbT
al-I;Ia�an al-JadalT,
Abu al-Qasim
Zakriya b. Khalid b.
Zakriya b. Samak b.
Khalid b. al-Jarral:i b.
'Abd Allah al-J;)inT
Al-I;Iasan b. Malik

Valencia

Cordova, Jaen

397

Bashkuwal,

Pechina

Cordova,
Elvira

398

Bashkuwal,

<400

I;IumaydT, 237

Murcia

400

Bashkuwal,

Valencia

400

I;IumaydI, 554;
QabbI, 934

Almeria

Mecca,
Baghdad

Pechina

Mishraq

1054

245

I;IumaydI, 14;
QabbI, 22

>400 I;IumaydI, 68;
QabbI, 138

Valencia
Murcia,
Callosa

400

685

>400

Thughr

QabbT, 1442

Valencia

Baghdad

>402 I;IumaydI, 606

Kura Valencia Cordova

Hajj, Mi�r,
Kairouan

403

Bashkuwal,

Pechina

>405

QabbT, 344

Almeria

405

Bashkuwal,

Pechina

406

Bashkuwal,

406

Bashkuwal,

Na�r b. al-I;Iasan b. Valencia
AbT al-Qasim b. AbI
l;Iatim b. al-Asha'ath
al-Tunkufi al-ShashI

577

438

317

1411

379
Almeria
Tahir b. Hisham b.
Tahir al-Azday
AJ:imad b. Yal:iya b. Tortosa
Malik b. YaJ:iya b.
'A'd b. Kaysan b.
Ma'an b. 'Abd alRaJ:iman b. Salih
Al-I:Iasan b. Isma'Tl, Murcia,
Ibn Khayzuran
Mavuroa
Almeria
'Umar b.
MuJ:iammad b.
'Umar b. al-JuhanT
al-Maktab
Mayurqa
AJ:imad b. MutarTf,
Ibn I:Iattab
Al-I:Iasan b. 'AIT b. Murcia
MuJ:iammad al-Ta'T
'Abd al-RaJ:iman b. Pechina,
Almeria
'Abd Allah b.
Khalid b. Musafir alHamadhanT alWahranT
IbrahTm b. Qasim b. Almeria
lsma'Tl b. Yunis alMa'afrT
Murcia
AJ:imad b.
MuJ:iammad
Murcia
Al-I:IussaTn b.
lsma'Tl b. al-Fa<;ll al'UtaqT
Khalifb. HanT
Tortosa
Umaya b. 'Abd
Allah al-HamdanT
al-MayurqT
'Abd al-'AzTz b.
Ju'afar b.
Mul:iammad b. JsJ:iaq
b. MuJ:iammad b.
Khawast al-FasT alBaghdadT alMa'amar
'Abd al-Qahar b.
Sa'Td b. YaJ:iya alUmawT

Mishraq

407

Mi�r

408

409
409

Cordova,
Thughr

Mishraq

Bashkuwal,
311
Bashkuwal,
857

410

Bashkuwal, 69

411

Bashkuwal,
321
Bashkuwal,
696; .QabbT,
1012

411

Cordova

Bashkuwal,
550
Takmila (Fez),
34

>411

Takmila (Fez),
343

>412

Takmila (Fez),
35
Bashkuwal,
327

412
412

Bashkuwal,
384
Bashkuwal,
262

Mayurqa

Mishraq, Hajj, 413
Mecca, Mi�r

Onda, MadTna
Turab/
Valencia

Baghdad trade 413

Bashkuwal,
808

414

Bashkuwal,
836

Sharq alAndalus,
Denia

380
Ghalib b. 'Abd
Allah b. AbT alYaman al-Qaysa
Abu Tamam alQatina
Al)mad b. Tarffb.
al-batab
Al)mad b. 'Abd alMalik b. Al)mad b.
'Abd al-Malik b.
'Umar b.
Mubammad b. 'Isa
b. Shahid
Musa b. 'Abd alRabman b. K.halifb.
Musa b. Ab1 Ta!Td
'Abd Allah b. 'Abd
al-Rabman b. Jabbaf
al-Mu'afrT
Mubammad b. alQasim b. Ab1 J:laj alQarawT
Mubammad b.
'Umar b. Yusuf alMalikT al-Hafaz
Mubammad b.
YabqT b. Yusufb.
Armaliyuth al'AbdarT al-$aydlan1
Mubammad b. Ab1
Safra b. Saraq alAsadT
J:lussafo b. 'Abd
Allah b. J:lussafo b.
Yaqub

Mayurqa,
Denia

Cordova

414

Takmila
(B.A.H.), 1956

Mayurqa

Cordova

416

Oabb1, 405

Murcia

Cordova

417

Oabb1, 442

Al)mad b.
Mubammad b.
Darraj, Abu 'Umar
al-Katib, al-Qastam
Sa'Td b. Sulayman b.
al-HamdanT
Khalafb. Han!' Abu
al-Qasim
al-K.halTI b. Al)mad
b. al-Busi, Abu Sa
'1d al-FaqTh

Denia

417

Jativa
Valencia

418

Cordova

Almeria

Bashkuwal,

1346

Bashkuwal,

588

Mishraq trade 418

Bashkuwal,

1317

Valencia

Cordova

Mishraq

419

Bashkuwal,

Pechina,
Almeria

Cordova

Mishraq

420

Bashkuwal,

Almeria

420

Bashkuwal,

Pechina

421

Bashkuwal,
329; Oabb1,
649; J:lumaydT,

421

J:lumaydT, 182;
Bashkuwal,
77; OabbT, 343

Denia

421

Bashkuwal,

Tortosa,
Valencia
Almeria

>422

J:lumaydT, 425

Cordova,
Zaragoza

1121

1028

1127

373

492

>422 J:lumaydT, 427

381
AJ)mad b. IbrahTm b.
AbT Ziyad al-LawatT
'Abd al-Da'im b.
Marwan b. Jabr alLughawT'
'Abd al-AzTz b. 'AIT
al-ShahrazurT
Sa'Td b. Harlin b.
Sa'Td
'Ubayd Allah b.
Yusufb. Mall.1an
I:Iajaj b. Qasim b.
Mu]:iammad b.
Hisham al-Ru'TnT
Thabit b.
Mu]:iammad alJurjanT al-'AdawT,
Abu al-Fatuh
'Abd Allah b. 'AbTd
Allah b. al-WalTd b.
Mu]:iammad b.
Yusufb. 'Abd Allah
b. 'Abd al-'AzTz b.
'Amru b. 'Uthman b.
Mubammad b.
Khalid b. 'Uqba b.
AbT Mu'ayt b. AbT
'Amru b. Umayya b.
'Abd Shams alMu'aytT
Mubammad b.
AJ)mad
'Uthman b. DalTm,
Abu 'Amru
Mukhtar b. 'Abd alRabman b. Sahr alRa'TnT
Al-Mahlub b.
AJ)mad b. AsTd b.
AbT Sufra al-AsadT
Bashar al-A'mT
Sa'Td b. AbT
Mukhlid al-AzadT

Murcia

Mishraq

>423

Almeria

Ba�ra

426

Denia

Mishraq

427

Murcia

430

Jativa

430

Almeria

Ceuta

Denia

Denia,
Mayurqa

Cordova

431

Mishraq,
Sardinia

431

I:IumaydT, 345;
J;)abbT, 604

Bougie

432

Bashkuwal,
598

432

Takmila
(B.A.H.), 457
Bashkuwal,
881; J;)abbT,
1187;
I:IumavdT, 700
Bashkuwal,
1385

434

Cordova

Almeria

Malaga

Bashkuwal,
809
Bashkuwal,
507
Bashkuwal,
675
Bashkuwal,
347

Mishraq

Denia,
Valencia
Pechina

Almeria

Takmila (Fez),
112
Bashkuwal,
847

435
Mishraq

435

Bashkuwal,
1390

Denia

<436

Denia

<436

I:IumaydI, 342;
J;)abbT, 599
I:IumaydT, 483;
J;)abbT, 822

382
Tamam b. Ghalab b.
'Umar al-LughawT
al-TayanT, Abu
Ghalab
'Abd al-Rabman b.
'Isa b Raja' alShamantanT
Mubammad b. 'Abd
Allah b. Abmad alBakrT
'Abd Allah b.
Khamis b. Marwan
al-An�arT
IdrTs b. al-Yaman,
Abu 'All
'Uthman b. AbT
Bakr b. I:Iamud b.
Abmad al-Sadafi,
Abu 'Arnru alMasafaqasT
'Abd al-Rabman b.
Khalifb. Musa b.
AbT TalTd
'Uthman b. 'AIT b.
Muslim b. 'AIT alSarTjT al-MayurqT
'Abd al-Rabman b.
lbrahTm b.
Mubammad
Abmad b. al-l:lasan
b. 'Uthman alGhasanT
Sulayman b. Abmad
al-TtanjT
'Abd al-Malik b.
Sulayman alKhawlanT, Abu
Marwan
'Umar b. al-ShahTd
al-TuiTbT, Abu l:lafis
Al-Fa<;ll b. Abmad b.
Mubammad b.
Darraj al-QastalT

Murcia,
Almeria

436

Cordova

436

Almeria

Bashkuwal,
287; I;>abbT,
602; I:IumaydT,
343
I;>abbT, 1032

436

Bashkuwal,
1163

Valencia,
Denia

>436

Takmila
(B.A.H.), 1295

Ibiza, Denia

>436

I:IumaydT, 314;
I;>abbT, 562
I:IumaydT, 697

Murcia,
Mayurqa

Cordova

'Iraq,
Maghreb,
lfrTqiya,
Sardinia

Andalus

Almeria
Mayurqa

Seville

Mayurqa

Cordova

'Iraq

>436

437

Bashkuwal,
745

437

Bashkuwal,
879

438

Bashkuwal,
711

Pechina,
Almeria,
Denia
Almeria

Kairouan

440

Takmila (Fez),
121

Mishraq

440

Mayurqa

IfrTqiya, Mi�r, 440
Mecca

Bashkuwal,
466; I;>abbT,
767
Bashkuwal,
777; I;>abbT,
1069;
I:IumavdT, 630
I;>abbT, 1169;
I:IumaydT, 689
Bashkuwal,
1003;
I:Iumaydl, 756;
I;>abbl, 1286

Almeria

440

Valencia,
Denia

440

383
Mul)ammad b. 'Abd
Allah b. Hizb Allah
al-Watha'qT
Al)mad b. RashTq alKatib, Abii al'Abbas
Al)mad b.
Mul)ammad b.
Al)mad b. Burd
Mul)ammad b.
Khala$a al-ShadhiinT
'Abd Allah al-Ba$Tr
Mul)ammad b.
Qasim b. Shama'la
al-.QabT al-MuqrT
IbrahTm b. 'Amara
Khalif al-BarTIIT
'Abd Allah b.
Mul)ammad b. 'Abd
Allah al-JadalT
'Uthman b. Sa'Td b.
'Uthman al-UmawT
al-MaqarT

Valencia
Murcia,
Denia,
Mayiirqa
Almeria

Cordova

Denia

440

Bashkiiwal,
1155

440

J:{umaydT, 208;
.QabbT, 401

>440

.QabbT, 355

>440

J:{umaydT, 49

Pechina

Mishraq

442

Bashkiiwal,
1171

Pechina,
Almeria
Valencia

Mishraq

443

Almeria

Mishraq

444

Bashkiiwal,
209
Bashkiiwal,
387
Bashkiiwal,
608

Mishraq,
Mi$r,
Alexandria,
Mecca,
Kairouan

444

Bashkiiwal,
882; .QabbT,
1189; Yaqiit,
5:36-7.

446

.QabbT, 473
Bashkiiwal,
718
Bashkiiwal,
1023

Ali ita, Denia,
Mayiirqa,
Pechina,
Almeria

443

Cordova,
Zaragoza

Al)mad b. AbT alRabT'
'Abd al-Ral)man b.
Al)mad b. Khalif
Qasim b.
Mul)ammad b.
Hisham al-Ra'TnT
Mul)ammad b. 'Abd
al-Malik al-GhassanT
Al;mad b. Kha$Th b.
Al)mad al-An$arT

Almeria

Denia

Cordova

'Abd al-Ral)man b.
Al)mad b. Khalaf,
Abii Al)mad

Almeria

Toledo

Almeria

Toledo

Mishraq, Hajj 448

Almeria

Ceuta

Mishraq,
Mi$r,
Kairouan

Pechina

Kairouan,
Qal'a
J:{ammad

448
448
450
450

Bashkiiwal,
1176
Bashkiiwal,
122
J:{umaydT, 580;
.QabbT, 1000

384
Mubammad b.
Abmad b.
Mubammad b.
Hassan b. Ishaq b.
'Abd Allah b. Ishaq
b. Ju'afar
'Abd Allah b. Ab1
'Umar Yusufb.
'Abd Allah b.
Mubammad b. 'Abd
al-Barr, Abu
Mubammad
Khalif b. Abmad b.
Batal al-Bakd
Khalif b. Han!', Abu
al-Qasim
al-Khan! b. Abmad
al-Busff, Abu Sa'1d
al-FaqTh
'Abd Allah b. 'Abd
al-Rabman b. Mu'afi
Sa'1d b. Abmad b.
Mubammad alGhafaq1
Abmad b. Isbaq b.
Tahir Abu Bakr
Sulayman b.
Munakhil al-Nafiz1
'Abd al-Malik b.
Ziyada Allah b. 'An
b. l:[ussafa b.
Mubammad b. Asad
al-Tam1m1 thuma all:[umman1
'Abd al-Wabid b.
Mubammad b.
Muhib al-TujTh1 alQabr1
Qasim b.
Mubammad b. Said
Qumh
'An b. Abmad b.
Isma'II, Ibn Sida
Abmad b.
Mubammad b. bizb
Allah

Denia,
Orihuela

Cordova

Denia

Valencia

Seville

450

Takmila
(B.A.H.), 439

>450

l:[umayd1, 576;
l)abb1, 968

Ifr1qiya,
452
Mishraq, Hajj

>452

Tortosa,
Valencia
Almeria

Bashkuwal,

392

l)abbI, 721

Mishraq

>452

l)abbI, 725

Mishraq

453

Bashkuwal,

454

Bashkuwal,

Murcia

455

l)abb1, 382

Jativa

456

Bashkuwal,

Mishraq,
456
Mecca, Mi1;,r,
Kairouan, Hajj

Bashkuwal,

456

Bashkuwal,

457

Bashkuwal,

Murcia, Denia

458

Bashkuwal,
899; l)abb1,

Valencia

459

Bashkuwal,

Jativa
Jativa

Almeria

Cordova

Cordova

Valencia,
Jativa
Pechina,
Almeria

Mishraq, Hajj

613

526

455
778

868

1026

1209
125

385
Al)mad b. Sa'Td b.
'Umar al-Ma'afrT alBajjanT
Al)mad b. Sa 'Td b.
Mubammad b. Ab,
al-Fava<;iT
Al)mad b. Ibrahim b.
Al)mad b.
Mubammad b.
'Umar b. Aswad alGhasanT
Adham b. Al)mad b.
Adham
Al)mad b.
Mubammad b.
Al)mad
Al)mad b. Sharif
Al)mad b.
Mubammad b. 'Isa
b. Hila!
Ibrahim b. Al)mad b.
Mubammad b.
MaghTth b. Al)mad
b. Maghith b.
Al)mad b. MaghTth
al-Sufi
'Umar b.
Mubammad b.
Wajib
'Amir b. KhaHfa alAzdT
'Ubayd b. 'AH b.
'Ubayd al-AzdT alSusT
'AH b. Al)mad, Abu
al-t.Iasan, Ibn Sida
Yusufb. 'Abd Allah
b. Mubammad b.
'Abd al-Barr alNumarT, Abu 'Umar
Al)mad b. Yabya b.
Maynmun alMakhzumT

Pechina

Toledo

459

Takmila (Fez),
40

Almeria

Ecija

459

Bashkuwal,
126

459

Bashkuwal,
129; Takmila
(Fez), 125

459

Bashkuwal,
273
Takmila (Fez),
42

Almeria

Almeria

Mishraq, Hajj

Cordova

Murcia

460

Alcira,
Valencia
Almeria

460

Valencia

Cordova,
Elvira

460

Toledo

460

Takmila (Fez),
353

460

Bashkuwal,
871

460

Bashkuwal,
960
Bashkuwal,
965

Valencia

Hajj

Denia
Almeria

Kairouan

Denia
Jativa

Alcira

Takmila (Fez),
43
Bashkuwal,
130

Cordova

460
460

t.IumaydT, 709

460

QabbT, 1447;
J:lumaydT, 874

461

Takmila (Fez),
44

386
$a'd b. Al)mad b.
'Abd al-Ral:unan b.
Mubammad b. $a'd
al-Tughlabl
'Abd Allah b. Sa 'Id
b. Harlin
Ya'qiib b. Musa b.
Tahir b. AbT alI:Iasam
'Abd al-'AzTz b.
Hisham b. 'Abd al'AzTz b. DurTd alAsadT
Yusufb. 'Abd Allah
b. Mubammad b.
'Abd al-Barr b.
•A�im al-NimarT
Al)mad b.
Mubammad
Al)mad b. Sa'Td b.
Matraf
Ghalib b. 'Abd
Allah al-QTsT alQutaynT al-MuqrT'
Al)mad b.
Mubammad b.
Yabya b. Al:unad b.
Mubammad b. 'Abd
Allah b. Mubammad
b. Ya'qub b. Daud
al-TamTmT
Abu Al)mad alMaqarT
lbrahTm b. Abmad b.
Mubammad b.
Aswad al-GhasanT
'Ubayd Allah b. alQasim b. Khalif b.
HanT'
Mubammad b.
Khalasa al-Nahwa
al-Kafif
Al)mad b.
Mubammad b.
Aswad al-GhassanT
Al)mad b. al-Fa<;ll b.
'AmTra

Almeria

Seville

Murcia
Murcia

Cordova

Almeria

461

Bashkiiwal,
545

461

Bashkuwal,
619
Bashkuwal,
1533

461
463

Bashkiiwal,
792

463

Bashkuwal,
1513

Valencia

464

Tortosa

>464

Denia

466

Takmila (Fez),
47
Takmila (Fez),
47
Bashkiiwal,
987

Denia,
Valencia,
Jativa

Cordova

Almeria,
Denia

Cordova,
Zaragoza,
Toledo,
Seville

467

Bashkiiwal,
133; QabbT,
350

Denia

Tudela

467

Takmila (Fez),
297
Bashkiiwal,
217

Pechina

467

Tortosa

467

Bashkuwal,
678

>468

Takmila
(B.A.H.), 456

Almeria

469

Bashkiiwal,
135

Almeria

469

Bashkuwal,
137

Denia

Zaragoza

387
'Abd al-Ra}:unan b.
'Abd al-Rabman b.
Malik al-GhassanT
Hisham b. Abmad b.
'Abd al-'AzTz b.
Wac;lah
lbrahTm b. Sa'Td b.
'Uthman b. Wardun
al-NumfrT
lbrahTm b. Mukhlid
Khalif b. Abmad b.
Ju'afar al-JarawT
Shakr b. Khiyara al'AmirT
Abd Allah b.
Ibrahim b. Jamab alKutamT al-Sebfi
Abmad b. 'Uthman
b. Sa'Td b. alAmawa
Mubammad b.
'Umar al-BakrT
Hussayn b. Khalifb.
Yahya b. IbrahTm b.
Mubammad alAmawT
'Abd al-Ra}:unan b.
Abu al-TTb
Abmad b. 'Alt b.
Khalaf b. TamarshTI,
Abii Bakr
'Abd al-Rabman b.
Mubammad b. 'Isa
b. 'Abd al-Rabman,
lbn al-l:lashsha'
'Abd Allah b. 'Alt b.
AbT al-Azhar alGhafiqT
Sulayman b. Khalif
b. Sa 'Td b. Ayiib b.
Warath al-TajTbT alBajT al-MalikT alI:Iafi'.?
Isma'Tl b. 'Amr alQarshT al-'UmarT

Murcia

Mishraq, Hajj 469

Bashkiiwal,
730

Murcia

469

Bashkiiwal,
1448

Almeria

470

Bashkiiwal,
219

470

Bashkiiwal,
221
Bashkiiwal,
393
Bashkiiwal,
539
Bashkiiwal,
664

Jativa

Malaga
Mishraq

Almeria

470
470

Jativa
Sharq alAndalus

Ceuta

Denia

Cordova

Hajj

Pechina

470
471

Bashkiiwal,
138

471

Bashkiiwal,
1214
Takmila
(B.A.H.), 29

Denia

Alexandria

472

Valencia

Mishraq,
Baghdad

472

Murcia

473

Bashkiiwal,
733
I)abbT, 456

Denia, Tortosa Toledo,
Cordova

Mishraq,
Mecca, Mi�r,
Kairouan

473

Bashkiiwal,
734

Almeria

Toledo

Mishraq

473

Bashkiiwal,
624

Denia,
Mayiirqa,
Almeria

Cordova,
Zaragoza

Mishraq, Hajj, 474
Mecca,
Baghdad

Bashkiiwal,
457; I)abbT,
779

Almeria

Cordova

Mishraq

Bashkiiwal,
251

475

388
'Abd Allah b. Mafiiz
b. Abmad b. Mafiiz
al-'Afi6
Mubammad b.
Mubarak
Khalif b. Ibrahim b.
Mubammad al-Q1s1
al-Maqar1 al-Tuntun
Abmad b. 'Amr b.
Ans b. Dalhath b.
Ans b. Falahadan b.
'Umran b. Munis
Zughiba b. Qutba al'Udhar1
Mubammad b. Kh1ra
al-Umaw1
Rabman b. Abmad
b. Yabya b. Khamb.
Masawayah b.
I:Iamdfa al-An�ar1
'Abd al-Jamb.
Wahbun
'Abd Allah b. Sabal
b. Yusuf al-An�ar1,
al-MaqarI
Law1 b. Isma'Tl b.
Rabi' b. Sulayman
al-Mukttib Abu alI:Iasan
Musa b. 'Abd Allah
b. al-I:Iussayn b. 'Ali
b. Ab1 Ja'afar b. 'Ali
b. Musa b. Ja'afar b.
Mubammad b. 'An
b. al-I:Iussayn b. 'An
b. Ab1 Talib
Maw�! b. Abmad b.
Maw�!
'Abd Allah b. Abi
al-Matraf
'Abd al-Salam b.
Musa.fr al-Qaraw1
Mubammad b.
Yabq1 al-Lukhm1
Mubammad b.
Nu'ma al-Asad1 al'Abar al-Qayrawan1

Jativa

475

Denia

476

Denia

477

Toledo

Almeria

Mishraq,
Hijaz, 'Iraq,
Mi�r

Valencia,
Denia

Toledo, Ceuta Mishraq

>478

480

Tortosa, Denia

Mayurqa

Kufa, Sicile,
bilad Banu
I:Iammad

Valencia

480

Takmila (Fez),

54

Qabb1, 1104
Bashkuwal,

480

Bashkuwal,

480

Bashkuwal,

481

Almeria

Mishraq

481
481

Kairouan

1224

480

Hajj

Almeria

145

635; Qabbl,
931
Mu'jam, 80

Pechina

Almeria

Bashkuwal,

394

Bashkuwal,

478

Mishraq,
Kairouan

1221

Bashkuwal,

Cordova

Murcia,
Ronda
Almeria, trade

Bashkuwal,

478

Almeria

Murcia, Lorca Seville

Bashkuwal,

629

481

1350

1399

Bashkuwal,

636

Bashkuwal,

843

Bashkuwal,

1226

Bashkuwal,

1331

389
481

Bashkuwal,

484

Bashkuwal,

Valencia

484

Bashkuwal,

Murcia

484

Bashkuwal,

Murcia,
Valencia
Jativa

485
485

Bashkuwal,

Almeria

485

Bashkuwal,
1232; I)abbt,
Bashkuwal,
1235; Oabbt,

Mutarafb. YasTn

Jativa

Tahir b. MufawizTn
A}:imad b. Mufawiz
al-Ma'afari'
'Abd al-'Aztz b.
Mubammad b. Sa'd
Mubamrnad b. 'Abd
Allah b. BThsh alMuffi
A}:imad b. 'Alt b.
Khalafal-Nabawt
'Alt b. Std b. Abmad
b. al-Ghafaqt
Mubammad b.
Khalifb. Sa'td b.
Wahib b. al-Murabit
Mubammad b.
Khalifb. Mas'ud b.
Shu'Th, lbn Saqat
Mubamrnad b.
Sa'idun b. 'Alt b.
Bilan al-Qarawt
'Abd Allah b.
l;layyan b. Farbun b.
'Alm b. 'Abtd Allah
b. Musa b. Malik b.
l;lammdun b.
l;lavvan al-Arusht
Mubammad b.
Ribt'a
A}:imad b. 'Abd alWalt b. Abmad b.
'Abd al-Walt alBatfi
'Alt b. 'Abd alGhant al-Fihrt alMuqrt' al-l;lu$rt alGharawt
Mubammad b. Abt
Na$r Fatub b. 'Abd
Allah al-Azadt all;lumayd1
Sulayman b. Abt alQasim Najab

Jativa

Cordova

Cuenca,
Denia, Jativa

Cordova

Mishraq, Hajj 485

Valencia,
Almeria

Cordova

Mishraq,
Kairouan

Valencia

1379
551

798

1230

Takmila (Fez),

66

905

104
106

485

Bashkuwal,

487

Bashkuwal,
639; I)abbt,

1330

923

Valencia,
Alcira
Valencia

Murcia

Tangier

Mayurqa

Cordova

Valencia

487

Bashkuwal,

>488

Takmila (Fez),

488

Mishraq,
488
Ifr1qiya, Mi$r,
'Iraq,
Baghdad

490

1237

56

Bashkuwal,

933

Bashkuwal,

1238

I)abbt, 780

390
'Abd Allah b. alFa<;ll b. 'Umar b.
Fatb al-Lukhm1
Mubammad b.
AQmad b. 'Abd
Allah al-Nubaw1
Al-Mubarak b. Sa'Td
b. Mubammad b. alI:Iasan al-AsadT alBaghdadT
Abu al-'Abbas alJazfrT
Tahir b. Khalif b.
Hayra

490

Takmila
(B.A.H.), 1308

Mishraq,
Mecca

490

Bashkuwal,
1243

Baghdad

490

Bashkuwal,
1402

Alcira, Denia

491

Mu'jam, 272

Alcira,
Valencia,
Denia
Mayurqa

491

Takmila
(B.A.H.), 268

Mishraq, Hajj, 491
Baghdad
Mishraq
492

Bashkuwal,
913
Mu'jam, 288

Denia,
Valencia,
Mayurqa
Almeria
Almeria, trade Cordova

'Ali b. Sa 'Td b. al'AbdarT
Sulayman b. MuHajj Denia,
Valencia
'Abd Allah b.
Denia
Mubammad b.
Yabya b. Farj b. alZahirT
'Abd al-'AzTz b.
Jativa,
'Abd Allah b. alAlmeria
Ghazi
'Abd al-Mana'am b. Sharq alMin Allah b. Abu
Andalus
Bakr al-HiwarT alQayrawanT
Mubammad b. Tahir Denia
b. 'A!T b. 'Isa alAn�ar1
Mubammad b. 'Abd Tudmfr,
Allah b. AbT Ju'afar Murcia
al-KhushnT
Musa b. Sulayman
Almeria
al-LukhmT al-MuqrT
Khalif b. 'Abd Allah Almeria
b. Sa 'Td b. 'Abbas
b. Mudfr al-Azad1
'Abd al-'Az1z b.
Almeria
'Abd al-Wahab b.
Ab1 Ghalib alQayruwanT, Abu
Mubammad

>492

Takmila
(B.A.H.), 1353

493

Bashkuwal,
800

Kairouan

493

Bashkuwal,
844

Hajj,
Damascus

494

Takmila
(B.A.H.), 543

494

Bashkuwal,
1244; I)abb1,
186
Bashkuwal,
1351
Bashkuwal,
398

494
495

Cordova
Kairouan

495

I)abbT, 1098

391
AJ:imad b. Marwan
b. Qay�r al-Umaw1
Isma'Ii b. Mahalhal

Almeria

496

Bashkuwal,

Valencia

496

Takmila (Fez),

Sulayman b. Abu alQasim Najah, Ibn
Dawd
'AIJb. 'Abd alRaJ:iman b. al-Rush
b. AJ:imad al-An�ar1
al-Muqrl', Abu alI:Iasan
YaJ:iya b. Ibrahim b.
Ab1 Zayd al-Lawafi
al-Muqr1
Yaz1d

Denia,
Valencia

496

Bashkuwal,

496

Bashkuwal,
912; Pabb1,

Isa b. 'Abd alRaJ:iman al-Salmi
AJ:imad b.
MuJ:iammad b. 'Abd
al-Rabman al-An�ar1
al-Sharq1 al-Wa'?:
Ibrahim b.
MuJ:iammad b.
Khalaf al-Nakhan
Hussayn b. Abu
Bakr al-Hadram1
'Abd al-Baq1 b.
MuJ:iammad b. Sa'1d
b. A�bagh b. Bariyal
al-An�ar1
Mubammad b. 'Abd
al-RaJ:iman b.
AJ:imad b. Khalasa
al-Lukhm1 alNaJ:iawT Abu 'Abd
Allah
Mas'ud b. 'Uthman
b. Khalifal-'Abdar1
al-Shantamar1
MuJ:iammad b.
l:labTh b. 'Ubayd
Allad b. Mas'ud alUmaw1

Jativa

Cordova

156

478

461

1230
Mishraq, Hajj 496

Bashkuwal,

Almeria

497

Bashkuwal,

Murcia

498

PabbJ, 1152

Murcia

Sharq alAndalus,
Valencia

Ceuta

Mishraq,
'Iraq, Mi�r,
Hajj

500

Almeria

500

Denia

500

Almeria,
Valencia

Guadala-jara

Denia,
Almeria

Murcia
Murcia

Mi�r
Cordova,
Grenade

1490
1537

Bashkuwal,
159; Takmila
(Fez), 64
Takmila (Fez),

355

502

Takmila
(B.A.H.), 78
Bashkuwal,

502

Mu'jam, 95

502

Bashkuwal,

503

830

1365

Bashkuwal,

1287

392
'Abad b. Sarban alMu'afrT, Abu alI;Iasan
Khalifb. SulaTman
b. Khalifb.
Mubammad Fatbun
Mubammad b.
I;Iaydara b. Abmad
b. Mufawaz alMa'afarT
lbrahTm b. AbT alFae;!! b. $uwab alMajarT
Khalifb.
Mubamrnad b.
Khalifal-An�arT
'Abd al-Qadr b.
Mubammad al$addafi alQayrawanT
'Umar b. A}:imad b.
Rizq al-TajTbT
Mubammad b. 'Isa
b. Mubammad alLukhmT
MuJ:iamrnad b.
Abmad b. lsl:iaq b.
Tahir
'Abd al-RaJ:iman b.
'Abd al-'AzTz b.
Thabit al-UmawT
Abmad b. 'Abd alMalik b. 'Arnira alOabbT
'Abd al-RaJ:iman
b.'Abd al-'AzTz b.
Thabit
'AIT b. Ghalib b.
MuJ:iammad b.
Ghalib
Abmad b. Marwan
b. MuJ:iamrnad b.
'Abd al-'AzTz b.
MuJ:iammad b.
I;Iamad b. Raja' b.
Nafa' b. 'Abd al'AzTz al-TuiubT

Jativa,
Almeria

504

OabbT, 1122

Orihuela,
Jativa, Denia

505

Bashkuwal,
399; alRushatT, 20.
Bashkuwal,
1257

Jativa

505

Cordova

506

Takmila (Fez),
363

509

Bashkuwal,
302

507

Bashkuwal,
835; OabbT,
1118

Almeria

507

Denia,
Almeria,
Mayurqa
Murcia,
Valencia

507

Bashkuwal,
873
Takmila
(B.A.H. ), 511

508

Bashkuwal,
1264

Jativa

509

Bashkuwal,
749

Murcia

>510

OabbT, 443

Jativa

510

OabbT, 1033

510

Bashkuwal,
917

511

Takmila (Fez),
78

Fes

Jativa
Almeria

Kairouan

Almeria

Tortosa
Valencia

Huesca

Hajj

393
Ibrahim b. Al)mad b.
Khalifb. Jama'a b.
Mahdi" al-BakrT Bakr
b. Wayal Abu Isl:iaq
al-DanT
lbrahTm b.
Mul:iammad b.
lbrahTm b. 'Abd
Allah b. 'A�am
Mul:iammad b.
Yal:iya b. al-TudmTrT
Al)mad b. 'Uthman
b. Makl:iul
Khuli� b. 'Abd Allah
b. Al)mad b. 'Abd
Allah al-'AbdarT
Sulayman b. 'Abd
al-Malik b. RubTI b.
lbrahTm b. 'Abd
Allah al-'AbdarT
'Abd Allah b.
Mul:iammad b. DurrT
al-TujTbT Abu
Mul:iammad
Mul_iammad b. 'AIT
b. Nashra
Al)mad b. lbrahTm b.
Mul_iammad b.
Khalifb. IbrahTm b.
Mul:iammad b. AbT
Layla, Abu al-Qasim
HussaTn b.
Mul:iammad b.
Fiyyurh b. l:layyun
b. Sukkara al-Siddafi

Denia

511

Mu'jam, 48

Murcia

511

Takmila (Fez),
368

Murcia

511

Bashkuwal,
1266
Bashkuwal,
121
Bashkuwal,
417

Almeria

Badajoz

Mishraq, Hajj

513

Valencia
Valencia

Seville

Denia, Jativa

Zaragoza

Denia
TudmTr,
Murcia

Silves

Valencia,
Almeria,
Murcia

Zaragoza

Pechina
al-l:lussayn b.
Ya'qub b. al-BajjanT,
Abu 'AIT
Almeria
'Abd al-'AzTz b.
'Abd al-Malik b.
Shafi' al-MaqarT
Denia
Mul:iammad b.
Hussayn b. AbT Bakr
al-l:la<;larmT

513

513

Bashkuwal,
462

513

Mu'jam, 184;
Bashkuwal,
646

Baghdad, Hajj 513

Takmila
(B.A.H.), 526
Bashkuwal,
164; .OabbT,
377

Mishraq,
Baghdad,
Ba�ra

514

514
Mishraq,
Mecca, Ba�ra,
Baghdad,
Damascus,
Mi�r,
Alexandria
514
Mishraq

Bashkuwal,
334

514

Bashkuwal,
502

514

Mu'jam, 85

.OabbT, 656

394
Mubammad b.
Yabya b. 'Abd Allah
b. Zakariya
Abmad b. 'Abd alRabman b. Jabdar
al-An$ar1
Abmad b. 'Abd
Allah b. Ab, alQasim
Mubammad b. alI:Iasan b. 'AH b.
Yusuf al-Khawlan,
Mubammad b. Bassa
b. Abmad b.
Ardhuman al-Zuhir1
al-Muqr1
Ibrahim b. 'A$am,
Abu Umayya
Musa b. 'Abd alRabman b. Khalafb.
Abl Talid al-Shatib1
Abu 'Abd Allah
Mubammad b. 'Abd
al-Rabman b Abmad
b. Khala$a alLakhm1
Mubammad b.
Khalifb. Sulayman
b. Khan b.
Mubammad b.
Fatbun al-Awriyiili
Abu Bakr
Mubammad b.
Wajib b. 'Umar b.
Wajib al-Qays1
Abmad b. Tahir b.
'Ali b. 'Isa al-An$ar1
Sufiyan b. al-'A$T b.
Abmad b. al-'A$, b.
Sufiyan b. 'As, b.
'Abd al-Kabfr b.
Sa'1d al-Asad,
'Abd al-Baq1 b.
Mubammad b. Sa'1d
al-I:Iaiar,

Almeria

514

Thughr

Bashkuwal,
1269; :Oabb1,
321
Bashkuwal,
166

Jativa

515

Jativa

515

Takmila (Fez),
82

515

Bashkuwal,
1270

515

Bashkuwal,
1272

Murcia

516

:Oabb1, 517

Jativa

517

:Oabb1, 1335

Valencia,
Denia,
Almeria

519

Muqtadhab,
64.

Denia, Murcia

519

Qabb1, 108

Valencia

519

Bashkuwal,
1276

Denia

520
520

Bashkuwal,
168
Bashkuwal,
532; Qabb1,
784

520

Qabb1, 1128

Mishraq

Almeria
Almeria

Murvie-dro

Valencia

Seville

Cordova

395
'Abd Allah b.
Mubammad b. 'Abd
Allah b. Abmad b.
al-KhushanI
'Abd al-'A�Im b.
Sa'Id b. al-Yab$abI
al-MaqarI
Mubammad b. alWalid b.
Mubammad b.
Khalifb. Sulayman
b. Ayub al-FihrI alTan;ushI
Mubammad b.
Khalifb. Sulayman
b. Fatubun
Abmad b. Mas'ada
b. Mas'ada
Abmad b.
Mubammad b. Sa'Id
KhalafMawla
Ju'afar al-Fata, Abu
Sa'Id al-MaqarI
Abu Mubammad alJ-:lijarI, al-AwriwalI
Abu Mubammad b.
QalbII al-BajjanI
Abu Bakr b. al-Farj
Abu J-:laf$ al-TudmirI
Abmad b. Walid alKh.c;l.r.m.y
Abmad b. lymana
lbrahim b. 'Abd al$amid, Abu 'Abd al$amid al-BalansI
BaqI b. Makhlad,
Abu 'Abd alRabman
Jahwar b.
Mubammad, Abu
Mubammad alTujibI, lbn al-Fulu
al-Hussayn b. Ya
'qub al-BajjanI, Abu
'AlI

Murcia

Cordova

Mishraq, Hajj

520

Bashkuwal,
652

520

Bashkuwal,
837

520

Bashkuwal,
1277

Orihuela,
Murcia

520

Bashkuwal,
1279

Tortosa

523

Takmila (Fez),
91
Takmila (Fez),
93
OabbI, 711

Denia
Tortosa

Valencia

Seville

Mishraq,
Baghdad,
Ba$ra,
Alexandria

525

Zaragoza

Tortosa

525

Orihuela

J-:iumaydI, 619,
n. 917
J-:lumaydI, 918

Pechina
Jativa
Tudmir
Tudmir

J-:lumaydI, 926
J-:lumaydI, 934
Farac;lI, 156

Cordova

Tortosa
Valencia

Mishraq

Farac;lI, 73
J-:lumaydI, 285

Almeria

Mishraq,
captured by
Rum

J-:lumaydI, 332

Almeria

Pechina

J-:lumaydI, 360

J-:lumaydI, 379

396
Khazaz b. Mu'sab,
Abu Marwan alGhasanT al-BaiianT
Khalaf b. 'AIT, Abu
Sa'Td
Zakariya' b. Yal)ya
b. 'A.'id b. 'A.'idh b.
KTsan b. Mu'in b.
'Abd al-Ral)man b.
Salih
Zakariya' b. Yal)ya
al-MaradT
Sa'Id b. 'AIT b.
Saha!. al-HamadanT
Saham. b. I:ITzwan
'Abd al-Ral)man b.
I:Iakam al-KhutanT
al-MursT
'Abd Allah, al'Atitar
'Abd Allah b.
Mas'ud
'Abd al-'Aziz b. AbI
al-Baqa
'Abd al-Wabid b.
Mul)ammad b.
Muhib b.
Mul)ammad alTujTbT, Abu Shakir,
Ibn al-QabrT
'AIT b. Al;mad alFakhrT, Abu alI:Iasan
'Umar b. 'AIT b.
'Umar
'A'idh b. KTsan
Al-Ghassaniya

Pechina

Mi�r

I:IumaydT, 430

Almeria

Kairouan,
Mi�r

I:IumaydT, 421

Tortosa

Tortosa
TudmTr

I:IumaydT, 439;
Farac;IT, 443

Farac;IT, 447
Farac;II, 528

Cordova

TudmTr
Murcia

Farac;II, 587
I:IumaydT, 595

Pechina,
Mayurqa
Murcia

Farac;IT, 692

Alcira
Jativa

Farac;IT, 713
Cordova,
Elvira
Cordova

Denia

Farac;II, 830
I:IumaydT, 655

Baghdad

TudmTr

Tortosa
Pechina,
Almeria
Matwa Kul b. Yusuf TudmTr
Mubammad b. AbT
TudmTr
al-Aswad
Mubammad b.
Almeria
Mubammad b. alI:Iasan al-ZubaydT
Abu al-WalTd

I:IumaydT, 707
Farac;IT, 960
Farac;IT, 996
I:IumaydT, 987
I:IumaydT, 818
Farac;IT, 1261

Seville

Kairouan

I:IumaydT, 4

397
Mul_iammad b.
Mas'iid Abu 'Abd
Allah al-BajanT alGhasanT
Mutrafb. Mu'awia
Na�r b. 'Abd Allah
al-AslamT

Pechina

Wahib b. Akhtal b.
RuzTq

Pechina

Tortosa
TudmTr

Cordova

J::[umaydT, 148

Mishraq,
lfrTqiya, Mi�r,
Mecca

Fara9T, 1434
Fara9T, 1489;
J::[umaydT, 837
J::[umaydT, 849

Bashkiiwal: lbn Bashkiiwal. Kitiib al-Sila. M.A. 11-13. Ed. I. al-AbyarT. Cairo, 1989.
I)abbT: al-I)abbT. Kitiib bughyat al-multamis fl tar"ikh rijiil al-andalus. M.A. 14-15. Ed. I. al
AbyarT Cairo, 1989.
Fara9T: Ibn al-Fara9T. Tiir"ikh 'ulamii' al-Anda/us. M.A. 3-4. Ed. I. al-AbyarT. Cairo, 1989.
J::[umaydT: al-1::[umaydT. Jadhwat al-muqtabis fl tiir"ikh 'ulemii' al-Anda/us. M.A. 7-8. Ed. I. al
AbyarT. Cairo, 1989.
Mu'jam: lbn al-Abbar. al-Mu 'jam fl a$bab al-qiiefi al-imam Abt 'Alf al-Sadafl (Alm6cham de
discipulis Abu Ali Assadafi). B.A.H. 4. Ed. F. Codera. Madrid, 1886.
Muqtadhab: lbn al-Abbar. Al-Muqtadhab min kitiib tub/at al-qiidim. M.A. 17. Ed. I. al
AbyarT. Cairo, 1989.
Takmila (B.A.H.): lbn al-Abbar. Kitiib al-tiikmila li-kitiib al-$ila (Complementum libri
assilah [dictionarium biographicum}). 2 vols. B.A.H. 5-6. Ed. F. Codera. Madrid, 18871888.
Takmila (Fez): lbn al-Abbar. Kitiib al-tiikmila li-kitiib al-$ila. M.A. 18. Ed. I. al-AbyarT.
Cairo, 1989.
Yaqiit: Yaqiit, Kitiib al-"irshiid al-iir"ib i/ii ma 'rifat al-adtb (Dictionary ofLearned Men of
Yaqi,t). 7 vols. Ed. D.S. Margoliouth. London, 1923.

398
Total: 395
Almeria': 122;31%
TudmTr: 75;19%
Valencia: 61;15%
Denia: 57;14%
Tortosa: 32;8%
Jativa: 29;7%
Mayurqa: 19; 5%
410-419: 18
TudmTr: 4
Mayurqa: 4
Almeria: 3
Valencia: 3
Denia: 2
Jativa: 1
Tortosa: 1
450-459: 23
Almeria: 8
Denia: 4
Valencia: 4
Jativa: 4
Tudmir: 2
Tortosa: 1
Mayurqa: 0
490-499: 28
Almeria: 8
Denia: 7
Valencia: 6
Tudmfr: 3
Jativa: 2
Mayurqa: 2
Tortosa: 0
Travel after 400: 86
Almeria: 42;49%
Denia: 16;19%
Valencia: 12;14%
Tudmir: 9;10%
Mayurqa: 9; I 0%
Tortosa: 5;6%
Jativa: 4; 5%

1

Before the fitna: 82
TudmTr: 31;39%
Almeria: 22;26%
Tortosa: 18;21%
Valencia: 10: 13%
Mayurqa: 1;1%
Denia: 0
Jativa: 0
420-429: 11
Almeria: 5
Denia: 3
Valencia: 1
TudmTr: 1
Tortosa: I
Jativa: 0
Mayurqa: 0
460-469: 29
Almeria: 8
Denia: 7
Valencia: 5
Tudmfr: 5
Jativa: 2
Tortosa: 2
Mayurqa: 0
500-509: 24
Almeria: 8
Jativa: 5
Denia: 4
Valencia: 3
TudmTr: 3
Mayurqa: 1
Tortosa: 0
Having travelled
Mayurqa: 50%
Almeria: 42%
Tortosa: 36%
Denia: 28%
Valencia: 24%
Tudmfr: 20%
Jativa: 14%

After the fitna: 313
Almeria: 100;32%
Denia: 57;18%
Valencia: 51;16%
TudmTr: 44;14%
Jativa: 29;9%
Mayurqa: 18;6%
Tortosa: 14;4%
430-4392: 24
Denia: 7
Almeria: 7
Mayurqa: 5
TudmTr: 3
Valencia: 1
Jativa: 1
Tortosa: 0
470-479: 23
Almeria: 8
Denia: 7
Jativa: 3
Valencia: 2
TudmTr: I
Tortosa: 1
Mayurqa: 1
510-525: 49
Almeria: 16
Denia: 8
Valencia: 8
TudmTr: 9
Jativa: 5
Mayurqa: 1
Tortosa: 4

400-409: 17
Almeria: 7
Valencia: 5
TudmTr: 3
Mayurqa: I
Tortosa: 1
Denia: 0
Jativa: 0
440-449: 24
Almeria: 12
Denia: 5
Valencia: 3
TudmTr: 1
Mayurqa: 3
Jativa: 0
Tortosa: 0
480-489: 26
Valencia: 7
Almeria: 6
TudmTr: 4
Jativa: 4
Denia: 2
Mayurqa: 2
Tortosa: 1
Travel
Travelled: 111;32%
Before beginning
fitna: 25;30%
After beginningjitna:
86;32%

Almeria and Pechina are grouped together, as well as TudmTr and Murcia.
Data for this decade is somewhat faulty because of Mujahid's death in 436. When I were unable to
determine a scholar's death, but knew whether or not they had served under Iqbal al-Dawla, I fixed
their death as <436 or >436.
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Appendix C
Dirhams minted by the rulers of the taifa of Denia

399

Year Mint

I

I

Aliita
. (Elota)
402 Aluta

403

Aluta

405

Aluta

405

Aluta

406

Aluta

406

Aluta

Obverse

'i) .JI 'i
oh__, ..:ill
.J 4Y::. 'j
'i) .JI 'i
oh__, ..:ill
.J 4Y::. 'j

�

'i) .JI 'i
oh__, ..:ill
.J 4Y::. 'j
I.JA"'-)1
'i) .Ji 'j
oh__, ..:iil
.J 4Y::. 'j
'i) .Ji 'j
oh__, ..:ill
.J 4Y::. 'j
'i) .JI 'i
oh__, ..:ill
.J 4Y::. 'j

Obverse
I marg·m
l�yfa..:ill F�U:.)Le �.J.i.ll
t--!) __, u.,til
I�yfa..:ill F�U:.)Le �.J.i.ll
i ul'.i
t-!.) ..,
fa yfa..:ill F�U:.)Le �.J.i.ll

�

Denia

?

Denia

430

Denia

l�yfa..:ill F�.J.i.ll �.J.i.ll
..,��U:._,lLe

...'-:-')

I� yfa..:ill F�U:.)Le �.J.i.ll

t,-!) .., c::.i....

l�yfa..:ill F�U:.)Le � _J.i.l i

t-,) .., u....

?

Denia

..iilJ_,......J�

...�;;_,,;1..l./�.J.i.ll

..iii 'i) .JI 'i
..iilJ_,......J�
\'..i..c..1
..iii 'i) .JI 'i
..iilJ_,......J�

I�yfa..:ill F...�;;_,,;1..l./�.J.i.ll

�

..iii 'i) .JI 'i
..iilJ_,......J�
..iii�
..iii 'i) .JI 'i
..iilJ_,......J�

�

?

Denia

iJ""""

..iii 'i) .JI 'i
..iilJ_,......J�
..iii�

References

rl.::..\ rL.'1 1
(.).;i._,..JI .Y--"i
..:ille .i.;_,..JI
rl.::..\ rL.'1 1
u,;i._,..JI .Y--"i
..:ille .i.;__,.;JI
� rL.'/1
.Y--"i ..iii
u,;i._,.JI

Vives, 711; Prieto,
n. 134a; Miles
Umayyads, 347
Vives, 712; Prieto,
n. 134b; Miles
Umayyads, 350
Vives, 819; Prieto,
135

.l.\l;,....

H asan b M u1·-h"d
I aID
- aw a
a I S a '"d
..iii 'i) .JI 'i
I�yfa..:ill FDenia
?

?

Reverse

I�yfa..:ill F...�;;_,,;1..l./�.).i.ll
�;;_,,;1..l./�.J.i.ll

�
yfa..:ill F� --'··· I�

I�yfa..:ill F... �.J.i.ll

rl.'jl
..iii�
u,;i._,..J 1 .Y--"i

Supplement Prieto,
80

rl.'jl
..iii�
u,;i._,..J1 .Y--"i
� rl.'/1
.Y--"i ..iii
u,;i._,.Ji

Vives, 820; Prieto,
137; Miles, 159
Vives, 821; Prieto,
136

iJ""""

Vives, 1323; Prieto,
198; Rada y
Delgado, 468
Vives, 1324; Prieto,
199
Figure 1
Prieto, 200

iJ""""

Prieto, 201

iJ""""

rl.::..\ rL.'1 1
u,;i._,..JI .Y--"i
iJ""""

fl.::..\ rl.'/I
u,;i._,..J1 .Y--"i
rl.::..\ rL.'1 1
u,;i._,..JI Y--"l
rl.::..\ rL. '1 1
u,;i._,..J1 .Y--"i
A.J__,.i.ll..i......
rl.::..\ rL.'1 1
u,;i._,..JI .Y--"i
iJ""""

A.l__, .i.ll ..i......
rl.::..\ rL.'1 1
u,;i._,..JI .Y--"i

Prieto, 202

Prieto, 203

400

?

Denia

..iii YJ.i...11 Y
..iii Jy-,.) �
..iii ,¥:-

... ...

432

Denia

..iii YJ .i...11 Y
..iii J_,..,.) �

yfa..iil F.J�l�...I�
.
U:!-'")l'.;

.)JP.-

- uwaffaq
I aM UJii
· h'd
I •A mtr1 aIM
- ....
..iii YJ.i...11 Y
.J \..til�:i....i.il.l.l
432 Denia
Jy-,.) �
---�
..iii
..iii ,¥:I� yfa..iil F435 Denia
�
YJ ..JIY
��l.l;> r-4 .J.i.11
o.l.:>..J ..iii
·")l'.; .J�
U:!-'
..J 4Y::. y
�

435 Madina
Daniya

435

436

Mayurqa

Denia

?

[Denia]

?

Madina
Daniya

�

YJ ..JIY
o.l.:>.J ..iii
..J 4Y::. y
�
�
YJ ..JIY
o.l.:>..J..iii
..J�y:;.Y
�
�
..iii YJ ..JI Y
J_,..,.)�
..iii
�
�
YJ ..JIY
o.l.:>..J ..iii
..J 4Y::. y
�
�
Y).i...llY
o.l.:>. .J ..iii
..J�y:.Y
�

I�yfa..iil F�l..i¼..lA! r-4 .J.i.11
. ")l'.; .J��
U:!-'

4..l.J.i.11

.la...,

r'� r' L.Y
.I
u.;1o_,.JI .J:!AI
�
4..l.J.i.11
r-� rL.'11
u.;1o_,.JI .J:!Ai
�
.la...,

�_,.JI
r-� rl..'/1
u.;1o_,.JI .J:!Ai
�
r-� rL.'11
u.;1o_,.JI .J:!Ai
..iii., �_,.JI
..lA,�

r-� rl..'11
u.;1o_,.JI .J:!Ai
..iii., �_,.JI

Vives, 1325; Prieto,
204a, 204b; Canto
et al., 2241
Prieto, 205b

Supplement Prieto,
81
Vives, 1297, 1298;
Prieto y Vives,
207b, 207c; Miles,
266; BarceloAshmolean, 1.
Figures 2, 3
Prieto, 207d

..lA,�

l�yfa..iil F�,j.).):!A,! r-4 .).i.11
..:.,)l'.; .J�

r-� rL.'11
u.;1o_,.JI .J:!Ai
..iii., �_,.JI

Vives, 1296;
Campaner, p. 45;
Prieto 207a ;

..lA,�

I�yfa..iil F��i..i ¼..lA!
...Wu,

r-� rl..'/1
u.;1o_,.JI .J:!Ai
..iii., �_,.JI

Vives, 1299; Prieto,
207e; BarceloMorgenstern 2, 3

..lA,�

l�yfa..iil F...¼..lA! r-4.J.i.ll

�
r-� rL.'11
u.;1o_,.JI .J:!Ai
..iii., �_,.JI

Vives, 1300; Prieto,
208

..lA,

I�yfa..iil F�l..i ¼..lA! r-4 .).i.11

r-� rL.'11
u.;1o_,.JI .J:!Ai
..iii., �_,.JI
..lA,�

Prieto, 207f
Figure 4

401

'Ali b M u1a
·-h"d
I IIQ b ii I aID
- aw a
437 Denia
�
'ij ,Ji 'i
o.l.:>..J .ill\

,J

438

Denia

'4_y;. 'i
�

o.l.:>..J .ill\

438

Mayiirqa

I� y_fa.illl

r.

:i.l...."-:!,il� r-A.J.l!I
. ")l:j .J�
U:!-'

�

'ij ,Ji 'i
,J

402

'4_y;. 'i

I� y_fa ..iii

�
�

'i) ,Ji 'i
o.l.:>..J .ill\
....i 4_y;; 'i

r.

:i.l.... "-:!,ii� r-A .J.l!I
. ")l'.; .J '-..LJ
U!-'
-W

I� y_fa ..iii

r-

:i.l...,�... r-A .J.l!I
c:..,)l'.; .J uW

�

439

Denia

�

'ij ,Ji 'i
o.l.:>..J ..iii
,J

440

Denia

'4_y;. 'i

I� y_fa "111 F:i.l.... "-:!,ii� r-A .J.l!I
J u;'.i)l:; J t-....:i

"-:!�)

�
�

'i) ,Ji 'i
O.l.:>._J .ilJ\

I� y_fa.illl r.
:i.l.... "-:!,ii� r-A .J.l!I
...I .J Ll:!-'-!)

,J 4y;. 'i

�

440

Mayiirqa

�

'ij ,Ji 'i
o.l.:>..J ..iii
,J

441

Denia

Denia

�
�

'i) ,Ji 'i
O.l.:>._J .ilJI

,J

442

'4_y;. 'i

I� y_fa.ill\ r.
:i.l.... � .J-»"-! r-A .J.l!I
...I J Ll:!-'-!)

'4_y;. 'i

I� y_fa ..iii r.

�

�

'i) ,Ji 'i

o.l.:>._J .ill\

,J 4y;. 'i
�1¥-

Jl,!)
i'� i'L.'jl
�_,.JI Y.-4i

Vives, 1304; Prieto,
209a; BarceloMorgenstern, 11

,J.J.l!I
Jl,!)
/'� i'L.'jl
�_,.JI Y.-4i
,JJ.l!I
Jl,!)
/'� i'L.'jl
�_,.JI Y.-4i
,J.J.l!I

Jl,!J

/'� i'L.'jl
�_,.JI Y.-4i

Vives, 1308;
Niitzel, 539; Prieto,
209e
Vives, 1309; Prieto,
209f; Miles, 268;
BarceloMorgenstern, 6, 7,
8, 9; BarceloAshmolean, 10
Vives, 1305; Prieto,
209b

,J.J.l!I
Jl,!)

Vives, 1310; Prieto,
209g; Miles, 269,
270 (?), 271 (?)

I� y_fa ..iii r.
:i.l.... "-:!,ii� r-A .J.l!I

Jl,!)
i'� i'L.'il
.
�_,.JI .J:!-4i
,JJ.l!I

Vives, 1311; Prieto,
210a; Miles, 272
Figure 5

Jl,!)

Vives, 1312; Prieto,
210b.

... I

· ··1
...t;:!.)i J�

,J
'i
�1¥-

Denia

,J.J.l!I

Vives, 1307; Prieto,
209d; Miles, 267;
BarceloMorgenstern, 5

Jl,!J
/'� i'L.'jl
�_,.JI .?i

/'� i'L.'jl
�_,.JI Y.-4i

'4_y;.

443

,J.J.l!I

Vives, 1306;
Lavoix, 456; Prieto,
209c; BarceloMorgenstern, 4

:i.l.... "-:!,ii� r-A .J.l!I
.J U:!-'-!) .J lS .l.:>.I

�

'i) ,Ji 'i
o.l.:>._J .ill\

Jl,!J

/'� i'L.'jl
�_,.JI Y.-4i

I� y_fa ..iii r.
:i.l.... "-:!,ii� r-A .J.l!I
J

U:!-'-!) _J c:..,)l:j

...)

,J.J.l!I

/'� i'L.'jl
�_,.JI .);!Ai
,JJ.l!I

��..._,--..

443

Denia

...J_,..i.ll..>"-'4
'i) -ul 'i
oh_, ..iil
,u 4�'i

446

Denia

...J_,..i.ll ..>"-'4
'i) -ul 'i
oh_J ..iil
,u4�'i

Ii.I. yfa..iii F��l.l.!�.J..i.ll

...J_,..i.ll ..>"-'4
'i) -ul 'i
oh_, ..iil
...i4�y

Ii.I. yfa..iii F��l.l.!�.J..i.ll

...J_,..i.ll..>"-'4
'i) A.JI 'i
oh_, ..iil
A...!4�'i

Ii.I. yfa..iil F��l.l!�.J..i.ll

..._i_,..i.ll..>"-'4
'i) A.JI 'i
oh_, ..iil
-u4�'i

Ii.I. yfa..iii F��l.l.!�.J..i.ll
.
I
�.)

..._i_,..i.ll..>"-'4
'i) -ul 'i
oh_, ..iil
,u 4�'i

...(..)-""'-"--

..._i_,..i.ll..>"-'4
'i) -ul 'i
oh_, ..iil
...i4�y

Ii.I. yfa..iii F��l.l!�.J..i.ll

..._i_,..i.ll..>"-'4
'i) -ul 'i
oh_, ..iil
,u4�'i

Ii.I. yfa ..iii F��l.l.!�.J..i.ll

..,

···c!)

�

447

0.12-!).., ..:,.....

�

Denia

0.12-!).., c!-'-'

�

448

Denia

0.12-!) _, uW

�

449

Denia

..,�

�

447 Denia
-9?
450 Denia

-�

�

455

Denia

�

457

Denia

�

..,� ..,�

",!l.....,)

� Jc!--'

JI.,,!)

Supplement Prieto,
90

JI.,,!)

Vives, 1314; Prieto,
212a; Canto et al.,
2233-7

JI.,,!)

Vives, 1315;
Lavoix, 457; Prieto,
212b; Miles, 273,
274; Rada y
Delgado, 469
Vives, 1316; Prieto,
212c; Miles, 275,
276; BarceloMorgenstern, 13

i'"� i'"IA'il
•
0:!i-_,.JI _>.!AI
...J_,..i.ll

i'"� i'"IA'/1
0:!i-_,.J1 _>.!AI
...J..,..i.ll .

i'"� i'"IA'/1
0:!i-_,.JI .);!AI
...J_,..i.ll

JI.,,!)

i'"� i'"IA'/1
0:!i-_,.JI _>.!A I
...J_,..i.ll

JI.,,!)

i'"� i'"IA'/1
0:!i-_,.JI _>.!AI
...J_,..i.ll

JI.,,!)

i'"� i'"IA'/1
0:!i-_,.JI _>.!AI
...J_,..i.ll

JI.,,!)

i'"� i'"IA'/1
0:!i-_,.J1 _>.!AI
...J_,..i.ll

JI.,,!)

..iii� i'"IA'/1
0:!i-_,.JI _>.!AI
...J_,..i.ll

Vives, 1317;
Lavoix, 458; Prieto,
212d; Miles, 277,
278; BarceloMorgenstern, 14,
15; Rada y Delgado,
470
Figure 6
BarceloMorgenstern, 16, 17
Vives, 1318(?);
Miles, 279; BarceloAshmolean, 18;
BarceloMorgenstern, 19
Vives, 1319;
Niitzel, 541(?);
Prieto, 2 l 2e
Prieto, 215

403

467

Denia

...JJ.lll __)1,A
'l) .JI 'x
O..l.:i..J ,li\

l�yfa.lll F-..;.. ¥1..l-! f"4 .J.lll
. - J�
(::!.Ji J u,µ...,

�\

468

468

Denia

Denia

...JJ.lll __)1,A

\�yy.-,:,.lll

F-

'xj .JI 'x

-..;.. ¥1..l-! f"4 .J.lll

O..l.:i..J .alJ\

(::!)J�J1.}...:i

�\

.._iJ.lll __)1,A
'x] .JI 'j
O..l.:i..J ,li\

�\

"-,!l..

\�yfa.lll

F-

-..;.. ¥ 1 ..l-! f"4 .J.lll
. u,µ..., J u·W

•M"-:!L.....;)J

I b 'Arb
I
M Uta
·-h"d
M u1·-h"d
-· a l -Daw a
a I s·ira.1
1
?
Segura
...o.)_A ?'14.J.lll...
cr

'x] .JI 'x
.all\
...JJ.lll

J\.;!)

.all\� i'L..)'I
l);U-4yJ I ..>.!" i
...JJ.lll

J\.;!J

.all\� /'L..)'1
l);U-4yJI ..>.!"i
...JJ.lll

J\.;!J

.all\� i'L..)'I

l);U-4yJI ..>.!"i
...JJ.lll

.l<l>�

J_,,....) �
.all\

l);U-4yJ I ..>.!" i

yk.

Vives,1320; Prieto,
216a; Miles,283,
284,285,286;
BarceloMorgenstern,20(?)
Fh1:ure 7
Vives, 1321,1322;
Prieto, 216b; Miles,
287,288,289,290,
291
Vives, 1322; Prieto,
216c
Figure 8

Supplement Prieto,
91; lbrahTm, 7

404

Appendix D
Dinars minted by the rulers of the taifa of Denia
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Appendix E
Dirhams minted in Denia in the collection of the Museo Arqueol6gico Nacional in
Madrid
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Figure 1
Hasan b. Mujahid Sa'id
al-Dawla
Denia
43?
M.A.N. III-82-2
15.15mm, 0,98gr.

Figure 2
Mujahid
Denia
435
M.A.N. III-82-6
26mm, 3.355gr.

Figure 3
Mujahid
Denia
435
M.A.N. III-82-7
21,45mm, l.9lgr.

Figure 4
Mujahid
Denia
43?
M.A.N. III-82-8
22,75mm, 3.56gr.

Figure 5
'AlI Iqbal al-Dawla
Denia
442
M.A.N. III-82-18
23.2mm, 3.87gr.

Figure 6
'AlI Iqbal al-Dawla
Denia
449
M.A.N. III-82-30
24.95mm, 3.98 l gr.

Figure 7
'AlI Iqbal al-Dawla
Denia
467
M.A.N. III-82-39
26mm, 3.777gr.

Figure 8
'AlI Iqbal al-Dawla
Denia
468
M.A.N. III-82-40
24.3mm, 4.408gr.
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Appendix F
Historiography
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To understand to which spaces, Iberian and Mediterranean, Denia belonged, and to
understand its lines of tension is also to better understand its history.

It is also to

understand to what extent exchange between Denia and Pisa, for example, was intra
cultural, if we consider that these two ports formed part of the same maritime cultural
space; it is to understand what was the contribution of this Mediterranean maritime
culture vis-a-vis the political decisions of the rulers, themselves products of a Cordovan
culture which they established within their court. Indeed, should Denia be examined
according to the precedents of Spanish or Islamic historiography, or from an Ibero
Muslim point of view, or did Denia represent a share of a Mediterranean space in
continuity or "rupture," marked by the "commercial revolution"? Lastly, how does
Denia's multiple memberships question the identity of the Mediterranean space, as well
as the historiography on the subject?
The definition of Mediterranean space has been revisited by historiography for the
ten last years, in particular under the influence of work questioning a monolithic vision of
the Mediterranean. In the same way, Spanish historiography was confronted with the
contribution of Christian, Muslim and other components to the Iberian identity, often
through new methods and intellectual approaches. Denia has rarely been treated as
belonging simultaneously to these two historiographical spaces.

To show the

Mediterranean character and implication of Denia passes thus initially by the
reinterpretation at the local level of this double identity, beyond the characteristics
hitherto developed in the historiography of the Iberian and Muslim peninsula. It also
implies a description of membership to logics of various networks. This work has thus
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profited from the clarification, on the part of other historians, of these two aspects of the
taifa of Denia.
"H!SPANITY": CONTINUITY OR RUPTURE?

The historiography of the taifa period and of Muslim Spain has generally been defined by
the research interests of Hispanists, and thus, by the stakes of Spanish cultural identity
vis-a-vis its history, as well as by the internal mechanisms of this history.

This

historiography has thus been a captive of questions of national, regional and cultural
identities. A great part of this debate concentrated indeed on the influence exerted on the
Spanish identity by the almost eight-century existence of al-Andalus, and particularly on
questions of continuity or rupture. Although the two terms are insufficiently nuanced to
express the subtleties of the debate, the question refers to the possible apprehension of the
Muslim invasion and subsequent occupation of the Iberian peninsula in 711 as a decisive
rupture in Spanish history, with the identification of the persistence of the fundamental
elements of the Spanish identity guiding research on the period of Islamic domination.
Traditional Spanish historiography of the nineteenth century regarded the Muslim
period as a parenthesis, marked by the idea of devastation due to the invasion, as well as
by the survival of a few noble Visigoths in their northern mountain refuges, nobles who
preserved their "inherent" Spanish singularity.

The Reconquista, which could

anachronistically be seen as a Hispano-Catholic variation on the principle of the
"manifest destiny," became thus the inevitable process that expelled the foreign Muslim
culture, restoring that which was native, Spanish, and Christian. Although historians
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have largely given up this interpretation, its resonance is still present in certain popular
visions of Spanish history and identity. 1
The last decades of the nineteenth century witnessed an evolution of these
opinions concerning Spain's Islamic past.

The work of Spanish historians was

supplemented by a movement of Spanish Arabists, themselves inspired by the Dutch
2
Reinhart Dozy and his Histoire des Musulmans d'Espagne, published in 1861. Authors
began to recognize and understand that the majority of the indigenous population,
whether subsequently converted or not, remained after the Muslim conquest.3 These
works, however, were also characterized by an exaggerated stress, even a glorification, of
the Christian elements that survived the Muslim domination.

This movement was

represented best by the work of Francisco Javier Simonet, whose Historia de las

mozarabes of Espana was a real effort to use a broader selection of documents in order to
study the Christian communities that remained in Islamic territory.4 Although its use of
Arabic sources was innovative, and its analyses caused a reorientation of historiography,
its interpretations remained within the limits expressed by feelings of Spanish
nationalism; its use of the term "el cautivero," the captivity, to describe the Islamic
period clearly indicates the direction of these interpretations. In his Historia, as well as
in his Glosario de voces ibericas y latinas usadas entre las Mozarabes, Simonet argued
for a strong influence of the Romano-Visigothic subjects on the dominant elite, which

1

P. Guichard,Stnictures sociales "orientales" et "occidentals" dans /'Espagne musulmane (Paris,
1977),9.
2
R. Dozy,Histoire des Musulmans d'Espagne, 2 vols., 3rd ed. (Leiden, 1881).
3
P. Guichard,Structures, 9.
4
F.J. Simonet, Historia de las Mozarabes de Espana (Madrid, 1897-1903).
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minimized the concept of rupture caused by the Islamic invasion. 5 In this way, Simonet
revalorized the "Spanish" aspect of history, and the AndalusI past was revitalized within
historiography according to the idea that AndalusI Islamic culture was in fact produced
by the indigenous Hispano-Christian population, the Ibero-Muslim culture thus having
little to do with the "oriental" influence of the invaders. 6 "This idea of an unbroken
continuity in Spanish culture from the most remote ages, including Roman, Visigothic
and Arab rule, was to become the main battle-cry of traditionalism."7
In the decades that followed historians denied even the originality of the period of
Islamic rule.

One of the great Spanish historians of the twentieth century, Ramon

Menendez Pidal, did not reject the importance of Islamic culture in Spanish history,
especially compared to what he called the decadence of the North, but delved back to its
Byzantine and even Alexandrian roots to deny its Islamic specificity. At the same time,
he continued to insist on the uniquely Hispanic nature of AndalusI Islamic culture,
incorporating it into the eternal flow of Spanish history.8
Claudio Sanchez Albornoz also supported the idea of an eternal Spain, but saw
the Islamic invasion as a defining moment in Spanish history. Sanchez Albomoz's
decidedly nationalistic, and sometimes even racialistic, tendencies led him to decry the
devastating effects of the Muslim conquest, claiming that it deviated his "fatherland from
its true course" as one of the great nations of Europe.9 For Sanchez Albornoz, the only
effects of Islamic civilization were the reactions of the homo hispanus against the
5
6

P. Guichard, Structures, 10.

J. Monroe, Islam and the Arabs in Spanish Scholarship (Sixteenth Century to the Present) (Leiden,

1970), 100.
7
J. Monroe, Islam, 100.
8
J. Monroe, Islam, 252.
9
C. Sanchez Albornoz, Espana y el Islam (Buenos Aires, 1946), 14-15.
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occupation, leading to an increased warlike spirit and intensified religious intolerance.
The culture and essence of Spain were thus untouched. 10
In a debate that characterized Spanish historiography throughout much of the
twentieth century, Sanchez Albornoz's interpretations were contested by another Spanish
medievalist, America Castro. Castro was the first Spanish historian to argue for an active
dialogue among the Muslims, Christians and Jews of the Spanish Middle Ages, and that
the interaction between these three "castes" produced a distinctly new identity. He
argued for a total Arabization of the indigenous Iberian population, without denying that
the unique character of AndalusT Islamic culture was shaped in part by pre-existing
characteristics. 11
Although Castro's contribution to this debate was significant, it did not succeed in
dissipating the traditionalist belief that the Islamic invaders had little to no influence on
the essential core of Spanish culture or even on its ethnicity. Insisting on the numerical
inferiority of the invading forces, as well as the relatively recent, and so unstable, Islamic
conversion of most the Berber soldiers, historians argued for a rapid integration through
inter-marriage with indigenous women and alliances with local nobility. In this way, the
dominant elite superficially imposed its religion and language, but was quickly
"digested" by the numerically superior, and "racially pure," subjugated levels of society.
"From an ethnic, cultural and linguistic point of view, the lower social levels continued to
be the same as before, without any substantial alteration." 12

J. Monroe, Islam, 258.
J. Monroe, Islam, 259-60.
12
A. Garcia y Bellido, La peninsula iberica en los comienzos de su historia (Madrid, 1953), 59 (cited by
P. Guichard, Structures, I 3).
10

11

417
One the most curious examples of this interpretation was the book Les Arabes

n 'ont jamais envahi l 'Espagne by Ignacio Olague. Olague claimed that Spain was in fact
never invaded, that the various historical accounts of the invasion were attempts to
provide a satisfactory explanation for the slow and chaotic conversion of Hispano-Arian
society to Islam. 13 As absurd as this theory may sound, it was not without its supporters,
and is only a slight exaggeration of the theories of a strong cultural and ethnic continuity
between pre- and post-Islamic Spain.

PIERRE GUICHARD AND THE CASA DE VELAZQUEZ: THE BERBERS OF AL-ANDALUS AND
THE STRUCTURES OF SETTLEMENT

Although he was not the first to oppose these exaggeratedly continuist theories, Pierre
Guichard's work has been the most controversial contribution to the debate. Rather than
concentrating on Spain as a whole, Guichard's work has centered on the Spanish Levant,
or Sharq al-Anda/us. Beginning with an article published in 1969, Guichard sidestepped
any refusals of the rupture of the Islamic conquest, directing the debate into a completely
different realm. 14

Using the techniques that would characterize his work for the

following decades, Guichard studied not only the Arabic sources traditionally applied to
the subject, but also employed post-Reconquista documents as well as an in-depth
examination of the toponymic and onomastic evidence of the region. He thus held that
not only was the region of Valencia deeply Arabicized, but also the dominant aspect of
that process was the Berber character of the conquering settlers.

13 I. Olague, Les Arabes n 'ont Jamais envahi I 'Espagne (Paris, 1969); P. Guichard, Structures, I 3.
14 P. Guichard, "Le peuplement de la region de Valence aux deux premiers siecles de la domination
musulmane," Melanges de la Casa de Velazquez, 5 (1969): 104-157.
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Guichard's article went relatively unnoticed until the 1976 publication of his AlAnda/us: Estructuras antropol6gica de una sociedad islamica en Occidente and the

subsequent French edition Structures sociales "orientales" et "occidentales" dans
l'Espagne musulmane (hereafter Structures) in 1977.15 The foundation of Guichard's

working thesis was therein laid out, forming the base from which he, along with a team of
researchers from the Casa de Velazquez, would develop their theories on the structure
and settlement of Islamic society in the Sharq al-Anda/us.
Guichard's approach to the subject was typical of the French Anna/es school,
through a variety of historical and research tools he sought a global image of the
situation, collaborating with, among others, the archeologists Andre Bazzana and Patrice
Cressier. In Structures, however, Guichard's approach was mainly anthropological, or
ethnological. Like many students of the Anna/es school, his work was heavily influenced
by structuralism, notably that of the French anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss, and he
proposed an application of ethnological schemas to compare the indigenous social
structures to those imported by the Arab and Berber conquerors. He described the
indigenous "Occidental" culture as one based on the couple, bilinear, and whose family
lines lack firmness. Marriage practices tend towards exogamy and the circulation of
women, while wealth and honor ease and signify social success. In this society, there is
no rigorous separation between the sexes and women seem to play some kind of public
role. "Oriental" culture, on the other hand, is segmentary, patrilineal, and endogamous.
It lacks a central power, and bases its internal political organization on territorial groups
and family lineage.
15

Clan integrity and cohesion are protected through endogamous

P. Guichard, Al-Anda/us: Estructuras antropologica de una sociedad islamica en Occidente
(Barcelona, 1976); P. Guichard, Structures.
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marriages (the ideal marriage is between a son and his uncle's daughter). Women are
strictly excluded from public life and the sexes are separated.16
Using these two models Guichard attempted to define the nature of the structure
that prevailed in al-Andalus. During the first four chapters, Guichard remained within
the framework of "Occidental" and "Oriental," and showed quite determinedly that
Muslim Spain was characterized by tribal groups, separation of the sexes, and honor
based on the person rather than possession or rank. He also showed that the invading
forces were much larger than previously estimated and that their families accompanied
them.

Guichard concluded that there were few reasons to accept the traditionalist

hypothesis, that the patrilineal and endogamous structure of the invaders' society negated
the effects of intermarriage with indigenous women.17 Islamic Spain marked a rupture
with the past and was the result of the structures imported by the conquering Muslim
forces.
Guichard's findings were indeed conclusive, but it was the hypothesis presented
m the second half of Structures that would establish his reputation. Building on the
toponymic and onomastic evidence already presented, Guichard expanded on the Berber
hypothesis introduced in his 1969 article "Le peuplement de Valence ...." The invasion is
placed first within the context of the general economic and demographic decline of the
early Middle Ages. Specifically, Guichard argued for an abandonment of the Spanish
Levant by the Romano-Visigothic inhabitants, and a shifting of communication routes
from the eastern coast towards the plateaus of the interior. This, coupled with the
relatively large contingent of Berber warriors that Guichard estimated accompanied the
16 P. Guichard, Structures, 19.
17 P. Guichard, Structures, 175-6.
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Arab leaders of the expedition helps to explain his argument for an early, intense Berber
settlement of the Sharq al-Andalus. 18 This theory went against not only the traditionalist
view of the Muslim presence, but also challenged the equally traditional account of the
occupation in which the richer coastal plains were settled by Arab groups while the
Berbers were pushed into the barren mountainous regions of the interior. Faced with an
indigenous population in decline, both numerically and socio-politically because of the
"pre-feudal" evolutions resulting from the disintegration of Visigothic authority, the
"strong structures" of the Berbers enabled them to dominate and redefine the east
AndalusI landscape.19 The Sharq al-Anda/us then was transformed and determined by
the structuring agnatic, endogamous, and clannish characteristics of the Berber tribes that
settled the region, producing a segmentary, tribalized society.
The basis for Guichard's arguments in Structures was largely textual, leaving
aside material culture, in keeping with his training as a historian. In addition to historical
texts, however, Guichard also made important use of the region's toponymy, showing
that place names reflected the socially organizing patrilineal structures of those who had
settled the region. The best evidence for this is the high concentration of tribal toponyms
with the prefix Beni (from Banu, "descendant of' in Arabic) plus a marker derived from a
specific Berber or Arab clan or confederation. Benicasim, for example, is derived from
Banu Qasim, an important Berber group from northern Morocco.20 Such places names

are common in Algeria and Morocco, but also in southeastern Spain.

18 P. Guichard, Structures, 349.
19 P. Guichard, Structures, 193,203.
20 J.L. Boone and N.L. Benco, "Islamic settlement in North Africa and the lberian Peninsula," Annual
Review ofAnthropology, 28 (1999): 63; T. F. Glick, From Muslim Fortress to Christian Castle (New York,
I 995), 31.
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Over the next twenty years, however, his original thesis would be integrated into
an intensive research campaign that relied heavily on a close juxtaposition of textual and
material evidence. In addition, Structures had concentrated on the first three centuries of
Islamic rule, whereas his subsequent research, in close conjunction with the newly
formed Casa de Velazquez research team "Islam d'Occident. Peuplement, habitat et
culture materielle" with Andre Bazzana and Patrice Cressier, attempted to analyze the
structure of society and settlement throughout the entire period of Muslim rule, extending
even into the first years of post-Reconquista Valencia.
This expansion towards material culture and settlement patterns was neither a
spontaneous nor an isolated undertaking. In 1973, Pierre Toubert had published what
was to become one of the most innovative works on history in the latter half of the
twentieth century. In Les structures du Latium medieval, Toubert introduced the concept
of incastellamento that shifted attention from castles as objects to the space delimited by
them. 21

Toubert questioned the uniquely military-strategic function of the castle,

showing castle placement and space to be a product of a civilization, an integral part of
the social, cultural, and political structures of that civilization. Far from being an isolated
phenomenon, the theories of incastellamento were applied throughout Western Europe
and the Mediterranean. In addition to the research conducted by the Casa de Velazquez,
Toubert's hypothesis served, for example, as the founding principle for the international
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P. Toubert, Les structures du latium medieval. Le latium meridional et la Sabine du IX' siecle a la fin
du Xlf siecle (Rome 1973).
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archeology congress senes Castrum co-sponsored by the Casa de Velazquez and the
'

Ecole frarn;;aise de Rome.22
One of the major components of Toubert's incastellamento theory was the use of
"extensive archeology." This new technique was based on space, not sites, and therefore
differed from stratigraphic archeology, in which a thorough, in-depth, and costly dig is
carried out on a site.

Extensive archeology uses detailed terrain observation, aerial

photography interpretation, and methodical gathering of surface materials such as
ceramics to provide a global view of the logic and dynamics of rural settlement over a
large area. 23
Guichard's concentration on rural settlement patterns of Islamic Valencia was
thus not "parochial," but situated within a larger historiographical context. This does not
diminish, however, the impact that his work had on Spanish historiography. Structures
and Guichard's subsequent work provoked a debate that shifted historians' attention from
the "Pan-Hispanic" political history favored under the Franco regime to the study of rural
settlement patterns: "as drastic or polar a change as one could possibly conceive in
historical research."24
Over the course of the next fifteen years, Guichard's theory evolved into a
complex model and explanation of society and settlement in the Sharq al-Anda/us. An
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essential part of the theory behind this model was that of a tributary society. In 1974, the
Catalan historian and archeologist Miquel Barcelo introduced the community of Spanish
history to the works of Samir Amin, a French-trained, Egyptian, neo-Marxist social
scientist and his theories of economic development. 25 From a social-political point of
view, this tributary formation was organized around two principles: a state structure and
local rural communities, the relation between the two being based on the collection of
taxes. This model was particularly important in that it helped historians to distinguish
Andalus1 society from a feudal society in which a "noble" social class holds rights over
land and disrupts the direct relation between a state-controlled organization and the
majority of the population.26
Although it had not yet begun in earnest, Guichard's work on the rural settlement
patterns of Islamic Valencia predated the publication of Structures. The first in a long
series of articles and books co-published with the French archeologist Andre Bazzana
was presented at an archeology colloquium in Palermo in 1974. 27 The article, entitled
simply, "Recherche sur les habitats musulmans du Levant espagnol," placed Guichard's
theories on Berber settlement within an archeological context, setting the stage for his
and Bazzana's subsequent studies.
Over the next fifteen years, Bazzana and Guichard produced a corpus of work that
archeologically demonstrated that the Sharq al-Anda/us was a segmentary tribal society
25
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functioning under a tributary government organization.28 They showed that the rural
Muslim settlements in the plains and mountains were organized into vast, stable, and
2
coherent territories, measuring between 50 and 80 km . Within these territories, small

alquerias (from the Arabic qarya, pl. qurii) or farms were inhabited by free peasant
farmers who owned their land. Each of these territories had a perched fortification, or

/:zi$n (pl. /:zu$-iin), that served as both refuge and habitat. According to Guichard, these
/:zu$-iin were strictly defensive installations that served as refuge in the event of troubles.
The occasional qii 'id, or military administrator, present in these castles was a direct
representative of the government, and is in no way to be seen as a feudal figure. The

/:zu$-iin were horizontal in nature, rather than vertical, in keeping with traditional Berber
architecture. They also consisted of three elements: the celoquia or central rudimentary
dwelling for temporary residence; the central wall; and the albacar, a fortified open space
on the lower edges of the /:zi$n where the majority of the population would gather. The
village communities were relatively autonomous vis-a-vis the urban centers and were
themselves responsible for the construction of rudimentary collective fortifications in the
form of large walled refuges called albacars, often associated with the /:zu$-iin.29 These
rural settlements were thus "collective tribalized communes."
This interpretation of autonomous, collective rural communities and fortifications
escaping direct governmental control refuted any ideas of a feudalistic society. Guichard,
in fact, rejected any interpretation that could be construed (or even misconstrued) as
feudalistic. This explains in part his refusal to see the /:zi$n as anything other than a
28 See bibliography for both individual and collective publications by A. Bazzana and P. Guichard.
29 Ph. Senac, "Le Chateau dans I 'al-Andalus : bilan et perspectives de la recherche franr;aise," Melanges

de la Casa de Velazquez, 29.1 (1993): 176.
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community based construction, excluding any possibility of their having been used by
local independent powers. This refusal is at the base of most contentions between
Guichard and his more reconcilable critics, such as Rafael Azuar Ruiz.
Guichard's interpretation also went against the traditional notion of an urban-based
Islamic system. Prior to the incastellamento movement, historians considered Islamic
fortifications to be the result of an urban power, intended to survey and protect maritime
and terrestrial frontier zones. Not only did this approach reduce rural fortifications to a
uniquely military function, but it also relied heavily on the traditional cultural model in
which the madina was the dominant, structuring element of Muslim society.30 While this
interpretation was perhaps accurate elsewhere in the Muslim world, it was principally the
result of the nature of Islamic sources. As an explanation of this, the French Islamicist,
Claude Cahen, wrote that:
This civilization is fundamentally urban: not that the majority of people do not live
off of the earth, even during moments of maximum commercial expansion, but
because the city is the seat of all institutions ... and as a result the literature that we
depend on is a town literature that scorns or forgets peasants, or is only interested in
them in so much as they bring in supplies, taxes and rents.31
Thus, Arabist historians relying uniquely on textual sources had produced a model of
Islamic society in which "the l:zi$n as well as the villages and settlements were related to
the state, and their psycho-social context was the defining network of small and large
cities."32 In this system, the l:zu$i"m acted as seats for the military or administrative
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governor appointed by the central ruler, and the albacars served to stock taxes paid in
kind.
The culmination of Guichard and Bazzana's work on the rural fortifications came
with the 1988 publication of Les Chateaux ruraux d'al-Andalus. 33 In Chateaux, Bazzana
and Guichard's work on Valencia was complemented by that of another member of the
Casa de Velazquez research team, Patrice Cressier, applying the same extensive
archeology techniques in Andalusia. Chateaux provided a forum in which the authors
could address the critiques leveled at their theories and explicate, with detailed examples,
their "paradigm" of rural settlement. They insisted on the fact that the role of the burun
was not purely military, and that they were not necessarily the seat of a feudal,
seigniorial, or governmental official. The bu$iin were more the link to the needs of the
rural, unfortified, and open qura. The authors refuted any idea that the bu$itn were part
of a frontier network, arguing that frontiers did not affect in any way their general
organization.

The distribution of rural fortifications in the region of Valencia and

Andalusia seemed independent of both the need to survey roads and also of any
imperatives that might have been imposed by the existence of a frontier. The network
was at its densest where human settlements were more numerous and sparser towards the
political and military limits to the north.34
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In his Maisons d'al-Andalus (hereafter Maisons), Bazzana also evokes this
possibility of a shared Mediterranean tradition. 35

Like Guichard's Musulmans de

Valence, Maisons was Bazzana's dissertation for the doctoral d'etat, which often
represents over fifteen years of research, and while Guichard's dissertation was, like
Structures, largely text and document based, Mazsons represented a uniquely
archeological dissertation. Although Bazzana referred the reader to previous works, such
as Chdteaux, for details of the bi$n paradigm, his objective was to show "that material
culture, rural landscape, habitat structure - from the bi$n macrostructure to the familial
habitation microstructure - could also provide proof' of the segmentary Berberized
society of the Sharq al-Anda/us: "The results of the archeological investigation led me to
vigorously underline the indirect 'Oriental' influence that al-Andalus received; the
MaghribT screen had modified the contributions of the Arabic and Omayyad Middle
East. "36
Another area that has served to illustrate the segmentary tribalized society of the
Sharq al-Anda/us is irrigation.

Although the French school has not been the most

influential in irrigation studies, they understood early on the implications that irrigation
patterns could have for their models. Karl Wittfogel established the traditional view of
irrigation systems in his 1957 book Oriental Despotism. 37 Wittfogel explained that the
existence of complex irrigation systems indicated centralized political systems.

The

control of water imposed both economic and social constraints; large irrigation projects
demanded equally large funding and a large mobilization of labor, neither of which are
35

A. Bazzana, Maisons d'a/-Andalus. Habitat medieval et structures du peuplement dans l'Espagne
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possible without a strong centralized and bureaucratic authority. Wittfogel considered
then that Muslim Spain, being a highly irrigated region, was one of these "hydraulic
societies." Subsequent study has shown that Wittfogel 's theories do tend to be correct for
large irrigation projects involving large rivers and seasonal flooding.

They are not,

however, as applicable in the case of smaller, localized systems and semi-arid regions.38
The American archeologist Thomas Glick was one of the first to question
Wittfogel's theories in the case of Muslim Spain. He showed that nothing indicated that
the Valencian irrigation systems had been created during the Muslim occupation and that
Muslim Spain could be characterized as an "oriental despotism" only under the seventy
odd years of the Caliphate. 39

Glick's work helped to redirect the debate from the

chronology to the relations between irrigation and the social-political system.40 Glick
was, in fact, one of the early critics of Guichard's segmentary society, although not the
most vehement.

In his more recent publications, however, he admits having been

convinced both by the overall logic of the system, and by newer evidence being produced
by the next generation of historians.41
Andre Bazzana built on Glick's work and included irrigation systems in his study
of the Valencian region.

Guichard also uses toponymic markers of irrigation sites,

alongside those of rural settlements to illustrate the rupture between the end of Antiquity
and the beginnings of the Muslim occupation, an attestation of the large-scale Berber

38 T.F. Glick, From Muslim Fortress to Christian Castle, 67.
39 T.F. Glick, Irrigation and Society in Medieval Valencia (Cambridge, MA, 1970), 172-4.
40 A. Bazzana and P. Guichard, "Irrigation et societe dans l'Espagne orientale au Mayen Age," in

L 'Homme et l'eau en Mediterranee et au Proche Orient, I, ed. J. Metral and P. Sanlaville (Lyon, 1981),
120.
41 T.F. Glick, From Muslim Fortress to Christian Castle, xvii.
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migration. 42 Archeologically, Bazzana discussed in several articles, as well as in his
Maisons, the similarities between Valencian and North African irrigation systems,
especially techniques. 43 Patrice Cressier, whose work in the extreme southeast of Spain
has produced many of the same results, has seconded Guichard in this analysis. 44
Bazzana and Guichard demonstrated that some technology used was typical of
segmentary communities, although in the process they made a distinction between
"rudimentary" and "complex" systems that has been criticized by even their own
supporters.45 The distinction opposed elementary designs by peasants to the presumably
complex river-fed systems of the Valencian huerta.

Mateu and Barcelo have both

remarked that there are not necessarily qualitative differences between the two systems.46
Despite this criticism, the most adamant use of irrigation systems to support the
Guichard theory is that of Miquel Barcelo, whose work concerns primarily the Balearic
Islands. The Catalan archeologist and historian was present from the beginning as a
supporter of Guichard's theories, and probably played no small role in their formulation;
Barcelo translated Samir Amin's work into Spanish and was also the editing director of
Barra!, the publisher of the Spanish edition of Guichard's Structures. Barcelo's work
42
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echoes Guichard's in that he makes extensive use of toponyms to demonstrate the
segmentary and tribal nature of Islamic Majorcan society, advocating the Berber theories
of Guichard. His work differs however, in that it is highly archeological, much more so
than Guichard's. Barcelo argued early on that the documentary sources were insufficient
and that simple inventories of place names and techniques are not meaningful in
themselves. He has also called for a maximum integration of the "human irrigators" into
the analyses, criticizing any efforts to reduce irrigation systems to "technological units.',47
Moreover, Barcelo maintained that if the l:,,u�iin were not the result of an official state
policy, their study could not then explain the political structures of society; in addition,
the differentiation between rural fortifications produced by rural elements, and those
representing the interests of the state, differentiation often ignored in Guichard's work,
should be noted. 48
Thus, it was m their total negation of a state presence in these segmentary
structures, using l:,,u�iin as illustrations, that Guichard and its partisans provoked the most
disputes.

Among these critics, Arabists were most vehement, their uniquely textual

approach presenting the country as subjected to the urban world. The most enthusiastic
of these critics was Mikel de Epalza, professor of Arabic at the University of Alicante,
who, often with his colleague Maria Jesus Rubiera Mata, countered Guichard through a
series of articles and publications, defending his vision of an urban Islamic society.49
Epalza maintained that Al-Andalus "was an urban and urbanized space, with agricultural
zones always dependent on the cities," considering that "this new perverse
47 M. Barcel6, "El disefio", 176 (a reprint of a 1983 article).
48 M. Barcel6, "Los buJfm, los castra y los fantasmas que at'.m los habitan," Castillos y territorio en a/
Anda/us, ed. A. Malpica (Granada, 1998), 13, 17-18.
49 See bibliography for Epalza's and Rubiera Mata's publications.
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historiographical tendency" was a rejection of the "fundamentally urban institutions of
Arabic-Islamic society."50 Epalza refused the tribalized and segmentary nature of the
network of the l:,u�iin proposed by Guichard and his partisans, in particular proposing a
different interpretation for the toponyms. He intensely defended the traditional vision of
an Islamic society within which the fortifications extended along borders and roads
structured by a policy of State, portraying the albacars as storage places for taxes paid in
kind, i.e. rural tribute towards the centers of urban power. This interpretation, mainly
based on the information provided by contemporary Arabic documents and texts, clearly
illustrates the remarks of Claude Cahen on the urban focus of these same sources. Thus,
it appears impossible to reconcile the two models, segmentary and tribalized on the one
hand, and urban and politicized on the other, each one dependent on the methodology
employed, without the support of the two approaches, both material and documentary.
Rafael Azuar Ruiz, director of the archeological museum of Alicante, following
the evolution of his theories on the phenomena of settlement in Sharq Al-Andalus, offers
a middle ground between theses interpretations. Following the analyses advanced by
Barcel6's research team, in particular by Helena Kirchner, and according to the idea of
the fiscal pressures as a driving force in the evolutions of settlement suggested by
Guichard, Azuar Ruiz described the structure of settlement in Sharq Al-Andalus as
tribalized and independent, but related to the State and the urban centers by strong
bonds.51 Thus, according to the historical evolution of the sites, Azuar noted that the

50
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fortifications related to settlement sites were in fact the expressions of a State seeking to
impose a fiscal structure on a network that was dissociated from it. As we will see, this
"historicizing" approach is better adapted to the analysis of the fifth/eleventh century,
recognizing a role, both reactive and active, for the state. Thus, this reading makes it
possible to include the influence of rulers on settlement changes in their taifa, as well as
their restructuration of the taifa in response to these changes and the reaffirmation of its
place in the Western Mediterranean.

THE TAIFA PERIOD

If the questions of identity and societal structures have benefited from intense and
profitable debates, the taifa period has received an incomplete treatment.

Reinhardt

Dozy's Histoire de des Musulmans d'Espagne was certainly innovating in its nineteenthcentury context, and it is true that the author dedicated one of the four books to the "small
sovereigns," but, as Levi-Provern;:al noted in 1950, the work appeared out-of-date, for
lack of "rationalism," or its anecdotal treatment of events, and especially because of the
later discovery of texts which renewed knowledge on Muslim Spain.52 Given the interest
of his studies relating to previous centuries, precisely using these new sources that he
himself had often discovered, it is regrettable that Levi-Provenc;;al could not supplement

C. Laliena Corbera and J.F. Utrilla Utrilla (Zaragoza, 1998), 29-44; R. Azuar Ruiz, "Fortificaciones de
taifas en el Sharq al-Andalus," in Castillos y territorio en al-Anda/us, 116-140; R. Azuar Ruiz, "Ciudades y
territorios en el Sharq al-Andalus," in Ciudad y territorio en al-Anda/us, ed. L. Cara (Granada, 2000), 47199.
52 R. Dozy, Histoire des Musulmans d'Espagne, jusqu 'a la conquete de l'Andalousie par !es Almoravides
(711-1110), 3 vols., new ed. E. Levi-Provenc;:al (Leiden, 1932); E. Levi-Provenc;:al, Histoire de l'Espagne
musulmane, t. 1 (Paris, 1950), viii-ix.
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his own Histoire d'Espagne musulmane with the fourth volume planned for the taifa
period.
Indeed, the historian of this period long had to be satisfied with the introduction
provided by the Spanish numismatist Antonio Prieto y Vives for his study on the
monetary emissions of the reyes de taifas, which in fact gives only a rudimentary analysis
in support of the numismatic part of the work. 53 It was only with the publication of the
David Wasserstein's University of Oxford thesis in 1985 that a historian undertook to
examine the taifa period thoroughly. 54 Wasserstein's approach was typical of historians
of al-Andalus, in that his analyses started from a strictly Ibero-Muslim point of view, and
the book thus concentrated on the taifas that bad a policy and history at the heart of these
issues. The Rise and Fall of the Party Kings is a political history of the taifas, and the
examined aspects are exclusively dependent on that theme. Economic history, especially
out of the Iberian framework, is not treated there, and the taifas outside of the circles of
the former Cordovan power receive less attention less than those that sought to
appropriate that power. Moreover, because of historiography on the subject, Wasserstein
followed the structures of the debate on ethnic divisions between the taifas and the
importance of these divisions within the policies of the taifas, which then limited his
margin of movement in the interpretation of their internal and external relations.
Likewise, his later work on the political institution of the AndalusI caliphate remains in
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this political field, as announced by the title.
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The chapter on Mujahid al-'AmirI,

although innovative in its treatment of legitimacy through documentary sources and
numismatics, offers nothing beyond this political and AndalusT framework.
Following this same Ibero-Muslim model, Peter Scales concentrated on the fitna,
the civil war that marked the years between the fall of the 'Amirid regime in 399/1009
and the end of the caliphate of Cordova in 422/1031. 56 This period is among the most
complicated and inscrutable of the history of al-Andalus, and Scales' work is an
important tool for the historian of the period because of the clearness of its chronology, as
well as its critical presentation of the sources and their contents. However, the author's
analysis is also almost strictly political, sometimes integrating social aspects into the
spheres of the Iberian elite, and, like Wasserstein, treats outlying zones only in their
relations with the center. Denia is granted a place in the geography of the subject, but
only because of the importance of its ruler, Mujahid al-' AmirT, among the Saqiiliba, and
this only compared to the other members of the 'Amirid faction. The subject is not easily
adaptable to an opening on the Mediterranean, especially from a political point of view,
but the absence of economic aspects and especially of the sea in his analyses on the
coastal taifas is regrettable. Scales is in some respects a prisoner of his sources, because,
like the work of Maria Jesus Rubiera Mata, The Fall of the Caliphate of Cordoba is that
of an Hispanist-Arabist, and although he tries to show the limits of his sources, especially
concerning the role which they assign to the Berbers in the disintegration of the caliphate,
his point of view remains limited by the geographical framework of his authors.
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Specifically for our subject, one can wonder why Scales does not lend more importance
to the role of the revival of the Mediterranean and the implication of the coastal cities in
the early fragmentation of these zones at the beginnings of the fitna.
One of the more innovative subjects in recent historiography on Muslim Spain is
legitimacy.

This approach to the policy of the Umayyads, then taifa rulers, has

contributed greatly to the comprehension of their motivations as well as their actions.
Certain historians have shown that the construction of an ideology of legitimacy dictated
by the expectations of the Muslim Iberian and Mediterranean worlds was one of the
major concerns for the Umayyad, 'Amirid, and then taifa regimes. Gabriel Martinez
Gros has demonstrated the importance of ideological construction through literary
sources for the caliphal period, using authors who wrote in support of the Umayyads,
whether during the caliphate, or nostalgically under the taifas. 57 His study testifies to the
language and the symbols that these authors used in their search either to establish the
legitimacy of the Umayyad caliphate of Cordova, or to deplore the perceived absence of
this legitimacy in the taifa period. More recently, and thoroughly, the Italian Arabist
Bruna Soravia masterfully showed the importance of the discourse of legitimacy for the
Ibero-Muslim historian Ibn l:Iayyan, and how this structured his account of Umayyad and
taifa Spain. 58 Janina Safran has also examined the symbolism of legitimate power under
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the Umayyad caliphate, succinctly connecting literary production, court ceremony and
external and domestic politics under the light of legitimacy. 59
Denia's importance in post-Umayyad al-Andalus was such that sufficient
secondary works concerning the taifa are available to aid in interpreting its history.
Although three monographs have been written on Denia, there is still substantial work to
be done on the subject. These works are Ibero-centric in their interpretation, leaving
aside Mediterranean aspects while neglecting the social and economic history of the taifa.
The canon Roque Chabas' work must be placed at the heart of the Valencian

renaixenr:;a, a movement that sought to defend an idea of regional autonomy vis-a-vis the
centralizing forces of the dominant Hispano-Castilian culture. Indeed, at the end of the
nineteenth century, faced with a Spanish historiography that sought to define the Spanish
nation by its history, a group of historians, although more conservative that their Catalan
counterparts, worked to "save" Valencian history. 60 It is in relation to this movement that
it is necessary to interpret not only Chabas' 1874 Historia de la ciudad ofDenia, but also
his other efforts, in particular his journal of Valencian history entitled El Archivo. 61
Chabas' work was thus limited in its vision to the geographical framework of the region,
or at best of the peninsula.

The objective of demonstrating regional importance or

specificity placed the taifa in a regional, not Iberian nor Mediterranean, point of view.
His history of Denia, from antiquity to modern times, devotes few chapters to the
Muslim history of Denia, and even less to that of the taifa. Likewise, the articles of El

Archivo address little of the Muslim history of the area. These limits to Chabas' work
59 J.M. Safran, The Second Umayyad Caliphate (Cambridge, 2000).
60 P. Ruiz Torres, "Nationalism and the Science of History in the Representation of the Valencian Past,"
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come partly owing to the fact that the canon learned Arabic late in life, and this only
partially. 62 The historian thus had to limit himself to either published translations or
those that he could get through his contacts in the university world of the time. In spite
of this, Chabas made a noticeable effort to include the Muslim presence in his regional
studies, to the point of undertaking a laborious training in Arabic. His history of Denia,
despite his lack of university training, shows a concern for veracity, as well as a positivist
approach which could only improve knowledge on the subject; thus the documentary
analysis is augmented as much as possible with lapidary, archeological, and numismatic
sources. In spite of these efforts, the scale of Chabas' analysis is inevitably reduced.
Limited to Latin and translated Arab sources, it could only present an incomplete version
of this history, and this at the time when, under the same nationalizing impetus that the
Valencian renaixenr;a sought to counter, Arabic Iberian sources began to appear in the
collection of the Bibliotheca Arabico-Hispana in Madrid. These publications, in addition
to later discoveries and editions of sources, rendered much of Chabas' analyses
incomplete and sometimes even incorrect. Moreover, in spite of his efforts and concerns,
Chabas was a product of his time, and probably of his vocation. His history of Denia,
thus, transmitted the mistrust and even the scorn of nineteenth-century Spain for the
Muslim world, especially with regard to the fragmented structures of post-caliphal al
Andalus.
In 1961 Clelia Sarnelli Cerqua published, in Arabic, her thesis at the University of
Cairo on Mujahid al-'AmirT. 63 Like her article three years later, Sarnelli Cerqua's work
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concentrated on the literary aspects of the Denia court.
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The author used many Arabic

texts, of which several were then unpublished, to build her narration of the history of the
taifa. This narration was used to examine the intellectual and literary life of the taifa in
its political context m relation to the other taifas.

Although this regrouping of

information relating to Denia is useful, the work sometimes lacks analysis and
detachment vis-a-vis the sources, and is satisfied in transmitting details. Moreover, the
bibliography and the citations sometimes lack professional standards that could have
made its use more practical.
Regrettably, a lack scientific rigor also characterizes the Maria Jesus Rubiera
Mata's book, La Taifa de Denia, which remains, nevertheless, relevant for this study. 65
Although Rubiera Mata consulted what seems to me to be the near totality of the sources
treating the Iberian aspects of the taifa, its bibliography is rudimentary, and citations are
non-existent. This lack of scientific method sometimes makes the verification of the
author's assertions impossible, and frustrates the reader. Notwithstanding, the author
arranges the many Arab sources in a manner to make an often obscure history coherent.
Rubiera Mata thus reports the political history of the taifa in preparation for the final
section of the book on the literary culture of Denia in which she briefly introduces the
various figures that made Denia a focal point of the AndalusT intellectual world in the
fifth/eleventh century. The author demonstrates the relation that existed between political
power and this literary court, although she does not push this analysis as far one might
wish. Indeed, Rubiera Mata avoids problems such as the legitimacy of power, sometimes
64
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evoking them, but generally being satisfied with a simple description of the events or a
literary work. Moreover, La Taifa de Denia is limited to the strictly Arabo-Iberian
aspects of this history, and thus did not use more Mediterranean Arab sources, not to
mention Latin or non-documentary sources. This treatment of the subject is somewhat
surprising given that the author's introduction states that the taifa's interest comes
precisely from its international nature. 66 The absence of the social or economic history of
the taifa is also regrettable, although both are difficult to treat with only literary or
narrative sources. La Taifa de Denia can thus only be a synthesis of the political history
of the taifa.
Indeed, whether for Muslim Spain, the taifas, or especially for Denia,
historiography has for the most part been sequestered by the limits of a political
geography which does not answer the reality of the facts. Although the different studies
do describe the failed conquest of the island of Sardinia and Mujahid al-' Amiri can be
sure of his reputation as prince of the pirates from the Christian chronicles to
contemporary historians, Denia and its history, however, remain too often fixed in an
Iberian context that contains only one part of the elements necessary to understand them.

THE MIDDLE SEA

The Mediterranean is its own subject, generating volumes of analyses and history. It is
also used as framework of studies or as a reference for its littorals. However, as a
definition or framework, the Mediterranean is often intangible.

The majority of

"Mediterranean" studies are in fact studies of the lands that surround this sea, with more
66 M.J. Rubiera Mata, La Taifa de Denia, 7.
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attention given to these lands and their internal histories than their relations with the
Mediterranean.67 Historians often see in this space the extension of that with which they
are most familiar. Historians of Christian Europe, the Muslim world, or the Byzantine
Empire cross and meet but their fields remain distinct. Because of this, Mediterranean
history is often regarded as "interdisciplinary," as if the historian was crossing barriers
and not simply studying an area with its own integrity.68 However, one of the principal
questions of this work is to what extent this space has a coherence, and what was Denia' s
place in that space.
Mediterranean unity seems obvious at first, and the term is so present, in popular
as well as academic cultures. However, when examined more closely, this obviousness is
not so clear. This space has no political unity and this for seventeen centuries, since the
division of the Roman Empire under Diocletian. It is true that Roman domination left
cultural, legal or archeological traces, but those alone do not unify. Linguistically, there
are dozens of languages from completely different families spoken on its coasts, while
religion is equally a factor of division, among not only Christians, Muslims and Jews, but
also within these communities.

Thus, is this Mediterranean a reality, or only an a

posteriori construction? Or worse still, is it a political and social vision of the same order
as "Orientalism," allowing historians of the Western and Northern world, "advanced" and
"various," to distinguished themselves from the south, "backwards" and "uniform?"69 In
what way, then, can we speak of Mediterranean unity?
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Forty years ago Femand Braudel published the second edition, reviewed and
expanded, of his famous La Mediterraneee et le monde mediterraneen a l 'epoque de
Philippe II, initially published in 1949. 70 Although obviously this sea and its components

had been the subject of former studies, it is with Braudel that one finds the history of the
Mediterranean, and not in the Mediterranean, a distinction later espoused by Peregrine
Holden and Nicholas Purcell and their book The Corrupting Sea. 71

Braudel clearly

introduced the defining characteristics of this space that frames his, and our, historical
study. Indeed, following his concept of the ''longue duree," Braudel structured his book
between the almost imperceptible historical phenomena, i.e. the environment, the
"moyenne duree," i.e. the institutions and the structures of society, then finally event-

driven history. Braudel enumerates in his study of the Mediterranean the qualities that
distinguish and define it, make its unity.

He bases this unity on environment and

communication.
Thus, the environment, terrain, climate and, obviously, the sea itself are
determining factors in the construction of Mediterranean unity. Broken, peninsular and
insular terrains define and delimit this space. Alongside this relief is the climate, hot and
dry in summer, warm and rainy in winter, and the vine and the olive tree mark the
traditional limits of this Mediterranean climate. From these determining characteristics,
Braudel analyzes human adaptation, how the "moyenne duree" adapted to the ''longue."
Thus, Braudel considered that the homogeneity of this climate imposed the same survival
reaction on those who lived there, that this climate created a cultural unit through
agriculture and products and thus also through the trade of these. This was to the point
7
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where a Mediterranean traveler could Journey from port to port without feeling
transplanted or expatriated.72
This homogeneity is not however as monolithic as it may appear. It is true that
the Mediterranean climate is so specific that it lends its name to six other
"Mediterranoid" climatic zones.73 However, another characteristic of this Mediterranean
is precisely the highly erratic nature of its climate, so much so that annual precipitation
averages have no sense.74 Moreover, in southern Europe within this Mediterranean,
climatologists have recognized more than twenty-two climates by degree of d ryness.75 In
addition, this heterogeneity is amplified by an exceptional variety of terrain and
topography, whose own diversity in fact distinguishes the Mediterranean. 76 It is in fact
this diversity which brings us to the Mediterranean's second defining characteristic:
communication.
In The Corrupting Sea Harden and Purcell examined to what extent
Mediterranean unity existed before the period studied by Braudel, i.e. before the sixteenth
century. Although their analyses confim1 this unity, it takes a somewhat different form
from that of Braudel. Thus, against the theory of a homogeneous climate, and so a
homogenized economy, where it would be difficult to understand the motivations of
those merchants who are so important in the Braudelien construction, Harden and Purcell
propose that of "micro-regions" distinguished by their topography, whose excesses and
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kaleidoscopic

Mediterranean, in which the structures of maritime communication overcome tendencies
towards fragmentation. 78 Holden and Purcell criticize "the almost mystical attachment"
of French historians, such as Braudel or Lucien Febvre, for the concept of routes, as well
as a perceived dualism between "ocean-going trade" and coastal traffic. Instead of this
linear vision, The Corrupting Sea presents an alternative of small interlaced and
superimposed accidental networks. 79

Despite these differences, however, the two

approaches converge on the same vision of the Mediterranean, and Harden and Purcell
espouse the "movement in space" and "quasi-organic circulation" that Braudel
describes. 80
This idea of communication and exchange so central to The Corrupting Sea
dominates so much in recent historiography that this "Mediterranean" model, that of a
zone characterized by major and transforming exchanges between different cultures, has
been used to compare areas as distant and different as the Sea of Japan, Polynesia, and
the Caribbean. 81 According to this definition, a certain Mediterranean culture must have
existed, built through the communication, while preserving the specificities of each area.
If we accept then that communication is the major characteristic of this space, we
must also ask what a suspension or reduction in this activity would mean. About what
kind of communication are we speaking? Was it motivated by economic, cultural or

F. Braudel, La Mediterranee, 216; P. Harden and N. Purcell, Corrupting Sea, 10, 24.
P. Harden and N. Purcell, Corrupting Sea, 79.
P. Harden and N. Purcell, Corrupting Sea, 144.
8
° F. Braudel, La Mediterranee, 254; P. Harden and N. Purcell, Corrupting Sea, 144.
81
D. Abulafia, "Mediterraneans," 65 and passim.

77
78
79

444

religious reasons? And what was the effect of this communication on the littoral and
bordering areas?
The medieval Mediterranean economy has occupied a position of privilege m
historiography smce the publication in

1937 of Henri Pirenne's Mahomet et

Charlemagne. 82 No study on the role of the trade in the general economic evolution of
the Early Middle Ages can be unaware of the controversy associated with Pirenne's
name. Medieval historiography is often characterized by pointed studies, but Pirenne's
work caused one of the most important debates in this field by its general theory on the
economic evolution of the Early Middle Ages. 8 3 The work is divided into two parts, the
first explaining why, up to a certain point, Roman unity had been preserved despite the
Germanic invasions.

In the second part, Pirenne advances his analyses on the

consequences of the Muslim conquests, explaining why "Islam ruptured the
Mediterranean unity that the Germanic invasions had left intact," leaving two hostile
civilizations on the banks of the Mediterranean between which there were only
exceptional communications 84 . The central topic of the book is structured around the
changes that insulated the Merovingians in the West, causing the economic separation of
the Carolingians from the Mediterranean, and thus that "without Mohammed,
Charlemagne is inconceivable."85
Pirenne's theories are historiographically important, but his work was quickly
questioned.

Some of the book's problems can be explained by its posthumous
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publication, and the fact that it was Pirenne's son, Jacques Pirenne, and his disciple
Ferdinand Vercauteren, who brought it to the public. However, even if Pirenne could not
refine his explanations before its death, the book is a rather explicit example of his
theories.86 Pirenne's work benefited from new documentation in the form of new critical
editions of sources not readily available before, but his· examples sometimes lack weight
and references. However, the criticism of Pirenne is often focused on his exaggeration
of, or his lack of attention to certain facts - in particular the effects of the Muslims on
Mediterranean trade - but such problems are inherent in the formulation of generalizing
remarks.

In addition, Pirenne was a product of his time, reproducing thus certain

analyses with which a modem historian cannot agree, in particular the glorification or the
nostalgia of the Roman, Byzantine, or Carolingian empires, especially vis-a-vis their
invaders. Following evolutions in the idea of the state and government over the course of
the nineteenth century, as well as at the beginning of the twentieth century - i.e. the
construction of the modern state - historians sometimes preferred the grandeur of empires
or kingdoms to smaller or less considerable polities.87 The result, frequently, was that
those who disturbed these states were scorned, or that the importance of minor actors was
reduced.
The idea of a Mediterranean rupture, a total stop of communications between the
West and the East stimulated innumerable studies and responses among Pirenne's critics
and disciples of Pirenne. One need only count the number of articles or books with
"Mahomet et Charlemagne" in their title to understand the importance of this debate.
86
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Robert Lopez was among the first to respond to the problems raised by Pirenne, in
particular with his article "Mohammed and Charlemagne: a revision," in which he
showed that the disappearance of the products like papyri, textiles, spices and gold was
not contemporary to the Arab expansion.88 Given the quantity and the quality of the
sources available for the period, Lopez considered that the Pirenne debate was
unsolvable, but his work over the next half century showed that while a "general
depression, as much under the Merovingians as the Carolingians, had affected trade," the
level of exchange between West and East was more important than Pirenne had
believed.89
Although Lopez's remarks are largely reserved, Maurice Lombard was
enthusiastic with respect to medieval Mediterranean exchange. In response to the theory
according to which Islam would have ruptured trade, Lombard presented Islam as the
instigator of a new Mediterranean dynamic.90 He saw the Muslim world as an enormous
common market, whose urban consumption nourished the needs for the raw materials
that the West had in abundance, such wood, iron or slaves.91 Lombard maintained that
new circuits developed to provide for these needs and that the gold received from the
East in exchange for these staples brought an economic renewal to the West. Lombard's
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work had the merit of proposing an alternative system to Pirenne's, and not just specific
criticisms. However, Lombard's system was criticized for a lack of traces, in particular
that of gold coins in the West, as well as for a lack of documentation. 92 Lombard
reproduced, in addition, the same error as Pirenne, in that he exaggerated certain facts
while neglecting others.

We see moreover, with both Lombard and Pirenne, this

tendency towards a linear interpretation of trade routes and Mediterranean exchange from
one point to another, rather than in networks, focusing on ocean-going trade as a major
indicator of Mediterranean health.
More recently, Michael McCormick's study on the ongms of the European
economy brought this subject back to the historiographical forum with innovative tools
and a quantitative and qualitative widening of sources used. 93 Like Corrupting Sea,
McCormick's work concentrated on communication as a Mediterranean indicator, in this
case of the economy, and the two books are best read as two volumes of the same unit.
Although this book addressed the problem of the early medieval European economy, and
not the Mediterranean in its entirety, it does demonstrate continuity, although somewhat
reduced, of Mediterranean communications in the Early Middle Ages.

Instead of a

rupture caused by the Islamic invasions, the deceleration, according to his analysis, was
felt as of the third century, and especially beginning with the sixth, well before the
disturbances of the seventh and eighth century.

Moreover, McCom1ick identified

through the study of trade that had hitherto been neglected, in particular that of religious
relics or slaves, the continuous even reinvigorated pulse of communications under the
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Carolingians. Moreover, we should note his use of "illicit" exchange, such as piracy or
the slave trade, in addition to "traditional" indicators of economic exchange, with both
the licit and illicit forming parts of the communicative tool that used in this study as a
major characteristic of this space.
Olivia Remie Constable's thesis described the mvers10n m the balance of
Mediterranean power, specifically in connection with the Iberian Peninsula.94 Constable
demonstrated al-Andalus' historical and historiographical isolation vis-a-vis the
Mediterranean world, especially from the moment when the Reconquista extirpated the
Iberian economy from Muslim and Mediterranean circuits, integrating it with Europe and
the Atlantic. Although her study concentrated more on the fourth/tenth to fifth/eleventh
centuries, overflowing on each side, and although Constable referred to Denia several
times, the scale of the work prevented a thorough treatment of elements evoked and often
lost in the framework of the subject. One of the major merits of Trade and Traders was
to show that, in spite of reserves or doubts on the part of several historians, it was
possible to make an economic history of this area for this time period, and this through,
and thanks to, a variety of sources offered to the historian who is ready to extend their
nets beyond the locality and the punctuality of their subject.
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